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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF

RASA AND DHVANI

IN SANSKRIT POETICS

by

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Gujarat University
Ahmedabad-9

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Dedicated to

My

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FOREWARD

It gives me great pleasure, indeed, in publishing Dr. Tapasvi S. Nandi's thesis entitled "The Origin and Development of the Theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics".

Dr. Nandi has dealt with the subject in its historical perspective which forms an interesting study in probably one of the most important theories advanced by Sanskrit literary criticism. He has shown how the theory of Vyañjanā-Rasa-Dhvani was ably established by the efforts of such ālamkārikas as Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata. Ānandvardhana's views were by and large found to be acceptable to his followers with rare exceptions, such as Kuntaka, Mahimā, Bhoja, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, etc. The Vaishnavite ālamkārikas such as Rūpa Goswamin tried to give a different colouring.

I am thankful to Dr. Nandi for agreeing to the publication of this research work which was accepted by this University for the award of the Ph.D. degree. I also wish to express our grateful appreciation of the financial assistance given by the University Grants Commission for this publication.

I have no doubt that the students, teachers and others interested in this subject will find this reading a rewarding experience.

Gujarat University
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July 31, 1973.
Saur Shravan 9, 1895 (Saka).

K. C. Parikh
University Registrar

PREFACE

The present work actually forms the thesis for Ph D. prepared under the guidance of Prof. R. C. Parikh of the B. J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad. My thanks are due to the Gujarat University authorities for undertaking the publication of this work, which though written first, is actually my third work in a book form, the other two being, 'Sanskrt Nātakano Paricaya', and 'Bhāratiya Sāhityaśāstrani Vicāra Paramparāo', (in Gujarati) both being the publications undertaken by the University Book-Production Board, Gujarat Rajya. A fourth book viz the translation of Locana in Gujarati, with introduction and annotations is also in Press, and the Gujarat University has taken up its publication and my fifth work, viz. The Kāvyaprakāśa (I-VI) with Gunaratna's Sāradīpikā is also to be published soon. I am extremely thankful to Dr. Solomon, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Gujarat University and Dr. J. M. Shukla, Reader in Sanskrit, Gujarat University, for their helpful suggestions. My thanks are also due to Mrs. Harsha Nandi and daughter Chinmayee for being helpful in their own way throughout the course of the publication of this work. I also thank my sister Sragdharaben for preparing the word-index. Shri Ramanand Press also deserves thanks for the speedy work it carried out.

'Āsopālava', 4, Professors' Colony, Navarangpura, Ahmedabad-9. Vijayadaśami, 2029 (V.S.).

T. S. Nandi

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

One of the great prasthānas of Sanskrit Poetics is what we might call 'Dhvani, particularly rasa-dhvani, prasthāna'. It is therefore natural that the topics of vyañjanā-dhvani and rasa should have been discussed by many modern scholars. However, as far my knowledge goes, no one has discussed in detail, the origin and development of these two topics and their inter-relation in a connected form. It has been my humble attempt to do this work in the present thesis

In Dhvanyāloka, we find the dhvani theory in its fully developed form. At Dhv. I 2 we are told (1) that the 'artha' or sense which is the soul of poetry, is of two kinds viz vācya or expressed and pratiyamāna or implied It is this pratiyamāna artha which is regarded as the soul of poetry (Dhv. I. 5) (2), though Abhinava would allow this honour to that pratiyamāna sense alone which conveys rasa (3) In Dhv I 7, we are told (4) that this pratiyamāna sense is not understood merely by the knowledge of grammar or logic, but it is known only by those who know the essence of poetry Thus, Dhv indicates a verbal process in poetry which is only grasped by the aesthetics of poetry. So, what one has to find out in great poetry is his 'vyangyārtha' or the suggested sense, and the word that is capable of shedding light on it. When in a poem, this verbal process of vyañjanā predominantly engages the mind, it is called 'dhvani' or 'dhvanikāvya' by the sūris or sages. Ānanda says that the soul of poetry is dhvani (kāvyasyātmā dhvanih-Dhv. I.1). Here dhvani is a synonym of vyangyārtha. But he also says (Dhv. I. 13) and Mammata follows him, that a poem in which dhvani predominates is called dhvanikāvya (kāvya-viseṣah sa dhvaniriti sūribhih kathitah) (Dhv, I. 13). Here dhvani is a charcteristic of a poem which is classified by Mammata as uttama-idamuttamam atiśayini vyangye vācyāt dhvanirbudhaih

kathitah (K P I) Thus in one sense, dhvani is a characteristic of a poem in which vyangyārtha predominates

From Dhv I 1, we have to infer that Ānandavardhana does not regard himself to be the first to promulgate this theory As we learn from the introductory portion of the Dhv, this theory was a subject of great controversy amongst the learned critics of sanskrit poetry The very first verse informs us that though the wise have ordained that the soul of poetry is dhvani, still, some say that there is nothing like dhvani, while others say that it is something secondary in a poem, and still others maintain that the essence of dhvani is something beyond words (Dhv I 1) (5)

Unfortunately however, we do not find any work earlier than Dhv, which treats of dhvani in this fashion So, I have attempted in this thesis to find out, if possible, the earlier background of this theory

The theorists of poetry or writers on poetics in Sanskrit were primarily, as it should be, concerned with the nature and functions of poetry Poetry, however, is an art which uses human speech as its medium Therefore, these writers thought it proper to concern themselves with word and whatever it conveys, i e the various meanings, particularly the emotive suggestions in contrast with its direct or scientific meaning In other words, they considered, what is called in modern logic, the scientific and the emotive uses of language (Susane Stebbing Introduction of Logic) This has led to the theory of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā in Sanskrit poetics

According to Ānand there are three types of dhvani, viz. vastudhvani, alaṃkāradhvani and rasadhvani But vastu and alaṃkāra dhvanis can also take the form of abhidhā Rasadhvani, however, is exclusively conveyed by vyañjanā Thus vyañjanā and rasa become intimately correlated It appears that all the emphasis laid upon vyañjanā is mainly for the purpose of rasa-conveyance In this way these two topics viz

vyañjanā and rasa become so to say, parts of a single theory. So, investigation (or inquiry) in one topic remains incomplete without an investigation in the other topic. So in the second and third parts of my thesis, I have tried to study the origin and development of the concepts of rasa and the various theories advanced for its conveyance by different theorists (Part II & III)

In the first part of my thesis, I have started with the references of dhvani and vyanjana in the vedic literature including the Upanisads, starting with Rgveda After that I proceed to Nirukta, Rk-prātisakhya, Astadhyayi of Pānini and Mahabhāsya of Patanjali

It may be noted that we fail to come across the words 'vyañjanā, pratiyamāna as such in the Rv The word dhvani also does not occur in the Rv We will see, however, that we do come across different forms of the root √dhvan in Rv and also of the word dhvani' in Av But these occur in the usual sense of 'sound and do not have the technical sense of *dhvani as seen in Sanskrit Poetics*

However, we do come across different forms of the root √anj, and vi+√anj, such as ajyate, ajyase, ajyamanah, vyajyate, vyanjate etc etc A careful study of the different occurrences of √añj in its various grammatical froms shows that is seems to carry principally the meaning viz (i) to anoint' with a view to embellish, the second stage being that of embellishment proper, and (ii) 'to shine' Its use with the prefix 'vi is in the sense of 'to shine forth' 'to glitter' etc The idea seems to be to enhance the glitter of something by the application of some ingredient, the stages being first anointing and then the consequential embellishment and the general meaning of adding zest to a thing, and this adding zest, by means of revealing the hidden meaning of a thing Moreover, the survey of the occurrences of vi+√añj in the vedas shows two connected meanings, viz to bring out something hidden, by the application or enhancement of something, to brighten, to embellish,

to decorate, to adorn, to display I have similarly studied all such occurrences of √añj, vi+√añj, √dhvan and dhvani in the Nighantu and the Nirukta, Panini and Patanjali.

The Nighantu does not contain √añj and vi+√añj in any grammatical form There are certain occurrences of √añj in the Nirukta, but this is only by way of explaining the vedic mantras quoted therein, and we fail to come across any new shades of meaning other than those already found in the Vedas Nor do we find any occurrences of √dhvan or the word dhvani in either the Nighantu or the Nirukta However, at 7 13, in the Nirukta we have vyañjanamatram' in the sense of more indication 'Vyanjana here means an indicator This seems to be the earliest occurrence of 'vyañjana in the sense of 'indication' Similarly, in Ch I (Nirukta) Yaska cites the opinion of Gargya who holds that upasargas are not mean ingful by themselves but they serve to suggest or indicate the relation of nāma and ākyāta with a particular meaning Says Gargya na nirabaddhah upasargah arthān nirāhuh nāmā khyātayostu karmopasamyogadyotakāh bhavanti Thus, it seems, Yaska comes very near to the power of dyotana or suggestion We know that in the kāvyasāstra the word dyotana is used as an equivalent of vyañjana Thus these early occurrences of the √añj and vi+√añj and vyañjana foreshadow the later technical use in Sanskrit Poetics

In the Rk-pratisakhya we do not come across anything worthy of note In Pānini also there is no mention of vyañjanā or sphota or dhvani as such We come across 'vyañjana' in the technical sense of a consonant But at Pā II, i 34-vyañ janairupasiktc-, the explanation given is dadhnā upasiktam dadhikam Thus vyanjana is anything that is used to enhance the relish of the main or principal object of eating We come across the same use of the term vyañjana in the Nātyasāstra, wherein Bharata cites the analogy of ṣādavādirasa (Nā Śā Ch VI) This can have an important bearing on the vyañjanāvāda

of the ālaṃkārikas. In Patañjali also, we come across occurrences of different forms of √añj and vi+√añj and also of sphota and dhvani But the term dhvani occurs in the sense of sound only The word vyañjanā by itself is missing even here. At VIII 1.70, in the Mahābhāṣya it is observed, 'vyajyate anena iti vyañjanam'. Thus 'vyañjana' is that which reveals or manifests or brings something into light This sense of *prakāsana is note worthy, especially from the point of view of* the vyañjanāvada

I have also studied the occurrences of √añj and vi+√añj *in works of early poets such as Asvaghosa, Kalidāsa and also* Bhāsa, the supposed author of the thirteen Trivendrum plays Literary criticism follows literature So, I have tried to note certain important occurrences in these poets, which could have inspired the Sanskrit poetists in the formation of the theory of vyañjanā and dhvani For exmple, Bu Ca IV 84 reads : 'upapannamidam vākyam sauhārdavyñjakam tvayi' –Herein a vākya is said to be 'sauhārdavyañjaka' i e 'suggestive of friendship'. Similarly in Kālidāsa's Meghaduta (purva, 29) we have

"saubhāgyam te subhaga virahāvasthayā vyanjayanti' This is the description of the river Nirvindhyā As Mallinātha explains, the nāyakanāyikabhāva is clearly suggested here. Moreover, *Kumārasambhava VII 91 reads*

tān sandhiṣu vyañjitavṛttibhedam
rasāntaresu pratibaddharāgam etc

This has a clear reference to the concepts of vyañjanā and rasa Instances can be multiplied One fact emerges out of this, and it is that the ālaṃkārikas might have found much in this to draw upon

Ānandavardhana and Mammata make it clear that the original inspiration for the theory of vyañjanā comes from the Sphota-doctrine of the grammarians (6) So, I have tried to investigate this relationship I have based my study on the original works such as the Mahābhāṣya of Patanjali and the

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, etc as well as the exposition of Sphoṭa-in the works of scholars like P. C Chakravarty and Gaurinath Shastri I have tried to draw as many as nine important points to justify the statement of Ānanda and Mammaṭa that the Sphoṭa doctrine is their original source of inspiration for the dhvani-theory (Ch II)

As vyañjanā is one of the sabdavṛttis, and as a general discussion on sabdavṛttis forms an important part, particularly in later Sanskrit Poetics, I have thought it proper to discuss these topics also in detail (Ch III)

In these chs III & IV, I have not only discussed the nature and scope of different sabdavṛttis, but also the recognition of these by different schools of thought such as those represented by the Vaiyākaranas, Mīmāmsakas, etc (Ch IV)

In these chapters, I have consulted the original works, *yet I am particularly indebted to the works of P C Chakra* varty and Prof Devasthali In Ch V, I have tried to study the exact recognition of different sabdavṛttis in the works of early poeticists such as Bhamaha, Daṇḍin, etc It should be noted, however that in the works of these authors, we do not come across any systematic discussion of the nature and scope of the sabdavṛttis, as is seen in the works of later authors on alaṃkāra such as Mammata, Hemacandra, Visvanātha etc However, we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the ideas of functions of word. Bhāmaha has discussed the nature of word and has tried to refute the Sphotavāda Bhāmaha's familiarity with the function other than vyañjanā is quite apparent as shown by me in the thesis (Ch V) As to his familiarity with vyañjanā, we may say that vyañjanā does not occupy the same place as abhidhā in his mind, i e he does not seem to have known vyañjana as a separate vṛtti He, however, uses different forms of vi+√añj with the later meaning of vyañjanā at different places As in Bhāmaha, so also in Daṇḍin, we do not come across any mention of vyañjanā as such by name However, we come

across different forms of root vi+√añj in the sense of, 'to suggest' We also come across the term 'pratiyate' meaning 'is implied' We come across clear references to laksanā or gauni. Vāmana very often refers to bhakti, laksanā, or gaunārtha and upacāra. But he also does not mention vyañjanā by name. He seems to touch vyanjanā only indirectly

In Udbhata there are some direct and indirect references to the different vrttis including 'avagamana' (kāvyālamkāra, Udbhata) The meaning of 'avagamana' is very near to vyañjanā

In Rudrata, we come across direct and indirect references *to abhidhā and laksanā* and also *indirect references to vyañjanā*. Thus we see that in these early authors from Bhamaha to Rudrata, we do find references in their works which go to indicate that the idea of vyañjanā was not absent from their minds, though we cannot say that they have clearly visualised it, much less defined it It should be noted however, that the charm that comes out of vvañjanā is recognised by these earlier authors in different alamkāras such as paryāyokta, samāsokti, *aprastutaprasamsā, dipaka, ākṣepa, etc.*

The exponents of dhvani school like Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka and Jagannātha say that the earlier writers such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc though without clearly defining dhvani, had subsumed it under various gunas and alamkāras An element of implicit sense can be seen in the treatment of different gunas and alamkāras in the earlier authors, but I have, however, found no explicit recognition of dhvani as observed by Ānanda, Abhinava etc So, my submission is that even if an element of implicit sense is seen in different alamkāras and gunas treated by the early poeticists, and thus even if vyañjanā is seen as partly subsumed under this, it should not be taken as a proof that the theory of vayañjanā or dhvani was clearly recognised by Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc. (Ch. VI)

After having thus far studied the problem of the origin and development of the concept of vyañjanā-dhvani, I have attempted a study of the origin and development of the concept of rasa in Part II of my thesis which covers Chs VII-IX I have already referred to the probability that the importance attached to vyañjanā or dhvani in Sanskrit poetics is more or less due to its being the sole conveyor of rasa

I have studied the occurrence or rasa in the vedas and the upanisads and in the Nirukta and the Bṛhaddevatā I have also studied the occurrences of rasa in the works of both Pāṇini and Patañjali Then, I have studied the occurrences of the word rasa in different senses in the works of early poets such as Asvaghosa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa, (Ch VII), and then I have noted the view of Bharata (Ch. VIII) After this, I have studied the approach of the early ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc to the problem of rasa (Ch IX) The method of approach is similar to that in case of dhvani and vyañjanā in Part I

In the course of my study, I have tried to indicate as many as nine interesting points with reference to the use of the word rasa in various senses in the Rv We find the word rasa in the vedas, not only as signifying something liquid but we also find the qualities of joy-giving, tastefulness, exhilaration, being the essence of the vedas, etc attached to rasa Thus rasa in the vedas becomes an object of relish, a joy-giving essence, etc.

The Nā Śa (Ch 1 17) says that the fact of rasa in Nātya is derived from the Av Abhinava tries to explain this in a rather obscure way But I have tried to explain this in a different way. It should be noted however, that though the word rasa occurs at several places in the Av, we have no clear case of the later meaning of nāṭyarasa or kāvyarasa in it From another point of view, we may say that several hymns of the Av taken by themselves are impressive love lyrics, their ritualistic application notwithstanding The number of such hymns

is about thirty I have tried to suggest that the attempt to correlate nāṭyarasa or kāvyarasa to Av is not unjustifiable from this point of view

In the upanisads however, we see that the word rasa occurs also in the sense of essence of the universe and the Taittiriya Up *identifies ātman with rasa-raso vai sah In the Chāndogya* Up. rasa is a synthetic product of many ingredients In the Nirukta and the Bṛhaddevatā I have not found anything useful for my purpose

Thus, the different ideas associated with the word rasa in the vedas and the upanisads, have implicit in them the idea of aesthetic *taste as well and the term rasa might have been* used in the sense of aesthetic taste also as may be seen in the Mahābhāsya of Patanjali (Ch VII)

In Ch VII, I have tried to study the occurrence of √ras, or the word rasa in the works of Pāṇini and Patanjali In the dhātupātha √ras is seen in the sense of to 'make sound', 'liquification', and 'to taste' In Pa V 2 95- 'rasādibhyasca,' the meaning of rasa according to Pāṇini is not clear The Mahābhāsya seems to suggest that the meaning here is different *and illustrates it by using the expression-'rasiko natah', in* which the aesthetic sense of rasa is quite clear The Kāsikā here explains that the matup suffix is ordinarily to be used in respect of the qualities grasped by senses, but in case of 'rasiko natah' or 'rūpini apsarasām', etc , the idea is to suggest not merely the rasa or rupa apprehended by sense-organs, but sentiment or emotion and beauty respectively The Tattva-bodhini on the Siddhāntakaumudi makes this all the more clear when *it says—rasikam ityatra tu rasa sabdena bhāvo gṛhyate* na tu rasanāgrāhyo gunah (pp 303, NS Ed '33). From this we have to assume that this aesthetic sense of rasa might have been well established in usage, otherwise Patañjali could not have used the illustration of 'rasiko natah'

Then, I have studied the occurrences of 'rasa' or √ras in the works of early poets such as Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and

Kalıdāsa I have tried to suggest, quoting illustrations, that it is precisely such clear instances as explained in Ch VII, in the works of literary masters that might have been the original source of inspiration for theorists to formulate the rasa theories

Ch VIII clearly explains the views of Bharata as seen in ch 16 of the Nā Sā, dealing with the concepts of laksana, guna, dosa, and alaṃkāra It is stated (vs 113–114) that the gunas and the alamkāras have to be used in poetry may in consonance with the delineation of different rasas Here, it be noted, rasa is visualised in connection with poetry, in addition to natya

Ch IX studies the ideas of rasa as seen in the works of early poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Dand n etc I have observed that the earlier ālamkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc do not totally ignore the fact of rasa But they try to incor porate it under alaṃkāra, a source of charm to poetry Dandin is more elaborate in his treatment than Bhāmaha Udbhata also seems to be better informed about the concept of rasa and is probably the first to take rasa as svasabdavācya One point is clear that in all these authors the ultimate 'alaṃkārya' seems to be 'kāvya' itself, rasa being only an alaṃkāra, a kāvyaśo bhākaradharma

In Vāmana and Rudrata, we notice a new trend of incorporating rasa, bhāva etc. under guna, the essential or eternal quality of kāvya (nityadharma) For Rudrata the number of rasas is not just eight or nine In fact all the bhāvas can be enhanced to the capacity of rasa Ānandvardhana with his theory of vyañjanā and dhvani has given a new orientation to the entire theme of rasa Abhinava elaborates this position

Thus far I have traced the two streams of thought, one pertaining to śabdavṛttis, with particular reference to vyañjanā and dhvani, and the other pertaining to the origin and development of the concept of rasa and other cognate ideas In the

Dhv. we find these two currents meeting and merging with each other and bringing forth an integrated theory of rasa and dhvani.

So, in Part III of my thesis, comprising chapters X-XVI I have studied the theory of rasa and dhvani from the point of view of its development. This includes topics such as dhvani and rasa in Ānandavardhana', 'classification of poetry', 'the pūrvapakṣa against vyañjanā in Ānanda', 'some anti-dhvani theorists', 'dhvani in Abhinavagupta', 'rasa experience as in Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, etc.' 'rasa experience as in Abhinava,' and 'some other writers on rasa such as Dhanañjaya, Dhanika, Bhoja, Nāṭyadarpaṇakāras, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. Ch. X gives *a brief introduction to part III.*

'Rasa and Dhvani in Ānanda' forms the subject of ch XI. This is done in a novel and all-comprising fashion Ānanda does not discard the *other elements of poetry as alaṃkāra, guṇa, etc, mentioned by early authors such as Bhāmaha and the like.* Another point *worth noting is that we come to understand how the rasa-theory which originated with rūpakas or with nāṭya became generally a topic for all varieties of poetry.* We have seen that Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and others clearly emphasise the element of rasa in the mahākāvyas and kathās, the two important varieties of prabandha kāvya. But Ānanda makes the importance of rasa more comprehensive or universal in all the varieties of poetry of which prabandha is only one. Thus we may say that as far as our knowledge goes, it is in Ānanda that we find the element of rasa becoming the soul of all poetry, a thing which Viśvanātha in his famous utterance viz. vākyam rasātmakaṃ kāvyam, makes more explicit. It may be remarked that the concept of rasa was extended even to non-literary arts such as painting, sculpture, music and dance. *(See Viṣṇudharmottara purāṇa.)*

Then follows the discussion of the three-fold classification of poetry as given by Ānandavardhana. He however refrains

from calling it uttama, madhyama and avara or citra. In Ch XII I have discussed how Ānanda refutes the pūrvapakṣa against vyañjanā in the Dhv In doing so, he refutes the abhāvavādins first and clearly distinguishes between vyañjanā and abhidhā, vyañjanā and tātparya, vyañjanā and lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā and anumāna He also refutes the Naiyāyikas

While starting the exposition of dhvani as expounded in Dhv we raised the question of the earlier writers who did not accept dhvani and against whose view Ānanda was trying to establish his theory We noted that we have not been able to discover specific works or authors who hold views opposed to the dhvani theory Consequently, we relied upon Dhv. and Locana for those views We do, however, find works posterior to Dhv which carry on their polemics against the dhvani theory. In order to complete the discussion on dhvani I have also taken up a critical consideration of these works also (Ch XIII)

Among these works, we come across the AVM of Mukulabhatta, VJ of Kuntaka, DR of Dhanañjaya with Avaloka, VY V of Mahima Bhatta and Sṛ Pra of Bhoja

Mukula seems to incorporate implicit sense under lakṣaṇā which is only a part of abhidhā for him For Kuntaka vakrokti is vicitrā abhidhā He subsumes implicit sense partly under abhidhā and partly under lakasnā Kuntaka has also given much importance to rasa I have tried to evaluate his position critically Kuntaka, with his theory of vakrokti or a striking mode of speech differing from and transcending the ordinary everyday mode of speaking about a thing, and such that it charms by the skill of the poet, seems to comprehend all the sources of charm in poetry, beginning with alaṃkāra and ending with dhvani and rasa. For him, even dyotaka and vyañjaka words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning-arthapratītikāritva–are termed 'vācaka' i e expressive of meaning, metaphorically Thus broadly speaking, Kuntaka may be termed an antarbhāvavādin and bhaktivādin to a certain extent

In the fourth prakāsa of the DR. the authors touch the problem *of rasānubhūti or the experience of sentiment in poetry.* Dhanika's elaborate commentary brings out their views clearly. They accept the fact of rasādi but they fail to accept the proposition that rasādis are conveyed by vyanjanā. They accept bhāvyabhāvaka relation between rasādis and kāvya. They are of the opinion that the vyangya or suggestion of the dhvanivādins can be explained with the help of tātparya sakti or *purport alone.* Visvanātha *in his* SD *tries to refute the tātparyavādins It seems, however, that the controversy lies in* name only

Mahimabhatta has pointed out as many as ten blemishes in the definition of dhvani as given by Ānanda I have tried *to evaluate his argument critically and have shown that some* faults as pointed out by him are of a formal nature while others may be taken as or a fundamental nature and so bearing upon his theory of kāvyānumiti It may be noted that he has this much justification in his view that the indirect *thoughts and feelings arising out of the direct* meaning can be psychologically regarded as of an inferential nature. This however, is in no sense a logical anumāna or inference and even Mahima laughs at those who want kāvyānumiti *to be* tarkānumiti !

As for Bhoja, the author of S K Ā. and Sr. Pra Dr De seems to suggest that he (i e. Bhoja) does not accept the dhvani theory of Ānanda Dr. Raghvan tries to refute him. He noted that, in the S K Ā. and Sr. Pra there are alamkāras and *gunas which embody vyañjanā. This however, does* not make him a vyañjanāvādin, though, as Dr. Raghvan suggests, Bhoja can be taken as an antarbhāvavādin

A critical review of the opponents of the dhvani school shows that they are not opposed to pratīyamānatā or implied sense as a source of charm in poetry. The difference, however, arises *as to how this implication* is *grasped.* Ānanda regards

this as one of the functions of words, but this function is not, according to him, fulfilled by either abhidhā or lakṣaṇā He therefore posits a third function of word viz vyañjanā His opponents see no necessity of adding a third function of word because the implied sense can b* grasped by the inferential processes of thought, and by meanings yielded through abhidhā and lakṣaṇā So for them, to accept vyanana would lead to what is called gaurava doṣa Thus the question resolves itself into the acceptance or non-acceptance of this additional function of word Modern logicians who discuss the function of language do accept what they call the emotive use of language in addition to its scientific function The various emotive associations that a word has, become so to say, prominent in poetic language But if one considers the psychological process of the emotive function, one has to agree that they are of an inferential type In fact, as Mammaṭa says, those who experience and enjoy rasa have to be keen in the inference of sthāyin-(loke pramadādibhih sthayyanumāne 'bhyasapātavavatām etc' K P IV 28) Thus it is not impossible to reconcile both the opposing views

In the next chapter (i e Ch XIV), I have considered the views of Abhinavagupta on dhvani Abhinavagupta follows the Dhv in his theories on dhvani and rasa His two important works on this subject are a commentary on Dhv known as Locana and his commentary on the Nā Sā of Bharata, known as Nāṭyavedavivṛti or Abhinavabhāratī The merit of his work lies in clear elaboration and at times subtle explanation and original insights to a certain extent He was a great philosopher of the pratyabhijñā school

As Locana and the Abh are comm s, much of their content is naturally the same as that of Dhv and Nā Sā For the same reason, much of their treatment is bound to be piecemeal In the discussion of the contents of Dhv and Nā Śā, I have, as far as possible, confined myself to the works themselves, Here, while considering Abhinava's comm s, I have noted the points which have been clarified, elaborated and

sometimes improved upon by him. In the treatment of the e points some repetition has been unavoidable though I have tried to avoid it as far as possible. As noted just now, the treatment of the various topics in these commentaries, particularly in Locana, is piece-meal, and so, in order to give a coherent and critical account, I have brought together passages bearing on the same topic and tried to give a connected account (Ch. XIV).

In Ch. XV, I have tried to discuss the views on rasa-experience as explained by *Lollata*, *Śankuka*, *Bhatta* Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta. The views of the former i.e. Lollata, Śaṅkuka and Bhatta Nāyaka, are put forth by me as clearly and precisely on the basis of the presentation of their views by Abhinava. In doing this, I have not only consulted the *original sources but I have fully utilised the excellent* work of Gnoli, and Dr. K C. Pandey

Different Scholars have tried to correlate the views of these ācāryas such as Bhatta Lollata, Śrī Saṅkuka, etc. with different schools of thought. I have tried to show that excepting Abhinavagupta, nothing definite can be stated with reference to the rest. As nirvighnā saṃvit and camatkāra are central to the concept of rasa in Abhinava's theory I have tried to explain these terms in the light of pratyabhijñā philosophy

In Ch. XVI, I have tried tried to record the views of some other writers on rasa. This covers the works of Dhanañjaya, and Dhanika, Bhoja and Rāmchandra and Gunacandra, and also Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and *Jagannātha*. I have taken up Dhanañjaya, Dhanika, Bhoja and the authors of ND together bacause they have something novel, something different from the Kashmirian tradition to record, while Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha follow the lead of Abhinavagupta. I have tried to put this in a *critical* way though of course, as for the views of Bhoja, my thanks are due to the excellent work of Dr. Raghvan. Then follows the re'sume'.

In the 'resume', I have tried to correlate the conclusions reached in different chapters and present a connected account of the theory of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa I have tried to make clear how Abhinava has incorporated in his theory the views of his opponents I have also shown how the concept of rasa developed from its form of category of aesthetic experience to the stature of the higher spiritual experiences of the bhaktas

As mentioned in the beginning of this statement, dhvani-vyañjanā and rasa are much discussed subjects by modern writers on Sanskrit Poetics It will be therefore, presumptuous on my part to say that I have discovered something absolutely new However I humbly submit that the following points worked out in detail in this thesis are, as far as my knowledge goes, new in treatment and interpretation

(i) The sort of detailed discussion of occurrences of √añj, vi+√añj √dhvan and dhvani in the vedas, Nirukta, Rk Prā, Aṣṭādhyāyī and Mahābhāṣya, and the literary works of early poets such as Asvaghosa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa is attempted for the first time and this, (Chs. I) I humbly submit, is one part of my contribution to knowledge

(ii) I have tried to explain the relationship between the theory of Sphoṭa and the theory of dhvani, in (Ch II) by advancing as many as nine importants points

(iii) In Ch V, I have tried to discuss the recognition of different sabdavṛttis in the works of early ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc

(vi) In Ch VI, I have tried to discuss the recognition of pratiyamāna sense in the works of early poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc

(v) In Ch VII, I have tried to point out nine interesting points with reference to 'rasa' as seen in the Vedas The investigation, so far as I know, is in much greater detail as compared to earlier efforts by different scholars

(vi) Then, I have tried to study the occurrences of √ras and rasa in the works of Pāṇini and Patañjali. In the Mahābhāsya, I feel I have pointed out for the first time, that we come across an expression viz 'rāsiko naṭaḥ' which clearly suggests that rasa in its aesthetic sense was known to Patañjali and must have been in vogue much earlier (Ch VII).

(vii) Then, I have tried to suggest how actual practice in the literary works such as those of Asvaghosa, Bhāsa, etc might have influenced the theorists to formulate their theories of rasa (Ch VII)

(viii) In Ch VIII, I have tried to put the views of Bharata in a precise and clear way, and have also suggested that Bharata also thought of rasa with reference to poetry-kāvya-as well, and not with reference to nāṭya alone

(ix) In Ch IX, I have attempted an investigation into the treatment of rasa by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc

(x) In Chs X—XII, I have tried to put the ideas on rasa and dhvani as found in the Dhv of Anandavardhana I have tried to present the whole matter in a critical and comprehensive way and have tried to evaluate the arguments for and against vyañjanā critically

(xi) In a similar way, I have tried to present the ideas of some anti dhavani theorists (ch XIII) in a critical and comprehensive way

(xii) Chs XIV presents the views of Abhinava on dhvani in a coherent way Whatever is found in the form of a piece-meal treatment is taken up by me and arranged in a connected way so as to evolve a distinct pattern

I have also attempted to present as clear and precise an account as possible of the views of Lollata, Saṅkuka, Bhatta Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta in Ch XV, and tried to see whether these can be correlated to some 'darsana'

(xiii) In Ch. XVI, I have tried to present the views of some other important writers on rasa, such as Dhanañjaya, Dhanika Bhoja, Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. I have tried to give a critical account of these authors

All this, I humbly claim is my contribution to knowledge.

Foot-Notes

(1) Dhv I 2

yo'rthaḥ sahṛdayaślāghyaḥ kāvyātmeti vyavasthitaḥ ।
vācyapratīyamānākhyau tasya bhedāvubhau smṛtau ॥

(2) Dhv I 5

kāvyasyātmā sa evārthaḥ tathā cādikaveḥ purā ।
krauñcadvandvaviyogottaḥ śokaḥ ślokatvamāgataḥ ॥

(3) Locana on Dhv I 5.

tena rasa eva vastutaḥ ātmā, vastvalaṃkāradvanī tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyādutkṛṣṭau .. etc

(4) Dhv I. 7-

śabdārthaśāsanajñānamātreṇaiva na vedyate ।
vedyate sa tu kāvyārthatattvajñaireva kevalam ॥

(5) Dhv. I 1.

kāvyasyātmā dhvaniriti budhairyaḥ samāmnātapūrvaḥ
tasyābhāvaṃ jagadurapare bhāktamāhustamanye ।
kecidvācāṃ sthitamaviṣaye tattvamūcustadīyaṃ
tena brūmaḥ sahṛdayamanaḥ prītaye tatsvarūpam ॥



PART I

CHAPTER I

√AÑJ VI+ √AÑJ, √DHVAN AND DHVANI IN THE VEDAS
(Cir 1500, B C)

In this chapter we will try to study the occurrences of √añj, vi+√añj, √dhvan, dhvani etc in the Vedas (Cir 1500 B C)

First of all, we will take up Rgveda

Rv. I 124.8 is –

svásā svásre jyā'yasyai yonimaraigápaityasyāh
pratīcáksyeva ।
vyucchánti rasmī'bhih sū'yasyañjyankte
samanagā iva vra'h ॥

Sayana explains · añji vyañjikam tejah yadvā, añji vyaktam jagat, ankte, anakti, prakasayati

i e anoints brings into light, displays, causes to appear, reveals, *Griffith* explains it as 'decks'

Rv. V. 1.3 :

yádim ganásya rasana'májigah sucirankte
śúcibhirgobhiragníh ।
a'ddáksiṇī yujyate vājayántyuttanāmūrdhvó
adhayajjuhu'bhih ॥

Sā –ankte=vyanakti, visvam jagat.
=anoints

Griffith– 'is anointed'

Rv. VIII. 29.1 :

babhrureko visuṇah sūnāro yuvāñjyañkte hiranyáyam ǀ

Sa-āñji, abhivyajyate prakasyate anena ityañji abharanam

abhivyaktisādhanam kuṇḍalamukutadikam svaśariram. ankte abhivyañjayati

=adorns, causes to appear, brings into light, displays, decks; Griffith-'decks'

ankti-

Rv. I. 153.2 :

prástutirvām dha'ma na práyuktiráyāmi mitra varunā suvrktih ǀ

anákti yádvām vidáthesu hóta sumnám vam suri'rvrṣaṇāvi'yaksan. ǁ

Sā.-anakti=vyañjayati=manifests, displays, brings into light, reveals, Griffith-'decks',

Rv. IV. 6.3 :

yata' sujūrṇi' rāti'nī ghṛtáci pradaks ṇiddevátatimuraṇáh ǀ

údu svárurnavajā' na'kráh pasvó anakti sú ihitah sumékah ǁ

Sa.-anakti=gacchati,

yadva sudhitah svasureva
udu utkrstah pasvah pasūn anakti
svarutā pasumanakti it eṣah=anoints

Griffith-'anoints'

Rv. X. 68.2 :

saṃ góbhirāṅgirasó nákṣamāṇo
bhágaivédaryamáṇam ninꞏāya ।
jáne mitró na dáṃpati anaktī br'haspate
vājáyāśu'ṃrivāajú ॥

Sā.-anakti = saṃgamayati = brings together
= unites;

This seems to be an unusual meaning; may be metaphorical; Griffith-' decks ';

añjate-Rv. I. 92.1 :

etā' u tyā' uṣásah ketumakrata pūrve árdhe
rájaso bhānúmañjate ।
niṣkṛṇvānā' ā'yudhaniva dhrṣṇávah práti
gavòrusiryanti mātáraḥ ॥

Sā.-bhānum, prakāśam añjate = vyaktikurvanti
= displays, causes to appear, brings into
light, menifests, reveals,

Griffith-spread (shining light)
i.e. causes to appear, display, reveal.

Rv I. 151.8 :

yuvā'ṃ yajñaih prathamā' góbhirañjata ṛ'tāvānā
mánaso ná práyuktiṣu ।
bháranti vāṃ mánmanā giródṛpyatā mánasā
revádāśāthe ॥

Sā.-añjate = vyañjayanti yajamānāh
= display, cause to appear.

Griffith-' deck ';

Rv. VIII. 72.9 :

pari tridhā'turadhvaram jūrṇīreti návīyasi I
madhva hôtaro añjate II
Sa – añjate = madhva añjate iti = anoint

Rv. IX. 10.3 :

rā'jāno na prasastibhih Sómāso gobhirañ'jate I
yajño na sapta dhātr'bhiḥ II
Sā – añjate = ajyante = samskriyanta ityarthah
= anoint, adorn,
Griffith–' deck ',

Rv. IX. 102.7 .

samicine abhi tmanā yahvī' ṛtásya mātárā I
tanvāna yajnamanusagyádanjate II

Sā – anjate somam mis'rayanti tada svayamabhigacchati = mix, (i.e anoint),
Griffith–' adorn '

Rv. IX. 86 43 :

añjate vyañjate sámañjate kratum rihanti
mádhunābhyañjate I
sindhorucchvasé patayantamukṣáṇam hiraṇyapāvāh
pasumasu gṛbhṇate II

Sā – añjate – (gobhih), anoint,
vyañjate = vividhamañjanti,
samañjate = samyaganjanti,
and madhunā gavyena abhyañjate = well anoint,
Griffith–' balm ' (i e. anoint),

añjanti :

Rv. I. 95 6 :

ubhé bhadré joṣayete na mene gā vo na vas'ra'iva
upa tasthur évaih I
sá dákṣaṇām dakṣapatirbabhūvañjánti yám
dakṣinató havírbhih II

Sā.–añjanti = ārdrīkurvanti; tarpayanti (i.e. anoint)
Griffith–'balm'.

Rv. III. 8.1 :

añjánti tvā́'madhvaré devayánto vánaspate mádhunā daí'vyena ।
yadūrdhvásti'ṣṭhā dráviṇehá dhattādyádvā kṣáyo mātúrasyā upásthe ॥

Sā.–añjanti = tvayi gṛtaṃ siñcanti ityarthaḥ (i.e. *they anoint*) *Griffith–'anoint'*;

Rv. III. 14.3 :

drávatāṃ ta uṣásā vājáyantī ágne vā́'tasya pathyā̀bhiráccha ।
oátsīmañjántī pūrvyáṃ havi'rbhirā' vandhúreva tasthaturduroṇé ॥

Sā.–añjanti = siñcanti = *anoint (and adorn)*
Griffith–'adorn';

Rv. V. 3.2 :

tvámaryamā' bhavasi yátkanī'nāṃ nā́'ma svadhāvanguhyaṃ bibharṣi ।
añjántī mitráṃ súdhitaṃ na gobhir yáddámpatī sámanasā kṛṇóṣi ॥

Sā.–govikāraih kṣīrādibhiḥ añjanti = 'anoint',
Griffith–'balm'.

Rv. V. 43.7 :

añjánti yáṃ pratháyanto ná víprā vapā́'vantaṃ nā́'gninā́ tápantaḥ ।
pitúrna putrá upási preṣṭha ā́' dharmó agni'mṛtáyannasādi ॥

Sā.–añjanti = anoint;
Griffith–'deck';

Rv. IX. 109.20 :

añjántyenaṃ mádhvo rasénendrāya vṛṣṇa i'nduṃ mádāya |

Sā – añjanti = saṃyojayanti = (mix, i.e. anoint)

Griffith – 'balm' (= anoint),

aṅdhve.-Rv. X. 100.10 :

ūrjam gāvo yávase pi'vo attana ṛta'sya yā'h sádane kós'e aṅdhvé |

tanū'revá tanvo astu bhesajámā sarv'atātimáditim vṛṇimahe ||

Sā. – aṅdhve = vyañjayatha = Cause to appear, manifest, display;

Griffith – 'are balmed'.

ajmaḥ-Rv. IX. 45.3 :

Griffith-'balm'

aṇgdhi-Rv. X. 156.3 :

ā'gne sthūrāṃ rayim bhara pṛthúṃ gómantamas'vi'nam |

angdhi' khaṃ vartáya paṇiṃ ||

Sā.–angdhi vṛstyudakaih siñca = anoint;·

or, atmīyaih tejobhih vyañjaya prakās'aya = reveal,

Griffith. – oil, i.e anoint;

anajyāt.–Rv. X. 31.4 :

nítyas'cakanyatsvápatirdámūna yásma u deváh savitā' jaja'na |

bhágo vā góbhiraryamémanajyatsó asmai cā'rūs'chadayadutá syāt ||

Sā – anajyāt=vyaktikuryāt
=to cause to appear, reveal, manifest;
Griffith–'may appear to him'.

anajan – Rv. III. 19.5 :

yattvā hótāramanájanmiyédhe niṣādáyanto
yajáthāya devā́ḥ ǀ
sa' tvā́ṃ no agne'vitéśa bodhyádhi śrávāṃsi
dhehi nastanū'ṣu. ǁ

Sā – anajan, gṛtāhutibhirauksan=anointed;
Griffith–anoint;

ānaje–Rv. I. 102.1 :

ima'ṃ te dhíyaṃ prá bhare mahó mahī'masyá
stotré dhiṣáṇā yátta ānajé ǀ
támutsavé ca prasavé ca sāsahi'mi'ndraṃ
deva'sah śávasāmadanna'nuo. ǁ

Sā. – ānaje = aktā śaṃsiṣṭāsit = anoint;
and adds : añjū vyaktimraksaṇagatiṣu;

Rv. VIII. 63.1 :

śá pūrvyó maha'nāṃ venáh r'tubhirānaje ǀ
yasya dvā'rā mánuspitā devéṣu dhíya anajé. ǁ

Sā – ānaje=āgacchati;
or, prāpa, ānajiḥ prāptikarmā;

ajyate :

Rv. VIII. 20.8 :

góbhirvānó ajyate sóbhariṇāṃ ráthe kóse
hiraṇyáye ǀ
góbandhavah sujātā'sah isé bhujó mahā'nto
nah spárase nú ǁ

Sa – ajyate, vyajyate, prakatikriyate, = revealed,
Griffith – ' balmed '.

Rv. VIII 51 9 :

yasyāyam viśv ā ryo dā sah Sevadhipa arih I
tira'ścidaryé rusame paviravi tubhyetsó ajyate
rayih II

Sā – ajyate = praksipyate (Vālakhilyabhāsya),
Griffith = ' is brought off

at Rv. IX. 32.3 :

Sā – ajyate = sicyate, or snigdhikriyate =
(anointed),
Griffith – ' anointed ',

Rv. IX 76.2 .

Rv X. 118.3

Sā – ajyate-sicyate-ano inted,
Griffith-' balms '

Sa – ajyate gobhih (= is anointed),
Griffith – ' balmed ' ,

Rv. III. 40 6

gírvanah pahí nah sutáṃ madhordhā'rabhirajyase I
índra tva dātamídyásah II

Sa – ajyase = sicyase = " (you) are anointed "
Griffith – ' art bedewed ', (i e anointed),

Rv IX. 66 9 ·

mrjánti tva samagruvóvyo jirā vadhi svāṇi I
rebhó yadajyase vane II
Sā – ajyase = aktah Sikto bhavati, = anoint
Griffith – ' deck thee ',

also at **Rv. IX. 85.5 :**

Sa.-ajyase=sikto bhavasi; anointed;
Griffith-'balmed' with milk;

also at **Rv. IX. 78.2 :**

Sā.-ajyase=preryase;
Griffith-'balmed'.

akṭaḥ, akṭā, akṭaḥ, occur at

Rv. IV. 3. 10-Sā.-sikto bhavati; 'sprinkled with oil'-Griffith.

VI. 4 6-Sā.-saṃśiṣṭaḥ; '*decked*'-*Griffith;*

VI. 5·6,-Sā. saṃsiktaḥ, 'decked with brightness' -Griffith.

IX. 96·22-Sa-siktaḥ; 'decked'-*Griffith;*

aktam-at,

Rv. II. 3·4-Sā.-ājyena aktaṃ, 'bedewed with' -Griffith;

IV. 27·5,-Sā.-siktaṃ; 'filled with a shining liquid'-Griffith;

IX. 74·8,-Sā-saṃpṛktaṃ; 'shining, milk anointed'-Griffith;

X. 177·1;-Sā.-vyaktaṃ; abhivyaktaṃ; 'adorned with'-Griffith;

ajyamānaḥ-occurs at

Rv. IX. 97·35-Sā.-gobhiḥ sicyamānaḥ -'is purified'-Griffith;

X. 31·9-Sā.-vyajyamānaḥ, vyaktibhavan =caused to appear, revealed, displayed, Griffith-'balmed';

ajyamānā-occurs at,

Rv X, 31·10, Sa 'nisicyamānaretaskā'

añjat, añjan-at

Rv I. 92 5-añjan, añjanti (Sā)=display,
-'deck'-Griffith.

In the Yajurveda

anaktu-occurs at VI 2,

XXVII. 12;

XXXVII 11,

añjantu-XXIII 8,

anaje-XXXIII. 29,

ānañja-VIII. 30,

ajyate-XXXIII. 82,

aktam-II 16,

añjat-XXIX 1, and 2,

and **samañjan**-XX. 37,

'**anaktu**'-Yv. VI 2.

agreṇirasi svāveśa unnetṛṇāmetasya vittādadhi tvā sthāsyati devastvā avitā madhvānaktu supippalābhyastvausadhibhyaḥ ı

dyāmagreṇaspṛkṣi āntarikṣiṃ madhenāprāḥ pṛthivīmupareṇādṛṃhīḥ ıı

anaktu=mrakṣiyatu, (Uvaṭa)=anoint,

Yv. XXVII. 12:

tanūnápādásuro visvávedā devó devéṣu deváḥ ı
pathó anaktu mádhvā ghṛténa ıı

anaktu=anoint, (Uvaṭa),

Yv. XXXVII. 11 :

yamā'ya tvā makhā'ya' tvā sū'ryasya tvā tápase ।
devástvā savitā' mádhvānaktu ।
pṛthivyā'ḥ saṃspṛ'saspāhi ।
arcírasi śocírasi tapo'si ॥
madhvā anaktu (Uvaṭa), – anoint,
anaktu = limpatu (Mahidhara).

añjantu – occurs at,

Yv. XXIII. 8 :

vásavastvāñjantu gāyatréṇa cchándasā rudrā'stvañjantu traiṣ'ṭubhenac chándasādityā'stvāñjantu jā'gatena chándasā bhūḥ bhuvaḥ svárlājī३ñcchācī३nyavye gávya etádánnamatta devā etádánnamaddhi prajāpate ॥
añjantu = anoint;
= snigdhaṃ kurvantu = anoint, (Mahidhara)

ānaje, occurs at
Yv. XXXIII. 29 and is Rv. I. 102·1,

ānañja – at Yv. VIII. 30 :

purudasmó vísurūpa índurantármahimā'na'ñj dhiraḥ।
ekapadīṃ dvipadīṃ tripadīṃ catuspadimastāpadiṃ
bhúvanā'nu prathantāṃ svā'hā ॥

ānañj, – añjatervyāktikaraṇārthasyaitadrūpaṃ.
vyaktikaroti (Uvaṭa ;
= brings into light; displays, causes to appear etc. etc

ajyate – Yv. XXXIII 82,
It is the same as Rv. VIII. 51·9

Uvaṭa observes : ajyate dhātūnāmanekārthatvāt añjirdānārthaḥ vikaraṇavyatyayaśca anakti dadāti rayiḥ dhanaṃ

aktam-at Yv. II. 16 :

va'subhyastvā rudrébhyastvā'dityébhyastvā
sa'mjānātham dyāvāpṛthivī mitrā' va'ruṇau tvā
vṛṣṭyāvatām ।
vyantuva'yo'ktam ri'hāṇā marútām pṛ'ṣatirgaccha
vaśā' pṛ'śnirbhūtvā' divam gaccha ta'to no
vṛ'ṣṭimā'vaha ।
cakṣuṣpā' agne'si ca'kṣurme pāhi ।
aktam=drutameva (Uvaṭa);

samañjan-Yv. XX. 37.

narāśa'ṃsaḥ pra'ti śūro mi'mānasta'nūna'pātpra'-
tiyajña'sya dhā'ma ।
góbhirvapā'vānma'dhunā samañja'n hiraṇyai'-
ścandri yajati pra'cetāḥ ॥
samañjan=anointing; -

añjan-Yv. XXIX 1 and 2;

añjan=vyaktikurvan (Uvaṭa)=revealing; displaying;
and añjan=samañjan=anointing grtena (Uvaṭa);
In the Sāmaveda we have,
ajyase-I. 195.
añjate-I. 564;
II. 1121; 964; 1755;
vyañjate-I. 564;
samañjate-I. 564;
ajyate-II. 770;
II. 1099,
II. 1609;
añjānaḥ-II. 1080;
II. 1209,

Now,

Sv. I. 195 is Rv. III. 40·6
Sv. I. 564 is Rv. IX. 86·43;
Sv. II. 1121 is Rv. IX. 10·3;
II. 1755 is Rv. I. 92·1;
II. 770 is Rv. IX. 32·3,

Sv. II. 1099 is
saṃ vatsa iva mātṛbhirindurhinvâno ajyate ı
devāvirmado matibhiḥ pariskrutaḥ ‖
ajyate='is sent' Griffith.

The root may be √aj and not √añj

Sv. II. 1609 is Rv. VIII. 51 9

Sv. II. 1080 is;
punāno vāre pavamāno avyaye vrso acakridadvane devānāṃ soma pavamana niskṛtam gobhirañjāno arṣisi ‖
añjānaḥ='balmed with' Griffith,
i e. anointed;

Now we may examine the occurrence in the Av.

anakti-Av. V. 27 2.
devo deveṣu devaḥ patho anakti madhvā ghrtena ı
=anoints (Whitney);

añjate-Av. XVIII. 3·18. is Rv. IX. 86·43;

anajmi-Av. IV. 14·6.
aja'manajmi pa'yasā ghrtêna divya'ṃ payasa'm *suparṇa'ṃ* bṛha'ntaṃ ı
téna gemma sukṛta'sya loka'ṃ sva'tārohanto abhí nā'kamuttama'm ‖
anajmi-abhidhārayāmi (Sā.);
=anoint; Whitney;

anaktu-Av. V 28·3,

tra'yaḥ pósastrivr'ti s'rayantāmana'ktu pūsā'
pa'yasā ghrténa ।
a'nnasya bhūmā' pūrusasya bhūma' bhūmā
pas'ūna'm ta' iha' S'rayantām ॥

anaktu = anoint, (Whitney),

añjantu occurs at Av XVIII 3 10 and III. 22·2;

Av. III. 22.2 :

mitra's'ca va'ruṇas'céndro rudra's'ca cetatu ।
devā'so vis'va'dhayasasté māñjantu va'rcasā ॥
añjantu=aktaṃ ās'liṣtaṃ kurvantu (Sā),
=anoint, (Whitney),

Av. XVIII 3. 10·2 is,

va'rcasa mā'mpita'raḥ somyā'so a'ñjantu devā'
ma'dhunā ghrténa ।
ca'ksuse mā pratara'ṃ tāra'yanto jara'se mā
jara'dastim vardhantu ॥

añjantu=anoint; (Whitney),

anktam-Av. VI 69·2
and IX 1·19,

Av. VI. 69 2. is,

a's'vinā sāraghéna mā ma'dhunānktaṃ s'ubhaspati
ya'tha bha'rgasvatīm vā'camava'dāni ja'nāṃ a'nu ॥

anktam=abhisiñcatam (Sā)
—anoint (Whitney),

Av. IX. 1·19 is the same as above

We read herein 'varcasvatim' for 'bhargasvatim'.

Conclusion :

Thus, the root '√añj' seems to carry principally the meaning,—

(i) 'to anoint' and as a consequence thereof,

(ii) 'to shine' Its use with the prefix 'vi' is in the sense of 'to shine forth', 'to glitter' etc The idea seems to be to enhance the glitter of something by the application of *some ingredient.* *

vi+ $\sqrt{}$añj :

We come across different forms of the root vi+ $\sqrt{}$añj in the Vedas

We will first take up the Rgveda

We can make a note of the fact that vi+ $\sqrt{}$añj occurs more frequently in what are known as the *later mandals of the Rv. We will try to study* all these references carefully and will try to find its *sense or senses in their various occurrences.*

vyañjate :

Rv I. 64 4 :

citraíraññjibhirvapuse vyañjate va'ksaḥsu rukā'ṃ a'dhi yetire s'ubhó ।
amsesvesam ní mimṛksur rsta'yaḥ sak'ṃ jajñire svadha'yā divó na'raḥ ॥

---

* Grassman, Roth and Bothlingk also have '$\sqrt{}$añj' in the following senses

(i) to anoint, to rub the ointment, to embalm, (salben),

(ii) to emit, (sputzen),

(iii) to shine, to glitter (glanzend),

(iv) to shine forth, (erscheinen)

(v) to decorate (schmücken),

(iv) to embelish, to attire dress (zürüstn)

vyañjate=vyaktam kurvanti
alamkurvantityarthah (Sā)
i e. they bring into light, cause to appear, display, reveal, decorate and
añjibhiḥ is explained by Sa as rūpabhi—vyañjanasamarthaih ābharaṇaiḥ
Griffith explains it as='they deck', añjibhih as 'glittering ornaments'.

Rv. VII 79.2: is

vyañjate divó antesvaktū'nvis'o na' yuktā' usa'so yatante |
sa'm te ga'vasta'ma ā' var'tayanti jyótiryacchanti savitéva bāhū ||
Sa explains as, 'vyakīkurvanti'—
i e. cause to appear, reveal etc
Griffith—'paint' (i e anoint),

Rv. IX. 86.43 is the same as seen above (see añjate),
vyañjate=vividhamañjanti (Sa).
and samañjate samyagañjanti,
=anoint, well anoint,
Griffith—'balm' (i e. anoint).

vyajyate—Rv. X 85 28,
nīlalohita'm bhavati kṛtya'saktírvyajyate |
édhante asyā jñāta'yah pa'tirbandhéṣu badhyate ||
vyajyate=tyajyate (Sā)
=driven off (Griffith)
The root is vi+√aj, not vi+√añj
It should be noted that this is the same as Av XIV. 1 26
Whitney observes that the root is vi+√aj

Rv. IX. 71.7 is

pa'rā vyakto aruṣó diva'ḥ kavírvṛ'ṣā tripṛṣṭhó '
. anavista gā' abhí ।
saha'sraṇītirya'tiḥ parāya'tī rebhó na pūrvíruṣa'so
ví rājati. ॥

Sā.–somaḥ vyaktaḥ vispaṣṭadhārāyuktaḥ yadvā vasatīvarıbhirvis'eṣeṇāktaḥ siktaḥ san.

i.e. clearly manifested, displayed or well anointed;

Griffith – ' shines ';

vyaktam – Rv. X. 14·9;
X. 127·7;

Rv. X. 14.9 :

a'peta vīta ví ca sarpatā'to'smā etáṃ pita'ro
loka'makran ।
a'hobhiradbhíraktúbhirvyaktaṃ yamô
dadātyavasā'namasmai ॥

Sā. explains : vyaktaṃ = saṃgatam;
= accompanied with (i.e. adorned with);

Griffith – ' adorned with ';

Rv. X. 127.7 :

úpa mā pépis'atta'maḥ kṛṣṇa'ṃ vyaktamasthita ।
ûṣa ṛṇéva yātaya ॥

Sā. says : vyaktaṃ vis'eṣeṇa svabhāsā sarvasyāñjakaṃ spaṣṭarūpaṃ vā i.e. that which well anoints everything with its own light, or that which is clearly manifested;

Griffith (that which) decks, (i.e. adorns);

vyakta :

Rv. VII. 77.3 :

devā'nām cā'kṣuḥ subha'gā va'hantī sveta'm
na'yantī sudṛ'sīkama'svam ।
uṣā' adars'ı ras'mibhirvyaktā citrā'maghā
visvamanu-pra'bhūtā ॥

Sā.–does not wait to explain vyaktā. But it means, 'clearly manifested'.

Griffith–(that which) 'shines apparent' i.e. clearly shines;

Rv. VIII. 56.4; is;

ta'tro a'pi prā'ṇīyata pūta'kratāyai vyaktā ।
a'svānāmíuna' yūthyām ॥

There is no Sāyaṇabhāṣya on this. We get vālakhilyasūktabhāṣya which explains it as: vividham gantā; nānāprades'eṣu pracalan.

Rv. X. 86.5. is,

priyā' taṣṭā'ni me kapir'vyaktā vyadūduṣat ।
sīro nvasya rāviṣam na' suga'm duṣkṛ'te bhuvam
vís'vasmādíndra úttaraḥ ॥

Sā.–explains as vyaktā=vyaktānyājyai, vis'eṣeṇāktāni i.e. (well adorned);

Griffith : vyakta=beauteous things (i.e. well adorned);

vyaktāh–occurs at Rv. VII. 56-1.

Rv. VII. 56-1; is,

kā' īm vyaktā na'raḥ sanīḷā rudra'sya ma'ryā
a'dhā sva'svāḥ ।

Sā.-'kāntiyuktāḥ' i.e. 'beautiful' 'lustrous', 'radiant';

Griffith-'radiant';

vyaktam-Rv. X. 85·21;

udīrṣvā'taḥ pa'tvatī hyeṣ'ṣā vis'vā'vasuṃ na'masā girbhírīḷe।

anyā'miccha pitṛṣa'daṃ vyaktāṃ sa'sáte bhāgó janú ṣā ta'sya viddhi. ॥

Sā.-explains as: vyaktāṃ anūḍheti paris'gutāṃ vigatāñjanāṃ vā।

i.e. 'clearly manifested', or that whose añjana is removed.

Griffith-'fair' (i.e. beautiful).

vyañjata-occurs at Rv. VIII. 7·25,

Rv. VIII. 7·25. is,

vidyúdhastā abhídyavaḥ síprāḥ s'írṣa'nhiraṇya'yīḥ।

s'ubhrā' vyañjata śriyé ॥

Sā.-vyañjata vyañjayanti vyaktīkurvanti dhārayantityarthaḥ i.e. 'display'; 'bear';

Griffith-'deck'.

We have seen as may as thirteen occurrences in which we come across different forms of the root vi+√añj in the Rv. These thirteen references from the Rv. bear the general sense of opening up something hidden and bringing it to light, embellishing, decorating, adorning and the like.

Thus, we can say that the root vi+√añj in the Rv. has these two connected meanings (*i*) revealing and (*ii*) adorning.

The Yajurveda has,
vyaktaḥ–at *XIX. 87;*
and vyaktaṃ–at XXXV. 1:

Yv. XIX. 87 is;

kumbhó vaniṣṭhúrjanitā' śa'chībhirya'sminna'gre yónyāṃ ga'rbho anta'ḥ I

plas'i'rvyaktaḥ śata'dhāra útso duhé na' kumbhaī' svadhā'ṃ pitṛ'bhyaḥ II

Uvaṭa explains, vyaktaḥ=spaṣṭaḥ i.e. clearly manifested or displayed; Mahidhara has vyaktaḥ= spaṣṭaḥ.

Yv. XXXV. 1. is,

apetó yantu paṇa'yo'sumnā devapīya'vaḥ I

asya' loka'ḥ sutā'vataḥ dyubhira'hobhiraktúbhi-rvyakta'ṃ yamó dadātvavasā'namasmai. II

The second half is almost identical with Rv. X. 14·9b and Uvaṭa has vyaktaṃ=spaṣṭīkṛtaṃ clearly displayed; = manifected;

Mahidhara explains similarly.

Sāmaveda has

vyañjate–Sv. I. 564;
and vyaktāh–Sv. I. 433.

Sv. I. 564 is the same as Rv. IX. 86·43;

Sv. I. 433 is the same as Rv. VII. 56·1;

Atharvaveda has :

vyañjate: Av. XVIII 3·18; is the same as Rv. IX. 68·43;
Whitney explains: ' they anoint out ' (vi);
vyajyate–Av. XIV. 1·26. is Rv. X. 85·28;

Whitney explains it from root vi+√aj and not vi+√añj.

vyaktaṃ – Av. XVIII. 1·55 is Rv. X. 14·9;

vyaktā – Av. XX 126·5.

Thus, we see that the Av. has here practically everything borrowed from Rv.

The survey of the occurrences of the root vi+√añj in the vedas shows two connected meanings, viz., to bring out something hidden by applying or enhancing something, to brighten, to embellish, to decorate, to adorn.

Thus, putting together the result of our survey, we get:

(*i*) to deck; to adorn;
as in Rv. I. 64·4; (Sā. & Griffith)
Rv. X. 14·9 („ „)
Av. XVIII. 1·55 (Whitney).

(*ii*) to manifest clearly; display, cause to appear
as in Rv. I. 64·4; (Sā.);
Rv. VII. 79·2. (Sā.);
Rv. VII. 77·5. (Sā.);
Rv. IX. 77·7. (Sā.) (Griffith);
Rv. X. 85·21; (Sā.)
Yv. XIX. 87. (Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara)
Yv. XXXV. 1 (Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara):
Rv. X. 14·9. (Sā.);
Av. XVIII. 1·55 (Sā.)

(iii) to paint (i.e. to anoint), (Griffith),
as in Rv. VII. 79 2,

(iv) to balm (i.e. anoint); (Griffith);
Rv. IX. 86 43
Sv. I. 564,

(v) to anoint
as in Rv. IX: 86·43 (Sā.)
Av. XVIII 3 18 (Sā.) and also Whitney;
Rv. X. 86 5 (Sā.)

(vi) to shine forth;
Rv. VII. 77·3. (Griffith)

(vii) beautiful; (vyaktā); Griffith
as in Rv. X. 86·5,
and also 'kāntiyuktaḥ' according to Sā. at
Rv. VII. 56·1.

'radiant', Griffith–Rv. VII. 56 1
and also Sv. I. 433 (Griffith)
'fair'– Rv. X. 55 21 (Griffith)

We may also note the occurrences of the root √dhvan or the word 'dhvani' in the vedas.

We come across,
adhvanīt – at Rv. VIII. 6 13.
adhvānayat – at Rv. VI. 18·10,
dhvanayit – at Rv. I. 162 15
and dhvani, dhvanayaḥ at Av. V. 20 7.

Rv. VIII. 6·13. is;

ya'dasya manyu'ra'dhvanīdvi' vṛtra'ṃ parvaśó ruja'n |
apa'ḥ samudra'mairayat ||

Sā.–stanayitnulakṣaṇaṃ śabdaṃ akarot;
Griffith–'thundered'.

Rv. VI. 18 10 :

agni'rna śuṣkaṃ va'namindra heti' rakṣo ni'
dhakṣyans'a'nirna' bhimā', |
gambhira'ya ṛṣva'yā yó ruróјā'dhvānayad duritā'
dambha'yaccha ||

Sā.–yuddhe garjanalakṣaṇaṃ s'abdaṃ karoti.

Rv. I. 162.15 :

mā' tvāgni'rdhvanayiddhūma'gandhirmókhā
.....etc.

Sā.–'*to make noise*'.

Griffith–'make thee crackle',

Av. V. 20 7 is,

antareme nabhasī ghoṣo astu pṛthak te dhvanayo
santu s'ībham |
='let there be noise'; Whitney;

Thus, the root √dhvan and the word dhvani carry the sense of 'to make noise' and 'noise' respectively.

The occurrences of the root vi+ √añj in different forms might have proved to be a remote source of inspiration for the theory of vyañjanā in times to come.

(*iii*) to paint (i.e. to anoint), (Griffith);
as in Rv. VII. 79·2;

(*iv*) to balm (i.e. anoint) (Griffith),
Rv. IX. 86 43
Sv. I. 564;

(*v*) to anoint
as in Rv. IX: 86·43 (Sā.)
Av. XVIII 3·18 (Sā.) and also Whitney;
Rv. X. 86·5 (Sā.)

(*vi*) to shine forth;
Rv. VII. 77·3. (Griffith)

(*vii*) beautiful; (vyaktā); Griffith
as in Rv. X. 86·5;
and also 'kāntiyuktāḥ' according to Sā. at
Rv. VII. 56·1.

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We may also note the occurrences of the root √dhvan or the word 'dhvani' in the vedas.

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adhvanīt – at Rv. VIII. 6·13.
adhvānayat – at Rv. VI. 18·10,
dhvanayit – at Rv. I. 162·15
and dhvani, dhvanayaḥ at Av. V. 20·7.

Rv. VIII. 6·13. is;

ya'dasya manyu'ra'dhvanīdvi' vṛtra'ṃ parvaśó ruja'n|
apa'ḥ samudra'mairaya(||

This is a very important occurrence. 'vyanjana' here means 'an indicator' This seems to be the earliest occurrence of 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'indication' In a similar sense, we find another root viz. √dyut In Ch I. Yaska cites the opinion of Gārgya who holds that upasargas are not meaningful by themselves but they serve to suggest or indicate the relation of nama and akhyata, with a particular meaning Says Gargaya na nirbaddhāḥ upasargāh arthan nirāhuḥ nāmākhyā tayostu karmopasamyogadyotakāḥ bhavanti.

Thus, it seems, Yāska comes very near to the power of 'dyotana' or 'suggestion' of words, though, he does not mention it by name We know that in the Kavyasāstra, the word 'dyotana' is used as an equivalent of 'vyañjanā' 'Vyañjana' in the sense of indication' in Yāska as noted above is also an important occurrence of vi + √añj. We do not come across the occurrence of √dhvan or dhvani in either Nighantu or the Nirukta.

√añj and vi + √añj in Ṛkprātis'ākhya, Astādhyāyī of Pānini (Cir. 300 B C.) and the Mahābhāsya of Patañjali (Cir. 150 B.C.)

Ṛk. Prā :

In the RK. Pra, it should be noted at the outset, that we do not come across words such as vyañjanā, dhvani etc. The word vyañjana, in the technical sense of a 'consonant' occurs at several places (4)

Astādhyāyī of Pānini (Cir 300 B.C.).

In Pāṇini, we get 'vyañjana' at II 1·34, IV iv. 26, and II. iv 12 (5) In the last two occurrences,

√añj and vi + √añj in the Nighantu and the Nirukta
(Cir 700 B C – 300 B C)

The Nighantu .

The Nighantu has no word like 'vyanjana' nor any other from the roots √añj and vi + √añj

The Nirukta : (Cir 700 B C – 500 B C)

In Nirukta, however, we have come across certain occurrences of √añj in different forms, wherein it seems to carry the sence of 'to anoint' (1)

We have P. P of vi+√añj in 'vyaktavācah' at 11 29 *in the sense of* 'distinct speech'-(vi + √añj= to manifest clearly) (2)

At 7 13 *we come across the word* 'vyañjan amatram' in the sense of 'mere indication' (3) This reads as below

.. athota karmabhirṛsirdevatah stauti vrtraha purandara iti, tanyapi eke samamananti bhūyaṃsi tu samāmnānat vyañjanamatraṃ tu tat tasyabhidha nasya bhavati yatha brāhmaṇaya bubhuksitaya odanaṃ dehi, snatayn anulepanaṃ, pipasate paniyaṃ iti

(Moreover, a seer praises deities with regard to their activities, as (Indra) the Vrtra-slayer, or the City-destroyer, and so on Some make a list of these also but they are too numerous to be collected together in a list These epithets are mere indications of (a particular aspect of the proper) appella tions, just as 'give food to a Brahmaṇa who is hungry, or unguents to one who has taken a bath, or water to one who is thirsty' (3)

cussing this particular illustration, the author says that here also, a particular action (kriyā' which has 'mandra' for its kāraka is suggested by the upasarga viz. 'āṅ'. Thus we get 'vyajyate' in the sense of 'suggestion.'

We find 'vyajyante' at I. 3·1. 19–20/258; the author says that without 'kriyā' action, the kālas such as bhūta, vartamāna etc. are not suggested. vi+√añj occurs in the sense of 'suggestion'–(athavā nāntareṇa kriyāṃ bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante–) (and also, astyādibhiś'cāpi bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante) (I. 3·1. 19 20/258)

Again, at III. 1·67. 14/57–

tiṅgabhihitena bhāvena kālapurusopagrahā abhivyajyante kṛdabhihitena punarna vyajyante.

We have 'vyajyante' in the same sense. The author says that the meaning of 'bhāva' or 'action' is suggested by both tiṅ and kṛdanta. But there is some difference in these two. Whatever is suggested by kṛdanta is in the form of a 'dravya', while by tiṅ, kāla, puruṣa, and upagraha (parsmai, and ātmane) are suggested.

Moreover, at VIII. 2·48 23/23/408, we have

añjerañjanam añjanam ca prakās'anam tathā añjervyañjanam vyañjanam ca prakās'anam–the context is that when √añj is in the sense of prakās'ana, we do not change 'ta' into 'na' in case of a P.P.P. Thus, we get √añj in the sense of 'prakāśana'–.

it is seen in the sense of a consonant. At II. i. 34, we have : 'vyañjanairupasikte'. It is explained as : dadhnā upasiktaṃ dādhikaṃ'. Anything that is used to enhanec the relish of a principal object of eating is called a vyañjana, e.g. curd, in the case of rice.

Thus, vyañjana is that which serves to enhance the relish. We come across the same use of the term vyañjana in the Nā.Śā wherein Bharata cites the analogy of sādavādirasa (Ch. VI). This can have an important bearing on the vyañjanāvāda of the ālaṃkārikas, wherein, vibhāva, anubhāva, etc. cause to enhance the sthāyin to the capacity of rasa.

It should also be noted that Pānini does not mention 'dhvani', nor does he refer to sphoṭavāda. He mentions one Sphoṭāyana without referring to the theory of sphoṭa (VI. i. 121). We also come across the word 'vyakta' meaning 'distinct', 'clear', in the sūtra I 3·48 (6).

The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Cir. 150 B C.) :

In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, we come across many occurrences of different forms of the roots añj and vi+√añj and also of words such as vyañjana, Sphoṭa, etc. (7). Some of the important occurrences are as below :

We find 'vyajyante' at Pā. Su. VIII. 1.70. line 15, page 381; ihāpi tarhi mandrasādhanā kriyāṅgā vyajyate. The context is that in the illustration, "mandrairindra' haribhiryāhi mayūraromabhiḥ; the word 'mandra' being not an indicative of 'gati' 'or' action, does not get an anudātta svara. While dis-

cussing this particular illustration, the author says that here also, a particular action (kriyā' which has 'mandra' for its kāraka is suggested by the upasarga viz. 'ān'. Thus we get 'vyajyate' in the sense of 'suggestion.',

We find 'vyajyante' at I 3 1. 19-20/258, the author says that without 'kriyā' action, the kālas such as bhūta, vartamana etc. are not suggested. vi+√añj occurs in the sense of 'suggestion'–(athavā nāntareṇa kriyām bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante–) (and also, astyādibhis'cāpi bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānaḥ kālāḥ vyajyante) (I 3·1. 19 20/258)

Again, at III. 1·67. 14/57–

tiṅgabhihitena bhāvena kālapuruṣopagrahā abhivyajyante kṛdabhihitena punarna vyajyante.

We have 'vyajyante' in the same sense The author says that the meaning of 'bhava' or 'action' is suggested by both tiṅ and kṛdanta But there is some difference in these two. Whatever is suggested by kṛdanta is in the form of a 'dravya', while by tiṅ, kala, puruṣa, and upagraha (parsmai, and ātmane) are suggested.

Moreover, at VIII 2·48 23/23/408, we have

añjerañjanam añjanam ca prakās'anam tathā añjervyañjanam vyañjanam ca prakās'anam–the context is that when √añj is in the sense of prakās'ana, we do not change 'ta' into 'na' in case of a P.P P Thus, we get √añj in the sense of 'prakāsana'–.

Later on he says that √añc is also seen in the same sense 'añcitah gacchati 'means 'prakāśayati ātmānam iti gamyate'. In our popular usage añcitaḥ gacchati means 'being alert he goes-samāhito bhūtvā gacchati'. The author here uses terms such as 'iti gamyate'. This brings us very near to the vyañjanāvāda.

Thus we see that √añj, √añc and vi+√añj are all used in the sense of prakas'ana, i e. manifestation, or revealing or bringing something into light, or displaying something etc ... 'vyañjana' occurs in its technical sense of a consonant. At VIII. 2·48 24/24 however, we get it in the sense of prakaśana,
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as noted above Thus √añj and vi+√añj seem to occur in the same senses as in the earlier literature Vi+√añj in the sense of suggestion is also noted as at Mahābhasya VIII 1 70 15/381, or Mahābhasya I. 3 1.' 19/20 etc. as noted above
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Different forms of vi+√añj, dhvani etc. as seen in earlier poets.

(i) Bhāsa. (Cir. 300 A D.)
(ii) As'vaghoṣa. (Cir. 100 A D)
(iii) Kalidasa. (Cir 400 A D.).

We have traced the earlier occurrences of the words connected with vyañjana in the vedic litera ture. Now let us take note of these words in earlier classical literature e g. the plays or Bhāsa and works of As'vaghosa and Kalidasa.

That criticism follows literature does not quire proof. That practice precedes theory and in s turn is guided by theory is well proved in the story of literature, science, fine arts, etc. So, before e come to Bharata and Bhāmaha, let us take note the usage of vyañjanā, rasa, etc., in earlier classi-ıl literature. The date of the plays attributed to hāsa is still a matter of controversy. Bhāsa, how-/er, is placed earlier than Kālidāsa by scholars ke Keith and others. I shall therefore, take him rst for the sake of convenience of the treatment of ıe subject.

hāsa : (Cir. 300 A.D).

In the thirtten plays ascribed to Bhāsa, we come cross words like vyaktaṃ, vyaktih, suvyaktaṃ, yaktikṛtam etc., in the sense of 'clearly manifes-ed.' We also come across sūcayati, sūcayitavyah, ūcayanti etc., in the sense of 'suggesting or indica-ing' (8). Some of the more interesting occurrences re as below :

In the second act of Avimāraka the prince is itting all alone, lost in the thoughts of Kuraṅgī. Meanwhile, two maid servants of Kuraṅgī came there rith some message. The dialogue proceeds as follows :

Dhātrī-ārya ! kiṃ cintyate ?

Avimārakaḥ-Bhavati, śāstraṃ cintyate

Dhā – kiṃ nāmaitad ramaṇīyaṃ śāstraṃ vivikte cintyate ?

Avi.– Bhavati ! yogaśāstraṃ cintyate !

Dha – (sasmitam)pratigrhitam mangalavacanam !
yogaśāstrameva bhavatu !

Avi (ātmagatam) ko nu khalu vākyarthah !
anyadapyabhilāsavaśadanyathā samkalpa
yāmi ! (prakāsam) kimabhipretam bhavatyāh !

Dha – yogamicchantyavāgate svah ! anumata
aryena yoga iti nanu nisthitam kāryamas
mākam rājakule vivikta avakaśe ! tatrāpi
ko pi jano'dhikataram yogam cintayannasti !
tena saha tatraivaryena susthu yogavi
dhānam cintyatamiti !

The passage leaves no doubt that the author is not only fairly conversant with the 'abhipreta artha' or the implied sense, but also seems to be conversant with the verbal function called vyañjana

In the Carudatta act II we come across the following dialogue

Ganika – samvahaka āryah ! sukumāra kala
śiksitaryena !

Samvāhakah – kaleti śiksitā !
ājivikedanim samvrtta !

Ganikā – nirvedasucakamiva vacanamaryasya !
tatastatah !

Thus a sentence becomes 'sūcaka or suggestive of a bhāva called nirveda

Again in the act III we have,–

Brahmani ha dhik ! (niskrānta)

Vidūsakah esā vacā duhkham raksitvaśrubhih
sucayitva gata ! bhoh ! idam !

Here also, 'as'ru' or tears, an anubhāva, become suggestive of the feeling of grief.

Again, In the act I, we have Gaṇikā-(prāvārakaṃ gṛhitvā saharṣam)-anudāsinaṃ yauvanamasya paṭavāsagandhaḥ sūcayati !

The fragrance is said to reveal that his yauvana is 'anudāsīna' (not indifferent to the joys of life).

In the Pratimānāṭaka, act V we have,

Rāmaḥ...........aye imāni khalu pratyagrā*bhiṣiktāni vṛkṣamūlāni adūragatāṃ maithilīṃ sūcay*anti ! tathā hi......etc. (Act. V.)·

Here, one fact viz. that Sitā has not moved much farther, is suggested by yet another fact viz. the roots of trees that are recently sprinkled. But herein, we can read even the process of reasoning on the part of the hero. The word 'dhvani' occurs in the usual sense of 'sound' only.

As'vaghoṣa : (Cir. 100 A.D.)

Now we turn to Aśvaghoṣa (9). We come across 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'embellishment' ádoration' etc., as in Saundarananda XVIII. 11-viz,

maitrīstanīṃ vyañjanacārusāsnāṃ
saddharmadugdhāṃ pratibhānaśṛṅgām !
tavāsmi gāṃ sādhu nipīya tṛiptaḥ
tṛṣeva gāmuttamavátsavarṇaḥ !

Here, the word vyañjana, it may be noted is in the sense of alaṃkāra.

Again, at Bu Ca XVI 73, we have vyañjana in the same sense

sarvakleśābhividdhānām kleśaśalyasamuddharaḥ ।
sarvalakṣaṇasampannaḥ sarvavyañjanamaṇḍitaḥ ॥

vi + √añj in the sense of 'to manifest clearly' or 'to suggest' occurs at Bu. Ca IV 84

upapannamidaṃ vākyaṃ sauhardavyañjakam tvayi ।
atra ca tvānumesyāmi yatra mā dusthu manyase ॥

Herein, a vākya is said to be 'sauhardavyañjaka' i e suggestive of friendship. The sentence, i e a group of words, suggests the bhāva of 'sauharda' It may be noted that this passage is specially interesting and useful from the point of view of our inquiry

The occurrence of vyañjana meaning ornament in the verses quoted above is also of some importance for our investigation We know that in Vāmana the word alaṃkāra has two senses, (i) that of saundarya, and (ii) that of a figure of speech It is not unlikely that the word vyañjana had also a sense similar to alaṃkāra i e, beauty or beautifying agent and also the sense of suggestion The first sense of alaṃkara seems to have gone out of usage but the second sense seems to have prevailed in Sanskrit Poetics

We come across some occurrences of 'dhvani' in the sense of 'sound' only This cannot have any reference to the theory of dhvani of the writers of poetics

Kālidāsa (Cir. 400 A.D.):

In Kalidāsa, we come across vi+√añj in its different grammatical forms (10). All the occurrences of vi+√añj, in the Kumara., except at II. 11, are in the sense of 'to manifest', 'to display' 'to bring into light' etc At II. 11, we have 'vyakta' and 'vyaktetara' having the philosophical connotation of '*the manifest*' and '*the unmanifest*'. *Kumāra.* VII. 91 is more interesting. It runs as below:

tau sandhisu vyañjitavrttibhedam
rasāntaresu pratibaddharāgam I
apaśyatāmapsarasām muhūrtam
prayogamādyam lalitāngahāram II

Here, we have 'vyañjita' in the sense of *manifested, revealed. There is also the mentioning of* pañcasandhi, vrtti, and rasa. This suggests an advanced stage of the science of dramatury.

In the Megha. 12 (pūrva), we have 'snehavyaktih', i.e, the manifestation of love Megha. 29 (pūrva) is very interesting It reads as

venībhūtapratanusalilā' savatītasya sindhuh
pānducchayā tataruhatarubhramś'ibhirjīrna
parnaih I
saubhagyam te subhaga virahāvasthayā
vyañjayantī
kārśyam yena tyajati vidhinā sa
tvayaivopapādyah II

That the nāyakanāyikābhāva is suggested here is clear. Mallinātha explains it fully. 'Vyañjayanti' is explained as 'prakāśayanti' i.e. 'suggesting'. The river Nirvindhyā is said to suggest, by her

condition in separation, the good fortune of the cloud, the lover. This may have an important bearing on the formation of the theory of vyañjana of the writers on poetics, wherein something else is suggested with the help of something else.

In the Raghu also very often we have vi + √añj in the sense of 'to manifest' Raghu XIII 12 and XIV. 26 are more interesting They read as below

XIII 12—

velānilaya prasrta bhujanga vahormivisphūr
jathunirvis'eṣāḥ I

suryāms'usamparkasamrddharagairvyajyanta
ete maṇibhih phaṇasthaih II

vyajyante=unniyante (Mallinatha)– i e are suggested, and XIV 26 is—

athādhikasnigdhavilocanena mukhena sitā
s'arapāṇdureṇa I

ānandayitri parinetur āsidanaksaravy
añjitadohadena II

anaksaravyañjita is explained by Mallinātha as avāgvyapāraṃ yathā bhavati tatha vyañjitam

In Malavika, Vikrama, and Abhi S'a, in a the occurrences, vi + √añj carries the sense of 'to manifest'

Thus, we have seen that in Bhasa, Asvaghosa and Kālidasa, we come across certain occurrences of vi + √añj in the sense of 'to suggest', that might have paved the way to the formation or the theory of vyañjanā at the hands of the writers on poetics

Foot notes :

(1) **añjate** occurs at Nirukta 12.7 and is the same as Rv. I. 92.1.

añjan, at 3.20; (i e. Rv. I. 92.5.);

añjanti at 8.18; (i.e. Rv. III 8.1);

and also, **añkte** vyakte vyaktatare (Ch. I); akṣiṇī kasmāt, añkteḥ, etc.– in the sense of 'clearly manifested'. and also, **anakti** at 8.10;

Yāska explains 'uṣāsānaktā;

He says : uṣā vyākhyātā. naktetı rātrınāma. **anakti** bhūtānyavas'yāyena. apı vā naktā avyaktavarṇā tayoreṣā bhavatı.

anakti = anoınts,

avyaktavarṇā = not of dıstınct colour (ı.e. havıng no clearly manıfested colour).

'vı+√añj' ıs seen ın the sense of manıfestatıon;

(2) vyaktavācaḥ at 11.29 ıs :

devīm vācam ajanayanta devāḥ tām sarvarūpāḥ pas'avo vayantı,

vyaktavācas'cāvyaktavācaḥ ca

(3) *Translatıon – Sarup p.p 120*

Nırukta (7.13)–

ıtı ımā devatā anukrāntaḥ–sūktabhājaḥ havırbhājaḥ, ṛgbhājas'ca bhūyıṣṭāḥ kas' cınnıpātabhājaḥ, atha uta abhıdhānaıḥ samyujya havıs'codayatı ındrāya vṛtraghne ındrāya aṃhomuce ıtı. tānyapı eke samāmananti, bhūyāṃsı tu samāmnānāt yattu saṃvıjñānabhūtam syāt prādhānyastutı tat samāmane atha uta karmabhıḥ ṛṣıḥ devatāḥ stauti vṛtrahā purandaraḥ ıtı. tānyapı eke samāmanantı, bhūyāṃsı tu samāmnānāt. vyañjanamātram tu tat tasyābhıdhānasya bhavatı yathā brāhmaṇāya bubhukṣıtāya odanam dehı, snātāya anulepanam. pıpāsate pānīyam itı.

(Nirukt = 7.13)

(4) RK Prā. has,

'vyañjana' at XVIII (patala) 32 (sūtra), 42, 43,

vyanjanam'–I 5, 22,
II 8
VI 14,

'vyanjanasya'–XIV 15,

'vyanjanāt'–XIV 47,
XVIII 44,

'vyanjanānam'–XIV 16

'vyañjanani–I 6 23,
IV 1,
XVIII 33,

'vyañjane'–VII 1,
'vyañjanena'–III 17,
'vyañjanesu–VIII 48
'vyanjanasamgamam'–XVIII 40
'vyanjanasannipatah'–I 37,
vyañjanodayam'–VII 33,
'vy ñjanodayāt'–VI 46,

(5) Pāṇini (astadhyayī)
II iv 12,–
IV iv 26,–

(6) 'vyaktavāc–I 3 48–vyaktavācām samuccāraṇe–
'vyaktivacanah –I 2 51,–
sphotāyanah–VI 1 123–avaṅ sphotāyanasya

(7) In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali we have
vyajyante – at Pā Sū I 3 48 line 7-8-8-8/page 283
abhivyajyeta at V 3 55 17/415,
añjana at VIII 2I 48 23-23/408
vyañjana at pratyāhāra sutra 23 26/26
and at I 1 3 3/11/13/15/22/25 / 43

Foot notes :

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'vyañjanam'–I. 5; 22;
II. 8:
VI 14;

'vyañjanasya'–XIV. 15;

'vyañjanāt'–XIV. 47,
XVIII. 44;

'vyañjanānām'–XIV. 16.

'vyañjanāni–I. 6.23;
IV. 1;
XVIII. 33;

'vyañjane'–VII, 1;
'vyañjanena'–III. 17;
'vyañjanesu–VIII. 48,
'vyañjanasamgamam'–XVIII. 40;
'vyañjanasannipātaḥ'–I. 37;
'vyañjanodayam'–VII. 33;
'vyañjanodayāt'–VI. 46;

(5) Pāṇini (aṣṭādhyāyī)
II. iv. 12;–
IV. iv. 26;–

(6) 'vyaktavāc–I. 3.48–vyaktavācām samuccāraṇe–
'vyaktavacanaḥ'–I. 2.51 ,–
sphoṭāyanaḥ–VI 1. 123–avaṅ sphoṭayanasya.

(7) In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali we have ;
vyajyante – at Pā Sū. I. 3 48 line 7-8-8-8/page 283.
abhivyajyeta : at V. 3.55.17/415,
añjana : at VIII. 21 48.23-23/408.
vyañjana : at pratyāhāra sūtra 23 26/26
and at I 1 3 3/11/13/15/22/25;
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I. 1.3. 21/48;
I. 1.50. 19/123
I. 1.51. 16-19/128;
I. 1.73. 18-21-21/189;
I. 2 30 15/18/19/19/21/23/24/30, / 206
II. 1.34 35 19/386
III. 2 109 4/117;
VI. 1.2. 1/2/4/5/7, / 7
VI. 1.3 14/8,
VI. 1.131-17/19,
VI I 223 19/20/21/23, / 119
VI 1 223 6/9/9/15; / 1 20
VI 4.16-3/185,
VII. 1 73 19/265,
VIII 2 4-4/389
VIII. 2 48. 24/24 / 408, 2 / 409

vyañjanādyartha : at VII 2 115 7/8 / 314,

vyañjanānta at I. 1 29 10 / 91 :
II. 4 43 2/2 / 485
IV. 1 1. 18/21/21 / 191
VI. 1 223 17 / 119 : 8/11/20/21 / 120 ;
VI. 4 56. 23 / 203 :
VIII 2.82 23 / 415 :

The references are to Dr. Keilhorn's Ed

(8) In the Svapnavāsavadattam we have the following:
'sarpavyakti'–at Svapna V.
'vyaktam'–at Svapna V. 7
'vyaktam'–at Svapna VI. 14

In the Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa we have 'vyaktam' ātmahite ksaman (Act I) Introduction.

and also, Yaugandha.–vyaktīkrtam asāmarthyam etc

and, 'vyaktam' balam, etc

and also 'vyaktam'–(Act II 1),

Kāñcukiyaḥ-' suvyaktam '-(Act II),
rājā-' vyaktam '-(Act II),
Yau -vyaktam bharatarohako etc (Act IV)

The Avimāraka has,
Kauñjayanaḥ- *vyaktahimamurtih etc*) Act. I)
Avimārakaḥ-vyaktam svayam viṇām vādayati-(Act III)

The Cārudatta has:–
Nayakaḥ sarvathā suvyaktam gitam (Act III) and also,

Sajjalakaḥ dipaprabhāvyaktikrtam drs'yate-(Act III)

The Pratimānāṭaka has,
Rāmaḥ suvyaktaṃ prabhavāmiti etc (I 11) and also
Bharataḥ–bahumānavyākṣiptena manasa suvyaktam nāvadharitam etc (Act III).

The Abhisekanāṭaka has,
Angadaḥ vyakta mutsrjya deham etc. (II 25), and also
Rāvanaḥ vyaktamindrajitā etc (V 10), and also
Rāmaḥ vyaktaṃ daivagatim etc (VI 34)

The Dūtavākya has-
Duryodhanaḥ-suvyaktam prāpta eva kes'avaḥ and also,

Sudars'anah ...avyaktādiracintyātmā etc

The Dūtaghatotkaca has—

Durtarastraḥ-suvyaktaṃ nihatam etc I. 26 and also,-suvyaktaṃ dhanusi etc I 28

The Pañcarātra has

Bhismaḥ-' suvyaktam bahus'alinaḥ' etc. I 50, and also

Bṛhannalā Yena suvyaktakārina II 65

The Madhyama has,

Bhimaḥ suvyaktaṃ rākṣasijo etc I 26

The Urubhanga has,

tṛtīyaḥ vyaktikṛtā dinakarograkaraiḥ =etc I 121 and also

As'vatthāma vyaktam nirjita eva etc I 58 d

The Bālacarita has vasudevaḥ vyaktam ghoṣasamipe etc

(9) The Saundarananda has vi+ √añj at II 38, XIII 41, and XVIII 11,

The Bu Ca has vi+ √añj at,

IV 58, IV 84, IX 64, XII 18, XII 22 XII 40, XVI 73, and XVI 130, and 'dhvani at IV 51, V 80, VIII 72,

Bu Ca, IX 64, XII 18 XII 22, and XII 40, have 'vyakta' and 'avyakta' having a philosophical con notation of 'the manifest' and 'the unmanifest' Sau II 38 and XIII 41 have vi+ √añj in the sense of 'to indicate', 'to manifeet clearly'

Bu Ca XVI 130 has vi+ √añj in the sense of 'to the letter' as opposed to 'artha' or 'spirit'

(10) In Kālidasa we have, vi+ √añj at

Kumāra -II 11, V 62, VI 23, VI 51, VII 91, VIII. 37, VIII 71, and IX 6,

Megha -Vs 12, 29 55 (pūrva),
and 21 (uttara)

Raghu -I 10, IV 68, V. 16, VI 12, VII 58, XI 41, XIII 12, XIV 26, XVI 23, XVII 40, XIX 30 XIX. 41, vı + √anȷ occurs ın the sense of 'to manıfest'

Mālavıkā Somewhere after I 9, II 10, and IV 1,
Vıkramo Somewhere after III 7, and V 7,
Abhı Śāku Somewhere ın act V
and at VII 8, VII 17,

√dhvan or 'dhvanı' occurs at
vs

Ṛtu - 10 (Pravṛdvarṇanam)
15 (, ,,)
and 21 (, ,,)

Kumara -I 56,
VIII 24,
VIII 71,
XI 36 38,
XIV 27, 39, 45

Megha -Vs 42, 56 (pūrva)–
Vs 3, 36 (uttara)

Raghu -II 72,
IV 73
VI 56,
VII 41.
and XVI 13,

CHAPTER II

'Dvani in the Grammarians and certain parallelisms between Sphotavāda and the theory of dhvani'.

We may say, on the authority of Ānandavardhana (middle of the 9th cen A D De, Sk P p. 101, Ed '60), that the concept of dhvani was not unknown to the early poeticists such as Bhamaha (last quarter of the 7th cen. A.D to the middle of the 8th cen. A.D. De p. 49–50), Dandin, (1st half of the 8th cen A D De p 67) etc. Ānandavardhana observes that Bhamaha and others subsumed dhvani under various heads such as alamkāra, guṇa, etc I am going to examine this position in Ch VI, but one point is clear that in Bhamaha, Dandin, etc dhvani has not emerged as the soul of poetry

Ānandavardhana and his followers clearly mention that they have derived inspiration for the dhvanivāda from the Sphotavāda of the grammarians We may therefore examine the Sphotavada of the Vaiyakaranis and also their concept of Sphota and dhvani We will also consider as to how far the writers on poetics are exactly indebted to the Vaiyākaranas in upholding their theory of dhvani and vyañjanā

The grammarians are held in very high esteem by the poeticists They, for their concept of dhvani

in poetry, turn to the Vaiyakaranas whom they quote with great respect Ānandavardhana in his Dhv says ' The expression,' is designated by the learned ', brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by *the learned and that it had not gained currency* in a haphazard fashion. The foremost among the learned are grammarians because grammar lies at the root of all studies They indeed refer to articulate sound units by the term dhvani or ' suggester ' In the same way, since the element of suggestion was common (to both), not only the word and its meaning, but it's essential verbal power and also that which is usually referred to by the term poetry, was given the same *designation,* viz *Dhvani by other* learned men, whose insight into the fundamental truth about poetry was profound and who were the followers of the principle laid down by the grammarians " (1)

(Translation Krishnamoorthy)

Mammata (middle of the 11th cen and beginning of the 12th cen A D – De, p 146) also in his K P speaks to the same effect when he says

" This (i e poetry) is the best when the suggested sense eclipses the expressed sense, it is styled Dhvani by the learned " And also—' Idaṃ, i e Poetry The learned grammarians gave the style of Dhvani to the word, in as much as it is suggestive of the suggested thing, viz Sphota (The Revealer) ' (2)

He adds, " Hence, others also following their view (gave the name of Dhvani) to the pair of

word and sense such as are capable of suggesting a sense other than the direct sense" (3).

Now, one thing that emerges very clearly out of this is that the term dhvani was first used in a peculiar sense by the grammarians and the poeticists, borrowing it whole sale, applied it to the domain of poetry in their own way.

Patañjali :

In order to get a clear idea of the concept of dhvani in the grammarians, we will turn to Patañjali first.

In the Paspasāhnika we come across the following discussion (4) · "when one says 'gauh' what is Sabda ? Is it the object which has the dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc ? "No", he says, "it is called dravya'. "Is it then its gesture, movement, or winking ?" "No', he says "it is called kriya or action" "Is it then the whiteness, blueness, brownness, or greyness ? No, it is called 'guna' Is it than the sum total of the qualities like "sattā" which ever exists even when the individuals are broken or destroyed ?" "No", he says, "it is called ākrti".

Then what is S'abda ? (5). "S'abda is that on the manifestation of which, the correct knowledge of the object which has dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc., is produced, or the sound which has a decisive meaning is said to be 'S'abda' in the world .. Hence, dhvani is S'abda".

When a word like 'gauh' is pronounced the following concepts appear in the mind of the hearer, the individuality cow, her action, her qualities genus cow, the shape of the cow, and also the word made up of 'g' au' and 'visarga' The hearer wants to make out the exact connotation Individually cow, her qualities, etc, are seen by the eyes and the word 'gauh' is heard by the ear. So, it is absurd to take this for the exact connotation But since the relation of S'abda and artha guna and gunī, and kriyā and kriyavan is that of identity according to the grammarians as there is a rule tadabhinnābhinnasya tadabhinnatvam, it is quite natural to think so The Mahabhasyakāra says that the ākrti, guna, etc are not the true connotations of the S'abda, but the true connotation is Sphota-that, which when manifested, enables the hearer to have a clear knowledge of the object 'cow'.

The sanskrit grammarians hold that the S'abda is not the sound units that we hear but it is manifested in the mind after the whole word is pronounced It may be noted that according to Sanskrit grammarians, S'abda is of four phases viz para pasyanti madhyamā and vaikhari S'abda Brahman when manifested at the muladhāra or the sacral plexus is called para vāk, when manifested at the naval it is pasyanti at the heart madhyama and vaikhari is that phase which is manifested out of the vocal organs as the articulated sound (6)

In the ninth āhnika, Patañjali discusses the taparasutra (pa. 1 1 70) There are two points to

be examined (*i*). Is 'tatkālasya' a correct expression or not? And (*ii*).-Is this sūtra an apūrvavidhi or a niyamavidhi? While discussing the latter point the author talks about Sphoṭa and dhvani (7):

At the end of some technical discussion (8), it is stated-

evaṃ tarhi Sphoṭaḥ, s'abdaḥ dhvaniḥ S'abdaguṇaḥ.- 'If so, Sphoṭa is the S'abda and dhvani is the S'abdaguṇa'.

Katham? how?

bheryāghātavat - Like the beater of a drum. tadyathā bheryāghāto bherīmāhatya kaścidviṃśati padāni gacchati, kas'cit triṃs'at, kas'cit catvāriṃs'at.

"This may be illustrated as follows—

One beater of the drum goes twenty steps at the time when the sound by beating the drum lasts, another thirty steps, and another forty steps. Beating is the same. The increase is due to the sound production by beating'.

It is observed,

"dhvaniḥ Sphoṭasca śabdānāṃ, dhvanistu khalu laksayet |

alpo mahāṃs'ca, kesāṃcit ubhayaṃ tatsvabhāvatah ||

With reference to sabdas there are dhvani and Sphoṭa. Of them dhvani alone is cognisable to the sense of hearing. It is short, it is long, and it is by nature both (long and short) at the hands of some.

śabda, he makes his position very clear by suggesting that no question of order such as priority and posteriority and that of plurality can be logically raised in relation to Sphota which is essentially one and eternal It is sound, he observes, that passes through successive stages in case of articulation and appears to be either long or short in proportion to the exertion required for the utterance of a word So, it is particularly due to varying modulations of voice, as caused by vocal apparatus, that 'ka' sound seems to be different from 'kha' sound and the like But Sphota remains unaffected. Thus the Sun, a fixed body, seems to be quivering when reflected in an agitated pool of water (11)

Order and difference pertaining to sound are falsely attributed to Sphota The dual aspects of śabda as observed already imply that sabda has the potency of expressing itself as well as its meaning that is associated with it by inseparable connection (12)

The grammarians maintain that there are two different aspects of words, viz, kārya or the popular form and nitya or the permanent form. The former is usually produced by the exercise of the vocal appartus and serves to give a reflection of internal consciousness, and the latter is what represents the ultimate germ of speech Sphota is to be identified with this latter aspect of speech

The three views regarding the cognition of sound and Sphota are (i) Sound when produced is heard by the auditory organs and becomes the

positive instrument whereby Sphota is comprehended. (ii) After having assumed the material form through the medium of sound, Sphota is capable of being heard, and (iii) sound acts upon the organ concerned and serves to manifest Sphota

Bhartrhari supports the third view Sound serves as an outer garment of Sphota Though incompre hensible and inconceivable in itself Sphota reveals its existence through the medium of sound

Sound and Sphota are intimately related As to how sound and Sphota, that are related to each other as the indicative and the indicated, are to be comprehended, Bhartrhari refers to four different views Some hold that Sphota is recognised as identical with sound, just as crystal looks red when in contact with a japa kusuma (13) Others say that sound (though not cognisable by itself) is indicative of Sphota Still others maintain that the exact nature of Sphota is too subtle to be determined and it is sound only that comes under comprehension and finally according to some, Sphota is really manifested but is indistinct and unintelligible on account of distance from where it is evolved

While referring to the intellectual process involved in the comprehension of śabda, Bhartrhari holds that the cognition of sabda practically follows from the last sound together with the impression made by the preceding ones We may try to understand this, 'varnoccāraprakriyā' or the process of the pronounc ing of sound units

There are three opinions as to the nature of a word, (i) the word is not eternal, i e, it is anitya The words are created and destroyed They have a jāti or a class in keeping with other objects This view is held by the Nyaya Vaiśesika systems (ii) Varṇas or sound units are nitya or permanent and are the cause of śabda These letters have a relation with meaning and this relation is called śakti This view is held by the Mīmaṃsa, Vedanta, Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools (iii) Third is the opinion of Sphotavada or the akhaṇdatavadi of the grammarians The grammarians believe in the identity and indivisibility of the letters On account of the contact of air and the like, the varnas or sound units are manifested as different These manifested letters are known as 'nada' They suggest the Sphota which is gathered by antima buddhi i e, final cognition As suggested above, Patañjali has already made this thing clear, when he talks of the four forms of vak such as para, pasyanti etc These are the four stages through which Sphota (nadabindu) receives manifestation Both parā and pas'yanti are too subtle and delicate to be comprehended by the sense organ Para resides in the mūladhara or the sacral plexus in the form of a motionless bindu (14)

Pas'yanti comes up to the naval region pushed up by the internal wind Of the four forms, it is madhyama that indicates Sphoṭa All these are more or less mysterious in nature Vaikhari is the popular form and it is what is uttered by the vocal organ and is capable of being heard by others It is again

held that nâda is simultaneously produced by *madhyamā and vaikharī but there is a lot of difference* between the two (15). The nāda, produced by the madhyamā is slightly cognised by us either at the time of counting japa, or when the ears are shut up (16). This nāda, manifested by madhyamā is what we precisely know by the name of Sphoṭa. It stands for Brahman and is eternal, one, without division, etc. *According to this view, it is one and the same* indivisible Sphoṭa that is represented by varṇa. pada and vākya, in the same way as one and the same face appears to be long and round when seen through stone, sword, and looking glass, or as a piece of stone taking reflection from red or blue flowers seems to be either red or blue (17). The difference between 'ka' and 'ga' is not on account of the diversity of Sphoṭa, but points to the peculiarities of sound that serves to manifest Sphoṭa (18). The unity and indivisibility of Sphoṭa are brought about by its comparision with the sky and consciousness, which though one and not admitting of fractions, are said to have such attributive difference as ghaṭākāśā, maṭhākās'a, and jiva, īs'vara, etc. respectively. Thus those who take pada and vākya to be similarly indivisible units say as follows : just as letters are devoid of parts, so too no letters are comprehended in padas (19).

Strictly speaking, it is not admissible to take words separately by splitting up a sentence. To those who advocate the divisibility of both pada and vākya, it is the last letter that indicates Sphoṭa, and each

preceding letter serves to make for a cognition of the intended sense (20).

Taking into consideration the difference between madhyamā and vaikhari sound can be divided into two viz original or eternal (i e inexhaustible) and artificial (derived) or momentary (21) The natural sound only, which is generated by madhyamā, suggests Sphota. The unnatural (aprakrta dhvani) sound is so termed because it rises from prākṛta dhvani and undergoes an amount of modification in the form of long and short sound Sphota which is essentially one and beyond any modification is not in the least effected by the quick utterance of sound which practically refers to vaikrta dhvani Another point that should be noted down is that it is Sphota alone, as is evident from its derivative meaning that is really associated with the expressiveness of sound (sphutatyarthósmādıti Sphotah) [For the sake of convenience alone we regard word as having meaning A closer examination of both the internal and external facts will show that Sphota alone is finally the significant element of speech Moreover, Bhartṛhari holds that Sphota is practically one and the same but it is only the indicator of Sphota viz Sound that differs (22)

How is Sphota manifested ?

The answer is that it is practically from the last letter that the cognition of the entire word is derived together with the impressions produced by preceding letters (23) And, it is evidently an intellectual

operation which enables us to retain recollection of the entire structure of a word, even when we hear the last letter alone. 'Manifested by sound', implies that Sphota, though permanent, is not aloways comprehensible, but comes under our cognition only when the vocal organs are engaged in operation for its manifestation

Thus Sphota is regarded as 'antimabuddhigrāhya'. There is a rule that s'abda, buddhi and karma are dvikṣaṇasthāyī (i e they continue to stay for two moments) They come into existence in the first moment, exist in the second and die out in the third For example, we may take the word 'ghata'. There are four letters in it viz, 'gh' 'a' 't' and 'a'. First 'gh' is created It continues to stay in the second moment In this very moment 'a' is created. In the third moment 'gh' is destroyed but 'a' continues to exist and 't' comes into existence Now when 't contipues in the next moment, the last 'a' comes into existence In the sixth moment the last 'a' also disappears Now, for those who regard letters to be eternal, 'utpatti' means 'abhivyakti'. So the whole word ghata, the varnasamghāta-or the collection of letters never comes into existence at one and the same moment Then how is the meaning gathered? The answer is that though the varṇa sound unit-is destroyed, it gives rise to some samskara or impression. This samskāra or impression stays on and is united with the next letter Thus the assemblage of samskaras unites with the last 'a' and we get the word 'ghata' This happens in case of yajñadikārya

(or sacrificial rite) which gives rise to the fruit in form of heaven (svarga). Sphota is also 'antimavarna-grāhya' in this very sense

The gist of the above is that eternal and indivisible sphota is manifested in the form of letters through dhvani or sound.

So, dhvani is two fold Prākrta or natural and vaikrta or unnatural as already observed The prākrta-dhvani is qualified by the qualities such as 'katva', 'hrasvatva', 'adyudattatva', etc. Even though Sphota is selfmanifested it is as though obstructed by the accumulated vayusamyoga or, contact with air. By removing this obstruction, the prākrtadhvani manifests Sphota. This manifested Sphota is different from the dhvani and so Sphota is said to be one, eternal, all-pervading and manifested by different dhvanis and it gives meaning when it becomes antyabuddhigrahya – i e, when gathered at the last moment. This prakrtadhvani is the same as varnas sound-units and Sphota is never manifested unless through them. Vaikṛta dhvani has a different function It creates vrttibheda e g. drtavilambitādi in the letters gathered by prākrta dhvani. Thus even if there is vaikrtadhvanibheda we have no prākrta-dhvanibheda So we get uniformity in form i e, ekarūpata of ākāra and the like

Thus, the term dhvani is used in three different ways:

(1) Dhvani is used for 'sabdaja śabda' of the Naiyāyikas On the basis of this, the ālamkārikas call vyangyārtha to be dhvani,

the sādharmya being pratiyamānatva or utpadyatva

(ii) According to Vaiyakaraṇas, Sphota is vyangya-suggested, and prākrtadhvani is the vyañjaka or suggester. Dhvani is thus vyañjaka On the basis of this, the alamkārikas call the 'vyañjaka sabdārthau' to be dhvani, and

(iii) the vaikrtadhvanis make for the vrttibheda Hence, vyañjanāvyāpāra is termed as dhvani

So, for the grammarians the relation between Sphota and dhvani is that of vyangya vyañjaka.

We have also noted that the grammarians use dhvani to mean (i) nādamatra or sound only, and (ii) śabda or word So ghaṭa the dhvani which is just sound-nādamatra-by itself has no relation with the object ghata-a pot which is seen, touched, etc (sparśaksama) The sound ghata is something quite different from the object ghata which can be seen touched, etc Still, it should be noted very carefully that the sound ghata indicates something which it is not viz the object ghata This idea of one thing indicating something else which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of dhvani. So, in all cases of expression where one thing expresses something which it is not, it is, so to say, taken as a case of dhvani It is this mode of expression, both to be found in ordinary conversation as well as in literature, that in sanskrit tradition is studied as a particular linguistic mode of expression Therefore, dhvani is that which suggests something other than

itself, and which is known to be separate from itself, and by this common point of suggestion (vyañjakatvasamyāt) the vyāpara-process-is also called dhvani. According to the vaiyākaraṇas the world is artharūpa i e, of the form of artha or meaning, and is derived from Sphoṭa, the S abdaBrahma In the like fashion, we derive the ghatartha from the word ghata

This dhvani is identified with word in our day to day affairs So kāvya is also termed as dhvanikāvya Every sound is suggestive of the S abdaBrahma, which is Sphoṭarūpa The artha of this S abdaBrahma is world Thus, S'abda, through Sphota, suggests an object The whole process is as follows dhvani-sabda-S abdaBrahma-i e, Sphota and vivartita artha Here we may note that even in the process of gathering the conventional meaning from the word, an element of suggestion or vyañjanā is involved. Vyañjanā is that process by which something not manifested becomes manifested Dhvani or S bda first suggests Sphota and as Sphota is eternally connected with the meaning, we derive meaning from dhvani Moreover, it may be noted that vyañjanā is that process of manifestation through which something already existing is manifested Vyañjanā does not create new objects

Sphotavāda and Vyañjanāvāda

We will be able to make a note of certain marked parallelisms between the Sphotavāda of the grammarians on the one hand and the vyañjanavada on the other The points of comparison are as below

(*i*) As observed earlier, for the grammarians, dhvani is explained as 'dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ'. Dhvani is so termed because it sounds or rings or reverberates Sphota, i.e. suggests it. The word ghata, for example, is used for the object-artha-ghata, which is seen, touched etc. This idea of one thing indicating something else which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of dhvani. So all cases of expression, where one thing expresses something which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of dhvani The writers on poetics extend this connotation of the word dhvani. Taking the quality of 'dhvanitva' into consideration, they include all that was related to this in dhvani Thus, guna, alaṃkāra, rīti, vṛtti, pada, padamsa, varna, vākyārtha, all these become vyañjaka, suggestive of the vyangya.

(*ii*) In the philosophy of the grammarians the sound 'ghata' for example, does not give the meaning directly. It does so through Sphoṭa which in its turn is suggested by the sound ghata. Thus what we ordinarily call meaning is arrived at by an indirect process. For the *ālaṃkārikas* also, the process of vyangyārthagrahana is not direct but indirect. We arrive at the suggested sense either through abhidha or through lakṣaṇā.

(iii) The grammarians believe in vākyasphota. They do not accept the separate existence of padas i e, individual words, and much less of letters or varnas But common experience of ordinary people misleads many to believe that the meaning is derived from individual words or padas and thus through letters or varṇas The Mimāmsakas accept this position. It seems, however, that here ordinary people, and so also the Mimāmsakas, do not seem to pierce the veil of delusion and mistake the nature of condition for the nature of the contents The nature of condition is the multiplicity of letters, the nature of contents is the unity of word, the vākyasphota

Similar is the case with some ālamkārikas, abhidhā and lakṣaṇa form the nature of condition and vyañjanā or dhvani is the nature of the contents Those who fail to distinguish between ends and means, seem to confuse abhidhā and lakṣaṇa with vyañjanā

(iv) To put it otherwise, for the grammarians the letters may be taken just as what we may call the object of knowledge i e, jñānasya viṣayah, while the word-whole is jñānasya phalam-the result or the fruit of knowledge For the alamkārikas also, abhidhā and lakṣaṇa are jñānasya viṣayah, while vyañjanā may be taken as jñānasya phalam These two are not to be confused

(*v*) The grammarians believe in vākyasphoṭa. So they avoid the contingency faced by the padavādin viz., that of recognising parts even of letters or varṇas. Similarly, those ālaṃkārikas who want to arrive at vyaṅgyārtha with the help of lakṣaṇā, will have to go for a second lakṣaṇā, and a third and a fourth lakṣaṇā ad infinitum, involving further and further prayojanas.

(*vi*) Sphoṭa is a distinct entity by itself, not to be identified with dhvani i.e., the sound of a word. The vyaṅgyārtha is also a separate entity, not to be confused with abhidheyārtha or lakṣyārtha.

(*vii*) For the grammarians, there is a krama, a sequence, in the process of gathering meaning form a word. From word to Sphoṭa and from Sphoṭa to meaning—this is the sequence. In the same way, with the ālaṃkārikas also, there is a sequence, perceptible or imperceptible, between vācyārtha and vyaṅgyārtha.

(*viii*) It is non-descrimination that makes for the acceptance of letters for the word-whole In the same way, it is non-descrimination that results in our recognising vyañjanā as either abhidhā or bhakti.

(*ix*) For the vaiyākaraṇas, there is a gradual and clearer revelation of the Sphoṭa. Each sound-unit reveals the whole of Sphoṭa and

> not a portion of it The revelation gets clearer and clearer by each succeeding sound-unit The Sphota revealation is a gradual process and the mind acquires progressively greater and greater aptitude for receiving further glimpses With the utterance of the last sound unit the process comes to a close By itself, there is neither qualitative nor quantitative difference in the word essence, but there may be difference in its grasping by the mind Thus the degrees of difference are purely subjective and not objective

For the alamkarikas also, the gathering of vyaṅgyartha is a gradual revelation in the sense that it comes only after the abhidhārtha or the laksyārtha as the case may be

The writers on alamkāra, for their concept of vyanjanā are alos partly indebted to other darśanas such as the samkhya, vedanta, and śaiva darsanas. Vyañjana for the poeticists manifeststhat which is not yet manifested i e it brings into light that which already exists but is not presented before us The analogy cited is ghatapradipanyaya (Dhv III) i e, the analogy of the lamp and the jar

Foot notes :

(1) Dhvanyāloka I सूरिभि कथित इति विद्वदुपज्ञेयमुक्ति न तु यथाकथञ्चित् प्रवृत्तेति प्रतिपाद्यते। प्रथमे हि विद्वांसो वैयाकरणा, व्याकरणमूलत्वात् सर्वविद्यानाम्। ते च तेषु श्रूयमाणेषु वर्णेषु ध्वनिरिति व्याहरन्ति । तथैवान्यैस्तन्मतानुसारिभि सूरिभि काव्यतत्त्वार्थदर्शिभि वाच्यवाचकसंमिश्र शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्यते व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्यात् ध्वनिरित्युक्त ।'

(2) Mammata K P "इदमुत्तममतिशयिनि व्यङ्ग्ये वाच्याद्ध्वनिर्बुधै कथित ।" and also 'इदमिति काव्यम्, बुधै वैयाकरणै प्रधानभूतस्फोटरूपव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकस्य शब्दस्य ध्वनिरिति व्यवहार कृत ।"

(3) K P "अतस्तन्मतानुसारिभिरन्यैरपि न्यग्भावितवाच्यव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जन—क्षमस्य शब्दार्थयुगलस्य ।"

(4) "अथ गौरित्यत्र क शब्द ? किं यत् तत्सास्नादिलाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाण्यर्थरूप स शब्द ? नेत्याह, द्रव्य नाम तत्। .. ..तस्मात् ध्वनि शब्द ।"

(5) "कस्तर्हि शब्द ? येनोच्चरितेन सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो भवति स शब्द, अथवा प्रतीतपदार्थको लोके ध्वनि शब्द इत्युच्यते। तद्यथा शब्दं कुरु, मा शब्द कार्षी, शब्दकार्ययं माणवक, इति ध्वनिं कुर्वन्नेवमुच्यते। तस्मात् ध्वनि शब्द ।

(6) The Mahabhāsya reads as follows

चत्वारि वाक् परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिण ।
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति तुरीय वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ॥

M B I 1 1

The Vākyapadīya (V P) also reads

वैखर्या मध्यमायाश्च पश्यन्त्याश्चैतदद्भुतम् ।
अनेकतीर्थभेदायास्त्रय्या वाच परं पदम् ॥ I 144

According to Nāges'abhatta, the defin tion येनोच्चारितेन सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाणिनां सम्प्रत्ययो जायते स शब्द

applies to the Madhyamā Vāk, and the definition, प्रतीतपदार्थको ध्वनि शब्द applies to the Vaikharī Vāk

(7) The whole discussion proceeds as follows किं पुनरिदं नियमार्थमाहोस्वित् प्रापकम्? कथं च नियमार्थं स्यात्? कथं वा प्रापकम्? यद्यत्र अण्ग्रहणमनुवर्तते ततो नियमार्थम्। अथ निवृत्तं ततः प्रापकम्। तपरस्तत्कालस्येति नियमार्थमिति चेत् दीर्घग्रहणे स्वरभिन्नाग्रहणम्।

तपरस्तत्कालस्येति नियमार्थमिति चेत् दीर्घग्रहणे स्वरभिन्नानां ग्रहणं न प्राप्नोति।

(8) केषाम्? उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितानुनासिकानाम्। अस्तु तर्हि प्रापकम्? Let it then be an apūrvavidhi? प्रापकमिति चेत् ह्रस्वग्रहणे दीर्घप्लुतयोस्तु प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः।

विप्रतिषेधात्सिद्धम्। It is decided by the dictum विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्। अण् सर्वान् गृह्णाति इत्येतदस्तु तपरस्तत्कालस्य इति वा। तपरस्तत्कालस्य इत्येतद्भवति विप्रतिषेधेन। अण् सर्वान् गृह्णाति इत्यस्य अवकाशः ह्रस्वा अतपरा अणः। तपरस्तत्कालस्य अवकाशः दीर्घास्तपराः।

ह्रस्वेषु तपरेषु उभयं प्राप्नोति, तपरस्तत्कालस्य इत्येतद् भवति विप्रतिषेधेन।

यद्येवम् द्रुतायां तपरकरणे मध्यमविलम्बितयोरुपसंख्यानं कालभेदात्।

द्रुतायां तपरकरणे मध्यमविलम्बितयोः उपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यम् तथा मध्यमायां द्रुतविलम्बितयोः तथा विलम्बितायां द्रुतमध्यमयोः।

किं पुनः कारणं न सिध्यति?

ये हि द्रुतायां वृत्तौ वर्णास्त्रिभागाधिकास्ते मध्यमायाम्। ये च मध्यमायां वर्णाः त्रिभागाधिकास्ते विलम्बितायाम्।

सिद्धं त्ववस्थिता वर्णाः वक्तुश्चिराचिरवचनाद् वृत्तयः विशिष्यन्ते।

वक्तैव कश्चित् आश्वभिधायी भवति—आशु वर्णान् अभिधत्ते, कश्चिच्चिरेण, कश्चिच्चिरतरेण। तद्यथा—तमेवाध्वानं कश्चिदाशु गच्छति, कश्चिच्चिरेण गच्छति, कश्चिच्चिरतरेण गच्छति। रथिक आशु गच्छति, आश्विकश्चिरेण, पदातिश्चिरतरेण।

विषम उपन्यास । अधिकरणमात्राख्या मजति-क्रियाया । तत्रायुक्त यदधिकरणस्य वृद्धिह्रासौ स्याताम् ।

(9) The Mahabhāsya reads the following Rk to this effect

चत्वारि वाक् परिमिता पदानि तानि विदु ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिण ।
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति तुरीय वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ॥

(10) Says Abhinavagupta–"अस्माभिरपि प्रसिद्धेभ्य शब्दव्यापारेभ्य अभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणारूपेभ्य अतिरिक्तो व्यापारो ध्वनिरित्युक्त । एव चतुष्कमपि ध्वनि । तद्योगाच्च समस्तमपि काव्य ध्वनि । तेन व्यतिरेका व्यतिरेकव्यपदेशोऽपि न न युक्त । वाच्यवाचकमिश्र इति । वाच्यवाचक–सहित समिश्र इति मध्यमपदलोपी समास । गामश्व पुरुष पशुम् इतिवत्समुच्चयोऽत्र चकारेण विनापि । तेन वाच्योऽपि ध्वनि , वाचकोऽपि शब्दो ध्वनि , द्वयोरपि व्यञ्जकत्व ध्वनतीति कृत्वा । समिश्र्यते विभावानु-भावसवलनयेति व्यङ्ग्योऽपि ध्वनि ध्वन्यत इति कृत्वा । शब्दन शब्द शब्दव्यापार । न चासावभिधादिरूप अपि त्वात्मभूत सोऽपि ध्वनन ध्वनि । काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्य च योऽर्थ सोऽपि ध्वनि । उक्तप्रकार-ध्वनिचतुष्टयमयत्वात् । अत एव साधारणहेतुमाह–व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्यात् इति । व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभाव सर्वेषु पदेषु सामान्यरूप साधारण इत्यर्थ । (Locana, on Dhv I 13)

(11) प्रतिबिम्बं यथान्यत्र स्थित तोयक्रियावशात् ।
तत्प्रवृत्तिमिवान्वेति स धर्म स्फोटनादयो V P I 49

(12) ग्राह्यत्व ग्राहकत्व च द्वे शक्ती तेजसो यथा ।
तथैव सर्वशब्दाना एते पृथगवस्थिते ॥ .. V P I 55

(13) यथा जवाकुसुमरूपानुपक्तमेव स्फटिकादीना ग्रहण तथा ध्वनिरूपानुपक्त एव स्फोटस्तदविभागेनोपलभ्यते इति केषाचिन्मतम् etc
(पुण्यराज under V P I 82)

(14) परावाङ्मूलचक्रस्था पश्यन्ती नाभिसस्थिता ।
हृदिस्था मध्यमा ज्ञेया वैखरी कण्ठदेशगा ॥

(15) युगपदेन मध्यमावैखरीभ्या नाद उत्पद्यते—(मञ्जूषा)

(16) मध्यमा नादस्य कर्णपिधाने जपादौ च सूक्ष्मतरवायुव्यङ्ग्या—मञ्जूषा ।

(17) यथा च मुखे मणिकृपाणदर्पणव्यञ्जकोपाधिवशात् दैर्घ्यवर्तुलत्वादिमान तद्वत् ।

(18) व्यञ्जकध्वनिगतं ह्रस्वत्वादिकं स्फोटे भासते ।

(19) पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा इव ।
वाक्यात् पदानामानन्त्य प्रविवेको न कश्चन ॥ ...V.P.I. 77.

(20) पदवाक्ययोस्तु सखण्डत्वपक्षेऽन्तिमवर्गव्यङ्ग्य स्फोट एक एव । पूर्वपूर्व वर्णस्तु तात्पर्यग्राहक । –(मञ्जूषा)

(21) ध्वनिस्तु द्विविध । प्राकृतो वैकृतश्च ।
स्फोटस्य ग्रहणे हेतु प्राकृतो ध्वनिरिष्यते ।
वृत्तिभेदे निमित्तत्व वैकृत प्रतिपद्यते । (V.P.I 77)

(22) स्फोटे व्यञ्जकध्वनिगतत्वादिभानात् ककारो वुद्ध इत्यौपाधिको भेदव्यवहार । (मञ्जूषा)

(32) पूर्वपूर्वध्वन्युत्पादिताभिव्यक्तिजनितसंस्कारपरम्परापरिणकोन्त्यबुद्धिनिग्राह्य इत्यर्थ । कैयट ।

CHAPTER III

S'abdavṛttis; the nature and scope of Abhidhā

S'abdārthavṛttis :

According to the sanskrit writers of poetics, words possess three distinct s'aktis or functions, called, (*i*) the abhidha s'akti, (*ii*) the lakṣaṇa sakti, and (*iii*) the vyañjanā śakti. The terms vṛtti and vyāpāra are also used as synonyms for the term s'akti. Thus, by the abhidhavṛtti or the power of expression, the word is supposed to give the conventional meaning or the saṃketitārtha, by the lakṣaṇāvṛtti it gives lakṣyārtha, or the secondary sense, based upon certain conditions, and by the vyañjanāvṛtti, the word gives the vyangyartha or the suggested sense Accordingly, the word is said to be vācakā, lakṣaka and vyañjaka, and the sense is said to be vācya, lakṣya and vyangya respectively We also come across the mention of a fourth vṛtti called the tātparya vṛtti, but as it is connected with the sentence i.e., the correlated meaning of all the words *in a given sentence, and not with words taken individually, the alaṃkārikas generally do not choose* to include it under the functions of a word

As regards the nature of these śabdavyāpāras, there is a lot of difference of opinion among thinkers of different schools. The grammarians and the

philosophers (=dārsanikas) and even some of the ālamkarikas do not recognise the function called the vyañjanāvyapara Even the earlier authors on alamkara such as Bhāmaha, Dandin and Vamana etc., almost failed to recognise or even mention vyañjana as a separate vrtti in kāvya The tārkikas (i e logicians) and the Mimamsakas and some of the later alamkarikas also (e g Mahima and Bhoja) did not accept it (2) There are also others who distinguish between gaunī and laksana We will try to consider the nature of the different vrttis separately and discuss the difference of opinion with reference to the same

Abhidā.

We begin with abhidha or the function of denotation or expression Abhidha is that function by which the word gives the conventional-saṃketita or the primary meaning The word here becomes vacaka and the sense is termed as vācyārtha (3) Thus, for example the word 'gauh' by abhidhavyapāra means, 'sasnādimat-pasuvisesah' or, an entity having a dew lap, horns, etc This conventional or the samketita artha is gathered directly and hence is called the mukhyārtha or the principal meaning and the word is known as mukhya and the abhidhāsakti is also called mukhya sakti, or the mukhyavyāpāra

As to the nature of samketagrahana or gathering of convention, there is a considerable difference of opinion. This samketa has been classified in different ways. The Naiyāyikas classify saṃketa as 'pāribhāsika',

'naimittika' and 'aupādhika' When we fix up a name for calling somebody, say, e g, a father calls his son Devadatta, or when we fix up a technical term to refer to a particular meaning in science, e g, say, dhvani, guṇa, etc, in the alamkaraśastra, it is termed as 'pāribhāsikasamketa Naimittika is that which refers to jati, e g, asva, manusya etc, and aupādhika is that which refers to the upādhis or attributes For the Naiyayika, upadhi or attribute means that jāti in which so many apara jatis reside e g pas'u consists of asva, go etc (4)

For Bhartrhari, samketa is two fold viz ajānika (or natural) and adhunika (or man made) By ajanika is meant the same as naimittika of the Naiyāyikas Thus ājanika is nitya Ādhunik isamketa is of the form of yadākadā' (i e kādacitka) and the Sāstrakārs make its use (5)

Classification of Abhidhā

Abhidha is said to be three fold viz (i) rudhi, (ii) yoga and (iii) yogarudhi These are again known as (i) kevala samudāya śaktih, (ii) kevalavayava sakt h and (iii) samudayavayavasakti-samkara (6) Rudhi is said to be there where the word as a whole samudaya–conveys the meaning Here, we gather the meaning with the help of akhandasakti of the word (7) *Here rudhi is formed because the meaning* of the components of the word is not at all comprehended separately, or, even if the meaning of the word is gathered separately, it is ultimately not recognised Again, when meaning of the components

of a word becomes important, in order to get the full sense of the word as a whole, it becomes the case of yogātmaka abhidha (8) Yogarūdhi is said to be in cases where avayavasakti and samudayasakti are both required (9) In the case of 'pankaja', the etymological meaning is . 'that which is born in mud' This can be applicable to anything born of mud, other than lotus also. The Naiyāyikas do not accept either rūdhi or yoga in this case Appayya Diksita holds that it is better to accept yogarūdhi here (10).

At times it happens that there are more than one conventional meanings attached to one and the same word. Here, abhidhartha is decided with the help of various factors such as context and others Bhartrhari has mentioned all these factors (11) Visavanatha also gives a fuller explanation (12)

Thus, we have seen that abhidhā deals with the directly expressed sense of a word.

Tatparya Vrtti :

Now, we may consider the tatparya vrtti Abhidha and laksanā are the functions of a word, i e. words taken separately. The meaning of the sentence whole is conveyed neither by abhidhā, nor by laksanā, but by a separate power of the sentence called Tatparya. The meaning of the sentence is thus termed as tatparyartha The tātparyasakti is that power which assimilates the sense gathered by abhidhā and gives a new sense (abhinavartha) which is not just an assimilation of vācyārtha (i e not yogamātra), but

is something unique (apadārthópi vakyarthah) The Dhvanivadins call it tātparyavrtti. In this view of the Dhvanivadins we can easily read the influence of the abhihitānvayavada of Kumarila Bhatta It may be noted that even though Kumarila recognises a separate function for vākyartha, as something different from abhidha, we do not get the clear mentioning of tātparyavrtti in the works on Mimāmsā till we come to Mimāmsā-kaustubha of Khaṇḍadeva (13th or 14th Cen. A.D.)

Vākya, its import ·

While treating the nature of this tātparvyavrtti, we will at the outset, consider the nature of a sentence or vakya and its import

Expression of thoughts is the sole purpose of the use of language. Ideas, again, are completely and best expressed through the medium of sentences as such and not by means of individual words Thus, a sentence is rightly called the unit of significant speech An idea becomes definite only when it is capable of being expressed in the usual form of a sentence Thought, in language, will therefore mean that a man does not think in isolated words but in choerent combination of words, in order to give consistency and relevancy to his very mode of thinking The Naiyāyikas have drawn our attention to this important linguistic fact, when they deal with the nature of logical propositions A logical proposition, as we know, is, to all appearance, a sentence —a combination of words connected together by mutual

relation. Jagadīsa says that the so called verbal cognition (śābdabodha) is derivable only from a sentence, i.e to say, when a number of significant words (sārthaka), having expectancy (ākānksa) and compatibility (yogyata) with one another, are related so as *to constitute a sentence in the logical sense* of the term (13) Thus, a logical proposition is an idea or judgement expressed in the form of a sentence. It should be carefully noted, however, that the meaning of a sentence, which follows from a sentence as a whole, should be distinguished from that of its constituent parts Jagadis'a notes that śābdabodha is not materially the same as s'abdartha or the meaning of isolated words The meaning of the sentence is something more than the mere sum total of the significations of component parts. (vilaksaṇo bodhaḥ–S' S'. Pra.)

Vākya, Definition : Before dealing with the import of a sentence, we will try to understand the definition of a sentence. Thus, Patañjali says that action (ākhyata), with the help of all or each of the following viz avyaya or indeclinable, kāraka, and visesaṇa or adjective, makes for a sentence (14). A kriyāvis'esaṇa or an adverb is also included herein (15) Just action, aided by vis'eśana alone, can also make for a vākya–(ākhyātaṃ savis'esaṇam). At times a sentence is of *the nature of an action alone–ekatin (mbh. II. 1 1).* The grammarians hold that the pada-pādams'a aspect of a vakya is ultimately illusory, and they accept the sentence whole and give us the concept of vākyasphota. (16).

For the Naiyāyikas, a sentence is a collection of words having expectancy (17). Viśvanātha says that a sentence is a collection of words having compatibility, expectancy and juxta-position or, proximity (18).

In the vedas we come across only consolidated sentences, i e. sentences which are supposed to have *been originally undivided into parts The Taittirīya* Samhitā supports this–Vag vai paracyavyakṛta–. The grammatical method of analysis is a later development in the history of language. This view is strengthened by the definition of Samhitā or *emphonic combination* of letters as we find in the Rk Pratisākhya · Padaprakrtih Samhitā It is said that the Samhitā *or the close combination of* letters as 'agnimīle' is what represents the original *form and* the practice of breaking it up, i e into agnim and *ile,* shows only a grammatical process followed in a much later period The dictum 'padaprakrtih samhita' gave rise to a great *controversy.* The padavadins (=Mimamsakas) and the vākyavadins (=Vaiyākaranas) have constructed it in different ways. The padavadins take padas as real and significant, and the sentence *for them* is only a combination of such padas (inflected *words*) They *explain* the *compound* 'padaprakṛtih *in* such a *way* so as *to prove the* priority or originality (prakṛtitva) of the padis (padani prakrtiryasyah) The Vakyavādins take the sentence, or better say vakya–sphota, to be the only significant unit of speech They simply reject the notion of the precedence or priority of the padas in

preference to that of a sentence and thus explain the compound padaprakrtih as padānam yā prakrtih seyam padaprakrtih It is difficult to say which of the two explanations is more acceptable (19) Durgācārya has some relevant notes on this. It is emphatically stated that the Mantras, revealed as they were through the holy seers of antiquity, manifested themselves in the compact form of the samhita or combination, and not in that of isolated words The teacher makes the student acquainted first with the Vedas in their Samhita form before he is allowed to proceed in his study on a grammatical line. Again, at the time of performing Vedic rites, the priest cites the Mantras in their consolidated form

Grammarians :

The grammarians attach much importance to vakya-sphota as the really significant element of speech Thus, Sphotavadins are the same as vākyavadins The author of the S'abdakaustubha says that of the eight varieties of Sphota, only vākyasphota is accepted to be real and significant (20) Thus, to the Sphotavadin the sentence is an indivisible unit (akhaṇda) and the analytical method of grammer that breaks up a sentence into parts is but an artificial device used for the understanding of unintelligent people (21)

Punyaraja also holds that this view is shared even by Pānini and Patañjali (22). So, "padanyasatyani vakyameva satyamityarthah"– notes Punyarāja on

Vakyartha .

As to the nature of the vakyārtha, we come across different views (see, Dr Kapildeva Dwivedi in his arthavijnāna or darśana, where he has quoted from Jayanta Bhatta —This is quoted by Bholasankar Vyāsa), as below

(*i*) The sense of a sentence is jñana

(*ii*) As kriyā (action) is the most important element in a sentence the vakyārtha is kriyā,

(*iii*) The vākyārtha is phala (result, fruit) as we perform any action with a view to some phala

(*iv*) The vakyārtha is Purusa (Isvara), for the result of action (phala of kriyā) is for Him

(*v*) The vākyartha is bhavanā i e the vyāpāra or activity of the karta or agent with reference to some desired object, such as svarga or, heaven

(*vi*) The vakyartha is sabdabhāvana or vidhi

(*vii*) The vākyartha is niyoga or preraṇā

(*viii*) The vākyārtha is udyoga.

(*ix*) The vakyartha is pratibha,

The Naiyayikas hold phala to be the vākyārtha while the Vaiyakaranis believe it to be pratibha or intuition The view of the dhvanivada is not gathered clearly but as the ālamkarikas follow Vaiyakaranis in general, we may hold them to do the same here also

So, according to the Vaiyakaraṇas, the meaning expressed by a stentence is pratibha or intuition which is innate or ingrained in us all (30) This pratibha is inborn and not post natal, neither a sense-born acquisition nor a result from common experience It is termed as samskara or bhāvana, finally seated in our mind and linked together with the continuous currents of knowledge flowing from previous stages of existence Thus, it is termed as purvavasanā also The Vaiyākarana has to take recourse to the theory of previous existence in order to explain the concept of pratibha

So, what a sentence really signifies is the sense abiding in intelligence (bauddhārthasya vacyatvam) Words may have different meanings as taken individually, but when grouped together in a sentence, we have a single sense that is different from the padārthas or the meanings of isolated words This kind of a sense derived from the whole is called pratibha i e intuition (31) According to intuition, says Puṇyaraja, the padarthas, unreal in themselves, help in the manifestation of pratibhā (32) According to Bhartrhari, the first thing that pratibhā achieves is to bring about an association of the meaning which seems to be otherwise unconnected (asamsrsta) It is the objective (visaya) that is directly conveyed by a sentence (33) This pratibha is directly manifested by the use of words or by the ever blossoming intellect which originates from the experience or memory of by gone lives (34) Pratibha is the source of all popular usages, and serves as the most reliable

it is one that retains in itself the action usually denoted by a verbal root (56). We find certain sentences in which some words seem to be so predominant by their very nature as to denote the entire meaning by themselves without the help of others The meaning of the sentence gāyako gāyati– can be gathered by the single word 'gāyakah' the the verbal form 'gāyati' being unnecessary Only in such cases a single inflected word is found to stand for the whole sentence, even independently of the verbal form But, so far as the grammatical conception of the sentence is concerned, one cannot just do away with 'vyāpāra' i e action. We can easily notice here that a sentence, whether consisting of a single word (i e. either a nāma or an ākhyata), or a combination of words must be, as a rule indicative of some action, either expressed directly or understood To the Indian grammarian a sentence without a verb is an impossibility

The Naiyāyikas, however, do not share this view of the grammarians Jagadis'a maintains that a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant and consistant words, but he does not put much emphasis on the inclusion of a verb It is not necessary that the verb should be mentioned explicitly, specially when (kriyā) action is easily understood from the context So, Jagadisa rejects the notion of the grammarians that there can be no sentence without a verb (57) He bases his contention on popular usage 'Kuto bhavān?', is a combination of words having no verbal form and yet forming a sentence.

So, it is not correct to say that a sentence without a verb is practically incomprehensible. For, the grammarian, herein, a verb, viz. āgacchati' is implied and without it *neither the sense is complete nor is* the proper kāraka, (i e. apādāna) determinable

We have noticed that Bhartrhari has referred to as many as eight different views on the constitution of a sentence These views, generally speaking, fall under two distinct categories, viz akhaṇḍapaksa, and khaṇḍapaksa The Sphotavādis *who take the sentence* to be an indivisible unit, support the former viz akhandapaksa, Mimāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, who take the sentence to be a combination of words, are in favour of the latter, viz khandapaksa

We have seen that to the Sphotavadi, Sphoṭa represents the real word (the eternal word), sound being only a quality of it (58). Sphota is two fold viz external and internal (59) The external Sphota admits of further division into class and individual (60) Those who support the indivisibility of a sentence, are likely to take a sentence as forming either a class (jātisphota) pertaining to a combination (samghātavartini), or an individual (vyaktisphota), that is to say that a sentence is one without any parts (ekónavayayavah), or an intellectual assimilation (buddhyanusaṃhrtih) (61) These three definitions according to the Sphotavādin *are duly noticed and* explained by Bhartrhari. According to Sphotavāda, a sentence that is expressive of sense is one and not dissolvable into parts (62). It represents either vyaktisphota or jātisphota i e, an individual or a

class in so far as the outward manifestation of Sphota is concerned The formal difference seen in these various types of sentences is said to be simply due to upādhi viz the operation of vocal organs employed in the production of sound and so on (63) Sphota has its internal aspect or vital side and in that it is not at all verbal but purely intellectual The intellectual assimilation as showing the internal form of a sentence means that a sentence, so far as it is related to the internal world of thought, remains essentially intellectual in its origin before it is materialised into audible sound —It is Nāda or sound says Bhartrhari, that turns such intellectually assimilated ideas into concrete expression of a sentence (64)

For the khandapakṣa, a sentence is either an action, a kind of order or succession, a collection of words the first inflected word, i e, pada or inflected words i e padas having mutual expectancy with one another We have earlier seen these views For those who regard the sentence as a 'krama', the word 'krama' is used in the following way. Though usually the word 'krama' implies a property of time as 'paurvāparya' (65)–i e priority and prosteriority, its particular use in grammer is explained by Bhartṛhari and Puṇyarāja as below Every inflected word in a sentence has got some special significance as that of karmatva, kartrtva, etc, which come to our notice in a successive or well marked order together with similar meanings (viśeṣa) conveyed by other words (66) For example, if we want to bring out the sense of a

sentence like, 'devadatto grāmam gacchati', in a strictly grammatical method, we are apt to express it in the following way the act of moving which has 'devadatta' as its agent and the village as its object Here, the idea of 'karmatva' which adds a special feature to the meaning obtained severally from each inflected word, is called 'visesa' that becomes comprehensible in a fixed or definite order-(67) This definite order is regarded as the main factor of a sentence Again, it is stated that there can be no sentence made up of words alone, if it happens to be devoid of such an order (68) Thus, a sentence is intrinsically a particular order in which words are combined together in such a way as to express the intended sense (69)

These definitions of a sentence that are acceptable to the khanda paksa, can be classified into two classes on the basis provided by the two well known schools of the Mimamsa system, viz Bhatta (i e of Kumārila) and guru (i.e of Prabhakara) Kumarila and his followers uphold the 'abhihitānvayavada' as against the 'anvitabhidhānavada' of Prabhākara and his supporters *According to Kumārila, therefore*, a sentence should be explained either as a combination of words (samghata) or as an order (krama) and according to Prabhakara, it is a verbal form (ākhyāta), or the first inflected word (adyam padam) or inflected words possessing mutual expectancy (sarvapadam sākanksam) that make for a sentence (70)

These two views, then, refer to the meaning expressed by a sentence There is a great difference

of opinion as to the meaning or the significance of a sentence For the Sphotavadin it is pratibhā (71) To one who defines vakya as a verbal form, it is action ('kriya') that forms the meaning of a sentence (72) For the abhihitānvayavāda it is association (samsarga) (73) 'Samsarga'—'association' is used here in its literal sense It means that a sentence acquires some special feature, or import (tatparyārtha) when it conveys the intended sense (74) It means that when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises *invariably some additional significance, distinct* from those of the constituents Thus, the sense that evolves out of such anvaya or correlation of meaning is something *more than a mere sum-total of them* (75) Jagadiśa calls it-vilaksanobodhah' or special significance that results from the correlation of meanings For the anvitābhidhānavādins, on the other hand, the meaning of a sentence is for all purposes the same as is signified by its component parts (76) Thus the import or the tātparyārtha of the anvitābhidānavādin is nothing more than the meaning given by individual words themselves (77).

As to what forms the 'nimitta' of the vakyārtha there prevail different views Vācaspati Miśra in his Tattvabindu refers to these views and establishes the Bhatta view as the Siddhānta We will try to see the different views in the light of Tāttvabindu, as follows

(*i*) According to the Spotavadı grammarıans the nımıtta for the vākyartha ıs akhaṇda vakya, the padavarṇavıbhāga beıng only the result of Avıdyā (78)

(*ii*) Accordıng to some Mımāmsakas and Naıyāyıkas the nımıtta for the vakyārtha ıs the knowledge of that last letter whıch ıs accompanıed by the samskāras or ımpressıon of the experıence of the meanıng of the precedıng padas (79)

(*iii*) Or, accordıng to some other Mımāmsakas, ıt ıs that varnamala or serıes of letters that ıs reflected ın the mırror of memory, accompanıed by the experıence or anubhava bhāvanā of tattad padapadartha (=those words and letters) (80)

(*iv*) Or vakyartha ıs just the expressed meanıng (abhıdheyārtha) of the words correlated wıth other words on account of expectancy compatıbılıty and juxtaposıtıon Thus anvıtapadas or correlated words make for the expressıon of vakyartha Thıs ıs accordıng to Prabhākara (81)

(*v*) The padārtha, whıch ıs accompanıed by ākānksā yogyatā and sannıdhı and expressed by the words used, makes for the vākyārtha Thus first of all the padas gıve padārthas and then wıth the help of ākānksā yogyatā etc, they gıve vākyārtha Thıs ıs the abhıhıtānvayavada of Kumārıla Vācaspatı Mıśra also accepts thıs vıew * On thıs

abhihitānvayanvāda is based the idea of tātparvavṛtti (82)

Now, the first view is taken up for consideration The Sphotavādin holds that if it be held that the varṇas in the vyasta form make for the vākyartha, then the other letters become redundant (83) If it is held that samastavarnas make for the vākyārtha, then again, there are two alternate possibilities viz. (*a*) do you consider this correlation (samuha) as genuine (vāstavika) or artificial–(aupādhika)? (84) The idea is that whether the varṇas–letters are naturally (vastutah) (genuinely) correlated to one-another or not We have the experience that they are correlated and thus as they are thus accompanied by the experience of the hearer, they become related But as varṇas are nitya and vibhu, they cannot be correlated to one another and as we have the experience of these letters gathered at different times, the experience also cannot be correlated (85)

The Sphotavādi also refutes the view of those who held the view that pūrva purva saṃskārayukta antimavarna makes for the vākyārtha The Sphotavādi asks as to what do the varṇavādins mean by the word 'samskāra', or 'impression' It is either the smṛtibīja or something like the purification of rice etc, by chaffing etc (86) Certainly, the second alternative is not meant here So here, the saṃskāra stands for smṛtibija But smṛti it self being just a vāsanā or impression, which is of the form of power of the soul, the vākyārthapratīti thus becomes the result not of the saṃskāras but of the power

of the soul Again, the Sphotavadī says that even though we have identical letters in words such as nadi, dīna, sāra, rasā etc., we have different meanings. So, letters in their akhanda form only, make for sense Thus, akhandavākya should be accepted by the varnavādi (87) The Sphotavādī cites the illustration of the word 'gauh' and says that the experience of the word gauh suggests that there is ekata-oneness-and akhaṇdata-wholeness-in this word For, if we take the different letters to be the objects of our experience it runs contrary to our day to day experience (88) If it is argued by the varṇavādin that just as the individual soldiers make for the army, or just as individual trees make for the forest, similarly different varṇas make for a pada and thus pada is aupādhika, to this we ask as to what is meant by this 'upādhi?' 'Upādhi' or attribute can be two-fold, viz. (*i*) ekajñānavisayatā, or becoming the object of one and the same experience or, (*ii*) ekābhidhehyapratyayahetutā-i e, becoming the cause of the experience of one and the same bhava (ekābhidheya) Now, if by the upādhi is meant (*i*), then we will have to accept the padajñāna even before varṇajñāna which goes against the varnavādi, and if by upādhi is meant (*ii*), then, there is itaretarās'rayadosah As arthabhinnatā or difference in meaning-is the cause of the distinction between one pada and another, and as padabhinnatā is gathered with the help of arthabhinnata, the fault of itaretarās'rays arises Thus, the vākyārtha should be connected only with the akhaṇḍi sphota This is the view of

the Sphotavādin, which forms the prima facie view in the Tattvabindu.

After explaining the first view held by the Sphotavādin in detail Vācaspati goes on refuting it. Vācaspati argues in the following way. Do the Sphotavādins establish their view on the foundation of our (*i*) normal experience, or (*ii*) on the difference of senses of pada and vākya ? (89) If the first alternative is accepted, then again two alternatives prop up therein according as (*a*) you accept vākya to be avayavi i.e., having avayavas or parts in form of padas or (*b*) you do not accept any avayavas *or parts with reference to the vakyārtha. Now (a)* cannot be accepted as pada is held to be 'vibhu' or all-pervasive even by the objector, and in that case it is not possible to dream of an avayavi vākya which is 'vibhutara' or more pervasive. The very notion of 'vibhutara' is illogical (90). Again, the Naiyāyikas take śabda to be the quality of ākāśa and quality or guṇa is avibhājya—i.e., incapable of *division, and it cannot be the* samavāyikāraṇa of anything else, it being always 'dravya' itself. Thus, padas cannot be the aṅgas or factors of the vākyārtha (91). Now, if you accept the second alternative i.e. (*b*), viz. that there is no avayava in a vakya, then it follows that the sentence as a whole makes for the sense and neither the varṇa, nor the pada is important and therefore varṇa or pada has no independent existence in a language. Well, it is true that only the sentence exists in a language, and that this akhaṇḍaspota is manifested by dhvani, but

all this is putting aside the reality and is like the face reflected in a jewel, sword, or a mirror. Again, we ask that if the first dhavni reveals the sense, what would be the use of other dhvanis Again, your antimadhvani also fails to reveal the Sphota fully. So, this Sphota and akhandavākya is a wrongly postulated hypothesis The final dhvani reveals the sense only if it is aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis. So they cannot be held as useless. Just as a jeweller gives his opinion about a particular stone after looking at it repeatedly, in the same way, the hearer decides the vākyartha, with the help of the final dhvani aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis It is because of this that we, the padavādins, accept the last letter, aided by the impression of the preceeding letters to be the cause of vākyartha (92)

The varnavādin refutes the theory of Sphota, for according to him, for vākyarthagrahana, or gathering of the sentence-sense, there is no necessity to postulate the hypothesis of Sphoṭa The varṇas themselves, used in the pada, make for arthapratiti or apprehension of meaning When they are in a particular order (say, sarah), they give a particular meaning, and when they are in a different order (say, rasah) they give a different meaning Thus, the pada gives a particular meaning with the help of krama-sequence-, nyūnātiriktatva, swara, vakya, sruti smrti, etc. If different letters of the same pada are pronounced by different people, we do not get the meaning If I say, for example, 'sa' and you say 'rah', we do not get the idea of 'sarah'.

Thus, it is necessary that a pada should be pronounced by one and the same man, at one and the same time. Thus, eka-kartṛtva is an important factor in arthānubhava and is the jñāpakahetu of it. So the vākyārthajñāna is the result of varṇasamūha and it is no use postulating the hypothesis of an anavayava vākya (93).

It may be noted that Maṇḍanmis'ra in his Sphotasiddhi finally establishes the Sphoṭavāda in an admirable way after refuting the views of Kumārila and his supporters. We need not go into those details here.

Vācaspati then considers the second view held by some Mīmāṁsakas and some Naiyāyikas. This view is slightly better according to him than the first one, as there is no postulation of any adṛṣṭa like Sphota herein. This view takes letters and words to be the cause of vākyarthapratiti We get some trace of this view in the Nyāyabhāsya of Vātsyāyana. According to Vātsyāyana, when letters are spoken, the hearer listens to them. These letters are not correlated in form of words-padas-, and therefore the hearer first of all correlates them and through the agency of words (padavyavasāyena) and with the help of memory, he correlates different words also and gathers thereby the vākyārtha (94).

So, according to this view, we do not hear any sentence fully at a given moment. The speaker speaks letters one by one. As the letters perish immediately (ās'uvinās'itva) and in a moment (kṣaṇikatva), every first letter disappears when the next one is uttered.

Thus, when the whole sentence is completed, the listener hears only the last letter at that moment. But he undoubtedly gathers the whole sentence. The solution to this situation is that even though the preceding letter or letters die out the moment they are uttered, they leave behind them their impression in the minds of the listeners. With the hearing of the last letter this impression comes up in form of memory and produces the vākyārthadhī (95)

The abhihitānvayavādin (i.e. the Siddhāntin) refutes the above view as below: Is it so that the last syllable explains the vākyārtha after causing the memory of the correlation of the meaning of itself and the vākyārtha? Then, we say that when the mental impression exhibits its strength viz,–the remembering of padārthas, the padapratyaksa, etc., at this moment, the cause viz. impression, does not exist. At the same time, when a listener remembers the correlation of pada and padārtha, he cannot clarify the position of the final syllable of a pada or vākya. So, the hearing of the last letter accompanied by the memory of the preceding etc., cannot make for the vākyadhī (96).

The third view is supposed to be held by some other Mīmāṃsakas. According to the commentator of the Tattvabindu, this view is not held by any particular ācārya, but both this and the preceding one are just placed as prima facie views by Vācaspati Mis'ra (97). According to some this view is held by the earlier Mīmāṃsaka Upavarṣa, who is older than

Sabara (98) So, according to Upavarsa 'gauh' is constituted of g, a, u, and visarga

These varnavadins hold that we gather the meaning of a word or a sentence in the same way in which it is used by the elderly people Now, these elderly people, in their regular affairs, do not use single letters of words, but use sentences to convey meaning But a sentence cannot be without parts (anavayava) So, the sentence is just the correlation of letters (varnasamūha) left in memory This varnamālā or *dhvanimālā is the* cause and vakyārthadhih is the effect The knowledge of pada-padartha is held to be instrumental only (nimittamātra) while the vakyarthadhih follows genuinely from the varnamālā or a group of letters or phonemes or syllables (99) The Bhatta *Mimāmsakas do not* accept this view They find two faults with this, viz, those of 'gauravadosa' and 'visayābhavadosa' (100) They explain it in the following way, suppose, they say, we take the following eight sentences–viz 'arbhaka, gāmanaya, arbhaka, gām badhana, śiso, gamānaya, śiśo, gām badhana, bala, gāmānaya, bala, gam badhana, dimbha gamanaya, dimbha, gam badhana' – Now, in these eight sentences we can see only seven different words viz gam, ānaya, badhāna, arbhaka, siso, bāla, and dimbha According to the varnavādin (i e the IIIrd view), we will have to accept separate power of each of the eight sentences Thus, we will have to accept eight śaktis in respect of these eight sentences If we accept the view of the padavadins, we will have to accept only seven śaktis with reference

to seven words. Thus we have to go for unnecessary acceptance of additional śaktis if we accept the varṇavāda. Thus, it becomes redundant on account of kalpanā-gaurava (101). Another fault that is seen in this view is that of viṣayābhāva. The varṇamālā in a vākya can cause vākyārthadhīḥ only when there is first padārthadhīh. Padārthajñāna is a must before vākyārthajñāna. It is only when the padārthas are correlated that the vākyārtha flashes upon our mind. Thus, padārthajñāna is necessary before their correlation (anvaya). In this case, how can we take varṇamālā as the cause of vākyārthadhīḥ? Again, when we listen to a sentence, we cannot remember the syllables of even five or six words in a sentence, then what to talk of a long sentence full of many words? (102). Thus, this (viz. the third view) cannot be accepted.

The fourth view is the one held by Prabhākara and his followers who are known as anvitābhidhānavādins. For them, the words used in a sentence, on account of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, are first correlated and then they yield the vākyārtha, through the power called abhidhā (103). The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas or the abhihitānvayavādins object to this view. Their objections are as below – when the anvitābhidhānavādī says that the abhidhā power of a word is able to convey its meaning as well as correlation (anvayas), is it so that the vākyārtha is gathered through all the padārthas together or not?. If they (=anvitābhidhānavādins) hold that all the words together do not convey the vākyārtha, then for them only the first word-pada-will convey the vākyārtha.

So, the use of other padas becomes redundant, as the vivaksa (intention) of the speaker will be conveyed by just one word alone ! (104) Or, if it be said that other words also convey vakyartha, then in the sentence, harih gam badhnāti, wherein we get three words, the meaning of the action 'badhnati' will not become clear until it is connected with 'harih' the agent and 'gam the object The same is the case with the other words. Thus, there arises the contingency of itaretaras'raya (The illustration cited by Vācaspati Mis'ra is ukhayām pacet) (105).

The fifth view is held by abhihitanvayavadins or by Kumarila and his followers According to them, the padas first convey their meaning separately, and then after getting correlated, they convey the vākyārtha

Vacaspatimis'ra in his Tattvabindu refutes Prabhākara's anvitabhidhānavada and establishes the abhihitānvayavada as the Siddhānta The abhihitanvayavādin says that unless a contrary evidence arises, usually, for any effect, we consider the immediately preceding factor as the cause of it (106) Whenever there is vakyārthajñana it is preceded by padartha jñanasmrti, which should be then recognised as its cause Again, this padārthasmarana alone is not sufficient for bringing about the sentence-sense, but their correlation is also important Thus the smarana of the padarthas in the mind, qualified by ākanksa, and sannidhi, makes for the vākyarthadhih (107) Again the abhihitanvayavādin holds that the mental impression (manovasana) by itself does not create the smrti or memory of the objects of experience that

were known or unknown earlier. It just makes for the remembrance of the padārthas of a given padasamūha qualified by ākanksā, yogyatā etc. Thus, padarthasmrti goes with (i.e. is sahakrtā) akanksādi and thus only (i e ākānksādi trayasahakrta) makes for the knowledge of the vākyārtha.

As for the argument that if padarthajñana is caused by smrti which is different from padas, then, in that case, it will not be capable of causing knowledge of the vākyartha; for, in case if it is held to be capable of this, then we will have to accept this as the seventh pramaṇa over and above the six, held by the Mimamsadars'ana Or the s'abdapramana will have to be included in this novel pramana, and this is not noticed by S'abara and others, who have not accepted padartha as a separate pramana because they have already mentioned āgamapramana which could have been only a sub-variety of the new padartha pramana (108), and also that if agamapramana is a sub-variety of padārtha, then, padartha should be mentioned along with the other five pramānas, and this means casting aspersions on the scholarship-vidvattā-and omniscience-sarvajñatva-of Bhagavān Bhasyakāra Moreover, if we take padārthajñana as the nimitta of vākyārthajñāna then, we will have to accept either three vṛttis or two, such as (i) the first s'akti that helps the pada to give its individual meaning, and (ii) the second that causes its memory, and (iii), the third that correlates, or at least the two that give padarthajñāna and vakyarthajñāna

respectively while in the view of the anvitabhidhana-vāda only one s'akti is required and thus there is no kalpanāgaurava–or the contingency of imagining many vrttis (109)(110) Vācaspati gives the following reply

The abhihitanvayavadin holds that only one sakti as mentioned by the Prabhākaras can not be connected with the anvaya or correlation For thus, as anvaya or correlation is just one and identical with reference to different padas, we will have to accept the position in which all the padas stand for one another as synonyms [1] (111) The abhihitānvayavādin again asks the following question to the anvitābhidhanavadin Is it so that a pada by its sakti conveys only the meaning as such (padarthasarupa) and not the correlation (anvaya) also which makes for the vākyārthadhih? Or is it so that it conveys both its meaning and the correlation, both of which help to bring about the vakyārthadhīh? The knowledge of the correlation of one padartha with another padartha is born of some other pada either known (spasta) or unknown (aspasta), and not by the padas themselves Those who are learned in the vedas also hold this view and according to them, kriya or action, by abhidha cannot convey the karta or agent (112). Thus, the abhihitānvayavādī accepts another sakti, different from abhidhā, and it is termed as laksaṇas'akti For them in laukika and vaidic sentences, the vakyarthadhih is caused by laksana Vācaspatimis'ra clarifies the stages which the s rota–listener–has to pass through while going from vakyasravana to

vākyarthajñana. It is as follow. An individual listens to the sentences, spoken by the elderly people and thereby becomes conscious of activity (pravṛtti), inactivity (nivrtti), joy or sorrow (harṣa, soka) etc Thus, he records this sentence as the cause of pravrtti, nivṛtti etc As the elderly person goes on using one word (pada) after another, he gathers *newer and newer meanings (anupajata) and this new* (or anupajāta) meaning dawns upon the mind only after listening to some particular words (visesa pada) even though the words already pronounced are very well there. Thus the child takes them to be the cause of it (i e knowledge) This knowledge is only with reference to the padārtha alone and as such it cannot make for the pravrtti, *nivrtti*, etc But when the whole sentence sense is gathered then only it causes pravrtti, nivṛtti etc. This visista artha or, particular meaning, goes with the whole sentence The vrddhavyavahara results into this The words used in the vrddhavyavahara have this conveying of the visistārtha as its object, but by abhidhā they convey only the padartha alone Thus, as in the case of laukika vakyas, so also in the case of vaidika vakyas the words convey the sentence-sence through laksaṇāa lone (113)

It becomes quite clear that for the Bhātta Mimāmsakas the grasping of the meaning of the sentence, the vākyārthagrahaṇa, is achieved with the help of laksana. Kumārila himself notes in his vārtika that vakyārtho laksyamāno hi sarvatraiveti nah sthitih.

Pārthasarathi Miśra in his Nyāyaratnamala refutes the anvitābhidhānavāda and establishes that

even though in a single sentence, we get many padas, still, with the help of ākāṅksādi we gather the correlation between different padas (114) Neither the sentence, nor the words by themselves make for the vākyārthadhī First of all, from the padasvarūpa we get padārtha through abhidha and then vākyartha becomes lakṣita i e. indicated (115) In a sentence there are many words, but when there is vākyārthadhih, all the padarthas are united just as all types of pigeons get together for picking up grains (116).

Vācaspati has made it quite clear that the power that correlates the word senses in a sentence is quite different from abhidha and it is lakṣaṇa But this lakṣaṇā is different from lakṣana of the alamkarikas and thus we come across at least four vrttis, viz, *abhidhā, lakṣaṇa, gauni and padārthānvayas'akti* In order to avoid the gaurava of recognising so many vrttis the padarthānvaya s'akti is also termed as lakṣaṇa (117) This lakṣaṇā or padārthanvayas'akti is different from lakṣaṇā of the alamkarikas and probably because of this others might have named it differently as tatparya śakti,

Ālamkārikas

As seen above, some of the Bhatta Mimamsakas later on, called it tātparya vṛtti in order to distinguish it from lakṣana as such Probably, the Mimāmsakas in Kasmira, followed this tradition which was mentioned by even Abhinava and Mammaṭa Moreover *Abhinava and Mammata have* identified gauṇi and lakṣaṇā of the Mimamsakas Thus, for them, tātparya becomes the third vrtti and vyañjana is therefore

termed as the Turīyā Vrttı (118). Abhınava and Mammata also accept thıs view of the abhıhıtanvayavāda It becomes clear when we read ıtyantagranthena upapadıtasya abhınavaguptacaryasammatapaksasya bahuvacanam s'rı mammaṭācāryapādaıh svasammıtatvamuktamıtı tıkakāraıh sarvaıh uktamıtıdık (Bālabodhını pp. 27).

But lateron, certaın dhvanıvadıns rejected thıs tātparyavrttı, and Vıdyanatha, the author of Pratāparudrıya, ıncludes tatparyavrttı ın vyañjanavrttı and mentıons the tatparyartha as ıdentıcal wıth the vyangyārtha. The vıew vız-soyaṃ ıṣorıva dırghadır ghataro abhıdhā vyāparaḥ etc. (supposedly mentıoned by Bhaṭta Lollata) consıders tātparyavrttı as just a part of abhıdhavrttı. Mahıma gathers the tātpary ārtha wıth the *help of anumāna or ınference.* He does not recognıse tātparyavrttı ın gatherıng the sense of 'nısedha' or negatıon, from the sentence, vısam bhak saya, macāsya grhe bhunıkthah. For hım, the nısedh ārtha does not fall ın the provınce of sābdabodha, but ıs gathered by the process of anumāna, where the vacyārtha becomes the hetu. Thus, here we have an ınstance of ārthı prakrıyā and not sabdı prakrıya (119)

Lakṣaṇā :

After consıderıng the nature of abhıdhā and tātparya we may consıder laksanā or the power of ındıcatıon, or that *functıon of a word* whıch gıves us the secondary meanıng. The word that gıves the secondary sense ıs called lāksanıka, the sense, lakṣyartha, and the functıon, lakṣana. That words

are at times used in a sense other than the primary was recognised by pioneer grammarians such as Patañjali who admitted a gaunī vrtti besides mukhyā vrtti He has explained the conditions that necessitate the recognition of laksaṇā as a process of transference of one s attribute to another The various illustrations of laksaṇā cited by him under the rule Pa. 4-1-148, are as below mañcah hasanti, gangāyām ghosah, yastih pravesaya etc These are so clear and typical that they have been often used by others The Mīmāmsakas and Naiyayikas and all the other schools of thought recognise laksaṇā Though this vrtti was generally called laksana other names also were current viz gauni vrttih, bhaktih or upacāra Usually when there is a laksaṇika or, secondary use of words, we see commentators saying gauṇóyam sabdaprayogah, bhāktah va or, upacaroyam etc., though of course herein we come across different shades of meaning We will consider this in detail later on

Laksaṇā, then, is a secondary function As Mammata says, the power really belongs to vācyartha, though, for all practical purposes, it is supposed to belong to vacaka sabda (120) Thus, if gangayāṃ ghosah is taken as an instance of laksanā, the laksvārtha of gangā tata is, really speaking conveyed by the vacyārtha viz gangapravāha, and not by the word 'gangā' The idea is that the power of the sabda 'gaṅgā becomes exhausted in expressing gangāpravāha Now, where lies the possibility of the word, which has become powerless after giving the abhidhartha, conveying the laksyārtha viz. gangātaṭa ?

Thus, when we say that lakṣaṇā is the power of a word, we are slightly inexact and attribute to the word, a function that belongs to its sense.

Conditions of Lakṣaṇā :

Lakṣaṇā presupposes three conditions. (121). (*i*) The vācyārtha must be inapplicable (i.e. mukhyārthabādha) (*ii*) The lakṣyārtha must be such as is connected with the vācyārtha-(mukhyārthayoga, or tadyoga), and (*iii*) The lakṣaṇā must have been resorted to either (*a*) in keeping with usage or rūḍhi, or (*b*) with a definite purpose (prāyojana).

The vācyārtha becomes inapplicable or bādhita because of its coming into conflict with the pramānas (122). In gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ, the mukhyartha viz. gaṅgāpravāha is bādhita, say, by pratyaksa pramāṇa and again fails to comply with the second requirement of a vākya viz. 'yogyatā'. In determining whether a sense is bādhita or not, we take note of the tātparya or purport of the words. Thus, when we say that in gaṅgayāṃ ghoṣah the mukhyārtha of gaṅgā is bādhita, it is the purport or tenor of the sentence that makes us say so. Otherwise, one could have said that the mukhyartha of ghoṣa (and not gangā) is bādhita and that lakṣaṇā applies to ghosa and not gaṅgā.

Now, the lakṣyārtha must be such as bears some sort of connection-may be even of vaiparitya or contrariety-with the vācyārtha. If this condition is not fulfilled, every sense could be the lakṣyārtha. The connection may be any one of the five enumerated


by Bhartrmitra and others

abhidheyena sambandhat sādrāyāt samavāyatah I
vaiparityāt kriyayogāllaksanā pañcadhā mata II (123)

Canons of interpretation in Sanskrit, are, on ground of 'gaurava dosa' against the secondary use of words, where the primary use would give the same idea (124) Laksana which is a secondary function, requires justification Laksanā is justified on the score of prayojana or rudhi Gangātate ghosah will fail to convey the sense–prayojana–of the preponderance of s'aitya and pāvanatva or coolness and purity, that is conveyed by 'gangavam ghoṣah', which, therefore, is justified The example of lakṣana based on rudhi is 'karmaṇi kus'alaḥ' according to Mammata Visvanatha disagrees (125) Hemacandra does not accept rudhimulā laksaṇā at all (126) It might have been that all instances of laksaṇa must have been prayojanamula in the beginning The first gentleman who transferred 'kuśala' to the realms other than that of darbhagrahana did so on the basis of upacāra (i e transfer due to similarity) But constant use has totally overshadowed the prayojana element in it Māṇikyacandra very critically brings out this view point when he says nirudhā iti bhras opacārapraittayah Kumarila also recognised this fact, and even went to the length of saying that even rūdhilaksaṇās may to-day be employed as prayojanalakṣaṇās under certain circumstances (127) We have seen that 'tadyogah' is one of the requirements for laksaṇā This tadyoga may be samīpya sambandha, angangībhava sambandha,

tatkarmya, sādrśya, svāmibhṛtya sambandha, tādarthya etc. Based on these sambandhas or relations, laksana is divided into gauṇī i e., based on sadrśya sambandha and śuddhā i e based on sâdrśyetara sambandha. We will consider the classification of laksanā later on. It may be noted here that according to the Prābhākara Mimāmsakas, and certain ālamkārikas such as Hemacandra, gaunī vrtti is recognised as distinct from and independent of laksaṇā Thus, a word has, in view of the latter, four vrttis viz abhidha, gauni, laksana and vyañjana Vidyanātha, in his Prataparudriya refutes the view of the Prābha karas and observes that gauṇī cannot be a separate function of a word If at all, it can only be a subdivision of laksaṇa, as in both there is mukhy ārthabadha and tadyoga If gauṇī be accepted as a separate function of a word, he observes, then we would have to accept several functions based on several relations (128). The Naiyayikas also hold a similar view (129)

Classification of laksanā : Mammata seems to classify laksanā in the following way—



Thus, gauṇī lakṣaṇa is that which is based on sādṛśya sambandha, and s'uddha is one which is sadṛśyetara-sambandhamulā (i e the relations of kāryakarana, tadarthya, tātkarmya, etc) Suddha is again four fold as shown above, while gauṇī is two fold

It should be noted however, that these divisions and subdivisions pertain to prajaonavrtti lakṣaṇā alone and not rudhimula Māṇikyacandra suggests that rudhi lakṣana is so well established that we cannot penetrate into its nature (130) Thus, it is of the type of abhidhā (131) The S. D gives a more detailed classification

Upādānalakṣaṇā is also known as ajahatsvārtha or ajahallakṣana Its difinition is, according to Mammata, svasiddhaye parakṣepah It is a subdivision of śuddha The example is kuntah pravis'anti The vācyartha of kuntāḥ cannot be logically constructed with 'pravisanti' So, there is mukhy ārthabādha and we derive the idea of 'kuntin' or 'kuntadhāriṇah' *In this instance, the vācyartha is* completely comprehanded in the lakṣyārtha. The idea of 'kuntāh' is completely included in that of 'kuntadhāriṇah' So, it is called upādana lakṣaṇā or ajahat-svārthā.

Lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā is defined as 'parārthaṃ svasamarpaṇam It is also termed as jahallakṣanā. This is another sub-devision of s'uddhā In this particular variety, the vacyārtha surrenders its meaning and yields place to the lakṣyārtha In gangāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ, the word gangayīṃ surrenders its vācyartha

viz gaṅgāpravāha and makes room for the lakṣyārtha viz gaṅgataṭa This variety is called lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇa because gaṅgā here serves as the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) both of the vācyārtha and the lakṣyārtha The sampradāyaprakāśinī explains lakṣaṇā as lakṣaṇam upalakṣaṇam Māṇikyacandra and others explain the word lakṣaṇā as lakṣaṇena tatadijñāpanena According to Nāgesvarī it is lakṣanena svarthasamarpaṇena upalakṣita This svārthasamarpana is total and not partial (132)

These two viz upādāna and lakṣana are the varieties of s uddha only, and not of gauṇī While dealing with upādāna lakṣaṇā Mammaṭa takes care to refute the views of two different schools The first view refuted is that of Maṇḍana Misra according to Udyota or that of Mukula bhatta, according to Maṇikyachandra According to this view the jātivācaka s abdas like gauḥ conveys vyakti by upādāna lakṣaṇā Abhidhā is exhausted in giving the sense of gotva and therefore govyakti is indicated by the word gauḥ, through the process of upadana lakṣaṇā For Mammaṭa it is not so According to him govyakti is gathered by avinabhavamula akṣepa, i e by invariable implication Lakṣaṇā is not possible for want of either prayojana or rudhi Govyakti is here ākṣepagrāhya, i e. gathered by implication

The second view refuted is probably the one held by the Mīmāṁsakas According to this view, ratribhojana in case of Devadatta who is stout and yet does not take his food by day, is a matter of lakṣyārtha. Again, rātribhojana includes the idea of

divā-abhojana Therefore, it is the case of upādāna lakṣaṇā But, not so, according to Mammata, who holds that this is a case of arthāpatti which should be accepted here as it involves a lesser amount of gaurava than lakṣaṇā We have seen above that s'uddha is so called as it has no reference to upacāra, gauṇī on the other hand is based on upacāra Upacara is based on resemblance (133).

Sāropā and sadhyavasānā are two sub divisions common to both s uddhā and gauṇī Both sāropā and sadhyavasana involve aropa, to a smaller or greater extent In saropa, the aropa is associated with a consciousness of discinction between the object superimposed and that superimposed upon and in sādhyavasānā, the āropa is carried to such an extent that all consciousness of distinctness between the two objects is lost owing to the latter being merged into the former Again, if the instances involve the idea of sādrs'ya, they become the sub divisions of gauṇī and if they involve the relations of sādrsyetarasambandha they become the sub-varities of s'uddhā. Thus gaurvāhīkah and gaurevāyam are instances of gauṇī sāropā and gauṇī sadhyavasanā, while āyurghrtam and ayurevedam are instances of sāropā śuddhā and sadhyavasānā s'uddhā In short, we have a lesser degree of āropa in saropā then in sādhyavasānā where it is termed as adhyavasāna (134) It may be noted, that when based on sādrsya, sāropā becomes the basis of rupakālaṃkārah and sādhyavasanā, that of atiśayokti

Mammata and Vis'vanātha give three different views as to the functioning of laksanā in the instance- gaurvāhikah They are as below : (*i*) According to the first view, gauh in gaurvāhīkah indicates gogata-jadyamāndyadīgunas As these are found to be common to vāhika also, the word gauh expresses vahīkārtha. (*ii*) The second view says that gauh indicates vahikagatajādyamāndyādiguṇas (not gogata gunas as in the first view). These gunas or qualities through avinābhavasambandha suggest vahīka vyakti. (*iii*) The third view is that gauh indicates vàhika himself as being the substratum of jadyamandyādi common to both. The third view is accepted by Mammata We do not know exactly as to who held the first two views. The third is held by the Mimamsakas as is clear from a citation from Kumarila in support In Kumarila s Tantravartika (8th cen. A D.) which constitutes the commentary on the last three padas of the 1st adhyaya and also the 2nd and 3rd adhyayas of the S abarbhasya, we read the following mānantaraviruddhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe abhidheya-vinābhutapratītirlaksanocyate I laksyamaṇaguṇairyogat vrtteristā tu gaunata II As to the second view, Māṇikyacandra notes that it is very close to that of Mukula (135).

Mammata also mentions certain sādrs'yetara-sambandhas such as karyakaranabhava, tadarthya, svasvāmibhava, avayavavayavibhāva, tatkarmya, etc Mānikyacandra adds māna e g. adhakam as'nāti, dhārana (=holding) e.g. tuladhrtaṃ candanam tulā; ādhipatya (=leadership) as in pumanayaṃ gotram

(= This person is family) sthāna as in mañcaḥ krośanti etc The sambandhas are numerous (136)

As to the classification of lakṣaṇā, authors on the alaṁkāraśāstra differ We have seen Mammata's view Jagannatha's view is almost similar Viśvanatha gives as many as eighty varities of lakṣana The Vṛttivartikakara (Appayya Dīkṣita) gives a seven fold division of prayojanavati lakṣana (137) It may be noted that Mammaṭa also admits the gūḍhatva and agūḍhatva of the prayojana

Lakṣanā, not accepted ·

There are certain ālaṁkārikas who do not accept lakṣaṇā as a separate vṛtti at all e.g Mukulabhatta, Mahimabhatta and Kuntaka accept only abhidhā They do not accept lakṣanā as a śabdavyāpāra Bhatta Mukula suggests this when at the end of Abhidhavṛttimātrkā he says ityetadabhidhāvṛttam daśadhātra vivecitam He includes the varieties of lakṣaṇā under his ten fold scheme of abhidhā According to him, he treats of lakṣaṇā only because for him the dhvani of vyañjanāvādins is not different from lakṣanā (138) We will consider Mukula's views in the chapter on dhvanivirodha (Ch XXIV) For Mahima also, the word has only one s'akti and that is abhidha (139) For Mahima, lakṣyārtha becomes anumita or inferred through vācyārtha which serves as a hetu According to him, in gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ when we derive the meaning of people staying on the Ganges, it is anumitigamya or derived through inference Similarly, in gaurvahika, there is no lakṣaṇavyapara, but we have anumāna or inference

of the similarity of vāhīkah and gauh, on the strength of the superimposition of gotva on vāhika If it is otherwise, who will superimpose a thing on something totally different (140)

Next comes Kuntaka Kuntaka does not clearly negate lakṣaṇā at any place But when he describes vakrokti as 'vicitrā abhidha' we get a glimpse of his approach (141) The Mimāmsakas and the Naiyayikas accept lakṣana as a separate vrtti

From the above discussion it is clear that laksana is a derived function of language The primary sense of a word used in several contexts gets modified or transferred by these An attempt has been made by Sanskrit writers to note down as many such contexts as possible, for example, the relation of similarity which gives the varities of gauni, the relations of nearness, causality ownership possession, tātkarmya etc -which are responsible for the derived meanings of words As we have seen, writers like Mukula Bhatta do not consider it necessary to consider laksaṇa because, they think that it is derived from abhidha conditioned by contexts But the grammarians, Mimamsakas and logicians recognise laksaṇa as a seperate function because it is necessary for them, for logical clerity, to distinguish the different meanings conveyed by a word in different contexts

Vyañjanāvrtti

We now consider the nature of what is termed as vyañjanavrtti As noticed already, it is recognised to be the turiyavrtti, the first three being abidhā,

tatparya and laksana We have also seen that the tatparya vṛtti is called a sabdavrtti only through upacara i e. metaphorically, and the gauni of the Mimamsakas is included in laksanā, though certain writers on alamkāra, such as Hemacandra mention it as a separate vrtti

The Dhvanyāloka says that in poetry there is something which is beyond the expressed sense and it is this that is the true essence of poetry (142) We will see later on in due course, that some modern European writers also have underlined two uses of language, viz the scientific and the emotive and that the latter one has a special role in poetry

For the realisation of this implied or the pratiyamāna or vyangyārtha i e, the suggested sense, the writers on alaṃkara have established a separate vrtti or function of a word, and it is termed as the vyañjanavrtti which is not identical with either abhidha or laksaṇā With the help of vyañjanā, a word, subordinating itself and its meaning, suggests the vyangyartha which is more important and is termed as 'dhvani' in a poem (143) Just as an object, already existing beforehand, is manifested by light, in the same way this pratīyamānartha becomes manifested with the help of vyañjanā The pratibhā of the reader also plays a major role in gathering this vyangyārtha, observes Hemacandra (144) The vacyartha or laksyārtha, is only an instrument, a nimitta, in the realisation of vyangyārtha The stock example is—'gangayāṃ ghosah'—wherein the idea of coolness and purity is gathered through a separate power called vyañjanā

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Mammaṭa in his k. p. II. 9 days :

Yasya pratītimādhātuṃ lakṣaṇā samupāsyate I
phale śabdaikagamyetra vyañjanānnāparā kriyā II

and adds :-prayojanapratipipādayiṣaya yatra lakṣaṇīyā śabdaprayogaḥ tatra nānyatastatpratipattirapi tu tasmādeva śabdāt. na cātra vyañjanāvṛtenyo vyāparaḥ i.e. with reference to this fruit, for conveying the apprehension of which indication is resorted to, (and) which is understood from the (indicative) word alone, (there is) no other function than suggestion ..where (as in a sentence) a word is used with indication with the desire of conveying the motive, there the apprehension of that motive does not arise from anything else, but from that word alone. And there (i.e. with reference to the motive) there is no other function except vyañjanā.

Mammaṭa brings in the topic of vyañjanā while concluding the topic of lakṣanā. He says that lakṣanā again can be three-fold, viz (one) based on rūḍhi and the other two varities based on prayojana which may be gūḍha i.e. concealed or agūḍha i.e. not-concealed. To convey this prayojana, the vyāpāra or the function resorted to, is always vyañjanā. It is not abhidhā in the absence of convention or samaya, and it is not lakṣanā in the absence of further prayojana (II. 10). Again, the vyaṅgyārtha is not identical with the lakṣyārtha because, the latter one is not the primary sense or the mukhyārtha, nor is there any incompatibility i.e. bādha, nor any connexion with the fruit (yogaḥ phalena no), nor any motive herein (na prayojanametasmin), nor does the word

fail in conveying the motive (na ca s'abdah skhaladgatih). (K. P. II. 11.) Mammaṭa adds the following explanation: As the word Gaṅgā indicates the sense viz. the bank, because it is incomplete with the present context in its primary sense of the stream, like that if it were incompatible with the present context in its indicated sense of the bank also, then it would further indicate the motive. And the bank is not the primary sense of the word Gangā. Also here there is no incompatibility. And there is no connection of the bank, which is the indicated sense of the word Ganga, with properties like coolness, holiness etc, which are to be further indicated by that motive which is supposed to be indicated. Moreover the word Gaṅgā is not unable to convey the motive, as it is to convey the sense of the bank, in the absence of the three conditions (145). Mammaṭa adds that in this there would be anavasthā, the absence of finality which would cause the destruction of the very root (mūlakṣayakāriṇi anavasthā. K. P. II. 129) If this prayojana is to be indicated, it would be indicated by yet another motive, and that second motive also will be indicated by a third one, and so on Thus, want of finality or regressus ad infinitum, causing the non-apprehension of the matter in hand, i.e. the first motive, would result. Mammaṭa also rejects the case of the indicated sense being accompanied with or qualified by the motive The object of knowledge is different from knowledge, and the fruit of knowledge is also different from it. The object of direct perception is a blue thing and the like. But the fruit is knownness or

self consciousness. Thus, with reference to a qualified object, indication is not possible. But properties or qualities such as holiness and the like are realised as residing in the bank and are apprehended by a function other than expression, purport or indication And this function is designated by terms such as vyañjana, dhvanana, dyotana etc., and it should be necessarily admitted as having an independent existence (146)

Classification :

Mammata has classified vyañjana into laksaṇamūlā or that based on laksana and abhidhamūlā or that based on abhidhā The laksanāmūla is illustrated as in 'Gangayam ghosah'. The abhidhamūlā occurs when the function of expression of a word having more than one primary sense, is restricted to one sense by means of conjunction and the like, and the process which produces the apprehension of a sense that is not expressed is suggestion (147) Conjuction (or samyogah) disjunction (or viprayogah), association (or sāhacarya), antagonism (or virodhita), motive (arthah), context (or prakarana), special mark (or lingam), proximity of another word, (i.e s'abdasyanyasya sannidhih), capability (i e sāmarsthyam), propriety (or aucitya), place (or desah), time (or kalaḥ), gender (vyaktih), accent (svara) and etc are the causes of recollection i e apprehension of a particular meaning, when there is no decision or determination regarding the meaning of a word. Mammata also gives proper illustrations for all these cases. He concludes that, when though the power

and Mahima Bhatta do not accept this variety at all There are others who reject the whole of s'ābdi vyañjanā which, according to them falls within the scope of s'lesa Still others accept abhidhāmūlā s'abdī only in certain cases He holds that in the particular illustration viz. asāvudayamārūdhah kāntimān raktamandalah, the earlier authors recognise a case for abhidhamūlā s'abdī vyañjanā (152) But for him, it is a case of pure s'lesa, as both the meanings are gathered by abhidha (153) Appayya Dīksita does not accept s'abdas'aktimūlā vyañjanā, but he does accept s'abdaśaktimūla dhvani on the grounds that herein its charm is dependent on the use of certain words only (154). Vis'vanātha observes that Mahima's view viz. that in the particular illustration viz. durgālanghita vigrahe etc, there is no presence of of any aprākaranikārtha i e non-contextual meaning whatsoever, is only gajanimilikā on his part (155) Jagannatha has his own view. He holds that both in case of nanārthaka s'abdas'aktimūla dhvani and in case of s'lesa kāvya, there cannot be any obstruction in gathering both the meanings (i e. prākaranika i.e contextual and aprākaranika i e non-contextual) simultaneously It is no use saying that while in s'lesa there is tātparyajñāna with reference to both the senses, while it is not so in case of vyañjana Jagan nātha is of the opinion that in śabdas'aktimūla dhvani both the meanings are equally vācya or expressed and that both are gathered through abhidhā It is therefore not wise to accept vyañjanā for gathering the other sense–aparārthapratīti (156). Thus he does not seem to agree with the dhvanivadins in general

in case of the s'abdaśaktimūladhvani. But at places he agrees He believes that in case of words having multiple sense, when rūḍha or yaugika words are used, even the aprākaraṇikārtha is vācya. But when it is a case of yogarūḍha or yaugikarūḍha padas having a multiple sense, according to Jagannātha, the non-contextual sense is gathered through vyañjana (157). The illustration cited is–abalānāṃ s'riyaṃ hṛtvā....etc. Here, in respect of the first meaning in form of lightening and the cloud, there is rūḍhaśabda. But in respect of the second meaning, there is either rūḍhi or yoga. Again the second meaning is not avayavalabhya only, as in the case of yaugika words. This is, therefore, a proper instance of vyañjanā. Thus says he,

yogārūdhasya s'abdasya yoge rūḍhyā niyantrite ।
dhiyaṃ yogaspṛs'otthasya yā sūte vyañjanaiva sā ॥

i.e. when yogaśakti in case of yogarūdha sabdas becomes restricted by the rūḍhiśakti, (according to the dictum-rūḍhiryogādbaliyasi-) the yogārtha is derived through vyañjanā alone.

Modern Views :

Modern European thinking as to the function of language in poetry bears some striking resemblance. We may look into it in the light of Susan Stebbing (Introduction to Logic), and I. A. Richards (Meaning of Meaning, Principles of literary criticism) and other authors.

Language conveys both information and emotion. When the emotional element is subdued or suppressed

as far as possible we have the informative function of language When, however, the main function is to convey *emotion* and use *information even for the* purpose of evoking emotion as in rhetoric and poetry we call it the emotive function of language The first is *termed* the scientific use of language, and the other, the emotive use of language

Thus, one important function of language is to communicate information For science, this is the only function, and for this, it evolves a terminology i e a set of technical terms which aim at precision, i e uniqueness *of reference.* A scientific *statement* is, qua scientific, precise The aim of the scientist is to use his verbal symbol so as to achieve uniqueness of reference and thus to use language, in order to communicate information that is exact and precise

However, we see in our day to day life, that *very often statements are made not merely to* communicate information, but to arouse in the hearer a certain state of mind Literary critics, everywhere, have realised that the poet uses language not mainly to express statements that are true or false, but to express what is neither true nor false Thus, when e g Shelley says

". .Life, like a dome of many coloured glass stains the white radiance of eternity

Untill death tramples it to fragments "

he is neither talking non sense, nor making an assertion that must be accepted or rejected as true or false The question of truth or falsity does not arise at all

The poet is using language for an entirely different purpose from the scientist who says, "The Specific heat of air at constant pressure is O 2734" To distinguish between these two uses of language, Mr I. A. Richards has suggested the convenient terminology viz —"the scientific use of language", and "the emotive use of language" (Principles of literary criticism Ch XXXIV and also Meaning of Meaning, pp 226-9, 255-60, 271-5). When language is used simply in order to refer to a referend, its use is scientific. When it is used in order to arouse an emotional attitude in the hearer, to influence him in any way other than giving him information, then its use is emotive The most unmistakable examples of the emotive use of language can be found in literature, just because it is not the main function of literature to instruct Owen Barfeild in his, 'Poetic Diction A Study in Meaning' pp. 13, 14, says "When words are selected and arranged in such a way that their meaning either arouses, or is obviously intended to arouse aesthetic imagination, the result may be described as poetic diction . He adds, " . . the same sounds and signs may easily be vehicles of poetry at this place and not in that, at this time and not at that, to this person and not to the other" The scientist uses words so as to eliminate this variation of response It may be noted that what is called logical connection has little relevance to the emotive use of language Whereas, it is the condition of success in scientific language *

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* Susan Stabing Introduction to Logic

Foot notes ·

(1) प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्यदेव वस्त्वस्ति वाणीषु महाकवीनाम् ।
यत्तत्प्रसिद्धावयवातिरिक्तं विभाति लावण्यमिवाङ्गनासु ॥ ध्वन्या I 4

(2) The तर्कदीपिका says व्यञ्जना तु शक्तिलक्षणान्तर्भूता शब्दशक्तिमूला अर्थशक्तिमूला त्वनुमानादिना अन्यथा सिद्धा ।

(3) साक्षात्सङ्केतितं योऽर्थमभिधत्ते स वाचकः । K P II and also तत्र सङ्केतितार्थस्य बोधनादग्रिमाभिधा । S D II

(4) यत्रार्थे यन्नामाधुनिकसङ्केतवत् तदेव पारिभाषिकम्, यथा पित्रादिभिः पुत्रादौ सङ्केतितम् चैत्रादि यथा वा शास्त्रकृद्भिः सिध्यभावादौ पक्षतादि । जातिवाच्यताशक्तिमन्नाम नैमित्तिकम्, यथा गौः गवयादि, यदुपाध्यवच्छिन्नशक्तिमन्नाम तदौपाधिकम्, यथा काशपश्वादि–श श प्र

(5) आजानिकश्चाधुनिकः सङ्केतो द्विविधो मतः । नित्य आजानिकस्तत्र या शक्तिरिति गीयते । कादाचित्कस्त्वाधुनिकः शास्त्रकारादिभिः कृतः । V P

(6) सेयमभिधा त्रिविधा, केवलसमुदायशक्तिः केवलावयवशक्तिः समुदायावयवशक्तिसङ्करश्चेति । R G pp 141

(7) अखण्डशक्तिमात्रेणैकार्थप्रतिपादकत्वं रूढिः । – वृत्तिवार्तिक (अपय्यदीक्षित)

(8) अवयवशक्तिमात्रसापेक्षं पदस्यैकार्थप्रतिपादकत्वं योगः । – ibid

(9) अवयवसमुदायोभयशक्तिसापेक्षमेकार्थप्रतिपादकत्वं योगरूढिः । – ibid

(10) नैयायिकास्तु – पङ्कजादिशब्दरूपैकपदोपादानरूपयान्तरङ्गप्रत्यासत्त्या नाभिकमलकुमुदान्वयात्प्रागेव पङ्कजनिकर्तृत्ववैशिष्ट्येनोपस्थितस्य पद्मस्य पद्मत्वेनोपस्थितस्य पङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वस्य च नाभिकमलकुमुदाद्यन्वये नाकाङ्क्षा, न च विशिष्टस्य तदन्वयविषयिणी शाब्दधी, इति तदन्वयार्थं स्वतन्त्रपद्मत्वपङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वोपस्थितये पङ्कजादिपदस्य लक्षणैवाभ्युपगन्तव्या न तु रूढियोगो वा । – वृत्तिवार्तिक अपय्यदीक्षित–pp 5

(11) संयोगो विप्रयोगश्च साहचर्यं विरोधिता । अर्थः प्रकरणं लिङ्गं शब्दस्यान्यस्य सन्निधिः । सामर्थ्यमौचिती देशः कालो व्यक्तिः स्वरादयः । शब्दार्थस्यानवच्छेदे विशेषस्मृतिहेतवः ॥ हेमचन्द्र adds आदिग्रहणात् अभिनयापदेशनिर्देशसञ्ज्ञेङ्गिताकारा गृह्यन्ते । काव्यानुशासन I 23, pp 65.

(12) सशङ्खचक्रो हरि इति शङ्खचक्रयोगेन हरिशब्दो विष्णुमेवाभिधत्ते । अशङ्खचक्रो हरि इति तद्वियोगेन तमेव। भीमार्जुनौ इत्यर्जुन पार्थ । कर्णार्जुनौ इति कर्ण सूतपुत्र । स्थाणु वन्दे इति स्थाणु शिव । सव जानाति देव इति देवो भवान् । कुपितो मकरध्वज इति मकरध्वज काम । देव पुरारि इति पुरारि शिव । मधुनामत्त पिक इति मधुर्वसन्त। पातु वो दयितामुख इति मुख सामुख्यम् । विभाति गगने चन्द्र इति चन्द्र शशी। निशि चित्रभानु इति चित्रभानुर्वह्नि । भाति रथाङ्ग नपुसकव्यक्त्या रथाङ्ग चक्रम् । स्वरस्तु वेद एव विशेषप्रतीतिकृत् न काव्ये इति तस्य विषय नोदाहृतम् । S D

(13) वाक्यभावमवाप्तस्य सार्थकस्यावबोधत ।
सपद्यते शाब्दबोधो न तन्मात्रस्य बोधत ॥ श श प्र ३२

(14) आख्यात (साव्ययकारकविशेषण) वाक्यम् । महाभा II 11

(15) सक्रिया विशेषण च। mbh II 11

(16) तदस्मान्मन्यामहे पदान्यसत्यानि एकमभिन्नस्वभावक वाक्यम् । तदबुध बोधनाय पदविभाग कल्पित इति । वा प टीका पुण्यराज ।

(17) मिथ साकाङ्क्षशब्दस्य व्यूहो वाक्य चतुर्विधम् । श श प्र १३

(18) वाक्य स्याद्योग्यताकाङ्क्षासत्तियुक्त पदोच्चय ॥ विश्वनाथ सा द I

(19) दुर्गाचार्य on निरुक्त I 17 says सहिताया प्रकृतित्व ज्याय । मन्त्रो ह्यविभाज्यमान पूर्वं ऋषेर्मन्त्रदृश सहितयैवाभिव्यज्यते न पदै । अतश्च सहितामेव पूर्वमध्यायन्त्यनूचाना ब्राह्मणा अध्येतारश्चाध्येतार । अपि च याज्ञे कर्मणि सहितयैव विनियुज्यन्ते मन्त्रा न पदै ॥

(20) यद्यपीहाष्टौ पक्षा उक्तास्तथापि वाक्यस्फोटपक्षे तात्पय ग्रन्थकृताम्— शब्दकौस्तुभ ।

(21) V P I i 240 says उपाया शिक्षमाणाना बालानामपलापना ।
असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा तत सत्य समीहते ॥
and पुण्यराज on V P II 57 तस्मान्मन्यामहे पदान्यसत्यानि, एकमभिन्नस्वभावक वाक्यम् । तदबुधबोधनाय पदविभाग कल्पित ।

(22) एवं सूत्रकारस्य भाष्यकारस्य चाखण्डपक्षोऽभिरुचित । पुण्यराज on VP II 37

(23) उपाधिभेदेनैव शब्दस्य भेदप्रतिभासो न स्वतो नित्यत्वात्–पुण्यराज on VP II 22 and also अभिजल्पत्वमध्यासरूपत्वमागत शब्द । पुण्यराज VP II 129.

(24) असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा तत सत्य समीहते । VP II 240

(25) पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा इव ।
वाक्यात् पदानामत्यन्त प्रविवेको न कश्चन ॥ VP I 173

(26) यथा पदे विभज्यन्ते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादय ।
अपोद्धारस्तथा वाक्ये पदानामुपवर्ण्यते ॥ VP II 10

(27) वाक्यार्थस्यापि तथैव निर्विभागत्व प्रतिपादयितुमाह ॥ पुण्यराज

(28) शब्दस्य न विभागोऽस्ति कुतोऽर्थस्य भविष्यति ।
विभागै प्रक्रियाभेदमविद्वान् प्रतिपद्यते ॥ VP II 13

(29) ब्राह्मणार्थो यथा नास्ति कश्चिद्ब्राह्मणकम्बले ।
देवदत्तादयो वाक्ये तथैवस्युरनर्थका ॥ VP II 14

(30) तत्राखण्डपक्षे प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज on VP II 1

(31) विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभाऽन्यैव जायते ।
वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहु पदार्थैरुपपादितम् ॥ V.P II 145

(32) पदैरसत्यैरेवोपाधिभूतैरुपपादितामभिव्यक्तामिति ।–पुण्यराज on VP 145,

(33) उपश्लेषमिवार्थानां सा करोत्यविचारिता ।
सार्वरूप्यमिवापन्ना विषयत्वेन वर्तते । VP II 147

(34) साक्षाच्छब्देन जनितां भावनानुगमेन वा ।
इति कर्तव्यताया तां न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ॥ VP II 148

(35) प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोक सर्वं समनुपश्यति ॥ VP II 149

(36) समारम्भा प्रतीयन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् । VP II 149

(37) जन्मान्तराभ्यासहेतुकेयम् । पुण्यराज ।

(38) स्वरवृत्तिं विकुरुते मधौ पुंस्कोकिलस्य क॰ ।
जन्त्वादय कुलायादिकरणे केन शिक्षिता । II 151.
आहारप्रीत्यभिद्वेषप्लवनादिक्रियासु क ।
जात्यन्वयप्रसिद्धासु प्रयोक्ता मृगपक्षिणाम् ॥ II. 152.

(39) प्रतिभायाश्च शब्द एव मूलमित्याह । पुण्यराज
and also, भावनानुगतादेतदागमादेव जायते ।
आसत्तिविप्रकर्षाभ्यामागमस्तु विशिष्यते ॥ V.P. II 53.

(40) स्वभावचरणाभ्यासयोगादष्टोपपादिता ।
विशिष्टोपहिता चेति प्रतिभा षड्विधा विदु ॥ V.P. II 54.

(41) अयमर्थोऽर्थान्तरसाकाङ्क्ष इति व्यवहारात् । लघुमञ्जुषा pp 497

(42) The S D II says योग्यता पदार्थाना परस्परसम्बन्धे बाधाभाव । पदोच्चयस्यैतदभावेऽपि वाक्यत्वे वह्निना सिञ्चति इत्यादापि वाक्य स्यात् । आकाङ्क्षा प्रतीतिपर्यवसानविरह । स च श्रोतुर्जिज्ञासारूप । निराकाङ्क्षस्य वाक्यत्वे गौरश्व पुरुषो हस्ती इत्यादीनामपि वाक्यत्व स्यात् । आसत्ति बुध्यविच्छेद । बुद्धिविच्छेदेऽपि वाक्यत्वे इदानीमुच्च रितस्य देवदत्तशब्दस्य दिनान्तरोच्चारितेन गच्छतीति पदेन सङ्गति स्यात् । अनाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतयोरात्मार्थधर्मत्वेऽपि पदोच्चयधर्मत्वमुपचारात् ।

(43) सुप्तिङन्तचयो नैवमतिव्याप्त्यादिदोषत । श श प्र 13

(44) घट वृत्ति कर्मत्व

(45) अर्थैकत्वादेक वाक्य साकाङ्क्ष चेद् विभागे स्यात् । मी.सू. II 146
and also एकार्थ पदसमूह वाक्य । शा.भा.मी.सू. II 146

(46) साकाङ्क्षावयव भेदे परानाकाङ्क्षशब्दकम् ।
कर्मप्रधानं गुणवदेकार्थं वाक्यमिष्यते ॥ V P. II 4

(47) भेद संसर्गो वा वाक्यार्थ इति यदुच्यते । . एकप्रयोजनत्वादुपपन्नम् ।
शा. भा. on MI Sū II 1 45

(48) तस्मात्तेभ्य प्रतीमेताभिहितत्वात् प्रयोगस्य-मी. सू. II, 1. 4. and also अपूर्वस्याख्यातपदप्रतिपाद्यत्वम् शा.भा. and also भावशब्दा एषापूर्वस्य चोदका । शा भा.

(49) आख्यातशब्द सङ्घातो जाति सङ्घातवर्तिनी ।
एकोऽनवयव शब्द क्रमो बुध्यनुसंहृति ॥
पदमाद्य पृथक् सव पद साकाङ्क्षमित्यपि ।
वाक्य प्रति मतिर्भिन्ना बहुधा न्यायवादिनाम् ॥ V P II 1

(50) आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति ।
आख्यातशब्दे नियत साधन यत्र गम्यते ।
तदप्येक समाप्तार्थं वाक्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥ V P II 327

(51) आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति पक्षे क्रिया वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज-on V P II 1

(52) आख्यात साव्ययकारकविशेषण वाक्यम्-वार्तिक 9 on पा 2 1 1

(53) अपर आह । आख्यात सविशेषणमिति एव सर्वाणि ह्येतानि क्रिया विशेषणानि mbh on Vartika 9

(54) यथानेकमपि क्तान्तं तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम् ।
तथा तिङन्त मप्याहु तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम् ॥ V P II 6

(55) नास्यत्र वाक्यभेद, मन्नीयैतत् प्राधान्येनैक क्रियापदमत्र स्थितमन्यानि क्रियान्तराणि तद्विशेषणान्येव-पुण्यराज, and also बहुष्वपि तिङन्तेषु साकाङ्क्षेष्वेकवाक्यता । V P II 450

(56) वाक्य तदपि मन्यन्ते यत् पद चरितक्रियम् । V P II 326

(57) क्रियारहित न वाक्य अस्तीति प्राचो प्रवादो निर्युक्तिवादश्रद्धेय । श श प्र on पा 13

(58) स्फोट शब्द, ध्वनि शब्दगुण इति । पुण्यराज V P II 1

(59) स्फोटश्च द्विविध । बाह्य आभ्यन्तरश्च । पुण्यराज V P II 1

(60) बाह्योऽपि जातिव्यक्तिभेदेन द्विविध ।

(61) तत्राखण्डपक्षे जाति सङ्घातवर्तिनी, एकोऽनवयव शब्दो बुद्ध्यनुसंहृतिरिति त्रीणि लक्षणानि (पुण्यराज on V P II 1)

(62) एव निरशमेव वाक्य वाचकमित्येव युक्तम् । पुण्यराज on V P II 12

(63) वस्तु प्रतिभाम सोऽसावुपाधिकृत एवेत्यर्थ पुण्यराज on V P II 19

(64) यदन्त शब्दतत्व तु नादैरेक प्रकाशित ।
तदाहुरपरे शब्द तस्य वाक्य तथैकता ॥ V P II 30

(65) क्रमो हि धर्म कालस्य तेन वाक्य न विद्यते । V P II 51

(66) सन्त एव विशेषा ये पदार्थेषु व्यवस्थिता ।
ते क्रमादनुगम्यन्ते न वाक्यमभिधायकम् ॥ V P II 50

(67) कर्मत्वमित्यादयो विशेषा सन्त एव पदेभ्य क्रमेण प्रतीतेभ्योऽवगम्यन्त इति क्रम एव वाक्यम् । पुण्यराज on V P II 50

(68) क्रमव्यतिरेकेण शब्दात्मक न वाक्यमभिधायकमस्तीत्युच्यते ।

(69) क्रम एव वाक्यमिति पदक्रमो वाक्यमुक्तम् । पुण्यराज on V P II 52

(70) अत्रापि सङ्घात क्रम इत्यभिहितान्वयपक्षे लक्षणद्वयम् पुण्यराज on V P II 1 and आख्यातशब्द पदमाद्य पृथक् सर्वपद साकाङ्क्ष मित्यन्विताभिधानपक्षे लक्षणत्रयमिति विभाग ।

(71) तत्र खण्डपक्षे त्रिष्वपि लक्षणेषु प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज V P II 1

(72) आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति अस्मिन् पक्षे क्रिया वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज on V P II 1

(73) सङ्घातपक्षे क्रमपक्षे च ससर्गो वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज on V P II 1

(74) पदानां परस्परान्वये पदार्थवशादाधिक्य ससर्ग स वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज V P II 41 and also
सम्बन्धे सति यत्वन्यदाधिक्यमुपजायते ।
वाक्यार्थमेव त प्राहुरनेकपदसंश्रयम् ॥ V P II 42

(75) पदाना समन्वये तात्पर्य्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थ समुल्लसती त्यभिहितान्वयवादिनाम् मतम् । K P II 7

(76) पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज
and also वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिन K P II7

(77) पूर्वमेते यो वाक्यार्थ स वाच्यान्तगत एवेत्यर्थ ।

(78) अनवगलमेव वाक्यमनाद्यविद्योपदर्शितालीकपदविभागस्य निमित्तमिति केचित् । तत्त्वबिन्दु PP 6

(79) पारमार्थिकपूर्वपूर्वपदपदार्थानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहितमन्त्यवर्णविज्ञानमित्येके । तत्त्वबिन्दु PP 6

(80) प्रत्येकवर्णपदपदार्थानुभवभावितभावनानिचयलब्धजन्मस्मृतिदर्पणारूढा वर्ण मालेत्यपरे । PP 7 ibid

(81) पदान्येवाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासन्निहितपदार्थान्तरान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायिनीत्यपरे । PP 7-ibid

(82) पदैरेव समभिव्याहारवद्भिरभिहिता: स्वार्था आकाङ्क्षायोग्यताऽऽसत्तिसध्रीचीना वाक्यार्थधीहेतव इत्याचार्या. । PP 8-ibid

(82 a) We have seen above the view of the Sphota vadins as explained by Bhartrhari We will try to see how Vacaspati Misra tries to refute the above-mentioned view of the grammarians

In the beginning we will see the *arguments put* forward by the Sphotavadin, which is the pūrvapaksa here For him akhanda Sphota is the nimitta for the vākyartha When we take Sphota to be akhanda śabda we can not take the pada-vakyadi vibhāga which we come across on the *ordinary plane* (vyavaharika-*or* empirical *plane*) *to* be 'akhanda sabda' The varnavadins hold varnas letters to be nimitta of vakyartha But the Sphotavadins may put the following question before the varnavadin

(83) सा न तावत्प्रत्येकम्, अनुपलम्भविरोधात्, वर्णान्तरोच्चारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् तत्त्वबिन्दु PP 25

(84) नापि मिलिता, तथा भावाभावात् । तथा हि वास्तवो वा समूह एतेषा माश्रीयते ? अनुभवोपाधिको वा ? ibid

(85) तत्र सर्वेषामेव वर्णाना नित्यतया विभुतया च वास्तवी सगतिरिति प्रसगिनी केषाचिदेव पदवाक्यभाव नोपपादयितुमर्हति । अनुभूयमाना नश्वनवानुभवानुसारिणी तत्पर्यायेण पर्यायवती न समूहभावभवात । न खल्वेकदेशकालानवच्छिन्ना समूहवन्तो भवन्ति भावा अतिप्रसङ्गात् । PP 25 ibid

(86) यो नु खल्वय सस्कारोऽभिमत आयुष्मत ? किं स्मृतिबीज, अन्यो वा प्रोक्षणादिभ्य इव व्रीह्यादे । PP.25 ibid

(87) तस्मात् स्वसिद्धान्तव्यामोहमपहाय अभ्युपेयतामनुसंहारबुद्धेरेकपदवाक्यगोचरता। PP.35. ibid.

(88) गौरित्येक इदं पदमित्येकपदावभासिनी धीरस्ति लौकिकपरीक्षकाणाम्। PP 49. ibid.

(89) स खल्वयमेको वाक्यात्मा वाक्यार्थधीहेतुः अनुभवादया व्यवस्थाप्यते अर्थधीभेदाद् वा अन्यथा अनुपपद्यमानात्। PP.9.ibid.

(90) न तावत्पूर्वः कल्पः। अवयविन्यूनपरिमाणत्वादवयवानाम्। परममहतां च वर्णानां तदनुपपत्तेः। PP.9. ibid.

(91) गगनगुणत्वे च अद्रव्यतया समवायिकारणत्वाभावेनावयवाभावाभावा। PP.10

(92) पूर्वपूर्वाभिव्यक्तिसंस्कारसचिवोत्तरोत्तराभिव्यक्तिक्रमेण त्वन्त्यो ध्वनिः स्फुटतरं विशिष्टस्फोटविज्ञानमाधत्ते इति न वैयर्थ्य द्वितीयादिध्वनीनाम्। नापि पूर्वेषां तदभावे तदभिव्यक्तिजनितसंस्काराभावेनान्त्यस्य ध्वनेरसहायतया व्यक्त्यवभासवाक्यधीहेतुभावाभावात्। PP.20 ibid

(93) तस्सिद्धमेतदर्थापत्तेरनुमानस्य वा निवृत्तिस्तदेकगोचरपदवाक्यावसायिनीति स्थित नानक्ययमेकं वाक्यं वाक्यर्थस्य बोधकमिति।—तत्त्वबिन्दु—PP 76

(94) वाक्यस्थेषु खलु वर्णेषूच्चरत्सु तावच्छ्रवण मर्वत श्रुत वर्णमेकमनेकं वा पदभावेन न प्रतिसन्धत्ते प्रतिसन्धाय पदं व्यवस्यति पदव्यवसायेन स्मृत्या पदार्थं प्रतिपद्यते पदसमूहप्रतिसंधानाच्च वाक्य व्यवस्यति सम्बद्धांश्च पदार्थान्गृहीत्वा वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यते। न्यायसूत्र वात्स्यायनभाष्य, III.2,62.

(95) स खल्वयमनयो वर्णः पूर्वपूर्ववर्णपदपदार्थविज्ञानजनितवासनानिचयसचिवश्रवणेन्द्रियसमधिगमजन्मग्रहणस्मरणरूपसदसद्वर्णनिर्भासप्रत्ययपरिवर्तीपदवाक्यार्थधीहेतुरुपेयते॥ तत्त्वबिन्दु —PP.77.

(96) न अन्त्यवर्णश्रुतिः स्मृत्या नीता वाक्यार्थबोधिनी, PP.76 ibid.

(97) एतत्तु मतद्वय संभावनामात्रेणोपन्यस्तं इति केचित्। तत्त्वबिन्दु टीका तत्त्वविभावना। PP.7.

(98) वर्णा एव तु शब्दा इति भगवानुपवर्षः—मीमांसाभाष्य 1.1.5 and also गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः? गकारौकारविसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपवर्षः। योगसूत्रभाष्य III.17.

(99) वृद्धप्रयोगाधीनावधारणो हि शब्दार्थसम्बन्धः । न च पदमात्रं व्यवहाराङ्ग प्रयुञ्जते वृद्धाः, किंतु वाक्यमेव, तथान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ... स्मृतिसमारूढा वर्णमाला परिशिष्यते । सा च नैमित्तिकं वाक्यार्थबोधमाधत्ते । पारमार्थिकं वस्तु पदतदर्थावधी निमित्तमात्रतयावतिष्ठते वर्णमालैव वाक्यार्थधीहेतुः इति । तत्त्वबिन्दु-PP.83,84

(100) गौरवाद्विषयाभावात्तद्बुधैरेव भाव्यते ।
वाक्यार्थधियमाधत्ते स्मृतिस्था नाक्षरावलि । तत्त्वबिन्दु-PP 84

(101) इत्यष्टानां वाक्यानां अष्टौ शक्तयः कल्पनीयास्तत्रेति कल्पनागौरवम् । पदकादिनस्तु सप्तानां सप्तैव शक्तय इति कल्पनालाघवम् । शुक्ला-मिति पदप्रक्षेपेण पदवादिनोऽष्टाना पदना अष्टौ शक्तय इति । तत्र तु षोडशापरा इति महद्गौरवमापन्नम् । pp 84 85 ibid

(102) अपि च त्रिचतुरपञ्चपदवाक्यवर्तिनीपदार्थप्रत्ययव्यवहितापि वर्णेन वर्ण माला स्मर्यतापि तदभ्यधिकपदवति तु वाक्ये सातिदुष्करा । P 89 ibid

(103) पदान्याकाङ्क्षितासन्नयोग्यार्थान्तरसङ्गतान् । pp 89 ibid
स्वार्थानभिदधन्तीह वाक्यं वाक्यार्थगोचरम् ॥

(104) तत्रानभिहितस्वार्थान्तरान्वितस्वार्थाभिधाने पदादेकस्मादेवोच्चरिता द्वक्षा प्रतीतेर्वैयर्थ्यमितरेषाम् । pp 93. ibid.

(105) Anvitabhidhanvadi may argue as follows If we do not *accept* the anvitābhidhanavada, then, in that case, we will have to postulate two abhidhaśaktis, viz the one that conveys the sense of individual words and the other that conveys the sense of the whole sentence, after correlating the word-sense Again says he, there is no fault in our view Even though every word in a sentence with abhidhā power, conveys the correlated meaning, still, the sense of the sentence is not gathered just by the first word alone So, it should be held that a word, by abhidha, conveys its own meaning and correlation and not the meanings of other words The anvitabhidhānavādins again put the following question to the abhihitānvayavadins viz that when we get some knowledge from the words, what

type of knowledge is it ? The Śastra speaks of four types of knowledge viz pramana samśaya viparyaya and smrta Now, arthapratiti can not be taken as a pramana, because pramāṇa occurs only with reference to that which is already existent Padārtha cannot be supposed to be existent before padaśravaṇa Nor can we take padarthajnana as either samśaya or viparyaya (=mithya jnana) As there is no fifth type of jnana we should take padarthajnana as smrta only Thus a pada depends on samskarodbodha and they make for the smrti in form of padarthajnana

विधान्तरावगमात् स्मृतिलक्षणयोगत ।

अभ्यासातिशयात् रूपस्मृतेर्नियोन्यसश्च ॥ pp 100 तत्त्वबिन्दु and also न च पचमी विद्या समस्तीति स्मृति परिशिष्यते । pp 100 ibid

The kavyaprakasa of Mammaṭa also throws light on the anvitabhidhanavada Mammaṭa discusses this theory in the second ullasa and then elaborately in the fifth ullasa Accordingly to Prabhakara then the vacyartha is itself the vākyartha

वाच्यार्थ एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिन । K P

The words in a sentence first express the samanya artha and then the viśistartha These two are two aspects of the same sense This visista artha is nothing else than the vacyartha itself

(106) एव तावदौत्सर्गिको न्यायो यदसति बलवद्बाधकोपनिपाते सहकारिणि कार्ये च प्रत्यासन्न हि कारणम् । सति तद्भावभाविते तथा चापस्मृति पद त् । –तत्त्वबिन्दु pp 111

(107) तत्स्मृतामेव (मानसीनां) स्वार्थस्मृतीनामाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासत्तिसहकारिणीनां कारणत्व वाक्यार्थप्रत्यय उपपत्स्याम ॥ pp 112 ibid

(108) ननूक्त न मानान्तरानुभूतानामपर्पाणा वाक्यार्थधीप्रसवसामर्थ्य उपलब्धम्, उपलम्भे वा सप्तमप्रमाणप्रसंग, आगमस्य वा तत्रैव अन्तर्भाव । तदेव प्रत्यक्षादिभि सह तु ल्यकक्ष्यतयोपन्यसनीयम्, न त्वागमस्तद्वद । —तत्त्वबिन्दु pp 120

(109) न हि प्रमाणानुपस्थितार्थविति प्रयुज्यते, प्रयुज्यते प्रमाणराजमार्गवर्ति वर्त्तिष्ठ शुचिष्ठितार्थित वा लौकिका । pp. 121. ibid.

(111) तथा च तिस्रः शक्तयः द्वे वा । पदानां हि तावदर्थस्वरूपाभिधानरूपा शक्तिः तदर्थरूपाणां अन्योन्यान्वयशक्तिः, तदाधानशक्तिश्चापरा पदानामेवेति । स्मारकत्वपक्षे तु शक्तिद्वयम् । अन्विताभिधानपक्षे तु पदानामेकैव शक्तिः तत् कल्पनालाघवात् एतदेव न्याय्यम् । pp. 133 ibid

(111) तन्मात्रविषये तस्याविशेषात् सर्वशब्दानां पर्यायताप्रसंगः । pp. 123 ibid.

(112) अनन्यलभ्यः शब्दार्थ इति मीमांसकवृद्धाः । अत एव आख्यातादौ कर्त्राद्यभिधायिता नाद्रियन्ते । pp 131 ibid.

(113) तथा हि वृद्धप्रयुक्तवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहर्षशोकभयसम्प्रतिपत्ते व्युत्पन्नस्य व्युत्पित्सुस्तद्धेतुभूतं प्रत्ययमनुमीयते । तस्य साधु अप्यनेकेषु अनुपजातस्य पदजातश्रवणसमनन्तरं सम्भवतः तद्धेतुभावमवधारयति । न चैष प्रत्ययः पदार्थमात्रगोचरः प्रवृत्यादिभ्यः कल्प्यत इति विशिष्टार्थगोचरोऽभ्युपेयते, तद्विशिष्टार्थपरता अवसिता वृद्धव्यवहारे पदानाम् तस्मात् लोकानुसारेण वैदिकस्यापि पदसन्दर्भस्य विशिष्टार्थप्रत्ययप्रयुक्तस्य अविशिष्टार्थाभिधानमात्रेण लक्षणया विशिष्टार्थगमकत्वम् ॥ pp 153 ibid

(114) सन्निध्यपेक्षयोग्यत्वैरुपलक्षणलाभेन ।
अनन्त्येऽप्यन्वितानां स्यात् सम्बन्धग्रहणं मन ॥ न्यायरत्नमाला, वाक्यार्थ प्रकरण pp 78

(115) तस्मान्न वाक्ये न पदानि साक्षात् वाक्यार्थबुद्धिं जनयन्ति किन्तु ।
पदस्वरूपाभिहितैः पदार्थैः संलक्ष्यतेऽसाविति सिद्धमेतत् ॥ pp 79 ibid

(116) वृद्धा युवानः शिशवः कपोताः खले यथाऽमी युगपत्पतन्ति ।
तथैव सर्वे युगपत्पदार्थाः परस्परेणान्वयिनो भवन्ति ॥

(117) एवं च न चेदियं पदवृत्तिर्लक्षणा लभ्यगमा चेति भवतु तर्हि चतुर्थी दृष्टत्वात् । अस्तु वा लक्षणा एव ॥ तत्त्वबिन्दु pp 157

(118) S D says तात्पर्याख्यां वृत्तिमाहुः पदार्थान्वयबोधने ।
तात्पर्यार्थं तदर्थं च वाक्यं तद्बोधकं परे ॥ II 2

and also अभिधाया एकैकपदार्थबोधनविरमाद्वाक्यार्थरूपस्य पदार्थान्वयस्य बोधिका तात्पर्यं नाम वृत्तिः । तदर्थश्च तात्पर्यार्थः । तद्बोधकं च वाक्यमित्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम् । S D

and also आकांक्षायोग्यतासन्निधिवशाद् वक्ष्यमाणस्वरूपाणां समन्वये तात्पर्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थः समुल्लसतीत्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम् । K P II

(119) विषभक्षणादपि परामेतद्दृढमेतस्य दारुणाम् ।
वाच्यादतोऽनुमिमिते प्रकरणवक्तृस्वरूपज्ञः ॥

विषभक्षणमनुमनुते न हि कश्चिदकाण्ड एव सुहृदि सुधीः ।
तेनात्रार्थान्तरगतिरार्थी तात्पर्यशक्तिज्ञः न पुनः ॥ व्यक्तिविवेक-I 67,68 pp. 122.

(120) मुख्येन अमुख्य. अर्थ-लक्ष्यते स आरोपितः शब्दव्यापारः सान्तरार्थनिष्ठो लक्षणा । K P. also प्रदीप—शक्यव्यवहितलक्ष्यार्थविषयत्वाच्छब्द आरोपत एव स व्यापार वस्तुतः अर्थनिष्ठ एवेत्यर्थः । तदेतदुक्तम् सान्तरार्थनिष्ठ इति । also उद्योत-सान्तरार्थनिष्ठ इति साक्षादर्थनिष्ठः सांतरा परंपरया शब्दनिष्ठ इत्यर्थ । also साहित्यचूडामणि-अन्तरं व्यवधाने तत्सहितः सान्तर तत्रार्थे निष्ठं तात्पर्य यस्य ।

(121) मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणाऽऽरोपिता क्रिया ॥ K.P. II

(122) See माणिक्यचन्द्र-मुख्यार्थस्य अनुपपत्तेरनुप्रयोगाच्च प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन बाधे साहित्यचूडामणि also observes बाधः प्रमाणपराहतत्वम् ।

(123) माणिक्यचन्द्र gives the following illustrations (i) अभिधेयेन सबंध, गङ्गायां घोष (ii) सादृश्य-गौर्वाहीक गौरेवायम् । (iii) समवाय-साहचर्यम्-कुन्ताःप्रविशन्ति; (iv) वैपरीत्य-भद्रमुख. meaning अभद्रमुख (v) क्रियायोग-महति समरे शत्रुघ्नस्त्वम् (शत्रुघ्न a proper name is used with reference to a slayer of enemies)

(124) तन्त्रवार्तिक notes : अगत्या लक्षणात् क्रममभिव्याहृतमेवेत् ।

(125) केचत्तु कर्मणि कुशलः इतिरूढावुदाहरन्ति । तेषामयमभिप्राय कुशांल्लातीति व्युत्पत्तिलभ्य कुशग्राहिरूपो मुख्योऽर्थः प्रकृतेऽसम्भवन्विवेचकत्वादिसा धर्म्यसंबन्धिन दक्षरूपं अर्थ बोधयति । तदन्ये न मन्यन्ते । कुशग्राहिरूपार्थस्य व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यत्वेऽपि दक्षरूपस्यैव मुख्यार्थत्वात् । अन्यद्धि शब्दाना व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमन्यच्च प्रवृत्तिनिमितम् । व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यस्य मुख्यार्थत्वे गौः शेते इत्यत्रापि लक्षणा स्यात । गमेर्डो इति गमधातोर्डोप्रत्ययेन व्युत्पादितस्य गोशब्दस्य शयनकालेऽपि प्रयोगात् । S D

(126) कुशल-द्विरेफ द्विकादयस्तु साक्षात्संकेतितविषयत्वान्मुख्या एवेति न रूढिलक्ष्यस्य अर्थस्य हेतुत्वेनास्माभिरुक्ता । (काव्यानुशासन) I

(127 Kumārila-निरूढा लक्षणाः काश्चित्सामर्थ्यादभिधानवत् ।
क्रियन्ते साम्प्रतं काश्चित् काश्चिन्नैव त्वशक्तितः ॥

(128) -गौणवृत्तिर्लक्षणातो भिन्ना इति प्राभाकराः । तदयुक्तम् । तस्याः लक्षणायां अन्तर्भावात् । -प्रतापरुद्रीय ।

(129) शक्तिलक्षणाभ्या अतिरिक्तैव गौणी वृत्तिरिति मीमासका । सा च तदतिरिक्ता नति नैयायिका आहु । –प्रतापरुद्रीय।

(130) माणिक्यचन्द्र notes रूढिस्तु या लक्षणा सा लोके प्राचुर्य गतेति न तस्या नयत्वम् ।

(131) अभिधाव्यापारतुल्यैवामाविति भाव ।

(132) माणिक्यचन्द्र यत्र शब्द सवथा स्वमर्थ त्यजन्न य लक्षयति तत्र लक्षणेन तदादिज्ञापनन लक्षणा ।

(133) —उपचारो हि नाम अत्यन्तविशकलितयो पदार्थयो सादृश्यातिशय महिम्ना भेदप्रतीतिस्थगनमात्रम् । S D

सुधासागर explains as – उपचारश्च सादृश्यसम्बन्धन प्रवृत्ति । सादृश्यातिशयम हिम्ना भिन्नयोर्भेदप्रतीतिस्थगन वा ।

सम्प्रदायप्रकाशिनी says गौर्वाहीक इत्यादिवत् भेदेन प्रतीतयोरैक्यारो पणमुपचार ।

(134) सम्प्रदायप्रकाशिनी explains अ वसान निश्चयज्ञानम् । तदिह अत स्मिस्तदेवे यथासरूपम् । माणिक्यचन्द्र says ननु पूर्वस्या (i e सारोपाया), अपि अभेदोऽस्ति रूपकस्याभेदात्मकत्वात्, सत्य, तत्र आसन्ननामात्रणाभेद इह तु अत्यासन्नतया।

(135) –S D explains अत्र केचिदाहु गोसहचारिणो गुणा जाड्यमान्द्यादयो लक्ष्यन्त । ते च गोशब्दस्य वाहीकार्थाभिधान निमित्तं भवन्ति । तदयुक्तम् । गोशब्दस्यागृहीतसङ्केतेन वाहीकार्थमभिधातुमसामर्थ्यात् गोशब्दार्थमात्र बोधनाच्च । अभिधाया विरतत्वात् विरतायाश्च पुनरुत्थानाभावात् ।

अन्ये पुनर्गोशब्देन वाहीकार्थो नाभिधीयते किं तु स्वार्थसहचारिगुण साजात्येन वाहीकार्थगता गुणा एव लक्ष्यन्ते । तदप्यन्ये न मन्यन्ते । तत्र गोशब्दाद्वाहीकार्थो प्रतीयते, न वा । आद्येऽपि गोशब्दादेव वा । लक्षिताद्वा गुणा दविनाभावद्वारा । तत्र न प्रथम । वाहीकार्थस्यासङ्केतितत्वात् । न द्वितीय । अविनाभावलभ्यस्यार्थस्य शाब्देऽन्वये प्रवेशासम्भवात् । शाब्दी ह्याकाक्षा शब्देनैव प्रपूर्यते । न द्वितीय । यदि हि गोशब्दात् वाहीकार्थो न प्रतीयेत तदास्य वाहीकशब्दस्य च सामानाधिकरण्य असगत स्यात् ।

तस्मादेव गोशब्दो मुख्यया वृत्त्या वाहीकशब्देन सहान्वयमलभमानो अज्ञत्वादिसाधर्म्यसम्बन्धाद्वाहीकार्थं लक्षयति । वाहीकस्याऽज्ञत्वात्यतिशयबोधन प्रयोजनम् । इय च गुणयोगाद् गौणीत्युच्यत ।

(136) माणिक्यचन्द्र says सहचरण स्थान तादर्थ्य वृत्त मान-धारण सामीप्य-योगसाधन आधिपत्येभ्यो मञ्च वर राज सक्तु चन्दन गङ्गा-शकट-अन्न पुरुषेषु अतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचार ।

(137) जहल्लक्षणा, अजहल्लक्षणा, जहदजहल्लक्षणा, सारोपा, साध्यवसाना, शुद्धा and गौणी । इत्येव सप्तविधा फललक्षणा) ।

(138) लक्षणामार्गावगाहित्वं तु ध्वने सहृदयै नूतनतयोपवर्णितस्य विद्यत इति दिशमु मुन्मयितुमिदमत्रोक्तम् (अभिधावृत्तिमातृका) ।

(139) शब्दस्यैकाभिधाशक्तिरर्थस्यैकैव लिङ्गता । – व्यक्तिविवेक I

(140) गोत्वारोपेण वाहीके तत्साम्यमनुमीयते ।
कोऽयतस्मिन्नतुल्यत्वे तत्त्व व्यपदिशेद्बुध ॥ व्य विवेक I. 46.

(141) – वक्रोक्ति प्रसिद्धाभिधानव्यतिरेकिणी विचित्रैवाभिधा । वक्रोक्तिजीवित pp 21.

(142) ध्वन्यालोक I. 5 प्रतीयमान पुनरन्यदेव वस्त्वस्ति वाणीषु महाकवीना ।
यत्तत्प्रसिद्धावयवातिरिक्त विभाति लावण्यमिवाङ्गनासु ॥

(143) ध्वन्यालोक I.13 यत्रार्थ शब्दो वा तमर्थमुपसर्जनीकृतस्वार्थौ ।
व्यङ्क्त काव्यविशेष स ध्वनि रति सूरिभि कथित ।

(144) हेमचन्द्र explains तच्छब्दमुपसर्जनितार्थावगमपवित्रितप्रतिपत्तृप्रतिभासहायार्थद्योतनशक्तिर्व्यञ्जकत्वम् । का शा I

(145) KPII.11- लक्ष्य न मुख्य नाप्यत्र बाधो योग फलेन नो ।
न प्रयोजनमेतस्मिन्, न च शब्द स्खलद्गति ॥

यथा गङ्गाशब्द स्रोतसि सबाध इति तट लक्षयति, तद्वद् यदि तटेऽपि सबाध स्यात्, तदा प्रयोजन लक्ष्येत । न च तट मुख्योऽर्थ । नाऽप्यत्र बाध । न च गङ्गाशब्दार्थस्य तटस्य पावनत्वाद्यैर्लक्षणीयै सम्बन्ध । नापि प्रयोजने लक्ष्ये किञ्चित् प्रयोजनम् । नापि गङ्गाशब्दस्तटमिव प्रयोजन प्रतिपादयितुमसमर्थ ।

(146) प्रयोजनेन सहित लक्षणीय न युज्यते । K P II 12

कुत इत्याह,

ज्ञानस्य विषयो ह्यन्य फलमन्यदुदाहृतम् ।
प्रत्यक्षादेर्नीलादि विषय फल तु प्रकटता संवित्तिर्वा ।
विशिष्टे लक्षणा नैवम् ।
निगदेनैव व्याख्यातम् ।
विशेषा स्युस्तु लक्षिते ।

तटादौ ये विशेषा पावनत्वादयस्ते चाभिधानात्पर्यलक्षणाभ्यो व्यापारान्तरेण गम्य । तच्च व्यञ्जनध्वननद्योतनादिशब्दवाच्यमवश्यमेषितव्यम् ।

(147) अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते ।
संयोगाद्यैरवाच्यार्थधीकृद्व्यापृतिरञ्जनम् ॥ K P II 14

(148) तस्मादभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणाव्यतिरिक्त चतुर्थोऽसौ व्यापारो ध्वननद्योतनव्यञ्जनप्रत्यायनावगमनादिसोदरव्यपदेशनिरूपितोऽभ्युपगन्तव्य । लोचन I 4

149) शब्दप्रमाणवेद्योऽर्थो व्यनक्त्यर्थान्तर यत ।
अर्थस्य व्यञ्जकत्वे तत् शब्दस्य सहकारिता ॥ K P III. 3

(150) S.D. 11. वक्तृबोद्धव्यकाकूनां वाक्यवाच्यान्यसंनिधेः ।
प्रस्तावदेशकालानां वैशिष्ट्यात्प्रतिभाजुषाम् ॥

Says प्रदीप—अर्थव्यञ्जकतायां वक्तृवैशिष्ट्यादीनामावश्यकत्व-मात्रम् । न तु शब्दव्यञ्जनायां सर्वथानुपयोगः । अत एव द्यालकादिप्रयुक्तात्, सुरभिमांसं भवान् भुङ्क्ते इत्यादितो द्वितीयादलीलार्थप्रतीतिः । न तु गुर्वादि-प्रयुक्तात् । अस्ति शब्दव्यञ्जना क्वचित् तन्माहात्म्येन विनापि इत्यन्यदेतत् ।

(151) S.D II —अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते ।
एकत्रार्थेऽन्यधीहेतुर्व्यञ्जना साभिधाश्रया ॥

(152) –अत्र प्राञ्चः–तत्र शब्दशक्तिमूलो व्यञ्जनाव्यापारः एव शरणम् । गत्यन्तराभावात् । वृत्तिवार्तिक —pp 9.

(153) वय तु ब्रूमः — अमावुदयमारूढः इत्यादौ प्राकरणिके अर्थे प्राकरणिक-वदप्राकरणिकेऽपि राजकरमण्डलादिशब्दाना परस्परान्वययोग्यत्वपतितद्ब्राह्य-धनदेशादिवाचकानां समभिव्याहाररूपसमभिधानियामकस्तनीयर्थद्वयस्यापि प्राकरणिकत्व इव प्राकरणिकाप्राकरणिकरूपत्वे अप्युभयत्राभिधैव व्यापारः, यथोक्तसमभिव्याहारस्यापि शब्दान्तरसन्निधिरूपत्वेन प्रकरणवदभिधानिया-मकत्वात् । pp. 10 वृत्तिवार्तिक ।

(154) ननु एवं प्रस्तुतार्थपर्यालोचनालभ्ययोरेव वस्त्वलङ्कारयोर्व्यक्त्युपगमे तत्र अर्थशक्तिमूलैव व्यक्तिर्भवेदिति पृथगर्थशक्तिमूलध्वनेः शब्दशक्तिमूलो न स्यात्, इति चेद्, मैवम् । तथात्वेऽपि प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतोभयसाधारणशब्द-सापेक्षतया प्रस्तुतमात्रापरपर्यायशब्दान्तर (र) परिवृत्त्यसहिष्णुत्वेन ततस्तस्य पृथग् व्यवस्थितेः । वृत्तिवार्तिक. pp. 15

(155) दुर्गालङ्घित-इत्यादौ च द्वितीयार्थो नास्त्येव इति यदुक्तं महिमभट्टेन, तदनुभवसिद्धमपलपतो गजनिमीलिकैव । S D V. ।

(156) इयं च नानार्थस्थलेऽपि तात्पर्यधियः कारणताया शिथिलीभवन्त्यां अता-त्पर्यार्थं विषयशाब्दबुद्धिसंपादनाय व्यक्तिस्वीकारः अनुचित एव, शक्त्यैव बोधद्वयापत्तेः । R.G pp. 141.

(157) एवमपि योगरूढेरस्थले रूढ्यैवानेन योगापहरणस्य सकलतन्त्रसिद्धयास्तद्व्य-नधिकरणस्य योगार्थलिङ्गितस्य अर्थान्तरस्य व्यक्तिं विना प्रतीतिः दुरुपपादा । R.G. 144.

CHAPTER IV

S'ABDAVRTTIS AS SEEN IN THE DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT SUCH AS THOSE REPRESENTED BY THE VAIYĀKARANAS, THE MIMĀMSAKAS ETC

We may now study the S'abdavṛttis as known to or recognized by *the different schools of thought such as those represented* by the grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas etc First, we will take up the views of the grammarians In the Mbh of Patañjali, we find mainly the discussion of the mukhya and gauna artha i e the discussion of the primary and the secondary sense In the discussion of mukhyartha or the primary sense, we come across terms such as abhidhāna and the like In the discussion on gaunārtha, we find ideas which later on seem to crystallise into gaunī and lakṣaṇā vṛtti

Vaiyākaranas

In the Mbh, we come across terms such as gauna, mukhya, abhidhātum, abhidhānavat, abhidhānārtha, abhidhāya, abhidhīyamāna, abhidheya, etc etc (1) But, we do not meet with either any precise mention of, or any definition as such of abhidhā, gaunī, lakṣanā, or vyañjanā Nevertheless Patañjali mentions two types of meanings viz. mukhya or the primary sense, and gaunā or the secondary sense

While discussing the type of secondary meaning, he mentions at least four different circumstances under which the secondary function takes place (2) Thus, tātsthya or the relation of location, tāddharmya or the relation of substance and quality or function, sāmīpya or proximity, and sāhacarya or being together, are mentioned under pā IV I 48 Thus we find that Patañjali mentions abhidhāna and the like, which gave

the way for abhidhāvṛtti Abhidhā is thus seen under the name of abhidhana or mukhyārtha in the Mbh, and the material for the later vṛttis of gauṇī and lakṣaṇā is also seen herein The material for the gauṇī lies in the sādharmya relation as noted above, while that for lakṣaṇā, in other relations such as tātsthya, samīpya etc which lead to the secondary sense No strict line of demarcation is laid between gauṇī and lakṣaṇā When we come to a later grammarian of repute viz Bhartṛhari, we find material which is the source of the later theory of vyañjanā In the Mbh itself, nothing more definite about vyañjana than what we have already noticed earlier is to be seen

Bhartṛhari, the author of V P has divided s'abdārtha into gauna and mukhya, and has shown two-fold upacāra (or imposition) with reference to s'abda and artha Those who take one word as capable of expressing several meanings, e g the word 'go' for both 'go-vyakti' and 'vāhīka', have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accidental meanings (4) A word does not express more than one meaning at a time-yaugapadyamatikramya paryāye vyavatisthate-V P. The other meanings that are not mukhyārtha, are to be comprehended by either context (or prakaraṇa) or connexion with some other words (i e. yogāt s'abdāntarena vā) (5) Bhartṛhari holds that the word 'go' which denotes 'govyakt' is also applied to 'vāhīka' on account of his sādharmya with 'go' (6) He observes that it is through usage that the meaning of a word becomes gauna and mukhya-prasiddhibhedāt gauṇatvam mukhyatvam copapadyate-V P

As explained by Puṇyarāja on V P II. 256, the artha is two-fold viz. svarūpa and bāhya Svarūpa is that which is naturally fixed by its very form such as 'gotva' of the word 'go' The bāhya is that which is indicated by upacāra e g when vāhīka is said to be 'go' (7) Thus far, Bhartṛhari gives the basis for abhidhā and gauṇī or lakṣaṇā, *almost on the lines of the Mbh*

Over and above this, Bhartrhari discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention with reference to more than one sense, i e a word having multiple senses Thus, he takes up the problem of a word having more meanings than one, all of which are mukhyārthas In his view, the particular meaning out of several is determined by factors such as context, time, place, etc In this connection, he gives the following verses

vakyāt prakaranādarthādaucityāddes'akālatah ।
s'abdārthah pravibhajyante na rūpādeva kevalāt ॥
V P II 316

samyogo viprayogas'ca sāhacaryam virodhitā ।
arthah prakaranam lingam sabdasvānyasya sannidhih ।
samarthyamaucitι des'ah kālo vyaktih svarādayah ।
śabdārthasyānavacchede vis esasmrtihetavah ॥
V P II 317 318 (8)

Here, we may ask as to what it is that fixes the particular meaning of the word and debars other multiple senses which it has by convention and usage ? To Bhartrhari this question does not seem to have occurred For him, saṃsarga or conjuction and the like, link the word to one mukhyārtha or the primary sense But to later thinkers on this subject, it appears necessary to postulate an additional sabdavrtti, over and above abhidhā and gauni, and laksanā In this, we may see the inspiration for the vyañjanāvrtti This is corroborated by the fact that writers like Mammata, Visvanātha and others mention these very verses (i e V P II 317, 318) as authority for their theory of abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā

Among the later grammarians, Nāgesa (18th cen A D) was the first to recommend the case of vyañjanā He apparently follows the ālaṃkārikas and repeats the same arguments

Nāgeśa holds that in certain cases, after mukhyārtha or mukhyārthabādha, as the case may be, is gathered, a further

meaning is to be seen This artha is either prasiddha, i e known, or aprasiddha i e unknown, and is either related to the mukhyārtha or *is unrelated to it This sort of meaning is* flashed upon the mind through vyañjanāsakti (9) Thus, Nāgesa holds vyañjanā to be abhidhāmūla and laksanāmulā This vyañjanā rests on s'abda, artha, pada, padaikadesa, varna, racanā, cestādi When a woman casts a glance of her eye with reference to somebody, her desire is thereby suggested This *apprehension is supported by experience–anubhavasiddha* So, even in cestā, vyañjanā can be seen (10) Vyañjakatva lies both in padas and arthādi That vyañjanā, wherein arthādi are suggested, rests on vaktrbodhavyādivais istyajñana, or the knowledge of the particular speaker, hearer etc. The pratibhā or the genius of the hearer acts as a *sahakāri kārana (11) In the absence of* pratibhā, there is absense of the apprehension of the suggested sense By pratibhā is meant the navanavonmesas'ālini buddhi This navanavonmesa is due to pūrvajanmasamskāras or the impression of the past birth So, for Nages'a, pratibhā is that factor which accompanied by prakaranajñāna in form of the speaker, hearer etc, makes for the apprehension of the suggested sense (12)

This vyañjanā is held to be connected even with the previous life (13) In case of gato'stamarkah, when we desire different meanings the mukhyārtha is never contradicted (bādhita) So, the other meaning is not gathered through laksanā So vyañjanā is not to be included in laksanā (14) The nipātas and upasargas also are suggestors as are the padas The Sphota is always vyangya or suggested and is described as such in the works on grammer Bhartrhari also takes Sphota to be vyangya Thus, Nāges'a considers vyañjanā to be useful even for the grammarians vaiyākaranānāmapi etatsvīkārah āvasyakah

Mimamsakas

Now we will consider the views of the Mimāmsakas Jaimini and S'abara hold that the language of the Sūtras must,

as far as possible be understood to convey the same sense as is conveyed by it in common parlance Jaimini says this expressedly in Mi Sū 1 3 30 When it is said prayogacodanābhāvādarthaikatvamavibhāgāt, 'avibhāgāt' means that no difference is seen between language of the scriptures and that of common parlance Thus, both words and sentences in the veda are in no way different from those in the popular usage (Mi Su 1 2 32–avis'itsastu vākyārthah) (15) However, the cases of veda and loka are not absolutely parallel The vaidika vākya is apauruṣeya i e not of human origin and always true, laukika vākya is pauruseya i e of human origin and therefore at times it may not be free from errors because of its human agency A further important point of distinction is that in the case of a laukika vākya, the abhipraya or some drsta artha or intension of the particular speaker is more important than the s'abda Thus, sabda becomes only a means of conveying the artha or abhipraya or intention (16) Therefore, in a laukika vākya, s abda in its vācyārtha is not strictly honoured Sometimes, the vācyārtha is given up in favour of some laksyārtha which suits the abhiprāya of the speaker in a much better way (17) In a laukika vākya, at times such devices as adhyāhāra or implication and viparināma or transference are also restored to (18) In the vaidika vākya, nothing else but s'abda is pramāna (19) S abara therefore very often refers to the general rule that laksanā is not admissible in a vidhi–vākya, while it has scope elsewhere (20) Thus, the Mimāmsakas mention both mukhya and gauna arthas They seem to accept mukhya vrtti and gauni or laksanā We will try to see if there is any distinction drawn between gauni and laksanā.

Jaimini and S'abara discuss the two senses viz. mukhya and gauna under Mi Sū III 2 1-2, S'abara holds that 'mukhya' is so termed because it is perceived from the word and is as it were the face of the word While, that sense which is known from the primary signification on the strength of some connection is termed as jaghanya, it being also termed as gauna as

it is connected with some guna (21) Thus, the Mimamsakas seem to hold at least two s'abdavrttis viz. mukhya and gauni They hold that a word, when seen to have two or more meanings, one is its mukhyartha *while the rest are all gathered* by the secondary power through the relation such as sadrsya, and the like The word barhih means grass primarily, but is applied to sanctified grass only secondarily through sadrsya *The word parvan, in the same way, primarily means 'samudaya'* but through samudaya-sambandha it also secondarily means kala (22) Words such as mata, having more than one primary sense are in fact two words and not one (23) It should be *noted that S'abara seems to suggest that in case of a gaunartha,* it is only a meaning that is somehow or other connected with the primary sense that is indicated and not any other sense at rendom. The s'abdartha sambandha is nitya and therefore *it is inadmissible to apply* any word *to* anything which it has no power to signify (24) It is also noted that at times, we come across words that convey two meanings e g kus'ala, pravina etc In such cases, one meaning is derived through etymology and is termed the yaugikartha and the other one is based on usage and is termed as rudhartha On account of prasiddhi i e. because of its being more current, the rudhartha is taken as the mukhyartha in such cases The Mimamsakas seem to hold that laksana is resorted to only as a means to avoid anarthakya, when the primary sense is found to be unsuitable to the context This again is only as the last resort (25) The Mimamsakas *hold that the most important* principle to be borne in mind is that between the two fuctions of a word viz sruti (or abhidha) and laksana, the former is stronger than the latter (26). S'rutyasambhava or mukhyarthabadha is the first pre requisite of laksana. On Mi Su. VIII.3.34 S'abara lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the vacyartha cannot be entirely abandoned Thus, *even the laksyartha is bound to* be s'abdartha, It cannot be as'abdartha (27) Thus, the conditon of 'tadyoga', or connection comes in This is explained again under

kinds of lakṣaṇā There seems to be no reference to vyañjanā as such

Naiyayikas

We have seen in our discussion of saṃketa that Gotama recognises what is specified as abhidhā lateron For him, the padārthas or the meanings of the word consist in vyakti or individual, ākṛti or form, and jāti or class. These are the aspects of reality expressed by a word The acceptance of abhidhā by Gotama and other Naiyayikas is clearly indicated in our discussion on saṃketa As to what is expressed by a word is shown in Nyā sutra II 2 65–vyaktyakṛtijātayastupadārthah. This means that in the opinion of Gotama, a word expresses individuality, form and class Now let us see his views regarding *lakṣaṇā*

We come adross some discussion as to the nature of secondary usage or upacāra at Nyā su II 2 64 –sahacaraṇasthānatadarthyavṛttamānadhāraṇa-sāmipyasādhanādhipatyebhyo brāhmaṇamañcakatarājasaktucandanagaṅgās ātakānnapuruseṣvatadbhāve pi tadupacārah *(31–A) Thus Gotama holds that* secondary usage or upacāra operates on the strength of ten relations such as sahacaraṇa (or going together), sthāna (or place) etc The Vātsyaya bhāsya cites illustrations to the point Thus, 'yastikāṃ bhojaya' or feed the stick, means the brāhmana with *a stick is to be fed* This explains the *relation of sahacaraṇa* (or going together) Sthāna or location is illustrated in 'mañcāḥ krosanti', tādarthya or the relation of purpose is illustrated when straw meant for preparing a mat is itself called a mat. Vṛtta or behaviour *is the relation as seen in*, 'this king is Yama or Kubera' He is so called because he behaves like Yama or Kubera. Māna or measure is illustrated when grains are said to be of a particular measure Dhārana or the relation of weighing is illustrated when sandal wood held in balance is called 'tulācandana' The relation of sāmipya or proximity seen as in, 'gaṅgāyām gāvah or cattle are grazing in the Ganges. Thus the place near the river is called by the name of river on

the strength of sāmipya or proximity 'Yoga' or combination is yet another relation Thus a black piece of cloth is called black because it is united with black colour Sādhana or means is illustrated when food is said to be prāna or life Actually, food is the sādhana or means or life Ādhipatya or being the head is illustrated when a man who is the head of a family is said to be family or house himself (*ayaṃ purusah kulam, ayam gotram* etc)

Elesewhere also in the Vātsyāyanabhāsya we come across numerous references to bhakti and bhākta artha But we do not come across any reference to vyañjana Word is not accepted to be nitya and abhivyangya or manifested Vyangya' is seen only in the sense of 'manifested' and not 'suggested'

We now turn to the new school of Naiyāyikas as represented by Ganges'a (1700 A D), Gadadhara (1700 A D), Jagadis'a (1700 A D) etc Gadādhara, Jagadis'a and Mathurānātha (1700 A D) are the authors of S aktivada, S'abdas' aktiprakās'ikā and Vyutpattivada respectively wherein they have dealt with the topic of s'abda, s abdartha and s'abdavṛttis

In the S'abdas'aktiprakās ikā (S' S' Pra) words are classified as below

(1) words with conventional meanings assigned to them (or rudha),

(ii) words with secondary signification (or laksaka),

(iii) words having both primary or conventional and derivative meanings (i e yogarudha)

and (iv) words, possessing derivative or yaugika artha alone S'abdas'aktiprakās ikā 16 reads

(*rudham ca laksakam caiva yogarudhaṃ ca yaugikaṃ* | *taccaturdhā parairūdhayauglkaṃ, manyate'dhikam* ||)

The word 'gaṅgāyām' in the illustration 'gaṅgāyām ghosah' forms an example of laksanā Paṅkaja is a yogarudha word defined as—

yannāma svāvayavavṛttilabhyārthena samam svārthasyānvayabodhakrt tannāma yogarudham, yathā paṅkajakṛsnasarpādharmadi-S'. S' Pra 26 i e they are those which combine in themselves twofold signification-conventional as well as derivative The yaugika words are those such as kāraka, pācaka etc, that connot the same meanings as are gathered by their component parts in which they may be grammatically analysed.

Gadādhara in his S'aktivada, discusses the problem of s'aktigraha By 's'akti' he means the mukhyā vṛtti called abhidhā He discucces at length the topic of saṅketagrahakatva of this mukhyāvṛtti At places, he touches laksanā also, which is connected with abhidhā. In the begining of his work, he recognises two functions viz. saṅketa and laksanā with reference to padārtha —saṅketo laksanā ca arthe padavṛttih (S'aktivāda) He does not go for any further relation He has neither mentioned nor rejected vyañjanā as a vṛtti, but his commentators try to interpret him in such a way as to make him refute vyañjanā Thus, Kṛsnabhatta observes that vyañjanā need not be recognised as distinct from laksanā and so also gauni. Both gauni and vyañjanā can be included in lakṣanā (32) Another commentator of his, Mādhava, tries to refute vyañjanāvāda. The vyañjanāvādin figures as an objector here The objection is that, the s'aktivibhāga of Gadādhara is not correct, for vyañjanā is a separate vṛtti When it is said by the heroine that, gaccha gacchasi cet kānta, etc, the meaning, viz, that 'if you will go, I will die', is gathered through vyañjanā alone, in the absence of which we fail to gather this sense (33) The Siddhānti (i e. Naiyāyika) does not agree with this If vyañjanā is recognised as a separate vṛtti, it must have some definite form If at all it has any definite form, it is the form of vācya When there is the apprehension of the suggested sense, it is always due to abhidhājñāna

Thus even in vyañjanā, we cannot proceed without the vācyārtha, which is its cause. Thus, vyañjanā is not a separate vṛtti other than abhidhā.

The vyañjanāvādin accepts something like a s'ābdīvyañjanā, e g vayasthā nagarāsaṅgādaṅgānām hanti vedanām From this sentence, two senses viz. (i) a young woman, in company of a young man, removes the torment of the limbs of the body, and (ii) Harītakī with Sunthī removes physical pain, are derived For the supporter of vyañjanā, it is a case of abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā But for the Naiyāyikas, the other sense is also gathered through abhidhā and it is futile to go for an abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā with reference to the pratīyamānārtha (35) Others (i e the vyañjanāvādins, the pūrvapakṣa), hold that the fact of pratīyamānārtha can be gathered in poetry, only through vyañjanā, and therefore its acceptance is inevitable (36) For the Naiyāyikas, this implied sense is gathered not by any vṛttiviseṣa, but by the faculty of mind Thus, vyaṅgyārtha is just a mental apprehension (mānasa bodhamātra),-mansaiva tādṛs'abodhasvīkārāt (Mādhavī)

Jagadīs'a, in his s'abdas'aktiprakās'ikā, kārikā 24, refers to the illustration viz mukham vikasitasmitaṃ etc, whereby suggestiveness has been established by Mammaṭa and others He discusses at length the problem of the recognition of vyañjanā He holds that there is no justification to recognise something like suggestiveness, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a work is concerned (37)

The so called vyaṅgyārtha i e s'aitya and pāvanatva, or saurabha (i e the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers) is derived by the usual mental apprehension, the special beauty of erotic sentiment (camatkara) also being a matter of mental apprehension (mānasabodha)

Thus we have seen that language is used both in the scientific mode and also in the emotive mode Scientific usage becomes the source of our abhidhā and the emotive use accounts for lakṣanā and vyañjanā

We have thus tried to study the concept of s'abdavṛttis in different dars'anas in the historical perspective The grammarians and the Mimāṃsakas, as seen above, were concerned more with the scientific use of language and therefore they mention only abhidhā and lakṣanā (and also guṇavāda in case of the latter) The Naiyāyikas also, for the same reason, see no need of recognising vyañjanā The grammarians, however as observed by us, enunciate the doctrine of Sphoṭa They also provide us with clues regarding the development of vyañjanā Coming to the alaṃkārikas, Ānandavardhana and his followers clearly define the three vṛttis viz abhidhā, lakṣanā and vyañjanā In the discussion of dhvani, they take the grammarians as their authority and we have tried to show above that their claim is not unfounded

Foot Notes

Patañjali has a 'gauna and 'mukhya' as below

at 1 1 15 एव तर्हि गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्र यय इति ।

1 4 108 -गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये संप्र ययो भवति । तद्यथा गौरनुबन्ध्य अजोऽग्नीषोमीय इति न वाहीकोऽनुबध्यते ।

8 3 82-अग्ने स्तु स्तोमसोमा । गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये सप्रतिपत्ति तद्यथा गौरनुबन्ध्यो etc

अभिधातुम् occurs at 2 3 1 -करोतेरुत्पद्यमान क्तोऽनवयवेन सर्व कर्माभिधत्त कटशब्दात्पुनरुत्पद्यमानया द्वितीयया य कटस्य कर्म तच्छक्यमभिधातुम् न हि कर्मविशेष ।

अभिधीयमान occurs at 2 2 24 25/421,

सामान्याभिधाने हि विशेषानाभिधानम् । 4

सामान्ये ह्यभिधीयमाने विशेषोऽनभिहितो भवति । तत्रावश्य विशेषार्थिना विशेषोऽनुप्रयोक्तव्य । etc अथवा विभक्त्यर्थोऽभिधीयते एतच्चात्र युक्त यद्विभक्त्यर्थोऽभिधीयते तत्र हि सर्वपश्चात् पद वर्ततेऽस्येति । etc

अभिधावत् at 1 1 58 1 3/153

. अनड्वाहमुदहारि या त्व हरसि शिरसा कुम्भ भगिनि साचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति । तस्य यथेष्टमभिसबधो भवति । उदाहारि भगिनि या त्व कुम्भ हरसि शिरसानड्वाह साचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति ।

अभिधानतः–at 1.3.1. 6/258;

प्रथममावग्रहणं च । ११ ॥

प्रथमभावग्रहणं च कर्तव्यम् । प्रथम यो भावमाहेति । कुतः पुन. प्राथम्यं किं शब्दतः आहोस्विदर्थत. । किं चातः । यदि शब्दत· सनादीना धातुसज्ञा न प्राप्नोति । पुत्रीयति वस्त्रीयति इति । अथार्थतः सिद्धा सनादीना धातुसज्ञा स एव तु दोषो भाववचने तदर्थप्रत्ययप्रतिषेध इति । एवं तर्हि नैवार्थतो नापि शब्दतः किं तर्हि । अभिधानतः । सुमध्यमेऽभिधाने यः प्रथम भावमाह ।

6 3 46 .....प्रधानतो वा यतो वृतिः ॥८॥

अथवा गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्रत्यय तद्यथा गौरनुबन्ध्योऽजोऽग्नीषोमीय इति न वाहीकोऽनुबध्यते ।

अभिधानलक्षण–3 3 19. 7/146 :

अकर्तरि च कारके सञ्ज्ञायाम् । (3 3 19)

···· 'अतिप्रसङ्ग इति चेदभिधानलक्षणत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य सिद्धम् ॥ ३ ॥

अतिप्रसङ्गात् इति चेत्तन्न । किं कारणम् । अभिधानलक्षणत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य सिद्धम् । अभिधानलक्षणा कृत्तद्धितसमासा । अनभिधानान्नभिष्यन्ति ।

अभिधानवत् and अभिधेयवत् at 1 2 51 15/227 .

लुपि युक्तवद्व्यक्तिवचने । 1 2 51 .....

अन्यत्राभिधेयव्यक्तिवचनभावाल्लुपियुक्तवदनुदेश ॥ १ ॥

अन्यत्राभिधेयवल्लिङ्गवचनानि भवन्ति । क्वान्यत्र । लुकि । लवण सूप । लवणा यवागू । लवण शाकमिति । अन्यत्राभिधेयवद्व्यक्तिवचनानि भवन्ति । लुकि । इहनाप्यभिधेयवल्लिङ्गवचनानि प्राप्नुवन्ति । इष्यन्ते चाभिधानवत्स्युरिति तच्चान्तरेण यत्न न सिध्यतीति लुपि युक्तवदनुदेश । एवमर्थमिदमुच्यते । अस्ति प्रयोजनमेतत् । किं तर्हीति .. . etc

अभिधानार्थ––2.1 51. 13/395,

तद्धितार्थोत्तरपदसमाहारे च ।२।१।५१।

.... अभिधानार्थं तु ।७।

अभिधानार्थं तु समाहारग्रहण कर्तव्यम् । समाहारेणाभिधान तथा स्याद तद्धितार्थेन माभूदिति । .. ..etc.

अभिधाय–5 3 74 4 6/424

कुत्सिते । 5 3 74 इह कुत्सितक अनुकम्पितक इति स्वशब्देनोक्तत्वा त्तस्यार्थस्य प्रत्ययो न प्राप्नोति । नैष दोष । कुत्सितस्यानुकम्पायां भविष्यत्यनुकम्पितस्य कुत्सायाम् । अथवा ।

स्वार्थमभिधाय शब्दो निरपेक्षो द्रव्यमाह समवेतम् ।
समवेतस्य च वचने लिङ्ग वचन विभक्तिं च ॥
अभिधाय तान्विशेषानपेक्षमाणश्च कृत्स्नमात्मानम् ।
प्रियकुत्सनादिषु पुन प्रवर्ततेऽसौ विभक्त्यन्त ॥ etc

अभिधान–1 1 69 1/178,

अणुदित्सवर्णस्य चाप्रत्यय । 1.1 69

अभिधानात्प्रत्यय सवर्णान्न ग्रहीष्यति । यान्हि प्रत्ययः सवर्णग्रहणेन गृह्णीयान्न तैरर्थस्याभिधान स्यात् । अनभिधानान्न भविष्यति । etc

1 2 60 6/231 –फल्गुनीप्रोष्ठपदाना च नक्षत्रे । 1 2 60 ।

फल्गुनीसमीपगत चन्द्रमसि फल्गुनीशब्दो वर्तते । बहवस्तेऽर्थास्तत्र युक्त बहुवचनम् । यदा तयोरेवाभिधान तदा द्विवचन भविष्यति ।

1 2 64 $\frac{18\ 21}{233}$ सरूपाणामेकशेष एकविभक्तौ । 1 2 64

प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशान्नैकेनानेकस्याभिधानम् ॥१॥ प्रत्यर्थं शब्दा अभिनिविशन्ते । किमिद प्रत्यर्थमिति । अर्थमर्थं प्रति प्रत्यर्थम् । प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशादेतस्मात्कारणान्नैकेन शब्देनानेकस्यार्थस्याभिधान प्राप्नोति । तत्र को दोष । ..etc

also 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 22/241

... ननु चोक्त प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशान्नैकेनानेकस्याभिधानमिति । यदि चैकेन शब्देनानेकस्यार्थस्याभिधान स्यान्न प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेश कृत स्यात् ।

प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशादेकेनानेकस्याभिधानमिति चेत्तदपिप्रत्यर्थमेव ॥३०॥ प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशादेकेनानेकस्याभिधानादप्रत्यर्थमिति चेदेवमुच्यते । यदप्येकेनानेकस्याभिधानं भवति तदपि प्रत्यर्थमेव । यावतामभिधान तावता प्रयोगो न्याय्य । यावतामर्थानामभिधान न भवति तावता शब्दाना प्रयोग इत्येव पक्षो न्याय्य ।

यावतामभिधान तावता प्रयोगो न्याय्य इति चेदेकेनानेकस्याभिधानम् ॥३१॥

यावतामभिधान तावता प्रयोगो न्याय्य इति चेदेवमुच्यते । एषोऽपि न्याय्य एव यदा एकेनानेकस्याभिधान भवति । यदि तर्ह्येकेनानेकस्याप्यभिधान भवति प्लक्षन्यग्रोधौ एकेनोक्तत्वादपरस्य प्रयोगोऽनुपपन्न । . etc

also 1.2.3.5. 79/242..... एकेनोक्तत्वादपरस्य प्रयोगोऽनुपपन्न इति चेदनुक्तः प्लक्षेण न्यग्रोधार्थ इति कृत्वा न्यग्रोधशब्दः प्रयुज्यते । कथमनुक्तौ यावतेदानीमेवोक्तमेकेनाप्यनेकस्याभिधानं भवतीति । सरूपाणामेकेऽप्यनेकस्याभिधानं भवति न विरूपाणाम् । किं पुनः कारण सरूपाणामेकेनाप्यनेकस्याभिधान भवति न पुनर्विरूपाणाम् ।

अभिधानं पुनः स्वाभाविकम् ॥३३॥

स्वाभाविकमभिधानम् ।

उभयदर्शनाच्च ॥३८॥

उभय खल्वपि दृश्यते । विरूपाणामप्येकेनानेकस्याभिधान भवति । तद्यथा । द्यावाक्षामा । द्यावा चिदस्मै पृथिवी नमेते इति । विरूपाणा किञ्च नामैकेनानेकस्याभिधान स्यात्किं पुनः सरूपानाम् ।

also at 1 3 1 6/258 ; भूवादयो धातवः । 1 3 1 . ..

.. प्रथमभावग्रहण च ॥११॥...etc & see above, अभिधानतः ..

again at, 1.4 51 8/335 कथितेऽभिहिते त्वविधिस्त्वमतिर्गुणकर्मणि लादिविधिः सपरे ।

कथिते लादिभिरभिहिते त्वविधिरेष भवति । किमिद त्वविधिरिति । ..etc.

again, 2 1 1 7/363–सख्याविशेषो व्यक्ताभिधानमुपसर्जनविशेषण च योगः।

अथैतस्मिनेकार्थीभावकृते विशेषे किं स्वाभाविक शब्दैरर्थाभिधानमाहोस्विद्वाचनिकम् । ......etc

again, 3.1 7 18/12 धातोः कर्मण. समानकर्तृकादिच्छाया वा । 3 1 7

अनभिधानाद्वा ॥५॥

अथवानभिधानात्सुबन्तादुत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति । न हि सुबन्तादुत्पद्यमानेन सनेच्छाया अभिधान स्यात् । अनभिधानात्तत्र उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति ।...etc

again 2 1.36–$\frac{2}{389}$–अर्थ शब्दो यं पुल्लिङ्ग उत्तरपदार्थप्रधानश्च तत्पुरुषस्तेन पुल्लिङ्गस्यैव समासस्याभिधानं स्यात्, स्त्रीनपुंसकलिङ्गस्य न स्यात् ।...etc.

2 1.51. 13/395 तद्धितार्थोत्तरपदसमाहारे च । 2 1.51 ..see अभिधानार्थे above, 2.1 69 24/403 · कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्मत्वर्थीयैश्चाभिधान यथा स्यात् ।...etc

2 1 67 $\frac{10\ 10\ 15}{404}$—एवमपि यद्यत्र कदाचित्कर्मधारयो भवति कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्न वर्थैरभिधानं प्राप्नोति । सर्वंदचायमेवमर्थो यत्न' कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्मत्वर्थीयैरभिधान मा भूदिति । ..etc ....तत्र कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्मत्वर्थीयैरभिधानमस्तु बहुव्रीहिणेति बहुव्रीहिणा भविष्यति लघुत्वात् ।...etc

2 2 24 18/421 पदार्थाभिधाने नुप्रयोगानुपपत्तिरभिहितत्वात् ॥४॥ पदार्थस्याभिधाने –नुप्रयोगस्यानुपपत्ति' । चित्रगुर्देवदत्त इति । किं कारणम् अभिहितत्वात् । चित्रगुशब्देनाभिहित सोऽर्थ इति कृत्वा नुप्रयोगो न प्राप्नोति ।

2 2 24 13,15/424 न चानभिधानादसमानाधिकरणेषु सद्भाव ॥१६॥ अभिधानात् । तच्चावश्यमनभिधानमाश्रयितव्यम् । क्रियमाणेऽपि वै परिगणने यत्राभिधान नास्ति न भवति तत्र बहुव्रीहि । तद्यथा पच भुक्तवन्तो ऽस्येति ।

अथैतस्मिन्सत्यनभिधाने यदि वृत्तिपरिगणनं क्रियते वर्तिपरिगणनमपि कर्तव्यम् । तत्कथ कर्तव्यम् ।.. .etc

2 2 29 23/432 प्लक्षस्य न्यग्रोधत्वान्न्यग्रोधस्य प्लक्षत्वात्स्वशब्देनाभिधान भविष्यति ।

again at, 2 2 29 25/433. . अभिधानं स्वाभाविकम् ॥१५॥

स्वाभाविकमभिधानम् ······etc

and 2 3 1 12. 13/442–न वान्यतरेणानभिधानात् ॥८॥

न वैष दोषः । किं कारणम् । अन्यतरेणानभिधानात् । अन्यतरेणात्रानभिधानम् । सदिप्रत्ययेनाभिधानमसिप्रत्ययेनानभिधानम् । यतोऽनभिधान तदाश्रया सप्तमी भविष्यति । कुतो नु खल्वेतत्सत्यभिधाने चानभिधाने चानभिहिताश्रया सप्तमी भविष्यति न पुनरभिहिताश्रय प्रतिषेध इति ।

अनभिहिते हि विधानम् ॥९॥

अनभिहिते हि सप्तमी विधीयते । नाभिहिते प्रतिषेध. ।......किं पुन. द्रव्य साधन आहोस्विद्गुणः । किं चातः । यदि द्रव्य साधन नैतदन्यद् भवत्यभिहितात् । अथ हि गुणः साधनं भवत्येदन्यदभिहितात् । ..etc

- 2 3 5 14/445 कालाध्वनोरत्यन्तसंयोगे । 2 3 5.

. ...शालिभिरभिधान यथा स्यात् ।... etc

3 1.7 18/12 see above

3.1.7. 13/13 11/15–अकर्मणो ह्यसमानकर्तृकाद्यानभिधानम् ॥७॥ इच्छायामभिधेयायां सन्विधीयते न चाकर्मणोऽसमानकर्तृकाद्दोत्पद्यमानेन सनेच्छाया अभिधान स्यात् । अनभिधानात्तत उत्पत्तिन भविष्यति ।

.......सर्वस्य वा चेतनावत्वात् ॥१५॥ ...एवमपि इष्यते ग्रामो गन्तुमिति परसाधन उत्पद्यमानेन क्तेन ग्रामस्याभिधानं न प्राप्नोति ।

3.1.22 9–11/29–एकाज्ग्रहलादिग्रहणे च ।२।·····यत्रैकाचो हलादिश्चोत्पद्यमानेन यद्यर्थस्याभिधानं न भवति न भवति तत्रोत्पत्तिः । etc....यत्र चानेकाचो हलादेर्वोत्पद्यमानेन यद्यर्थस्याभिधान भवति भवति तत्रोत्पत्तिः ।...etc

3.1.26 22/31 इह तर्हि पाचयत्योदनं देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्तेनेत्युभयोः कर्त्रोर्णेनाभिधानं प्राप्नोति । प्रत्ययार्थविशेषणे पुनः सति न दोषः । प्रधानकर्तरि लादयो भवन्तीति प्रधानकर्ता णेनाभिधीयते यश्चात्राप्रधान सिद्धा तत्र कर्तरीत्येव तृतीया ।...etc.

3 1 67 $\frac{1\text{-}1\text{-}3\text{-}9}{58}$ किमुच्यते कृताभिहित इति न लेनाप्यभिधानं भवति । अशक्य लेनाभिधान आश्रयितुम् ।...यदि च लेनाप्यभिधानं स्यान्नेद पक्षान्तरं स्यात् । .. तस्मान्नैतच्छक्य वक्तु लेनाप्यभिधान भवतीति । भवति चेदाभिहिते विकरणाभाव इत्येव ।..... etc

again at, 3 4 26 13–18/174 .. ननु च भुजिप्रत्ययेनानभिहितः कर्तेति कृत्वा अनभिहिताश्रयो विधिर्भविष्यति तृतीया । यदि सत्यभिधाने चानभिधाने च कुतश्चिदनभिधानमिति कृत्वानभिहिताश्रयो विधिर्भविष्यति तृतीया यवाग्वां द्वितीया प्राप्नोति । किं कारणम् । णमुलानभिहित कर्मेति । . ... etc ..etc pp 175...यदि सत्यभिधाने चानभिधाने त कुतश्चिदनभिधानमिति कृत्वानभिहिताश्रयो विधिर्भविष्यति तृतीया यदुक्तमोदने द्वितीया प्राप्नोतीति स इह दोषो न जायते ।...

4 1 48 6/218– सिद्ध तु स्त्रियाः पुशब्देनाभिधानात् ।३। सिद्धमेतत् । कथम् । स्त्रियाः पुशब्देनाभिधानात् । स्त्री पुंशब्देनाकारान्तेनाभिधीयते ।

4 1 91. $\frac{14\text{-}15}{246}$ अपत्याभिधाने स्त्रीपुल्लिङ्गस्याप्रसिद्धनपुसकत्वात् ।४।

अपत्याभिधाने स्त्रीपुलिंगस्याप्रसिद्धि । किं कारणं । नपुंसकलिङ्गत्वात् । अपत्य नपुसकलिङ्ग तेन नपुसकलिङ्गस्यैवाभिधाने स्यात्स्त्रीपुल्लिङ्गस्य न स्यात् । ननु चेद् पुरस्तादेव चोदित परिहृतं च । उत्पत्तिस्तत्र चोद्यत इह पुनस्त्व न्नेनाभिधानं चोद्यते ।

4 1 93 5/248 उत्पादयितरि चापत्ययुक्ते स्त्रिया युवत्या अभिधानं न प्राप्नोति ।

14/249-एवमपि स्त्रिया युवत्या अभिधानं न प्राप्नोति ।

25/250-क्रियमाणेऽपि हि सञ्ज्ञाकारिग्रहणे यत्र गार्ग्यादिभ्य उत्पद्यमानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थस्याभिधानं भवति भवति तत्रोत्पत्ति ।...etc

4 2 1 5/271 रक्तादीनामर्थाभिधाने प्रत्ययविधानादुपाध्यानर्थक्यम् ।१।

रक्तादीनामर्थाभिधाने प्रत्ययविधानादुपाधिग्रहणमनर्थकम् । *न ह्य रागादुत्पद्य* मानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थस्याभिधानं स्यात् । अनभिधानान्नतत उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति ।

4 3 25 13/307 कस्मान्न भवति तत्रास्ते तत्र शेते इति । अभिधानात् । तच्चावश्यमनभिधानमाश्रयितव्यम् । क्रियमाणेष्वपि ह्यर्थनिर्देशेषु यत्र जातादिषूत्पद्यमानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थस्याभिधानं न भवति तत्र प्रत्ययोत्पत्ति ।

also at 4 3 155 3-6/325, 4 4 76 14/333, 5 1 59 24/355 and 8 1 4 4/365 in the same sense

(2) Pā IV 1 48 is पुंयोगादाख्यायाम् ।

सिद्धं तु स्त्रीया पुंशब्देनाभिधानात् ॥३॥ अथवा पुनरस्तु तस्येद मित्यनेनाभिसम्बन्धेन । ननु चोक्तं पुंयोगादाख्याया तद्धितलुग्वचनमिति । नैष दोष । नावश्यमयमेवाभिसम्बन्धो भवति तस्येदमिति । अयमप्यभिसम्बन्धोऽस्ति सोऽयमिति । कथं पुनरतस्मिन् स इत्येतद् भवति । चतुर्भि प्रकारैरतस्मिन्स इत्येतद् भवति । तात्स्थ्यात् ताद्धर्म्यात्सामीप्यात्साहचर्यादिति । तात्स्थ्यात् तावत् । मञ्चा हसन्ति । गिरिर्दह्यते । ताद्धर्म्यात् । जटिनं यान्तं ब्रह्मदत्त इत्याह । ब्रह्मदत्ते यानि कार्याणि जटिन्यपि तानि क्रियन्त इत्यतो जटी ब्रह्मदत्त इत्युच्यते । तत्सामीप्यात् । गङ्गाया घोष । कूपे गर्गकुलम् । त साहचर्यात् । कुन्तान्प्रवेशय । यष्टी प्रवेशयेति ।

(3) The न्यायकोश observes शक्तिलक्षणाभ्यामतिरिक्तैव गौणी वृत्ति *रिति मीमांसका । सा च तदतिरिक्ता नैति नैयायिका आहु* । (न्याय-सिद्धान्तमञ्जरीप्रकाश)

(4) एकमाहुरनेकार्थं शब्दमन्ये परीक्षकाः। निमित्तभेदादेकस्य सार्वार्थ्यं तस्य भिद्यते । V.P. II 252 also Punyaraja says तत्रैकशब्ददर्शने शब्दोपचारः प्रसिद्ध्यप्रसिद्धिनिमित्तकः ।

(5) अर्थप्रकरणाभ्यां वा योगाच्छब्दान्तरेण वा । V.P.

(6) यथा सास्नादिमान् पिण्डो गोशब्देनाभिधीयते ।
तथा स एव गोशब्दो वाहीकेऽपि व्यवस्थितः ॥

(7) पुण्यराज says : अर्थः शब्दस्य द्विविध. स्वरूपं बाह्यश्च। तत्र निमित्ता-जाड्यादेर्गोत्व वाहीकेऽप्यनुपद्यते, शब्दस्तु गोत्वमेवाभिधत्त इति बाह्यार्थोपचारः ।

(8) Punyaraja holds that verses 317, 318 give someone else's views Mammata and others quote them as representing Bhartrhari's views.

(9) मुख्यार्थसंबद्धासम्बद्ध साधारणमुख्यार्थबाधमहादिप्रयोज्यप्रसिद्धार्थविषयक-धीजनकत्व व्यञ्जना ।

(10) अनया कटाक्षेणाभिलाषो व्यञ्जितः इति सर्वजनप्रसिद्धेस्तया चेष्टा-वृत्तित्वस्य अपि आवश्यकत्वाच्च ।

(11) अनया चार्थबोधे जननीये वक्तृबोद्धव्यवाच्यादिवैशिष्ट्यज्ञान प्रतिभा च सहकारि तद्बीजनकज्ञानजनकमेव वा ।

(12) वक्तृजादिवैशिष्ट्यसहकारेण तज्जनिका बुद्धि प्रतिभा इति फलितम् ।

(13) एव च शक्तिरेतज्जन्मगृहीतैवार्थबोधिका, व्यञ्जना तु जन्मान्तर गृहीतापि, इत्यपि शक्तेः अस्या भेदकम् ।

(14) एव गतोऽस्तमर्क इत्यादेः शिष्येण सन्ध्यावन्दनादेः कर्तव्यत्वाभि-प्रायेण गुरु प्रति प्रयुक्ताद्वक्तृतात्पर्याभावेऽपि प्रतिवेश्यादीनामभिसरणीयकमादि बोधस्य वाच्यार्थप्रतीतिपूर्वकस्य वाच्यार्थबाधज्ञानेऽजायमानस्य लक्षणया उपपाद-यितुमशक्यत्वाच्च ।

(15) M.S 1.2 32 अविशिष्टस्तु वाक्यार्थ. । and also, अविशिष्टस्तु लोके प्रयुज्यमानाना वेदे च पदानामर्थ. । स यथैव लोके विवक्षितस्तथैव वेदेऽपि भवितुमर्हति । (S B on 1 2 32 pp.150)

(16) MS XI.1.26 लोके कमार्थलक्षणम् । and also SB. on it– यच्च लोकवदिति, लोके कमार्थप्रधानम् । कार्यवशात् सकृदप्युक्तो सकृदाहरति,

असकृदप्युक्त सकृदाहरति नाहरति वा । अथेह शब्दलक्षण कर्मणि यथा शब्दार्थे प्रवृत्ति । तस्माल्लोकवदित्यदृष्टान्त । pp 2114 and also see MS XI 1, 62 अर्थाल्लोके विधित प्रतिप्रधान स्यात् । and also S B on it- अर्थाल्लोके प्रदीपस्य सकृदसकृच्च क्रिया । यदि सकृत्कृत सर्वं प्रकाशयति, सकृत् क्रियते, अथ न प्रकाशयति, ततोऽसकृत् । ततश्चास्य प्रयत्नसामर्थ्यम् । अथेह विधिन उपकारोऽनुपकारो वा गम्यते, न प्रत्यक्षेण । S B pp 2129 and also शब्दलक्षण कर्मणि शब्दाभिहित गम्यते, न लोकाभिप्राय । (S B on X 5 57 pp 1968) लोके कर्मार्थलक्षण भवति, न शब्दलक्षण यथाऽर्थस्तथा क्रियते, न यथा शब्द । वेदे तु शब्देनैवार्थोऽवगम्यते । तथैवानुष्ठेयमिति । SB on VI 8 27 pp 1516 and also शब्दप्रमाणका वयम् । यच्छब्द आह तदस्माक प्रमाणम् । । लोके तु कार्यं दृष्ट्वा चोदितमचोदितमप्य नुष्ठीयत एव । (S B on III 2 36 pp 793) and also लोके कर्मार्थलक्षण, शब्दलक्षण पुनर्वेदे । S B on III 1 17 pp 726) and also लोके अर्थलक्षण सव्यवहारे । येन येनार्थं समृध्येत तत्तोऽनुक्तो वा स समृध्येतैव । इह तु वेदे शब्दलक्षण । S B on III 1 16 pp 725 etc

(17) यथा लोके प्रस्थभुग्देवदत्त इत्युच्यते । यद्यपि सूपशाकादिभिरधिक प्रस्थो भवति, तथापि भुजौ प्रस्थो निर्दिश्यते व्यञ्जनान्योदनार्थानि । S B on X 8 29 pp 2079

(18) लौकिकेषु तु वाक्येष्वेव गम्यते । तानि हि विज्ञातेऽर्थे प्रयुज्यमाना न्यध्याहार्यपदानि गौणानि विपरिणतव्यवहितार्थानि च प्रयुज्यन्ते । तस्मात्तन्सादृश्याद्गनावगमदेष्वप्यर्थेषु भवति तत्वरूपो मिथ्याप्रत्यय । यथा मृगतृष्णादिषु । S B on IV 3 2 pp 1247

(19) See 16 above and also • न शब्दप्रमाणकाणामन्तरेण शब्द मवगतिर्याप्या । (S B on VI 1 3 pp 1353) शब्दलक्षणे च कर्मणि शब्दो न प्रमाणम् । (SB on X 5 44 pp 1962)

(20) नन्वनुवादेऽपि लक्षणा । ननुवादपक्षे लक्षणाया दोष । SB I 4 22 pp 364 अनुवादे हि लक्षणा न्याय्या न विधौ (S B on IV 4 91 pp 1278) यज्ञायुधशब्दस्यानुवादपदो न्याय्यो न विधिपक्षे । गौणो हि स आयुधशब्द याग़ादिषु । (S B on IV 1 8 pp 1201)

(21) क पुनर्मुख्य को वा गौण इति । उच्यते । य शब्दादेवावगम्यते, स प्रथमोऽर्थो मुख्य । मुखमिव भवतीति मुख्य इत्युच्यते । यत्तु खलु

प्रतीतादर्थात् केनचित्संबन्धेन गम्यते, स पश्चाद् भावाज्जघनमिव भवतीति जघन्य । गुणसम्बन्धाच्च गौण इति ।

(22) नायमुभयत्र पर्वशब्दो वर्तते । यदि कालवचनस्तत्संबधात्समुदाये गम्यते । यदि वा समुदायवचनस्तत्संबधात्काले । अन्यतरवचनो नोभयवचन । तत्र समुदायवचने कल्प्यमाने प्रकरणमनुगृहीत भवति । अपि च पृणाते पर्व शब्द पृणोतिश्च दाने प्रसिद्ध । दानानि च समुदाया । तस्मात् समुदाया भोज्या । एव शब्दावयवप्रसिद्धिरनुगृहीता भवति । S B on IX 2 53, pp 1739)

(23) अनेकस्याप्येक शब्दो भवति वाचक । तद्यथा मातेति मातरमपि वदति मातारमपि । माता च परम दैवत समा च पुत्रेष्वित्येतैरुपबद्धमानो जननीवचनोऽवगम्यते । माना सम क्षिप्रञ्चेत्येभिरनुबध्यमानो धान्यस्य मातु वाचक । (S B on X 14 pp 1810)

(24) शब्दे उच्चरिते नत्र तावन्मुख्या प्रतिपत्ति । शब्दे कार्यस्यासमवादर्थे कार्यं विज्ञायते । यथा गामानयेति । इह तु शब्द इव कार्य सभवति, नार्थे । अतोऽत्र शब्द विज्ञास्याम । पूर्वस्मादेष वाद पापीयान् । कस्मात् । औत्पत्तिकत्वात् । औत्पत्तिको हि नामिनाम्नो सबन्ध । यो हि शब्दो यस्मिन्नर्थं औत्पत्तिकेन सबन्धेन प्रसिद्धो न ततोन्य प्रत्याययितु शक्नोति । न हि गोशब्देनाश्वोऽभिधातु शक्यते । SB on शब्दमात्रमिति चेन्नोत्पत्तिकत्वात् । MI SI VIII 2 4-5 pp 1542

(25) यदाञ्जस्येन शब्दार्थो नावकल्पते तदा लक्षणायापि कल्प्यमान साधुर्भवति । यथा अग्नौ तिष्ठति, अवरे तिष्ठति अग्निसमीपे तिष्ठत्यवटसमीपे तिष्ठतीति भवति सव्यवहार । लक्षणादि लौकिक्येव (S B on pp 488) श्रुत्यसभवे लक्षणयापि व्यवहारो भवति । यथाग्नौ तिष्ठत्यवटे तिष्ठतीति । (S B on pp 1485) and also श्रुत्यसभवे लक्षणापि न्याय्यैव । S B on pp 1280 असति श्रुत्यर्थे लक्षणार्थो ग्राह्य । S B pp. 1551, again, मुख्याभावे गौणो गृह्यते (S B 1437 pp) सभवति श्रुत्यर्थे लक्षणार्थो ग्राह्य । S,B pp 1560 and also भवति लक्षणयापि शब्दार्थ (S B pp 1230) अगतिश्चैषा यल्लक्षणापरिग्रह । S B on pp 1545, again, त्रित्व हि चतुष्ट्वादीनि साहचर्याच्छक्नोति लक्षयितुम् । लक्षणा त्वाश्रिता भवति । किं क्रियताम् । अगत्याश्रीयते । सत्या गतौ नाश्रयितव्या । SB pp 2021

(26) श्रुतिश्चलक्षणाया ज्यायसी। S B pp 134, श्रुतिल्क्षणाविषये श्रुति र्ज्यायसी। SB pp, 324 श्रुतिलक्षणाविशये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या न लक्षणा। S B pp 565 1244 1262, श्रुतिल्क्षणाविशये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या। S B on pp 1210 1222, again श्रुतिश्च ल्क्षणाया गरीयसी S B pp 1260 श्रुतिश्च लक्षणाया बलीयसी S B pp 1278, श्रुतिल्क्षणयोश्च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या। S B pp 1556, and also श्रुतिश्च ल्क्षणातो न्याय्या। SB, pp, 2243,

(27) स्वार्थे वर्तमान सादृश्य गमयति। स्वार्थ जहत् कथ गमयेत् (S B on VIII 3 34)and also, न च ल्क्षणया प्रयोगे शब्दार्थ परिच्छिद्यते। यत्कारण स्वार्थे वर्तमानोऽर्थान्तरे ल्क्षयति। स्वार्थ जहन्नेव ल्क्षयेत्। S B on VIII 3 34

(28) कथ नु स्वार्थाभिधानेन प्रत्ययव्यवस्येति चेत्। अर्थसबन्धात्। सिंह इति निर्ज्ञाते प्रसह्यकारिता तत्र प्रायेणेति प्रसह्यकारीति गम्यते। अर्थ प्रत्ययसामर्थ्यात्। यो हि मन्यते प्रसह्यकारीति गम्यते। अर्थप्र ययसामर्थ्यात्। यो हि मन्यते प्रसह्यकारिण प्रत्याययेयमि ति यदि सिंहशब्दमुच्चारयति सिद्ध त्यस्याभिप्रेतम्। सिंहार्थ प्रतीत सबधादितरमर्थ प्रत्याययति। एव स्वार्थाभिधाने तद्गुणसबध प्रतीयते। S B on I 4 22 pp 357-360

(29) गुणसयोगाद्यद्गौणमिदमभिधान भविष्यति। भवति हि गुणादप्यभिधानम्। यथा सिंहो देवदत्त, अग्निर्माणवक इति।

(30) गुणवादस्तु। गौण एष वादो भवति यत्सबधिनि स्तोतव्ये सबध्यन्तर स्तूयते। S B pp 213

(31) (S B on I 11 pp 187) गुणवादस्तु स्यात्। यथा स्तेनां प्रच्छन्नरूपा एव च मन इति गौण शब्द। Thus stenam manah is gunavada-and also, स्यात्, प्रायात्। MSu I 2 11.

(32) एव च *गौणीव्यञ्जनयो पृथग्वृत्तित्व अयुक्त, तयो* ल्क्षणाया मन्तर्भावसम्भवात्।

(33) एतद्विभाजनमनुपपन्नम्, व्यञ्जनाया अतिरिक्तवृत्तत्वात्etc

(34) व्यञ्जनात् यज्जन्यशाब्दत्वेप्यस्य कार्यतावच्छेदककोटौ गौरवात। माधवी, शक्तिवादटीका,

(35) तादृशबोधे तात्पर्यज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वे शक्त्यैव तादृशबोधसंभवे अभिधा मूलव्यञ्जनास्वीकारानुपपत्तेः । pp. 2. Ibid.

(36) न च व्यञ्जनावृत्तित्वानुपगमे तत्र तत्र तादृशबोधस्य अनुभवसिद्धस्य अनुपपत्तिरित्यगत्या वृत्तित्वमङ्गीकार्यमिति वाच्यम् ।

(37) यथाकथञ्चिदुपनयवशेन मनसैव विशिष्टधीसम्भवात् । मानोरथिक-सुखप्रभेदपर्यवसित चमत्कारे सत्यपि शाब्दस्यैव मानसस्यापि बोधविशेषस्य हेतुतायाः सुवचत्वात् । व्यञ्जनाख्यपदार्थान्तरस्य स्वरूपसत्ताया अन्वयेबुद्धौ तद्-हेतुत्वस्य च प्रमाणविरहेणासत्वाच्चेति सक्षेपः । शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका. का. 24

CHAPTER V

S'ABDAVRTTIS—as in the earlier ālaṃkārikas

	Bhāmaha	Last quarter of the 7th Cen A D - Middle of the 8th Cen A D - De (S P.) P. 49-50, Ed '60
	Dandin	First half of the 8th Cen De ibid, p. 67.
	Vāmana	Middle of the 8th and Middle of the 9th Cen. A D. i e. about 800 A D - De ibid, p. 80
	Udbhata	End of the 8th Cen. A D. and beginning of the 9th Cen A D. - De ibid, p. 73
and	Rudrata	Middle of the 9th Cen A.D De ibid, p 85.

Śabdavrttis in earlier writers on Poetics

It should be noted at the outset that the earlier writers on poetics such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc., do not discuss the problem of S'abdavṛttis theoretically like later writers such as Mammata So, we cannot expect any definite mention of this subject in their works However, we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the ideas of the functions of a word

Bhāmaha

We begin with Bhāmaha In Bhāmaha, we come across some direct or indirect references to abhidhā as below. In the verse I 9 which reads as,

"s'abdas'chando'bhidhānārthā, itihāsās'rayāḥ kathāḥ

loko yuktih kalās'ceti mantavyā kāvyagairhyami"..,-he obviously seems to enumerate the different branches of learning which a poet-aspirant should study They are s'abda or grammar,

chandas or metrics, abhidhana or lexicography, itihasa or traditions etc Thus, abhidhana is here used in the sense of lixicon However, Abhinava quotes from Udbhata's vivarana of Bhamaha as follows

sabdas'chandobhidhanarthah iti abhidhanasya s'abdadbhedam vyakhyatum bhattodbhato babhase-s'abdanamabhidhanam abhidhavyaparah, mukhyo gunavrttis'ca

If this interpretation of Udbhata is correct, we may say that Bhamaha here refers to abhidha vrtti by 'abhidhanam'. We have seen that earlier writers use the term abhidhana to refer to abhidha But this interpretation of Udbhata seems doubtful, if we strictly adhere to the context which purports to enumerate the several branches of learning as noted above

However, in the following passages we will find that Bhamaha is familiar with the theory of abhidha

At III 21, and III. 25, we come across the mention of the word 'abhidha', but in both the cases, it means 'mere expressing' or 'naming' and not abhidhavyapara. But, while discussing the fault called 'avacaka' at I 41, Bhamaha says that– saksadarudham vacyerthe nabhidhanam pratiyate– The line means that an expression which is not conventionally related to the direct meaning is not understood Here, the terms viz 'vacya artha' and 'saksadarudham' show his familiarity with abhidha.

The following discussion shows that Bhamaha knows very well the theories of Sphota and apoha which are mentioned by later writers in connexion with abhidha Bhamaha, of course, does not accept the theories of Sphota and apoha in this connexion

In the sixth pariccheda Bhamaha discusses the nature and scope of sabda He also tries to strike some definition In the

related to artha which is of the nature of reality, through a relation which is eternal or non-eternal

Finally, at VI 20 he concludes that it is difficult to define precisely as to what a word is because it becomes manifold on account of the difference in letters which again are manifold on account of their parts

(VI 20–varnabhedādidam bhinnam varnāhsvāms'avikalpatah |
ke sabdāh kiñca tadvācyamityaho vartma dustaram ||

He then proceeds to classify words into a fourfold scheme based on dravya or object, kriyā or action, jāti or class and guna or quality (VI 21)

From the above discussion it follows that Bhāmaha has some definite views as to the nature and scope of word (VI. 13 14) and his views seem to be very near to those of the Mimāmsakas It may be noted that from the above discussion, it follows that Bhāmah seems to be quite familiar with abhidhā

As to Bhāmaha's familiarity with functions of words other than the direct one, particularly vyañjanā, we may say that vyañjanā does not occupy the same place as abhidhā, in his mind, i e he does not seem to have known vyañjanā as a separate vrtti He, however, uses different forms of vi+$\sqrt{}$añj with the later meaning of vyañjanā at different places We will consider these usages

At I 73, we come across the word 'vyajyate' as in,

hi śabdenāpi hetvarthaprathanāduktasiddhaye |
ayamarthāntaranyāsah sutarām vyajyate yathā ||

–by the word 'hi' the idea of supporter and the supported or the samarthyasamarthakabhāva is suggested

At I. 79, sāmāsokti is defined as,

yatrokte gamyate nyo'rthah tatsamānavis'esanah |
sa samāsoktiruddistā samksiptārthatayā yatha ||

Herein, we have a reference to another sense to be gathered by implication

At III 9 paryāyokta is illustrated and explained Bhamaha says that Kṛṣṇa's reply to S'ısupāla's invitation for dinner is meant to serve the purpose of avoiding the possibility of taking poison—rasadananivṛttaye This is also only implied At III 11 udātta is only illustrated as,

udāttaṃ saktimān rāmo guruvakyānurodhakaḥ |
vıhayopavanaṃ rājyam yathā vanamupagamat ||

Here the idea of Rāma's virtue is only implid III 21 defines apahnutı which also carries the same touch as seen above. (It is defined kiñcıdantargatopamā)

At V 58, we come across the term 'vyajyete' as in

—'yatra dṛstāntamātrena vyajyete sādhyasādhane |
tamāhuh s'uddhadṛṣṭāntam tanmātrāvıskrteryathā ||

Herein, says Bhāmaha, the sādhya and sādhana are just suggested by the illustration This according to Bhāmaha makes for 'dṛṣṭanta' which differs from upama At V 60 also, we have 'vyajyeran' to the same effect

V 60 reads

kathamekapadenaıva vyajyerannasya te gunāḥ |
ıtı prayuñjate santah kecıdvistārabhıravaḥ ||

In V 59 Bhāmaha has given an illustration of pure dṛṣṭānta wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dilıpa, Aila, Pradyumna and Naravahana, thereby implying the qualities of those monarchs in that king In V 60 says Bhāmaha that in order to avoid unnecessary details, people resort to one word as in V. 59 illustrated above Thus herein, we see a clear reference to the power of suggestion where the qualities of Bharata, Dilıpa etc are suggested by their naming

In his discussion of various alaṃkāras, we see that he takes for granted vyaṅgyārtha or implied sense, e g in aprastutaprasaṃsā, dıpaka, vyājastuti, nidars'ana etc This point is

further elaborated in a separate chapter called 'Pratiyamanartha' in the earlier alamkarikas'

Dandin

In the Kavyadars'a of Dandin we come across the following direct or indirect references to the different sabdavrttis. There is no reference to abhidha as such.

We come across some references to gaunavrtti or laksana as follows :

At I.95 Dandin says that words such as nisthyuta, udgirna, vanta etc are said to have been used in a charming way only when they are found in the secondary sense Says he

nisthyutodirnavantadi gaunavrttivyapas'rayam |
atisundaramanyatra gramakaksam vigahate ||

At II. 254, he says

temi prayogamargesu gaunavrttivyapas'rayah |
atyantasundarah drstastadudahrtayo yatha ||

He says that at times in 'hetu alamkara' the cause is said to be residing at a place far from that of the effect, or, the effect is described as occurring simultaneously with its cause, or the hetu is said to operate after the effect takes place These are actually instances where gaunavrtti functions

At II 100 samanarupa prahelika is defined as

samanarupa gaunarthSropitairgrathita padaih |
parusa laksanastitvan atravyutpaditas'rutih ||

Thus, the texture of samanarupa prahelika is woven with gaunarthāropita padas, i e. words having a secondary sense.

As in Bhamaha, so also in Dandin we do not come across any mentioning of vyanana as such by name However, we come across different forms of the root, *vi+√añj in sense of 'to suggest'*. We also meet with the term 'pratiyate' in the sense of 'to

implied'. Thus, Dandin seems to know a lot also of what is called implied sense or pratiyamāna artha

At I 76 Dandin defines the guna called udārata as

utkarṣavān gunah kas'cit yasminnukte pratiyate |
tadudārāhvayam tena sanāthā kāvyapaddhatih ||

Thus udārata occurs in that sentence, wherein after the expressed meaning is gathered–yasminnukte–there is an implication of some high quality This is an indirect reference to vyañjana,

At II 14, upamā is described as–

yathākathañcit sādṛs'yam
yatrodbhutam pratiyate |
upama nāma sa tasyah
prapañco yam pradars'yate ||

Thus in upamā, there is an experience of similarity either by abhidhā, or laksanā or vyañjanā

At II 16 vastūpamā is said to be pratiyamānaikadharmā In prativastūpamā also (II 46) there is 'sāmyapratiti' in an implied way We will see lateron that so many varieties of upamā have similarity implied in them At II 65 Dandin says that words such as spardhate, jayati, dvesti, etc are sādṛśyasucakāh or suggestive of similarity At III 136 anujñā ākṣepa is said to occur where through apparent anujña or acceptance something else is implied Says he

ityanujñamukhenaiva kāntasyaksipyate gatih |
maranam sūcayantyaiva sonujñaksepa ucyate ||

Thus there is some element of suggestion involved in this So also, in āsirvacanaksepa' (II 142) the Nāyikā suggests her own helplessness (svāvasthām sucayantyā)

At II 180 vyatireka is defined as, sabdopātte pratite
vā sadrs'ye vastunordvayoh |
tatra yadbhedakathanam vyatirekah sa kathyate ||

Thus vyatireka has some touch of an implied similarity II 189 mentions vyatireka which has pratiyamānasādṛśya

At II 234 Daṇḍin holds utprekṣā to be suggested by words such as manye, s'aṅke, dhruvam etc says he

manye s anke dhruvaṃ prāyo nūnamityevamādibhih |
utpreksā vyajyate s'abdairivas'abdo'pi tādrsah ||

Thus it seems that Dandin considers utpreksā to be implied only

At II 303 udātta is explained Dandin says that in the two illustrations (at II 301 and II 302) āsayamāhātmya and abhyudayagaurava, are respectively suggested-suvyañjita

(purvatrās'ayamahatmyamatrabhyudayagauravam |
suvyañjitamiti proktamudattadvayamapyadah ||

At II 350 nidars'anā is said to contain suggestion

yadi candrāmsubhih sprstā dhvāntarāji parabhavam |
sadyo rajaviruddhānām sūcayanti durantatām ||

Thus there is an indirect reference to vyañjanā

We will see in greater detail later on that as in Bhāmaha, so also in Dandin we can read a lot of pratiyamāna element in the different alakmāras such as dipaka, samāsokti, aprastutaprasàṃsā, vyājastuti etc.

Vamana

Vāmana, in his Kāvyālamkārasūtravṛtti very often refers to 'bhakti lakṣanā' or 'gaunārtha' and upacāra But he also, does not mention vyañjanā He, however, seems to touch vyanjanā only indirectly

At I i I, *he say that the word 'kāvya' here stands for* word and sense embellished by guna and alamkāra But, by 'bhakti', i e through secondary usage, it is taken with reference to s'abdārthamātra or 'word and sense' alone

(kāvyas'abdoyaṃ gunālaṃkāra-saṃskṛtayoh sabdarthayoh vartate|
bhaktyā tu s'abdārthamātravacano'tra gṛhyate ||)

On I ii 1 Vāmana says that the word 'arocakı' and 'satṛṇābhyavahārı' are metaphorically used (arocakısatṛṇābyavahārıs'abdau gauṇārthau) Vāmana holds that in vaidarbhi the presence of all the arthagaunas makes for the charm (tasyā-marthagunasampadāsvādya bhavati) Now this totality of arthagunas by themselves, as it resides in the diction called vaidarbhi itself is known by the name of vaidarbhi I ii 22 says sa'pi vaidarbhi tatsthyat

Vāmana then adds sāpiyamarthagunasampad vaidarbhityuktā tatsthyādityupacāratah vyavahāram dars'ayati Thus, it is used secondarily

At II i 12 Vāmana considers the fault called 'neyartha' He holds that when some meaning which is not heard of in the particular sentence is somehow inferred, it makes for the fault of 'neyārtha' The term viz 'paṅktivihamgamanāmabhṛt for 'Dasaratha' is an instance in point By 'paṅkti' is meant 'ten' by 'vihangamanāma is meant 'cakravāka Ratha or chariot is one that bears the name of 'cakravāka' on itself Thus 'paṅkti and 'vihaṅgamanamabhṛt' means 'Dasaratha This makes for the fault of neyartha Then, it is argued that if you find neyārtha in such illustrations then the word 'rathāṅganāma' for cakra vāka, used by all poets, also will be an illustration of neyartha To this, Vamana says na teṣām nirudhalakṣaṇatvāt Such words as 'rathānganama' for Cakravāka are instances of nirūdha lakṣaṇā i e what later alamkarikas call lakṣana based on rudhi or convention

II 1 14, Vamana says that whatever has an obscene sense as the other sense is asls'la and it is a dosa (asabhyārthantaramasabhyasmṛtihetus' caslilam) But, he adds at II. i 15 that secondary usage does not fall under this He says, na gupta-lakṣita asamvṛtani At II i 17, he defines lakṣita as lakṣaṇikāsabhyam lakṣitam' i e if the obscene sense is gathered secondarily, it is called 'lakṣitam and it does not make for the fault of as ila'

Under IV. iii 7, Vāmana notes that gauṇārtha, lākṣaṇikārtha can also become an alaṁkāra. He says—yathā ca gauṇasyālaṁkāratvaṁ tathā lākṣaṇikasyāpīti dars'ayitumāha -and he quotes sūtra IV. iii. 8 sādṛśyāllakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ He says: bahūni hi nibandhanāni lakṣaṇāyām tatra sādṛs'yāllakṣaṇā vakroktirasāviti Thus he knows a variety of lakṣaṇās but chooses only one based on similarity as the germ for vakrokti. The illustration cited is 'janmaphūmiḥ'. Vāmana says: tadevāsabhyārthāntaram lākṣaṇikenāsabhyenārthenānvitam padaṁ lakṣitam yathā janmabhūmiḥ iti. Vāmana adds that here this word viz-janmabhūmiḥ means the female organ only secondarily and not by the power of expression-taddhi lakṣaṇayā guhyārtham na svas'aktyā iti

He quotes an illustration in which 'unmīlana' and 'nimīlana' i e. opening and closing, which are the qualities of eye are superimposed on kamala and kairava, through similarity, and secondarily mean the blossoming and fading of the respective flowers ('sādṛsyāt vikāsasaṁkochau lakṣayataḥ'-). He cites some more illustrations to the same effect and adds: ityevamādisu lakṣaṇārtho nirūpyate iti lakṣaṇāyāmca jhaṭiti arthapratipattikṣamatvaṁ rahasyamācakṣata iti The secret of lakṣaṇā lies in an immediate gathering of the sense He says that lakṣaṇā based on something else than similarity does not make for vaktrokti-asādṛsyanibandhanā tu lakṣaṇā na vakroktiḥ.

In at IV. iii 9, he defines utprekṣā, the source of charm is adhyavasāna which is neither adhyāropa as in case of rūpaka, nor lakṣaṇā as in case of vakrokti Says he na punaradhyāropo lakṣaṇā vā.

At v. i 15, he discusses the topic of words that can or cannot be used in poetry i e. those that are prayojya or aprayojya He says: (v. i 15) - lakṣaṇās'abdāśca, and adds: lakṣaṇāśabdās'ca atiprayuktāḥ prayoktavyāḥ. yathā dvirephaṛodara-śabdau bhramara-cakravākārthau lakṣaṇāparau. He adds that: anati-prayuktāsca na prayojyāḥ yathā dvikaḥ iti. Thus

Vāmana here refers to what is termed as rūdhımūlā lakṣaṇā later on

As already noticed by us, Vāmana does not refer to vyañjanā directly But at places, he notes certain illustrations of 'punarukta' or repitition, which are actually not 'punarktadoṣa' according to him He says that such words or such repetitions are charged with further sense This is an acceptance of the implied sense But as to how this implied sense is gathered is not made clear by Vāmana

In II ii 13 he cites certain illustrations Thus says he, "dhanurjyādhvanau dhanuhsrutirārūdheh pratipatyai' i e in case of dhanurjyādhvanau' i e in case of a sound created by a bow-string, the idea of 'dhanuh' or a bow is already gathered by the term 'jyā' or bow-string So, the use of 'dhanuh' should be termed as reduandant But says Vāmana it is not so, because the idea of, 'arohana is not gathered in the absence of the word dhanuh-na hi dhanuh śrutimantarena dhanusyārūdhā jyā dhanurjyā iti sakyam pratipattum

In II ii 14 he cites further illustration to the same effect-karṇāvataṃsasravanakuṇdalasirahsekharesu karnadinirdesah sannidheh Thus, in karnavataṃsa, karna' is meant only to help the gathering of the idea of 'sannidhi or juxtaposition In II ii 15 Vāmana says 'muktāhāras'abde muktāsabdah suddheh' i e in the word 'muktāhara', the idea of muktā or pearls is already expressed by the word 'hāra but the mentioning of muktā is not more repetition as it brings about the apprehension of purity In the same way, (II ii 16) 'puspa mala' has puspa, only to bring about the sense of 'utkarsa' or excellence He adds utkrstānan puspānam mālā iti When we come across the use of 'mala with referense to 'ratna' or 'sabda', as in 'ratnamālā or sabdamālā' the usage is said to be a secondary one-sa tāvadupacaritasya prayogah nirupapado hi mālāsabdah pusparacanāvisesameva abhidhatte iti In the same way the word 'kari' in karikalabha' is not reduncant as it

brings about the apprehension of 'tadrupya' or similarity Vāmana says karikalabhasabde karisabdah kalabhenaiva gatārthah prayujyate, tadrūpyasya pratipatyartham iti,

Thus, this type of sense is derived in certain usages. But whether it can lead us to śabdaśaktimulā vyañjana or not is not made clear by Vamana

In the third adhikarana, second adhyāya, he deals with *samādhi guna with reference to artha He defines it as—artha-drstih samādhih* 2 7 Then, he classifies artha into vyakta and suksma at III 2 9 artho vyaktah sūksmasca. In III 2 10, he says that the sūksma is also two-fold—bhavya or that which can be easily grasped and vāsaniya or which can be elicited after close application (sūksmo bhāyvo vāsaniyasca (III 2 10), and adds-suksmodvidhā bhavati bhāvyo vāsaniyasca sighranirupañāgamyo bhāvyah ekāgratāprakarṣagamyo vāsaniya iti He goes on giving illustrations for the same Now both bhāvya and vāsaniya are more subtle as compared to the vyakta or expressed Out of these two vāsaniya is more subtle Thus, we come across a clear recognition of the implied sense without however, any reference to any vrtti

III ii 15 defines kāntiguna as-diptarasatvam kāntih The illustration he supplies is purely that of śrangāra rasa But again, as to how these rasas are to be gathered, is not made clear by him In all these cases, we may feel that Vāmana comes close to vyañjanāvyāpāra

Udbhata :

In Udbhata we come across some indirect or direct references to all the three vrttis as below –

At v 60 Udbhata defines vyājastuti as–

"śabdaśaktisvabhāvena yatra nindevagamyate |
vastutastu stutih śresthā vyājastutirasau matā ||

śabdaśakti here refers to abhidhāvyāpāra

At I 11 Udbhata defines rūpaka as—

śrutyā sambandhavirahādyatpadena pandāntaram, |—
guṇavṛttipradhānena yujyate rūpakam tu tat ||

Thus, we come across a reference to both abhidhā and guṇavṛtti, as is explained by Pratihārendurāja (approximately, – the first half of the 10th cen A D De. P 74) who says śrutih nirantarārthaniṣṭhah sabdavyāpārah

tayā srutyā anupapadyamānapadāntarasambandham sat padāntaramguṇavṛttih yatrāparena padena yujyate tatra rupakatā

At II 47 Udbhata defines paryayokta wherein we come across a reference to both abhidhā and avagamana The definition runs as

paryāyoktam yadanyena prakārenabhidhiyate |
vācyavācakavṛttibhyam sunyenāvagamātmanā ||

Vācakavṛtti is abhidhā and avagamana may be vyañjanā. The commentators viz Pratihārendurāja, the author of Laghuvṛtti and the Vivṛtikāra, identified as Rājānaka Tilaka by the editor, explain the definition of paryāyokta as follows

Pratihārendurāja explains -vācakasya abhidayakasya svasabdasya vṛttih vyaparo vacyarthapratyāyanam vacyasya tvabhidheyasya vyapāro vacyantarena sahakaṅksāsannidhiyos mahatmyātsamsargagamanam yogyatā evamvidhasca yo vācyavācakayorvyapāratamanrarenāpi prakarantarena arthasāmarthyatmanā avagamasvabhāvena yadavagamyate tat paryāyena svakañthanabhihitamapi sāntarena sabdavyaparenavagamyamanatvāt paryāyoktam vastu

Vivṛtikāra also explains as vācakavṛttirabhidhā, vacyavṛttih akānsasannidhiyogyatāvasat samsargagamanam tabhyam vinā arthasamarthyātmanā avagamasvabhāvena ya pratipadyate tat paryayenanyena rupena abhidhanam iti parāyoktam avagamavyāpārena kathamabhidhānamiti cet paryayoktatvamaprastutaprasamsavyakhyāne vaksyāmah

Thus according to the commentors, Udbhata here seems to refer to vācakavṛtti, i e abhidhā, vācyavṛtti or tātparya and avagamana i e possibly vyañjana

Rudrata

In Rudrata, we do not come across any direct reference to abhidha However, at VI 3, he difines 'asamartha', a fault, as

"padamidamasamarthaṃ syādvācakamarthasya na ca vaktum |
tam saknoti tirobhitatsamarthyam nimittena ||

'asamartha' occurs when a particular word, which is normally expressive of a particular sense, becomes incapable of doing so on account of its power of expression being eclipsed by some other factors Herein, we may read an ind rect reference to abhidhā In VI 5 and 6, in the same context, Rudrata describes another variety of asamartha where in a particular meaning, though normal to a particular word and yet not usually read from it, is read, e g √han in the sense of 'going' VI 6 says that –

sabdapravṛttihetau satyamapyasamarthameva rudhibalat |
yaugikamarthavis'esam padam yathā vāridhan jalabhrt ||

i e 'asamartha' also happens when ordinarily a word is capable of conveying a sense on the strength of etymology but is rendere incapable to convey it on account of rudhi or usage e g jalabhrt cannot be used for varidhi

The maxim vis, rūdhiryogādbaliyasi seems to be known to Rudrata also and he thus knows a varity of abhidhartha

In VI.11, he defines apratita, a fault, as,

yuktyā vakti tamarthaṃ na ca rūḍhaṃ yatra yadabhidhānatayā |
dvedha tadaprytitam saṃs'ayavadasaṃs'ayaṃ ca padam ||

Thus, Rudrata mentions abhidhānatayā rūdhamartham i e a meaning fixed by the power of abhidhā VI 12 gives an

illustration of apratita involving doubt e g himabā etc VI. 13. gives an illustration of apratitadosa having no doubt asams' ayam–e g as'vayosinmukhārcismān for vadavānala Rudrata says that here this particular word is used for the normally used yaugika or rūdha words. Here again we come across a reference to yaugika and rūdha s'abdas, which may lead to abhidhā

[padamaparamapratitam yadyaugikarūdhas'abdaparyāyaih kalpitamarthe tasminyathās'vayosinmukhārcişmān || iv 13]

At VII 1, also Rudrata seems to refer to abhidhārtha very clearly when he says

arthah punarabhidhāvānpravartate
yasya vācakah s'abdah |
tasya bhavanti dravyam gunah kriyā
jātiriti bhedāh ||

We do not come across any reference to gunavrtti or laksanā in Rudrata except at VII. 58 and here *too indirectly*, when he illustrates viparita anumāna The anumāna is said to be viparita because the sādhya is described as following the sādh akas ! The illustration cited is :

vacanamupacāragarbham dūrādudgamanamāsanam sakalam|
idamadya mayi tathā te yathāsi nunam priye kupitā ||

Herein 'vacana' is said to be 'upacāragarbha' Thus, there is an indirect mention of 'upacāra'

At VII 38, Rudrata defines bhāva as :

yasya vikārah prabhavannapratibaddhena hetunā yena |
gamayati tadabhiprāyam tatpratibandham ca bhāvosau ||

The illustration is

grāmatarunam tarunyā navavañjulamañjarisanāthakaram
pas'yantyā bhavati muhurnitarām malinā mukhacchāyā ||

Namisādhu explains that the bhāva of the lady *is* manifested here This is a case of an implied sense.

vyākhyātum bhattodbhato babhāṣe-śabdānāmabhidhānamabhidhāvyāpāro mukhyo guṇavṛttiśca iti. vāmano'pi sādṛś'ā yāllakṣaṇā vakroktih iti. manākspṛṣṭa iti. taistāvad dhvanidiguṇmilitā yathālikhitapāṭhakaistu svarūpavivekam kartumas'aknuvadbhih tatsvarūpaviveko na kṛtah, pratyutopālabhyate, abhagnanārikelavat yathās'ruta tadgranthodgrahaṇamātrena iti. (Locana)

Ruyyaka, in the beginning of his work alaṃkārasarvasva says,

iha hi tāvad bhāmahodbhataprabhṛtayas'cirantanālaṃkārakārāh pratiyamānamartham vācyopaskāritayālaṃkārapakṣanikṣiptaṃ manyante. tathāhi paryāyoktā prastutapras'aṃsāsamāsoktyākṣepavyājastutyupameyopamānanvayādau vastumātraṃ gamyamānaṃ vācyo paskārakatvena, "svasidhaye parākṣeph parārtham svasamarpanam" yathāyogaṃ dvividhayā bhangyā pratipāditam taih

rudratenapi bhāvālaṅkāro dvidhaivoktah, rūpakadipakāpahnutitulyayogitādāvupamālamkāro vācyopaskāritvenoktah. rasavatpreyaūrjasviprabhṛtau tu rasabhāvādirvācyas'obhāhetutvenoktāḥ utpreksā tu svayameva pratiyamānā kathitā. tadittham trividhamapi pratiyamānamalaṃkāratayā prakhyāpitameva,

vāmanena tu sādṛs'yanibandhanayā lakṣanayā vakrokty alaṃkāratvaṃ bruvatā kas'cid dhvanibhedo'laṃkāratayaivoktah

So also, Jagannātha in his Rasagaṅgādhara (pp. 555) says :

idam tu bodhyam. dhvanikārātprācīnairbhāmahodbhataprabhṛtibhih svagranthesu kutrāpi dhvaniguṇibhūtavyaṅgyādis'abdā na prayuktāh iti etāvataiva tairdhvanyādayo na svīkriyante ityādhunikānāṃ vācoyuktirayuktaiva, yatah samasoktivyājastutyaprastutapras'aṃsādyalamkāranirūpane kiyanto'pi guṇibhūtavyaṅgyabhedāstairapi nirūpitāh . aparas'ca sarvopi vyaṅgyaprapañcahparyāyoktakukṣau nikṣiptah na hyanubhavasiddho'rtho bālenāpyapahnotuṃ s'akyate dhvanyādipadaih paraṃ vyavahāro na kṛtaḥ tena na hyetāvatānaṅgīkāro bhavati

But here, we might demur The presence of vyanjanā or *suggested sense can be traced in all poetry beginning from the* Rv It is, however, quite a different thing to discover in poets and critics any conscious understanding of vyanjanā So, the discussion that follows, of the alamkāras and gunas in which vyañjanā seems to be subsumed, should not be taken as proof that the idea of vyanjanā or dhvani had dawned upon *the minds of Bhāmaha, Dandin etc They might* or might not have had the understanding of vyañjanā as a distinct function of a word

Bhāmaha

We *will begin with* Bhāmaha In *II 85* Bhāmaha's general outlook towards all the alamkāras becomes evident when he says,

saisā sarvaiva vakroktih, anayārtho vibhavyate |
yatno 'syām kavinā kāryah, ko'lamkāro'nayā vinā ||

Thus for Bhāmaha, atis'ayokti or vakrokti lies at the root of all the alamkāras, i e it is implied in all the alamkāras in one way or the other. At *I 30 also*, Bhāmaha asserts that this vakrokti *should* be present in all poetry, whether it be a mahākāvya or just a stanza
Says Bhāmha

anibaddham punargathā s'lokamatrādi tatpunah |
yuktam vakrasvabhāvoktyā sarvamevaitadisyate ||

Thus vakrokti is omnipresent for Bhāmaha In I 34, Bhāmaha is even prepared to reject the *so called vaidarbha* kāvya, if it *is* bereft of the element of vakrokti

I 34—apuṣṭārtham avakrokti prasannam ṛju komalam |
bhinnam geyamivedam tu kevalam s'rutipes'alam ||

Bhāmaha very clearly affirms the use of only 'vakra' word and sense in poetry when he says at I 36 that—

na nitāntādimātrena jāyate cārutā girām |
vakrābhidheyas'abdoktiriṣṭā vācamalamkṛtih . |

Thus word and sense, charged with the element of vakratā alone make for poetry

Parallelism between Bhamaha and Dandin

It will be interesting to note incidentally, that Dandin *also, like Bhāmaha, holds that atis'ayokti is at the root of all other figures of sense*

II 214 defines atis'ayokti as,

vivakṣā ya vis eṣasya lokasīmātivartini |
asāvatis ayoktih syadalamkārottamā yathā ||

Thus atis'ayokti, the best of alamkāras, consists of a statement which tends to describe the matter in hand in an uncommon way II *215* cites an *illustration* in which *ladies* who are secretly going to meet their lovers, are described as non-descernible in the moon-light on account of their putting on garlands of mallikā flowers and silk garments and having their bodies besmeared *with sendal paste II 216 says that in the above illustration there is an implied hyperbolic* description of the excellence of the moon-light-candrātapasya bāhulyam uktamutkarṣavattayā In II 217, there is an element of doubt implied This doubt, however, is not genuine but āharya

(Dandin says II 216b

sas'mayātis'ayādinam vyaktyai kiñcinnidars'yate,)

At II 219 the three worlds are described as enormously big enough to contain the glory of a king which is boundless The idea of the praise of a king is only implied

At II 220 Dandin says that this figure is the essence of all other figures of speech and that this sort of an expression is praised by all the masters of speech -says he,

alamkārāntarānāmapyekamāhuh parāyaṇam,
vāgis'amahitāmuktimimāmatis'ayāhvayām ||

Thus both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin seem to have an identical attitude towards alamkāras in the sense that both of them to have been struck not by the mere outward form of any alamkāra as such, but by something else that lies at the root of all the alamkāras This element, they term as vakrokti or atis'ayokti. We will find the element of avagamana or pratīyamānatā i e. implied sense in some of the figures described by them It may be noted here incidentally, that it is in this element of implied sense that the charm or camatkāra of the particular alamkāra lies

Bhāmaha's Treatment of the Arthālaṃkāras

Now, we proceed with Bhāmaha's treatment of the figures of sense.

Bhāmaha begins with rupaka Rupaka occurs when in consideration of the similarity in qualities, the upameya is identified with the upamāna (II 22) Thus, it is clear that the idea of similarity is implied in rūpaka, that is to say, upamā is implied in rūpaka At II 24 Bhamaha describes ekades'avivarti rupaka and it is already clear that this involves some implied element II 25 describes Dipaka as three-fold The element of upamā is implied in all the varieties of dīpaka as illustrated by Bhāmaha (II, 27, 28, 29) as follows

samānavastunyāsena prativastūpamocyate |
yathevānabhidhāne'pi guṇasāmyapratītitah ||
(Kāvyālaṃkāra II 34)

Thus, there is prativastupamā when, even in the absense of words such as yathā, vā, etc which are directly expressive of upamā, we have the apprehension of the similarity of qualities. So, in this figure also, the idea of similarity seems to be implied only

At II 68 ākṣepa is defined as,
-pratiṣedha iveṣṭasya yo vis'eṣābhidhitsayā |
ākṣepa iti taṃ santah saṃsanti dvividhaṃ yathā ||

Ākṣepa occurs when there is an apparent denial only with a view to convey some further sense-vis'esābhidhitsayā. Thus, the additional sense is implied only

II 75 defines vyatireka as,

upamānavato'rthasya yadvis'esanidars'anam |
vyatirekam tamicchanti visesāpadanādyathā ||

Thus vyatireka has also an element of similarity implied in it In the same way in vibhāvana, kāranāntarakalpanā is always implied (II 77, 78)

II 80 defines samāsokti as,

yatrokte gamyate'nyo'rthastatsamānavis'esanaih |
sā samāsoktiruddistā samksiptārthatayā yathā ||

Samsokti occurs when on the narration of a particular sense, another sense having similar qualities is implied There is a clear recognition of an implied sense here

After defining atis'ayokti at II 81, Bhamaha, as noted earlier, wants it to remain present in all the alamkaras The poets should be vigilant in bringing forth this element in kāvya as such Anything bereft of this element of atis'aya is only vārtā or a bare statement of fact and is no poetry Thus Bhāmaha rejects hetu, sūkṣma, and les'a as they have no element of vakrokti in them

II 86-hetus'ca suksmo les o tha nālamkāratayā matāh |
samudāyābhidhānasya vakroktyanabhidhānatah ||

II 91 defines utpreksā as,

'avivaksitasāmānyā kinciccopamayā saha |
atadgunakriyāyogādutpreksātis'ayānvitā ||

Thus utpreksā has no sāmānya i e idea of similarity as its purport, i e. utpreksā centres round sambhāvana or probability, and not mere similarity or sādṛs'ya But, it has again some element of upamā, i e similarity is only implied In utpreksā the upameya is said to possess such quality or action that normally does not go with it Thus, it has an element of atis'aya implied in it At II 50 also Bhāmaha clearly recognises

an element of atis'aya involved in both upamā and utpreksā. Says he–

yas'cātis'ayavānarthah katham so'sambhavo matah |
istam cātis'ayārthatvam upamotpreksayoryathā ||

In the third chapter, Bhāmaha begins his treatment with the alamkāras such as preyas, rasavat and ūrjasvi We will discuss the case of these alamkāras when we deal with the treatment of rasa in earlier ālamkārikas in a separate chapter later on.

Bhāmaha defines paryāyokta at III 8 a-as, paryāyoktam yadanyena prakārenābhidhīyate, and illustrates it at III 9 Bhāmaha holds (III 9) that the idea of avoiding the possible intake of poison is impled in Krsna's speech who words it differently Thus paryāyokta has an element of implied sense. Bhāmaha does not define the figure called udātta (III. 11-12), but it follows very clearly that the idea of āsayamahattva or vibhutimahattva is only implied

Bhāmaha has a totally novel connotation of śleṣa (III 14) which occurs when there is realisation of identity of the upameya with the upamāna through a guna or quality, kriyā or action or, proper noun i e. nāmnā It differs from the rūpaka in this respect that in rūpaka there is a clear mention of both the upameya and the upamāna in different terms (III 15). Thus, an element of similarity is implied in śleṣa also.

III 21 defines apahnuti as,

apahnutirabhiṣtā ca kiñcidantargatopamā |
bhūtārthāpahnavādasyāḥ kriyate cābhidhā yathā ||
Thus it has upamā which is implied

III. 23 defines viśesokti as,

ekadeśasya vigame yā gunāntarasamsthitih |
viśeṣaprathanāyāsau vis'esoktirmatā yathā ||

The added sense, viz. that of kāranāntarakalpanā is always implied

In the same way tulyayogitā (III 27) has an element of similarity implied in it It occurs when it order to suggest *some similarity in qualities, In case of two objects, one of* which is smaller in status, both are narrated as being connected *through an identical action*

III 27–nyūnasyāpi vis'istena guṇasāmyavivakṣasya |
tulyakāryakriyāyogāt ityuktā tulyayogitā ||

III 29 defines aprāstutaprasaṃsā, wherein there is mention of a matter not in hand implying the matter in hand

III *29–adhikārādapetasya vastuno'nyasya yā stutih |*
aprastutapras aṃseti sā caivaṃ kathyate yathā ||

Vyājastuti (III 31) has apparent censure and implied praise. It is defined as

duradhikaguṇastotravyapades'ena tulyatāṃ |
kiñcidvidhitsoryā nindā vyājastutirasau yathā ||

Nidars'anā has also implied similarly, because in it, without the use of *yathā, 'iva, etc*, *through action only*, some idea is expressed III 34 defines nidarsanā as,

-kriyayaiva vis' istasya tadarthasyopadars'anāt |
jñeyā nidars'anā nāma yathevavatibhirvinā ||

In upameyopamā (III 37), the idea of the elimination of any third similar object, i e tṛtīyasadṛs'avyavaccheda is implied In sabokti also (III 39) there is implied similarity Sasamdeha is defined at III 43 as,

upamānena tattvaṃ ca bhedaṃ ca vadataḥ punah |
sasaṃdehaṃ vacaḥ stutyai sasaṃdeham viduryathā ||

Thus, the idea of the praise of upameya is implied only. III. 45 defines ananvaya

yatra tenaiva tasya syādupamānopameyatā |
asādṛs'yavivakṣātah tamityāhurananvayam ||

Ananvaya occurs when a thing is compared with one's own self, in order to suggest that it is beyond comparison,

that is to say, it is unrivalled The idea of asādrs'yavivaksā is implied only

III 47 defines utpreksāvayava having in itself the use of double-meaning words and an element of both utpreksā and rūpaka. The idea of similarity between upameya and upamāna is necessarily implied

III 53–54-define bhavikatva which is a guna with reference to a whole composition in which past and future events look as if they are present, and which rests on a meaning that is charming, elevated and uncommon and a narrative that is capable of being effectively staged and wherein the expression is not involved The definition runs as ·

III. 53–54-bhāvikatvamiti prāhuh prabandhaviṣayam gunam |
pratyaksā iva draśyante yatrārthā bhūtabhāvinah ||
citrodāttādbhutārthatvam kathāyāh svabhinitatā ||
s'abdānākulatā ceti tasya hetum pracaksate ||

Thus, bhāvika is by itself of the nature of implied only as it rests on a whole composition

Dandin

Dandin defines madhura guna at I 51–52 as a statement which is gifted with rasa or sentiment and also when there is rasa with reference to the object or vastu described. Dandin says that such a composition, padasattih, as has words that look similar when heard also are capable of conveying rasa.

I. 51–52-madhuram rasavadvāci vastunyapi rasasthitih |
yena mādyanti dhimanto mathuneva madhuvratāh ||

yayā kayācits'rutyā yat samānamanubhūyate |
tadrūpā hi padāsattih sānuprāsā rasavahā ||

In the illustration vis. (I 53)

eṣa rājā yadā lakṣmim prāptavān brāhmanapriyah |
tadā prabhṛti dharmasya lokesminnutsavo'bhavat ||

It nourishes the emotion with reference to a religious king. Thus mādhurya has a lot of implied sense.

In I. 62, after explaining mādhurya guna in s'abda or word, Dandin proceeds to explain it with reference to artha as indicated by the words . vastunyapi rasasthitih. Dandin says that though all the alaṃkāras make for rasa in sense, it is agrāmyatā or the absence of vulgarity i e. the arthagata mādhurya, which carries this burden to a greater extent. Dandin says (I.62):

kāmaṃ sarvopyalaṃkāro rasamarth enisiñcati |
tathāpyagrāmyataivainam bhāraṃ vahati bhūyasā ||

Dandin further says I. 63–64 that such statements as, kanye kāmayamānam māṃ na tvam kāmayase kathaṃ-are vulgar and make for the detriment of rasa Says he,

iti grāmyoyamarthātmā vairasyāya prakalpate |
He observes that if the same statement is modified as,
kāmaṃ kandarpacandalo mayi vāmākṣi nirdayah |
tvayi nirmatsaro distyetyagrāmyortho rasāvah ||

It becomes charged with rasa and is free from vulgar sense. This mādhurya is full of implied sense.

Dandin defines udāra guna at I. 76. as,

utkarṣavān gunah kas'cid yasminnukte pratiyate |
tadudārāhvayam tena sanāthā kāvyabapdhatih ||

Thus, udāra guna consists of a .statement which is expressed for the implication of some lofty quality; and poetry is highly dependent on it.

The illustration cited is, (I. 77).

arthinām kṛpanā dṛstih tvanmukhe patitā sakṛt |
tadavasthā punardeva nānyasya mukhamikṣate ||

Dandin adds (I. 78) that in the illustration cited as above, the excess of generosity is clearly indicated-iti tyāgasya vākyesmin utkarsah sādhu lakṣyate.

I 79 explains another variety of udāra which consists of significant adjectives such as lilāmbhuja, kridāsara, hemāngada,

etc Here also, the idea of opulence is implied

I 79–slaghyairvis'esanairyuktam udāram kais'cidisyate |
    yathā līlāmbhujakrīdāsarohemāṅgadādayah ||

I 85 defines kānti guna as,
    kāntam sarvajagatkāntam laukikārthānatikramāt |
    tacca *vārtābhidhānesu varnanasvapi drs'yate* ||

Kānta occurs when there is an absence of hyperbole i e. when things are described in a normally charming fashion and is seen both in conveying facts or in the description of objects, and is liked by all

Thus, kānti guna has a natural mode of expression and thereby implies a world of ideas as is illustrated at I 86–87 as,

    grhāni nāma tanyeva taporas'irbhavādrs'āh |
    sambhāvayani yānyeva pāvanaih padapāmsubhih ||

and also

    anayoranavadyāṅgi stanayorjrmbhamānayoh |
    avakās'o na paryāptah tava bāhulatāntare ||

In the first illustration, the praise-worthiness of the house is implied and in the second, feeling or love with reference to the heroine is implied

In samādhi guna, according to Dandin (I 93), there is superimposition of somebody else's quality on something else This is a clear instance of laksanā based on similarity which is implied

I 93 says,

    anyadharmastato' nyatra lokasīmānurodhinā |
    samyagādhiyate yatra as samādhih smrto yathā ||

I 94 is given as an illustration in point–

    kumudāni nimīlanti kamalānyunmisanti ca |
    iti netrakriyādhyāsāllabdhā tadvācinī śrtih ||

Dandin then adds that words such as nisthyuta, udgirna, vānta etc convey a charming sense when used metaphorically.

If they are used in the direct sense, they turn out to be vulgar Thus even here, we have a touch of an implied sense

I 95 says nisthyūtodgirnavāntādi gaunavrttivyapās'rayam ı
atisundaramanyatra grāmakaksām vigāhate ||

This samādhi guna, says Dandin is the quint essence of poetry and is resorted to by all poets

I 99-*tadetat kavyasarvasvam samādhirnāma yo gunah* ı
kavisārthah samagro pi tamenamanugacchati ||

Thus, in his treatment of gunas Dandin seems to cover implied sense In his treatment of the figures of sense i e *arthālamkaras also, he seems to have incorporated implied* sense We have already noted earlier his general attitude towards alamkāras We will not discuss all the alamkāras such as rupaka, dipaka, apahnuti, vyājastuti, aprastutaprasamsā, tulyayogitā, paryāyoktam, ākṣepa, etc, which have implied element as explained earlier when we dealt with Bhāmaha But, Dandin has given a good many varieties of upamā and almost all of them contain an implied sense

Dandin defines upamā at II 14 as,

yathakathañcit sādrs'yam yatrodbhūtam pratiyate |
upamā nāma sā tasyāh prapañco yam pradars'yate ||

Thus, upama occurs when similarity is gathered in anyway yathākathañcit-i e in a directly expressed fashion or an implied way Most of the varieties of upamā as explained by Dandin have implied similarity Thus, vastūpamā (II 16) has the common quality implied only (pratiyamānaikadharmā) Viparyāsopamā has upamāna in place of upameya and vice versa. Thus it implies the superiority of the upameya (II, 17) Anyonyopamā (II 19) is the same as upameyopamā having the idea of trtiyasadrsa,-vyavacheda-or elimination of a third possible similar object-as implied only Niyamopamā (II 19) has the idea of restriction implied when the face is described as similar to the lotus alone

In atis ayopamā also (II 22), in the absence of any *upamavācaka*, the similarity is only implied II 23 gives utpreksitopama and has an element of utpreksa implied in it Adbhutopamā (II 24) which is the same as what later alam karikas recognise as yadyarthātis ayokti has implied similarity Mohopama (II 25) has moha or bhrānti implied Sams ayopama (II 26) is the same as sasamdeha of the later alamkarikas having implied similarity Nirnayopama (II 27) is what Vis'vanātha recognises as nis'cayalamkara having implied comparison II 30 gives nindopama which has the same quality of implied sense Similar is the case with pras am opama (II 31), acikhyasopamā (II 32) virodhopamā (II 33 pratisedhopama (II 34) catupamā (II 35) tattvakhyānopama (II 36) asādha ranopama (II 37) asambhavitopama (II 39) bahupama (II 40), vikriyopama (II 41) etc etc

Prativastūpama (II 46) is-vastuktā cidupanyasya nyasanat
tatsadharmanah
samyapratitirastiti prativastupama yatha ||

There is implied comparison between the statements

Tulyayogopamā (II 48) also has the same charm of implied sense

Thus we see that in Dandin also, there is recognition of pratiyamāna or implied sense

Vamana

For Vāmana the position is all the more clear for he recognises upama as the basis of all the alamkāras and all the rest are termed by him as upamaprapañca His kāntiguna is defined as diptarasatvam-i e one in which rasas are aroused This clearly bears the stamp of an implied sense His samadhi is defined as arthadrstih i e a perception of the sense (III 2 7) Vāmana goes on classifying artha as vyakta and suksma(III 2 9) and the latter again as bhāvya or that which is elicited easily and vāsanīya or that which is elicited only after concentration

(III. 2.10). The illustrations of both these varieties contain an implied sense.

Udbhaṭa

Udbhata in his K.S S. practically follows the same pattern as laid down by Bhāmaha and seems to incorporate the elment of implied sense in the same way as seen in Bhāmaha Pratihārendurāja (first half of the 10 cen. A.D. De. P. 74. ibid) wants us to believe that Udbhata has knowingly incorporated dhvani under alamkāras when he says:

-kais'cit sahṛdayaih dhvanirnāma vyañjakatvabhedātmā kāvya-dharmo'bhihitah |
sa kasmādiha nopadistah ? ucyate, eṣvevālamkāresvantarbhāvāt ||

Rudraṭa

Rudrata also can be safely imagined to have touched the element of implied sense with reference to all the alamkāras such as rupaka, dipaka, paryāyokta etc. He defines and illustrates the two-fold bhāva also in VII. 38–41, which contains an implied sense. He has an elaborate treatment of rasa but is silent about any theoretical discussion of rasa-realisation.

PART II

CHAPTER VII

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMEOT OF RASA IN SANSKRIT POETICS

(I) Rasa in

(i) The Vedas

(ii) The Nirukta

and (iii) Bṛhaddevatā

'Rasa' in the Vedas

'Rasa is a word of frequent occurrence in Vedic and classical sanskrit literature (1). It is well-known that rasa is derived from the √ras which occurs in the pāṇinīya dhātupātha and is explained as having the senses of 'to make sound' 'to taste' and 'to be oily; (ras śabde (bhāvdi), and rasa āsvādanasnehanayoḥ (curādi).[1]

The root √ras has thus three different meanings. In the first sense it is associated with the river rasā according to Yāska (Nirukta. 11.25-rasā nadī bhavati, rasteḥ śabdakarmaṇaḥ). The word rasā is used as a name of a particular river or sometimes a river in general. One may say that here too the word may be connected to the sense of being liquid. Rasa in the sense of something liquid is associated with many things like juice or the sap of plants or the milk of the cow or the virile semen of the body etc. In fact we find lexicons giving all these various meanings. Amara for example says:

rūpaṃ śabdo gandharasasparśā'ścaviṣayā amī. (line 291, and also śṛṅgārādau viṣe vīrye guṇe rāge drave rasaḥ.

(line 2789)

and also the six fold tastes (line 295)

Hemacandra adds the following senses

gṛhe, *dhātau i e humours of the body*, *pārade i e mercury*, premṇi, bhāve, ātmani, and also in the sense of sukha

Thus the word rasa has a very interesting semantic history We are here interested in finding out how the physical sense of the word gets transmuted into the experience of *aesthetic pleasure or the flavour of a sentiment or emotion*

[In the Vedic saṃhitās, as we shall see below, we find not only the physical sense of something liquid but also the liquid (drava) or the sap that is in plants, animals etc, and also the juice *that can be pressed out or extracted* In *the later sense of the word kāvyarasa or nāṭyarasa, we do not find* any clear reference But in one context, we do find it associated with things literary] Let us therefore, take a summary view *of the different meanings of rasa, first in the vedic* saṃhitas

In the Rv the word occurs for about fifty-one times Rasā occurs for about eleven times The Yv has nineteen and *two occurrences of the words rasa and rasā respectively* The Av has about thirty eight occurrences (1). In the later saṃhitas some of the mantras are repeated from the Rv

Rasā is used for a river, at times a particular river, or a flow in general At Rv. VIII 49 2 Vālakhilya sukta) we have rasāḥ explained by the commentator as 'Jalāni'. Waters are termed as *the rasas of mountains Here, we see that* the waters of the springs that flow from the mountains are regarded as the sap of the mountains which is extracted from them by Indra and becomes water The mantra runs as

satānīkeva pra jigāti dhuṣṇuyā hanti vṛtrā'ni dāśuṣe |
girerīva pra rasa' pinvire datrāni purubhojasaḥ ||

Thus, we have the double sense of the extracted sap and water

At.Yv. 9. 3–we have apāṃ rasah and also apāṃ rasasya yo rasah These are explained by both Uvata and Mahidhara as vayu and prajāpati respectively. We may add that here the word rasa seems to carry the sense of essence of soul and consequently the presiding deity. The mantra reads as below:

apā'ṃ rasamúdvayasaṃ sū'rye sántam samā'hitam |
apām rásasya yo rasastám vo gṛhnāmyuttamámupayāma
gṛhītósíndrāya tvā júṣtam gṛhṇāmyeṣá te yoniríndrāya tvā
juṣṭatamam ||

The same sense is repeated at Yv 19 44, 20 22 and 31.17.

Then, thirdly, we have rasa in the sense of the rasa of herbs. This may be in form of an extracted juice as in case of some, or may be just sap in the some plant

In the IX mandala of the Rv., it is mostly to be seen in these senses e g at Rv. IX 66—

táṃ gobhirvr'ṣaṇaṃ rásaṃ mádāya devavītaye |
sutáṃ bharāya sáṃ sṛja || (rasa is extracted juice),

and also RV. IX. 23. 5.

–so'mo arṣati dharnasirdadhāna indriyáṃ rasáṃ |
suvī'ro abhis'astipā'h ||

'rasa' means 'sap'.

Fourthly we have rasa in the sense of the tastes. Rv. I. 187. 4, 5 have 'rasāh' explained by Sāyana as the six tastes such as, sweet, sour, etc. Rasāh i e. tastes lateron become in the dars'anas the sense-quality of taste.

Rv. I. 187. 4 is

táva tyé pito rásā rájāṃsyánu vi'ṣṭhitāh. |
dívi' vā'ta iva s'ritā'h||

So also Yv. 39.4 has rasa in the same sense and is explained by Mahidhara as 'svādutvam.'

Yv. 39.4–is,

R. 13.

mánasah kā mamā kūlim vācaḥ satyamas ıya ı
pas ū nām rupáma nnasya ra so yásah śrih s rayatāmma yı svā'hā ||

Fifthly, we have rasa with reference to the animals such as a cow horse etc With reference to the cow it means milk as at Rv I 37 5 which runs as–

pra saṃsā gosvaghnyam krilam yacchardho marutam
jambhe rasasya vavrdhe ı
rasasyagoksıratupasya (Sāyana)

At Rv VII 104 10 we have rasa with reference to food, horses cows and body Now what exactly is the meaning of rasa in all these cases is not made clear by Sayana, but it may mean essence The mantra runs as

yo no rasaṃ d psati pitvo agne yo as'vānaṃ yo gavāṃ yastanū nām |
ripu h stenah steyakr ddabhrametu nı sa hıyatām tanvā ta na ca ||

Rasa of the serpants obviously means poison as at Av V 13 2 and 3

At V 13 2 is,
yát te ápodakaṃ visáṃ tát te eta svagrabham ı
gṛhnā mi té madhyamámuttamam rasamutā vamám bhıyásā nes adā du te ||

Av IV 27 3 has rasa of the horse It is explained as *speed of the horse by the commentator Th s also may be the* sense in Rv VII 104 10 as quoted above

Sixthly, we have *rasa* of the human body as seen in Rv VII 104 10 above Rv I 105 2 has rasa in the sense of virile semen It runs as

árthamıdvā u arthına ā jāyā yuvate pátim ı
tuñjā te vr snyam páyah parida ya rásam duhe vittáṃ me asyá rodası ||

We also come across occurrences in which 'rasa appears as an independent entity e g rasah, used in plural, means tastes

as explained by Sayana (Rv I 187 4 and 5, see above) In the Yajurveda also, one occurrence is noteworthy Yv 18 9 reads as below

ūrk ca me sunr tā ca me páyas'ca me rásas'ca me ghrtam ca me mádhu ca me ságdhis'ca me sápitis'ca me krsis ca me jaitram ca me au dbhidyam ca me yajñéna kalpantam |

In the above quoted mantra, several things are asked for through sacrifice The occurrence of rasah between 'payah' and 'grtam may signify the juice of something edible or drinkable Here, it may be noted however, that rasa is mentioned by itself and not as of something It may also be noted that it figures along with urj sunrta, and payas, wherein urja may mean strength or vigour either of speech or body Sunrta may mean the sweet and true speech and payas may mean any fluid or juice or vital spirit, power etc In this context rasa may also be taken in a similar connotation as the best or finest or prime part of anything, essence, etc It might also mean taste or charm, pleasure delight

Av x 8 44 has 'rasena trptah' This is a mystic hymn and rasa may mean the essence of the universe The mantra runs as–

akamo dhi re amr tah svayambhū rásenā trpto na ku tas' cano nah |
táme vávidva n na bibhaya mrtyórātma nam dhi ramajáram yuvānam ||

Here it may be noted that the sense of satisfaction or fulfilment or even ecstasy is associated with rasa rasa as causing fulfilment or joy The eighth interesting use of rasa is seen at Rv IX 67 31 and 32 which run as below

yáh pavamaniradhyetyr sibhih sámbhrtam rásam |
sárvam sá putámas'nati svaditám matarisvana ||

and also

pāvamani ryo adhyetyr sibhih sámbhrtam rásam —
tasmai sarasvati duhe ksirám sarpimádhudakám ||

Sāyana explains rasam as vedarasabhūtam sāram sūktasamgham in the first quotation, and as vedasāram sūktasamgham in the next one. This is applied to the pāvamāni sūktas which are studied by the rsis. It is possible here to see a meaning similar to the later meaning in kāvyarasa i.e. essence causing joy.

Lastly, it will be interesting to note which feelings are associated with rasa. Usually we come across the qualities of exhilaration, joy-giving, taste, flavour etc.

Rv. IX. 66 as quoted above speaks of the quality of exhilaration caused by rasa-'madāya'

Rv IX 97 14 has,—

rasā'yyah páyasā pinvamānā irájannesi mádhumanta-
mamsu'm |
pávamānaḥ santanímesi kṛnvánnídrāya soma
parisicyámānah ||

rasāyyah is āsvādyah i.e. tasteful, having flavour etc.

The same context associates rasa as causing joy, exhitaration, ecstasy or intoxication. Thus rasa is said to be 'madirah' at Rv IX 96. 21-as below .

pávasvendo pávamāno máhobhih kánikradatpári
vā'rānyarsa |
kri'lancamvorā' vis'a pūyámāna índram te ráso madiro
mamattu ||

Thus in the Vedas, we get rasa not only in the physical sense but we find the qualities of joy-giving, tastefulness exhilaration, being the essence of the vedas, being the essence of the universe, etc. also attached to rasa Thus rasa in the vedas becomes an object of relish, a joy-giving essence. These senses make it very easy for the aesthetes to utilise the word for the aesthetic flavour of sentiments and emotions as found in literature.

Here we may refer to that famous verse of the Nā Śa (Ch I vs 17) whose purpose is to show relationship of the natyaveda with the other vedas and thereby give it vedic prestige Taken in this light one may not bother oneself with finding any real basis for the statement The verse runs as below

jagrāha pāthyaṃ ṛgvedād
sāmabhyo gītameva ca ı
yajurvedādabhinayān
rasānātharvanādapi (NS I 17)

It is however, possible to find some connection with th vedas without streaching the meaning too far e g the matr of the Rv are essentially pāthya i e recitable This accordi to Abhinavaguptapāda is due to the trisvara character (i udātta anudātta and svarita) of the ṛgvedic mantras Th point has been elaborated by Bharata in the chapters vāgabhinaya (Ch XVI G O S Ed) The relation of g with the sāmans of the samaveda is obvious Yv is Abhinava says ādhvaryakarmapradhāna i e in the Yv activities of the adhvaryu such as movement towards right etc are predominant Essentially the movements of different parts of the body have a particular significanc the different ritual activities So the abhinayas are re to the Yv As to the relation of the rasas with the hy of the Av we do not find any obvious relationship text of the abhinavabhāratī on this point, wh ch is quot below is not quite clear It runs as ātharvaṇavede tu s ā māraṇādikarmasu naṭasyeva tasyartvijah prastudavaisunād bhavānām prajās atrprabhṛtinavadhānagrahanadinā lohito dernepathyasya tesu tesu ca karmasu vis istaprayatnapurus padymāno vastambbā tmanah sattvasya saṃbhavāt tato b ānāmagrahanam vacikastvabhinayah purvamevoktah āṇyavibhavānāṃ dhṛtipramodādivyabhicārinām ca para satāṃ samāharaṇam praldhānamiti vibhavadisāmagrītū makacarvaṇāsambhavah iti tatastadgrahanamuktamiti (A Nā sā I 17 G O S Ed II)

The idea seems to be that priests in the various rituals of Av. such as those of śāntikarma, māranakarma etc put on costumes consisting of red turban and such other things. Through anubhāvas they express certain feelings. There is a sort of mental avastambha or resoluteness brought about by special efforts, and therefore there is the exhibition of such a sattva or mental disposition. According to Abhinava, this seems to be the connection of rasas with Av. One may imagine a scene in which one of such magical ritual is performed when everybody would be tense with emotion pertaining to a particular act Abhinava seems to have taken some such performance of the atharvana ritual as a source of emotional ecstasy in rasa.

We have seen before that though the word rasa occurs at several places in the Av., we have no clear case of the later meaning of nātyarasa or kāvyarasa. From another point of view, however, we may say that several hymns of the Av. taken by themselves are impressive love lyrics. The number of such hymns is about thirty three.

[Av. I. 34; II. 3; VI. 8; III 25, VI. 8,9, 82, 89, 102, 130, 131, 132, 139 VII. 36 (37), 37 (38), 38 (39) etc.]

A few lines from these may be quoted below : e g.
Av. VI. 8 :

yáthā vṛksám li'bujā samantáṃ parisasvajé |
evā' pa'ri svajasva mā'ṃ yathā kāmi'ny'aso yáthā mánnā'pagā' ásah ||

and also,

yáthā suparṇáh prapátan paksáu nihánti bhūbhyām |
evā' níhanmi te máno yáthā mā'ṃ kāmínya'so yáthā mánnā'pagā ásah ||

and also

yáthāmé dyā'vāpṛthivī' sadyáḥ paryéti sū'ryah |
evā' pā'ryemi te máno yathā mā'ṃ kāmínyaso yáthā mánnā'pagā aśah ||

(1) As the creeper embraces the tree on all sides, thus do thou embrace me, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me !

(2) As the eagle when he flies forth presses his wings against the earth, thus do I fasten down thy mind, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me.

(3) As the Sun day by day goes about this heaven and earth, thus do I go about thy mind, so that thou, woman shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me. (Translation-Maurice Bloomfield-Hymns of the Av. SBE. Vol. XLII.)

Av. VI 131 is a charm to arouse the passionate love of a man e. g.

Av. VI. 131.3. is,

yád dhā'vasi triyojanáṃ pañcāyojana'maś' vinam ।

tatastváṃ punarā'yāsi putrā'nāṃ na asah pitā ॥

"If thou dost run three leagues away (or even) five leagues, the distance coursed by a horseman, from there thou shall again return, shall be the father of our sons !"

(Translation-Bloomfiled)

The same note of a passionate woman's longing is heard also in AV. VI. 132. We quote the first mantra that runs as:

yám devā'h smarámásiñcannapsvantah s'ós'ucānaṃ sahā'dhyā' ।

táṃ te tapāmi várunasya dhármaṇā ॥

"Love's consuming longing, together with yearning, which the gods have poured into the waters, that do I kindle for thee by the law of Varuna."

(Translation-Bloomfield)

Av. VII. 36 is a love-charm spoken by a bridal couple. It runs as :

akṣyaú nau mádhusaṃkās'e ánīkaṃ naú samārjanan ।

antáh kṛnuṣva mā'ṃ hṛdi' mána innau sahā'sati ॥

"The eyes of us two shine like honey, our foreheads gleam like ointment. Place me within thy heart; may one mind be in common to us both !

(Translation-Bloomfield).

And aslo, AV VII. 37.

abhi' tvā manujātena dádhāmi ma'ma vā'sasā ।
yáthāso n áma ke'valo nányā'sām kirtáyās'cana' ॥

"I envelope thee in my garment that was produced by Manu (the first man), that thou shalt be mine alone, shalt not even discourse of other women!" (Tanslation-Bloomfield).

Instances can be multiplied. It should be noted that scholars are in agreement when they say that the hymns, their ritualistic application apart, should be taken as individual places viewed in this light, and away from the ritualistic background, the above quoted instances can serve as beautiful love lyrics. They become the passionate expressions of love, i e. s'ṛṅgārarasa primarily in its vipralambha aspect (e g Av. VI. 8) There are a few hymns in the Rv. such as the dialogues of Purūravas and Urvaśī, Yama and Yamī, etc. which contain such passionate expressions. But comparatively speaking the Av has more of them. Other bhāvas or feelings such as those of bhaya, utsāha, śoka also can be found in several other hymns of the Av. One may say, therefore, that the attempt to relate the later kāvya and nāṭya rasas to Av. is not unjustified.

['Rasa' in the Upaniṣads .

We come across several occurrences of the word rasa or the different forms of the root √ras in the Upaniṣads. Primarily they are to be seen in two or three different senses. The meaning of a liquid seems to be common to all. In the objects of five sense-organs, that which is gathered by the tongue is called 'rasa'.] We come across this sense in the Prasnopanisad (4.8) which says : rasas'ca rasayitavyam, i e. 'when there is taste, it is to be tasted.'] So also in the Bṛh,

Up-sa yathā saindhavaghanónantaro'-bāhyah kṛtsno rasaghana eva. (4 5 13)- 'just as a piece of saindhava salt has nothing like the internal or the external, but the whole of it is full of taste' In the above-mentioned occurrences rasa is seen in the sense of taste In the Pras'nopanisad (1 4,) esa hi dṛṣṭā. rasayitā-, the word rasayitā is in the sense of one who tastes There are many more occurrences to this effect. In the Mundaka Upanisad,-atas'ca sarva osadhayo rasas'ca (2 1 9), we have rasa in the sense of 'sap'

Then still further, rasa is seen in the sense of the juices of the trees out of which honey is formed, as in the Chāndogya Upanisad (6 9 1)

> yathā somya madhu madhkṛto nististhanti |
> nānātyayānāṃ vṛksānāṃ rasān samavahāramekatāṃ
> rasaṃ gamayati ||

Then, we come across more and more occurrences in the sense of 'essence of things e g in the Taittiriyopanisad (1 12) esa bhutānāṃ prthivi rasah, pṛthivyā āpo rasah apsāmosadhayo rasah osadhināṃ puruso rasah purusasya vāgrasah vāca rgrasah ṛcah sāma rasah samno udgitho rasah ||

Now, it may be noted that along with the sense of 'essence', there seems to be other subtle shades of meanings also with reference to rasa in the above quotation It should be noted that here, the number of rasas is eight This is rendered clear in the sentence that follows-sa esa rasānam rasatamah paramah parardhyo stamo yadudgithah, i e out of these, the udgitha is the highesth and the eighth rasa Thus the eighth rasa is the 'parama', the highest and is udgitha Very often 'aum' in the upanisads suggests this udgitha, the rasa of sāman. We may also take note of the following from the Taittiriya Upanisad

> "asadvā idamagra āsit tato vā sadajāyata |
> tadātmānam svayamakuruta tasmāttatsukṛtamucyate ||

iti yadvai sukṛtam raso vai sah rasam hyevāyam labdhvā "nandi bhavati (2 7) i e Verily in the begining was this asat (i e jagat) From it, verily was sat born. It made itself the ātman So it is termed sukrta Verily, it is sukrta Verily it is rasa On the attainment of rasa, this, verily, becomes joyous '

In this quotation, sukṛta is rasa, and that rasa is a joy-giving factor becomes clear But with all this one cannot say that rasa occurs in the same sense in the Upanisads as in Bharata To a certain extent the use of rasa at one place in the Jaiminiya Upanisad seems to come close to the sense as seen in Bharata

We will later on observe that rasa in Bharata has in its meaning the shades of the qualities of taste essence etc, as seen in the Upanisads. We also see, as in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad that rasa is the combined taste of several ingradients like honey, which is a 'samavahāra', a combination or a collection of the juices of many trees Possibly the eight rasas in the Chandogya might have inspired the theorists to imagine eight nātyarasas also Finally, it may be observed that the above quoted utterance of the Taittiriya Upanisad, in which rasa is said to be the soul and by its attainment one is said to attain highest joy, may be taken as an original inspiration for the later theorists

'Rasa' in the Nirukta :—

In the Nirukta of Yāska (circa 700-500 B C), we come across as many as thirteen occurrences in different forms of root √ras, or the word rasa, appearing either independently or in a compound We also come across rasā in the sense of the name of a particular river or a river in general In all the occurrences, √ras, or the word rasa seems to carry the same sense as that of 'to make sound', or 'juice' etc (2)

'Rasa' in the Bṛhaddevtā :

In the Bṛhaddevatā of S'aunaka we have 'rasa' ocrurring either independently or in a compound (3). In all the occurrences the usual senses of fluid, juice, sap or sense-quality are to be seen. Rasā occurs in the sense of a river.

FOOT NOTES

(1) 'Rasa' occurs in the Rv. as below :

	According to Sayana	According to Griffith
Rv.I. 23.23 : रसेन	जलसारेण	'essence'
37.5 : रसस्य	गोक्षीररूपस्य	rain
71.5 : रसम्	पृथिव्याः सारभूत हविः	Juice
105.2 : रसम्	पुरुषस्य सारभूंत वीर्य	bliss of love
187.4 : रसाः	षड् रसाः स्वाद्वम्लादि	juices
187.5 : रसानाम्	स्वाद्वम्लादीना षण्णां	savours of juices
Rv.V.43.4 : रसम्	(सोमस्य)	Juice
44.13 : रसवत्	सारवत् (पय.)	sweat-flavoured
Rv.V.44.21 : रसः	रसनीय प्रशस्यो रसवान् रसात्मको वा (इन्दुः सोम)	Juice pleasant libations
63.8 : रसाः	सोमरसाः	'essence'
Rv.VII.104.10 : रसम्	सारम्	savoury
Rv.VIII.1.26 : रसिनः	रसवत्	savoury juice
3.1. : रसिनः	रसवतः	Juice
3.20 : रसः	रसात्मकोऽमृतमयः	essence
53.3 : रसम्	आत्मीय द्रव	juice
Rv.IX. 6 6 : रसम्	(सोमं)	,,
16.1 : रसम्	(सोमस्य)	sap
23 5 : रसम्	(सोमस्य)	juice
Rv.IX.39.5 : रसः	(सोमरसाः)	

61 17	रस	–	,,
61 18	रस	–	,,
62 6	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	,,
63 13	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	,,
64 24	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	,,
65 15	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	,,
67 8	रस	(सोममय)	,,
67 15	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	,,
67 31	रसम्	वेदरसभूत सार	essence
67 32	रस·	सूक्तसंभृघ वेदसार सूक्तसध	essence
74 9	रस	(सोमस्य)	juice
76 1	रस	(रसात्मक· सोम·)	juice
77 5	रस	(रसात्मक सोम)	,,
79 5	रसम्	सोमम्	,,
84 5	रस	रसरूप सोम	,,
85 1	रसस्य	(स्वाद्य पीत्वा)	,,
86 10	रस	रसरूप (सोम)	,,
96 21	रस	(सोमस्य)	,,
97 1	रसम्	आत्मीय रसम्	juice
97 12	रसेन	(आत्मीयेन)	,,
97 14	रसाय्य	रसेन आस्वाद्य	abounding in sweet flavours
97 57	रसेन	—	essence
109 11	रसम्	—	juice
109 20	रसेन	(गव्येन)	,,
113 3	रसम्	—	,,
113 5	रसा	—	juices
113 5	रसिन	रसवत	of juicy–
Rv X.9 2	रस	(स्वभूत)	sap
9 9	रसेन	(स्वरसेन)	moisture
76 5	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	sap

'R'asa occurs in the Rv. as below :

Rv.I.112.12	रसाम्	रसा नदी भवति रसतः शद्बकर्मणः (निरु. ११–२५) इति यास्कः, नदी (रसने)	rasa wave
Rv.IV.43.6	रसया	सारभूता भूमिः	Rasā
Rv.V.41.15	रसा	नदीनामैतत्	river
53.9	रसा	जलानि	water-brooks
Rv.VIII.49.2	रसाः	रस आज पयसि	river
72.13	रसा	नदी	rasā
Rv.IX.41.6	रसा	(नदी)	rasā
Rv.X.75.6	रसया	शद्बायमानायाः अतरिक्षे	rasā
108 1	रसायाः	नद्याः-	rasā
108 2	रसायाः	नद्याः–	rasā
121.4	रसया	रसो जल, तव्दती रसा नदी–	

Rasa occurs in the S'ukla yajurveda as below :

Yv. I 21	रसेन	पिष्टारव्यरसेन	(acc. to Uvata and Mahıdhara)
II.32.	रसाय	रसभूताय, वसन्ताय	
IX.3	रसः	रसः सारः	
IX.3	रसम्	अपां रसम्, सारम्	
XI.51	रसः	अपां सारः	
XVIII.9	रसः	तत्रत्य. सारः	
XIX.35	रसिन	रसवतः सोमस्य	
XIX.75	रसिम्	सार	
XIX.79	रसम्-	–	
XIX 83	रसम्-	–	
XIX 94	रसेन	(अपां) रसेन	
XX.22	रससे रसेन	(अ जेन)	
XX 27	रसः	(सोमरसः)	

XXV 9	रसेन	वीर्येण
XXV 12	रसया	नद्या
XXXI 17	रसात्	अद्भ्य सम्भृत.-
XXXIII 21	रसा	नदी-
XXXVI 15	रस	(सोम)
XXXIX.4	रस	(अन्नस्य) रस सार -

The Samaveda has rasa at,

Sv. I. 239	रसिन
526	रसम्
558	रस
561	रसस्य
II. 162	रसा
240	रसा
241	रस
360	रसम्
371	रसेन
381	रस
428	रसम्
578	रस
627	रस
648	रसम्
649	रसम्
650	रस
693	रसम्
743	रसिन
749	रसम्
771	रसिन
807	रसाय्य
1188	रस

The Atharvaveda has rasa as below

		Acc. to Sāyana	Acc. to Whitney
Av. I 5.2	रस	सारभूतः अस	savour

I.28.3	रसस्य	असृगादिरूपस्य शरीरगतस्य	'sap'
Av. II.4.5	रसेभ्यः	औषधिसारभूतकाष्ठेभ्यः	juices
26.4	रसम्	उदक च बलकरं रसमेव	sap
26.5	रसम्	धान्य रसम्	sap of grain
29.1	रसे	सारभूते-मन्योदके	sap of what is earthly
Av. III.13 5	रसः	(अपां रसः)	Whitney (pp 109) says the description in pada (almost makes us fancy some kind of mineral water to be had in view.)
28.4	रस	क्षीराज्यदिरूप.	sap
31.10	रसेन	औषधीना रसेन	sap of herbs
Av IV 2.5	रसाम्	नदी	rasa (The ocean is the atmospheric one and rasa, the heavenly river)
4.5	रस·	(अपा) अमृतात्मकः	sap
15 2	रसा.	उदकाना	Juices of the waters
17 3	रसस्य	—	sap (See Av 1 28 3)
27.2	रसम्	वृष्टायुदक लक्षणम	sap
27.3	रसम्	द्रव (लक्षणम)	sap of herbs
35.3	रसेन	(स्वकीयेन) (or औरन i e अन्न)	Sap
Av. V.13 2	रसम्	(poison of the serpant)	Juice
13.3	रसम्	”	”
Av. VI.16 1	रसः	(तैलात्मकः)	juice
78.1	रसेन	दधिमधुघृतादिना	essence
124.1	रसेन	उदकानः बिन्दुः स्वकीयेन रसः	”
Av.VII94.1	रसेन	(अपा)	sap
Av.VIII 4.10	रसम्	(शरीरसार)	taste

Av IX.4 5	रस॰	अपा औषदीनां	sap
Av IX.8 2	रसम्	अपा औषधीना	sap
Av X.4 18	रस	(poison)	sap
5 46	रसेन	,	,,
6 2	रसेन	,,	,,
6 22	रसेन	,,	,,
8 44	रसेन	(some ystic sense)	,,
Av XII 6 4	रस	—	sap
Av XIV 2 58	रस	—	sap
Av XVIII 1 48	रसवान्	(सोम बहुरसोपेत)	full of sap
XVIII 2 24	रसस्य	देहसम्बन्धिन रसस्य, रुधिरादे –	Sap
4 23	रसवान्	—	rich in sap
4 81	रसाय	—	sap
Av XIX 31 4	रसा (Plu)	--	savours (connected with food)
31 5	रसम्	--	--
Av XX 51 2	रसा॰	—	sap of herbs

(2) in the Nirukta of Yāska we have,

rasateh –from √ras (to make sound)
at 6 21, 9 11, 11 25,

rasadhāranam –'holding of juices'
at 7 11.

rasam –juice
at 9 53, 11 29

rasaharanāt –from extracting juice'
at 3 16, 11 5

rasā names of a river
at 11 25

rasāh –'juices'
at 4 27, 6 19, 7 23

rasādānam –'drawing of juices'
at 7 11 ,

rasān :–Juices'

at 2.14; 4.27.; 11.23

rasānām :-of juices-at 10.10;

rasānī :-'roaring' at 11.25

rasānudānam :-'to release the juices; 7.10.

rasānupradānena :-'by giving juice' at 10.34.

'rasena' :-with juice. 6.15.; 12.1.

(3) in the Bṛhaddevatā we have.

rasa :-1.68.; 2.33.; 7.127.

rasādāna :-2.6.

rasāpāranivāsin :-8.24.

(rasā is a river.)

RASA IN PĀNINĪ (Astādhyāyı), PĀTAÑJALI (Mahābhāsya), AND AŚVAGHOṢA, etc.

'Rasa' in Pāninı [circa 3⁵0 B C (Keith)] and Patanjali [circa 150 B C (Keith)]—

With Nırukta and Brhaddevatā, we end the discussion on the meanings of rasa in vedic literature With Pānını begins our discussion of the meanings of rasa in what we now call classical sanskrit There is one reference to rasa in Pā V 2 95—'rasādıbhyasca' We cannot be sure as to the senses which Panını might have in mind when he used the word rasādı

In the dhātupātha also, √ras is explained as having the senses of '(rasa) sabde' and' asvādansnehanayoh' i e 'to make sound', and 'to taste, to liquify or to make something oily' respectively

In Patañjalı we have several occurrences of the √ras and also the word rasa, either occurring independently or in a compound We also come across words such as 'rasavācıtva', 'rasavacın' 'rasād', and 'rasıka' Excepting only one occurrence that we shall take up in detail as below, in all other cases the usual senses of 'to make sound', or 'to taste' etc and also that of a 'sense quality' or juice is seen (4)

While commenting on Pā V 2 95 as quoted above, the Mahābhāsyakāra referring to the previous sutra i e Pa V 2 94 'tadasyā'—styasmınnıtı matup' -asks the question as to why this sūtra (i e Pā V 2 95) is added, in as much as complete sense is covered by the previous sūtra A possible answer is that this sūtra is mentioned in order to exclude the use of other matup suffixes But this is not accepted by the Bhāsyakāra. According to him, there are examples of the use of other

matvarthıya suffixes in 'rasıko naṭaḥ', 'urvaśı vai rūpinı apsarasām', 'spars'ıko vāyurıtı —'The passage from the Mbh is quoted as follows

rasādıbhyas'ca. 5 2 95

kımarthamıdamucyate na tadasyāstyasmınnıtyeva matupsıddhaḥ ı

rasādıbhyaḥ punarvacanamanyanivṛttyartham ıı

rasādıbhyaḥ punarvacanam krıyate'nyeṣām matvarthıyānām pratısedhārtham

matubena yathā tyādye'nye matvarthıyāh prapnuvantı te mā bhuvannıtı naıtadastı prayojanam, drsyante hyanye rasādıbhyo matvarthıyāh rasıko naṭaḥ urvaśı vaı rūpınyapsarasam sparsıko vāyurıtı (Mbh on Pa V 2 95 pp 394–Edu Keılhorn) Kāsıkā explains this by saying that the matup suffix is to be used in the qualities grasped by senses But in the case of *rupını*, rūpıka etc the idea is to suggest not merely rupa grasped by the eye but beauty Similarly, in rasıko naṭaḥ, the meaning is not that naṭa possesses juice tasted by the tongue, but he possesses an emotion or sentiment -bhāvayogaḥ The passage from the Kāsıkā runs as belows

-rasadıbhyasca pratıpadıkebhyo matup pratyao bhavati, *tadasyāstyasmınnıtyetasmın vısaye* rasavān, *rupavān kımartha* mucyate, na purvasutrena matupsıddhaḥ ? rasadıbhyah punarvacanamanyanıvrtyartham anye matvarthıya ma bhuvannıtı katham rupını kanya rupıko dārakaḥ ? prāyıkametadvacanman, ıtıkarano vıvaksarthō'nuvartate athavā gunadıtyatra paṭhyate, *tena ye rasanendrıyagrahya gunastesāmatra* pāṭhaḥ *iha ma* bhut-rupını rupıka ıtı sobhāyogaḥ gamyate rasıko naṭa ıtyatra bhavayogaḥ rasa, rupa, gandha, sparssasabda, sneha gunāt, ekacaḥ, gunagrahanam rasādınām vıs'esanam, rasadıh

This point is made more explıcıt by the Tattvabodhını on the Sıddhānta kaumudı The author, Jñānendrasarasvatı says anyamatıvarthıyetı—katham tarhı rupını kanyā, rasıko naṭaḥ ıtı atrāhuh rasadıgane gunāt ıtı paṭhyate tena gunavācıbhya eva anyamatvarthıyasya nıṣedhahrupını ıtyatra tu rūpas abdena

saundaryam gṛhyate, tacca na guṇah rasikam ityatra tu rasasabdena bhāvo gṛhyate na tu rasanāgrāhyo guṇa iti (pp 30?-Edn. 1933 NS)

From the above discussion we cannot say whether Mahābhāṣyakāra wants to confine the use of matup suffix to the sense quality of taste only This is however the distinction made by Kās'ikā and later commentaries But this much is certain that the Mahābhāṣyakāra uses the word 'rasa' in 'rasiko naṭaḥ' in the sense of bhāva i e sentiment or emotion So, we may say that it is in the Mahābhasya that we meet for the first time the use of word rasa in the sense of 'nāṭyarasa' also

Other references in the Mbh on Pā III 1 26 show familiarity of the Mahabhāṣyakāra with dramatic performance or something akin to that This would suggest that the word rasa in the aesthetic sense must have become current before Patañjali How long before, we do not have at present the means to indicate

'RASA' IN

Aśvaghosa (Cir. 100 A.D.) (Keith)
Bhāsa (Cir. 200 A D.) (Keith)
Kālidāsa (Cir. 400 A D.) (Keith).

From our search for the use of the word rasa in the *aesthetic sense, we conclude that in the early vedic literature* as such, there is no clear indication of it, though there are certain usages as we noted above, which associate rasa with literary works where the meaning is of flavour as such and the joy incidental to it. But when, we come to Pāṇini and Patañjali, particularly the latter, we have a very clear use of the word rasa in the aeshtetic sense Whether this specific use of the word rasa was known to Pāṇini or not, we cannot definitely say But if the interpretation given by Patañjali also represents the view of Pāṇini, we can say that Pāṇini

also had in his mind the aesthetic sense of rasa to be distinguished from the sense of 'sense quality' of rasa We can, therefore, assume that this specific aeshtetic sense of the word rasa must have become current in the literary world of Patañjali and of later times 3

Earlier Poets

Let us now see from the works of earlier poets like As'vaghosa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa, whether there is any material for the formation of rasa theory in the famous sūtra to be found in the Nā Sā of Bharata By our study, we mean just to indicate how works of great poets might have guided Bharata in the formation of the theory As the data of Nā,Sā, falls between second Cen A D to still later times after christ, the authors under consideration can be said to fall in a period of fluidity regarding the formation of the theory We can not say of the authors that they follow theory in the same vein as done by Hars'a, the author of Ratnāvali, Priyndars'ikā etc. By our study we mean just to indicate how works of grear poets lying before Bharata might have guided him in the formation of the theory The works before Bharata may be necessarily those of A'svaghosa, Kālidāsa etc

It is almost accepted fact that literary theory draws upon literary practice just as grammar does upon linguistic usage. That the definitions of mahākāvya and the like as found in poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc were formulated in view of the master-pieces of Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa etc is an accepted fact, On the same analogy we may say that probably the formation of the famous rasasūtra in Bharata also might have been guided by the same fact as that of the careful observation and study of the actual practice of the literary giants who might have preceded him In view of this we may try to study the works of Asvaghoṣa, (Cir 100 A D), Bhāsa (Cir 200 A D) and Kālidāsa (Cir 400 A.D). We will try to find out if there is any mentioning or clear usage of the

so called vibhāva, anubhāva, sāttvika and vyabhicārins etc. which make for the actual rasa realisation in their particular piece and which might have thus been useful in the formation of a theory of rasa both in nātya and kāvya

Asvaghosa

In the *Bu Ca* of Asvaghosa at III 7, we have the description of king S'uddhodana bidding farewell to his son Sarvārth asiddha who was starting for his first excursion The verse reads as below

atho narendrah sutamāgatās'ruh
s irasyupāghrāya ciram nirīksya |
gacchati cājñāpayati sma vācā
snehanna cainam manasā mumoca || (Bu Ca III 7)

The S D has discussed *vatsala rasa sneha or vatsalatā* is the sthāyin putra i e son and the like are the ālambana vibhāva the cesta vidyā saurya etc of the son are the uddipanas āliṅgana (embrace) aṅgaspars a (touching the limbs) sirasācumbana (kissing the head) etc are the anubhāv as anistās aṅkā (imagining the calamity) harṣa (joy) etc are the sañcārins We have practically all this in the stanza quoted above

Bu. Ca III 13 22 describe the feelings of women eager to see the prince The vyabhicārin called āvega (impatience) is to be seen in these verses

Bu Ca IV 25 describes the anubhāvas that accompany śṛṅgārarasa in the following words

tā bhrūbhil prekṣitairhāvairhasitairlaḍitairgataiḥ |
cakrurākṣepikās ceṣṭā bhitabhītā ivāṅganāḥ ||

Bu Ca IV 54 61 describe the s ate of the prince who did not respond to the gestures of the beautiful ladies We find herein the delineation of sama and the realisation of śānta rasa The verse reads as below

evamākṣipyamāṇo'pi sa tu dhairyāvṛtendriyaḥ |
martavyamiti sodvego na jaharṣa na vivyathe ||
(Bu. Ca. IV. 54)

His friend Udāyi finds him thus lost in contemplation and in order to deviate him from it, starts addressing the prince–

iti dhyānaparaṃ dṛṣṭvā viṣayebhyo gataspṛham |
udāyi nīti-śāstrajñastamuvāca suhṛttayā || (Bu. Ca IV.62).

The feeling of nirveda finds beautiful expression in the words of Buddha who says :

jarā vyādhis'ca mṛtyus'ca yadi na syādidaṃ trayam |
mamāpi hi manojñeṣu viṣayeṣu ratirbhavet || (Bu. Ca. IV.86)

Bu. Ca. V. 29. describes the anubhāvas of vatsala rasa as below :

iti tasya vaco nis'amya rājā karinevābhihato drumaścacāla |
kamalapratime'ñjalau gṛhitvā vacanaṃ cedamuvāca bāṣpakaṇṭhaḥ ||

Bu. Ca. V. 45 describes the *uddīpana* and ālambana vibhāvas *of śṛṅgāra as follows :*

tata uttamamuttamāṅganāstam nis'itūryairupatasthurindrakalpam |
himavacchirasīva candragaure dravīnendrātmajamapsaroganaughaḥ ||

Bu. Ca. VII. 1–10 describe the effects on human beings, beasts, etc. when the prince makes an entry into the forest. We come across a beautiful delineation of the sthāyibhāva vismaya giving rise to adbhuta rasa.

Bu. Ca. VII. 7. says;

kaccidvasūnāmayamaṣṭamaḥ syāt
syādas'vinoranyataras'cyuto vā |
uccceruruccairiti tatre vācas-
taddars'anādvismayajā munīnām ||

Bu. Ca. VIII, 21,22 provide all the required factors that make for karunarasa.

vilambakes'yo malināmbarā
nirañjanairbāṣpahateksaṇairmukhih ।
striyo na rejumṛjayā vinākṛtā
diviva tārā rajaniksayāruṇāh ॥ 21

and also, araktatāmrais'caraṇairanūpuraih
akundalairārjavakandharairmukhaih ।
svabhāvapīnairjaghanairamekhalai-
-rahārayoktrairmusitairiva stanaih ॥ (22)

āvega born of calamity is beautifully illustrated in Bu. Ca. VIII. 20 as below

atiprahārsādatha s'okamūrcchitāh
kumārasamdars'analolalocanāh ।
gṛhādvinis'cakramurās'rayā striyah
s'aratpayodādiva vidyutas'calāh ॥

The sāttvikabhāvas such as stambha, vaivarṇya etc. that go *with the karuna rasa are to be seen in the following* :

hatatviso'nyāh s'ithilāmsabāhavah
striyo viṣādena vicetanā iva ।
na cakraśurnāśru jahurna śas'vasur-
na celurāsurlikhitā iva sthitāh ॥ (Bu. Ca VIII. 25)

The anubhāvas of karunarasa, such as daivanindā (censure of fate) bhūpāta (falling on the earth), krandita (weeping) etc. are seen in yasodharāvilāpa in Bu. Ca. VIII. 31-42.

Bu. Ca, VIII. 31 is—tatastu rosapravitaktalocanā
visādasambandhikaṣāyagadgadam ।
uvāca nis'vāsacalatpayodharā
vigādhas'okāśrudharā yas'odharā ॥

So also, Bu. Ca. VIII. 70,-itiha devi patis'okamūrcchitā,
ruroda dadhyau vilalāpa cāsakṛt ।
svabhāvadhirāpi hi sā sati s'ucā,
dhṛtim na sasmāra cakāra no hriyan ॥

Falling on the earth due to grief is described in Bu C VIII. 73, and the wailings on the part of king Suddhodana a described in Bu Ca VIII 75 80 Jadata (Stupourt), th sāttvika finds expression in Bu Ca VIII 81-

iti tanayaviyogajataduḥkhah
ksitisadrs'aṃ sahajam vihāya dhairyam |
das aratha iva ramas'okavas yo
bahu vilalapa nṛpo visaṃjñakalpah ||

Krodha, the sthāyibhāva of raudra and the anubhāva that accompany it are described in XIII 28-30

Bu Ca XIII 30 is,—mahibhṛto dharmaparās'ca nāgā
mahāmunervighnamamṛṣyamānah |
māram prati krodhavivṛttanetrā
nihs as'vasuh caiva jajṛmbhire ca ||

The material for bibhatsarasa is supplied in the descrip tion of hell in Bu Ca XIV

Bu Ca XIV-14 says

kecittiksnatrayodaṃṣtraitbhakṣyante dārunaih svabhih |
kecid dhṛṣtairayastundairvāyasairāyasairiva ||

so also in the Vth Canto wherein the charms of ladie are described as being infective,

Bu Ca V 61-reads,

vivṛtāsyaputā vivṛddhagātri prapatadvaktrajalā prakāsa guhyā |
aparā madaghūrniteva sisye na babhāse vikṛtaṃ vapuḥ poposa ||

sṛṅgāra finds beautiful expression in Sau IV 36-

athāpyanās'yānavisesakāyāṃ mayyesyasi tvaṃ tvaritaṃ tatastvāṃ |
nipidayiṣyāmi bhujadvayena nirbhisanenārdravilepanena ||

The vyabhicārin called vitarka finds beautiful expression in Sau IV 42

tam gauravam būddhagatam cakarsa
bhāryānurāgah punarācakarsa |
so'nis'cayānnāpi yayau na tasthau
turamstarangesviva rājahamsah ||

The anubhāvas of karuna are found in Sau, VI. 4,

sā khedasamsvinnalalatakena
niśvāsanispitavis'esakena |
cintācalāksena mukhena tasthau
bhartāramanyatra visankamānā ||

and also VI 5—tatas'cirasthānaparis'ramena
sthitaiva paryankatale papata |
tiryakca sisye pravihirnahārā
sapādukaikārdhavila mbapadā ||

āvega, is seen in the verses that follow Vilāpa or wailings are seen in verses 12-19. So also the anubhāvas of ksobha, krandana etc are seen in Sau. VI 24-25.

Sau VI 34 describes vividly all the anubhāvas that go with *karunarasa* as below

ruroda mamlau virurāva jaglau
babhrāma tasthau vilalāpa dadhyau |
cakāra rosam vicakāra māyām
cakarta vktraam vicakarsa vastram ||

Thus in Aśvaghosa we come across the actual description of *different vibhāvadis that give rise to different* rasas and thus providing enough material for the theorists to draw their own conclusions.

Bhāsa

In Bhasa's Svapnavāsavadattam, we have the vyabhicārin called smrti illustrated in V. 5 and 6 which read as below :

smarāmyavantyādhipateh sutāyāh
prasthānakāle svajanam smarantyāh |
bāspam pravrttam nayanāntalagnam
snehānmamaivorasi pātayantyāh (Svapna V. 5)

and also–bahus'o'pyupades'esu yayā māmīkṣamāṇayā ।
hastena srastakoṇena kṛtamākāsavāditam ॥

and also in the following

Rājā –śrutisukhaninade katham nu devyāh
stanayugale jaghanasthale ca suptā ।
vihagaganarajovikīrṇadaṇḍā
pratibhayamabhuṣitāsyarāṇyavāsam ॥

api ca, asnigdhāsi ghoṣavati yā tapasvinyā na smarasi,
sroṇisamudvahanapārs'vanipīḍitāni
khedastanāntarasukhānyupaguhitāni ।
uddis'ya mām ca virahe paridevitāni
vādyāntareṣu kathitāni ca sasmitāni ॥
2 (Svapna VI 1–2)

and also in Avimāraka II 1, which runs as,
adyāpi hastikaras'ikaras'italāṅgim
bālām bhayākulavilolavisādanetrām ।
svapneṣu nityamupalabhya punarvibodhe
jātisamrah prathamajātimiva smarāmi ॥

All these instances evoke vipralamba sṛṅgāra

We may be able to read the material for karuṇa in the speech of Das'aratha in Pratimā II, for whom Rāma is lost for ever

Rājā -bhrātaḥ ! sumantra !
kvame jyeṣṭho rāmah
nahi nahi yuktamabhihitam mayā ।
kva te jyeṣṭho rāmah priyasuta, sutah sā kva duhitā,
videhānām bhartumiratisayabhaktirgurujane ।
kva vā saumitrirmām hatapitṛkamāsannamaraṇam
kimapyāhuh kim te sakalajanasokārṇavakaram ॥

The vibhāva, anubhāva etc of hāsya are seen in the speech of Vasantaka in svapna V, where he starts telling a story to Udayana

Vidūṣakah -bhodu, annam kahaissam atthi naaram bamhadattam nāma tahim kila rāā kampillo nāma.

Rāja -kimiti kimiti

Vidūṣakah -(punastadeva pathati)

Rāja-murkha! rājā brahmadattabh nagaram kāmpilyam ityabhidhiyatām.

Vidūṣakah -kim rāā bamhadatto naa ram kampillam

Rāja evametat

Vidūṣakah -tena hi muhuttaam padivālḷedu bhavam, jāva ottbagaam karissam rāā bahamadatto naaram kampillam (iti bahus'astadeva pathivā) idānim sunodu bhavam

Raudra with kroddha as its sthāyin and the enemy as ālambana, the activity of the enemy its uddipana, etc is seen in the following passage from the Madhyama Vyāyoga

Bhimah - atha ko'yam bhimo nāma vis'vakartā sivah kṛsnah śakrah saktidharo yamah |
etesu kathyatam bhadra kena te sadṛs'ah pita ||

Ghatotkacah -sarvaih

Bhimah -dhiganṛtametat

Ghatokacah -katham kathamanṛtamityāha ksipasi me gurum, bhavatvimam sthulam vṛksamutpātya praharāmi (utpātya praharati) kathamanenāpi na sakyate hantum kim nu khalu karisye bhavatu, dṛstam etadgirikutamutpātya praharāmi etc etc

or as in Dutaghatotkaca wherein we have,

Ghatotkacah -(sarosam) kim dūta iti mām pradharsayasi mātāvadbhoh na dūto ham.

alam vo vyavasāyena praharadhvam samāhatāh |
jyācchedāddurbalo nāhamabhimanyuriha sthitah ||
mahānesa kaisorako'yam me manorathah api ca,
daṣtosto rusitimuddyama tiṣthatyesa ghatotacah |
uttisthatu pumān kascidgantumicchedyamālayam ||
etc etc.

Vīrarasa, with garva as its vyabhicārin is beautifully illustrated in Dūtavākya I 24, wherein Duryodhana says,

-bho dūta na jānati bhavān rājyavyavahāram
rājyam nāma nṛpātmajaiḥ sahṛdayiḥ jitvā ripūn bhujyate
talloke na tu yācyate na tu punardīnāya vā dīyate I
kāṅkṣā cennṛpatitvamāptumacirāt kurvantu te sāhasam
svairam vā praviśantu śāntamatibhirjuṣṭam śamāyāśramam II
(Dūtavākya I 24)

or in the following

Duryodhanaḥ:-ā kasya vijñāpyam madvacanādevam sa vaktavyaḥ,
kiṃ vyartham bahu bhāṣase, na khalu te pāruṣya sādhyā *vayam*,
kopānnarhasi kimcideva vacanamyuddham yadā dāsyasi I
niryāmyeṣa nirantaram nṛpaśatacchatrāvalibhirvṛta
stisthatvam saha pāṇḍavaiḥ pravṛtivaco dāsyāmi te sāyakaiḥ II
(Dūtaghaṭotkaca I 15)

Dharmavīra can be read in the following

Śalyaḥ -bho aṅgarāja vañcitaḥ khalu bhavān
Karṇaḥ -kena
Śalyaḥ -śakreṇa
Karṇaḥ -na khalu śakraḥ khalu mayā vañcitaḥ
anekayajñāhutitarpito dvijaiḥ
kirītimān dānavasaṃghamardanaḥ I
suradvipāsphālanakarkaśāṅgulir-
mayā kṛtārthaḥ khalu pākaśāsanaḥ II (Karṇabhāra I 23).

and also,

Śalyaḥ :-aṅgarāja na dātavyam
Karṇaḥ -śalyarāja alamalaṃ vārayitum, paśya,
śikṣā kṣayaṃ gacchati kālaparyayāt
subaddhamūlāḥ nipatanti pādapāḥ I
jalam jalāsthānagataṃ ca śuṣyati
hutam ca dattam ca tathaiva tiṣṭhati II (22)
tasmāt gṛhyatām. (nikṛtya dadāti) (Karṇabhāra I)

Bhayānaka is illustrated in the following.

Dāmodarah –

etā mattacakorasāvanayanāh prodbhinnakamrastanāh
kāntāh prasphuritādharostarucayo visrastakesasrajah |
sambhrāntā galitottariyavasanāstrāsākulavyābrtah
trastā māmannyānti pannagapatim drstvaiva gopānganāh ||
(Bālacarita, IV. 1)

Bibhatsa is evoked in Ūrubhanga I 11, as below:
ghrdhrā madhūkamukulonnatapingalāksā
daityendrakunjaranatankusatiksnatundāh |
bhāntyambare vitatalambavikirnapaksā
māmsaih pravalaracitā iva tālavrntāh ||

Thus we come across illustrations in the plays of Bhāsa, that might have been a source of inspiration to the theorists

Kālidāsa

In Kālidāsa also we observe the same. We come across the delineation of different bhāvas, anubhāvas etc that are associated in theory with particular rasas. We find them here also in the same context Thus, avahittha, the vyabhicārin of srngāra finds expression in Kum Sa VI 84 as,

evam vādini devarsau pārsve pituradhomkhi |
lilākamalapatrāni ganayāmāsa pārvati ||

The vyabhicārin called mati is seen in Sākuntala I 21–
asamsayam ksatraparigrahaksamā
yadāryamasyāmabhilāsi me manah |
satām hi sandehapadesu vastusu
pramānamantahkaranapravrttayah ||

'Svapna' is the vyabhicārin that goes with vipralambha śrngāra, It finds its expression in Megha (uttara, 49)–
māmākāsapranihitabhujam nirdayās'lesahetoh
labdhāyāste kathamapi mayā svapnasandars'anesu |
pas'yantinām na khalu bahus'o na sthalidevatānām
muktāsthūlāstarukisalayesvas'rules'āh patanti ||

All the perapherneha of vipralambha sṛṅgāra is supplied in Megha (uttara 47)–

tvāmālikhya praṇayakupitām dhāturāgaih silāyāmātmānam
te caraṇapatitam yavadicchāmi kartum |
asraistāvanmuhurupacitairdṛṣṭirālupyate me krūrastasminn-
api na sahate samgamam nau kṛtāntah ||

Herein, the heroine is the ālambanavibhāva, tatpraṇayakopa is the uddipanavibhāva, the desire to fall at the feet is the anubhāva, censure of destiny is the vyabhicārin and rati or love is the sthāyin

The uddipanavibhāva for sānta is met with in Sākuntala I 7

nivārā s'ukagarbhakoṭarmukhabhraṣṭāh etc

Unmādatis'aya, a vyabhicārin of vipralambha is seen in Vikramo-IV in the versa viz –

sarvakṣitibhṛtam nātha etc and also in taraṅgabhrubhaṅgā, etc.,

and also in–tanvi meghajalāradrapallavatayā etc Vitarka is seen in (Vikramo IV)

tisṣthetkopavas'āt prabhāvapihitā etc

Instances can be multiplied as we find the vibhāvādis of karuṇa in ajavilapa and rativilāpa, of smeṛa in Ku Sam vasantavarṇana etc Vira finds expression at Raghu III 51,

tatah prahasyāpabhayah purandaram
punarbabhāse turagasya rakṣitā |
gṛhāṇa sastram yadi sarga esa te
na khalvanirjitya raghum kṛti bhavān ||

or dharmavira as in Raghu II 57,

kimapyahimsyah tava cenmatóham
yas'ahs'arire bhava me dayāluh |
ekāntavidhvamsiṣu madvidhānām
piṇdeṣvanāsthā khalu bhautikeṣu ||

Thus, it is precisely such clear instances in the works of literary masters that might have been the original source of inspiration for the theorists to formulate their principles of literary criticism

We will now try to study the occurrences of the word 'rasa' in Asvaghosa, Bhāsa, and Kālidāsa and we will try to see if there is a clear reference to the asthetic sense of rasa in any occurrence

In the Bu Ca of Aśvaghosa, we come across two occurrences of rasa and one of rasā(5) None of it carries the technical sense of nāṭyarasa or kāvyarasa

Rasā at Bu Ca V 5 means 'the earth' However, Bu Ca V 62 is noteworthy

Bu. Ca V 62, is

iti sattvakulānurupam vividham sa pramadājanaḥ
s'ayānah |

sarasah sadrs'am babhara rupam
pavanāvarjitarugnapuṣkārasya ||

'sarasah' obviously means 'charged with srngrārasa'

In the Sau , we have five occurrences of rasa (6) Sau V 24 has,

sraddhādhanam śreṣṭhataman dhanebbyah |
prajñārasah tṛptikaro resebhyah ||

Rasa in prajñarasa does not carry any technical sense but rasa in 'rasebhyah' i e among all the rasas, may refer to the rasas such as as śṛṅgara, vira, etc or tastes in general

Sau XI 2 has anistanaiṣkramyarasah i e one who was not interested in inaction, and also virasah, 'without interest'

Sau IX 49 has 'rasan' in the sense of 'marking noise'. Sau XVI 93 has 'rasan' in the sense of 'taste'

Thus in Aśvaghoṣa, we do not come across 'rasa' in the technical sense of kāvyarasa or nāṭyarasa, excepting perhaps at Bu Ca V 62, as above

In the Trivendrum plays ascribed to Bhāsa, we have four occurrences of rasa (7) But none of it is seen in its technical sense

In Kālidāda, we come across several references of the word rasa 8 and some of them are definately referring to the technical sense of a nāṭyarasa or kāvyarasa

These are as below

Kum Sa VII 91 reads as below

tau samdhisu vyañjitavṛttibhedam
rasāntaresu pratibaddharāgam ı
apasyatām apsarasām muhūrtam
prayogamādyam lalitāngabāram ıı
'samdhi' refers to the pancasaṃdhis
'vṛtti' refers to kais'ikı, and the like
and rasāntareṣu' refers to various nāṭyarasas

Kum Sa V 82 is also noteworthy It has 'bhāvaikrasam manaa' obviously in the sense of *sṛṅgārarasa*

The Mālavikāgnimitram has the following occurrence of 'rasa' in its technical sense

Mā I, 4 reads as below:

devānāmidamāmananti munayah krāntam kratum cākṣuṣam,
rudrenedamumakrtavyatikare svānge vibhaktam dvidhā ı
traigunyodbhavamatra lokacaritam nānārasam drsyate,
nāṭyaṃ bhinnarcerjanasya bahudhapyekam samārādhanam ıı

Mā II 8 is,

angalrantarnihita vacanaih sūcitah samyagarthah,
pādanyāso layamanugatastanmayatvam rasesu ı
sākhāyonlrmrdurabhınayastadvikalpānuvrttau,
bhāvo bhāvam nudati visayādrāgabandhah sa eva ıı

Mā IV. is—

tāmāsritya srutipathagatāmāsayābaddhamūlah
samprāptānām nayanavisayam rūdharāgapravālah ı
hastasparsairnukulita iva vyaktaromodgamatvāt
kuryātkantam manasijatarurmām rasajñam phalısyas ıı

R 15

In these occurrences 'rasa' carries the technical sense of nāṭyarasa.

In the Vikramorvaśīya we have rasa in its technical sense, at,

I 8. : asyāh sargavidhau prajāpatirabhuccandro nu kāntipradah |
śṛṅgāraikarasah svayam nu madanah māso nu puṣpākarh ||
vedābhyājadah katham nu viṣayvyāvṛttakautūhalah |
nirmātum prabhavenmanoharamimam rupam purāno munih ||

III. 18 . muninā bharatena yah prayogah
bhavatiṣvaṣṭarasāśrayo niyuktah |
lalitābhinayam tamadya bhartā
marutām draṣṭumanāh salokapālah ||

and, Act. III–dvitiyah–tasmin punah sarasvatīkṛtakābandhe lakṣmisvayamvare tesu tesu rasāntaresu tanmayyāsit |

Thus in Kālidasa, we come across occurrences of 'rasa' in the aesthhtic sense.

Foot-Notes

All the references are to the Edn. of Dr. Keilhorn.

(1) In Patañjali we have

√ras-Pā. Sū. 2,4 85 line No. 16, 17, 17, 17, 20, pp. 500.

√ras-Pā. Sū. 1 3 10, Line 8-8, Page 268; 4/269.; 2.4 85; 17,18/19/22-499.; 5 6.7.8.9.11.18 24/500.; 2.2.3 4.5. 6.8.10/502.

rasa-1.4.110, 18/356.; 3 9/357.; 4.3.155.; 9. 15/325.

rasa-1.2.64. 5/246; 4.1.3. 7/198.

rasa-1.2.64. 3.4/246.; 4.1.3. 4-6/198,; 5.1.9. 24/366.

rasavācitva—Pā.Sū 4.4.24 line 18, page 330.

rasavācin- 4.4-24. $\frac{18/19}{330}$; 5-2-107- $\frac{5/5/6}{397.}$

rasādi— (ga) 5.2. 95. $\frac{19/21}{394}$;

rasika 5.2.95 $\frac{21-}{394.}$;

(2) The Bu Ca. has,

'rasa' at II. 8.; III. 51,; V. 52 (sarasah)
and 'rasa' at V. 5,

(3) The Sau. has rasa at

V. 24.–prajñārasaḥ, rasebhyaḥ;
IX. 48–'rasa'
XI. 2.–rasa,
XI. 49–rasan (=making sound)
XVI. 93–rasena,

(4) The trivendrum plays ascribed to Bhāsa have,

rasanā-pra. yau, III, pp, 84. Edn. Prof. Deódhar)
bhayarasam–Avi. I. 2; (pp. 110);
adhikarasaḥ–Avi. V. 4. (pp. 168)
guṇārasajñasya–Cā. I. 2. (pp. 197);
krīdārasesu–Cā. III. 1. (pp. 223)

(5) Kālidāsa has,

rasaṃ–Raghu I. 18;
samarasā Raghu IV. 18;
rasān– „ IV. 66;
rasavat– „ VIII. 68;
rasakhandana varjitam,–Raghu. IX. 36;
abalaikarasāḥ– Raghu IX. 43;
rasāntarāṇi, ekarasaṃ } „ X 17;
krīdārasam–Kum. Sa I. 29.
rasāt– „ „ III. 37.
rasātmakasya „ „ V. 22.
bhāvaikarasaṃ manaḥ– Kum. Sa. V. 82;
„ „ VII. 91,
jātarūparasa– „ „ VIII. 36;
mūlasekasarasaiḥ– „ „ VIII. 38;
dhāturasa– „ „ VIII. 58;
prabhārasam– „ „ VIII. 70,

anaṅgarasaprasaṅge- Ku. Sam. IX. 1;
rasena- „ „ IX. 41; and XI.
rarāsa virasam- „ „ XVI. 12;
sarasam- Rtu. Sc. I. 2. (grismavarnanam)-

The *S'ākuntala* has,

-sadayaṃ sundarı gṛhyate raso'sya-III.
lākṣārasah-Sā, IV. 4.
(bhavanesu) rasādhıkesu-S'ā. VII, 20.

The *Vıkramo* has

Śṛṅgaraıkarasah-I. 1,
astarasās'rayah-II.18;
rasāddṛte- II. 22;

rasāntaresu Act III-dvitıyah speaks,
Mālavikā-has,

nānārasam-I. 4;
rasesu- II. 8,
rasajñam-IV. 1

Megha has,

rasābhyantarah- I. 28 (-pūrvamegha)
sarasakadalı -II, 36 (uttaramegha)

CHAPTER VIII

'RASA' in Bharata (Nā Sa Cir 400 A.D.)

(The earliest technical discussion of rasa is to be found in the Nā S'ā, attributed to, Bharata (Cir. 400 A.D.)]In fact Nā Sā is also our earliest authority on such topics of sanskrit poetics as alaṃkāra, guna, dosa, etc I now, therefore, present *here a discussion on rasa as found in this work.* The *textual criticism* of this work on dramaturgy is not yet fully carried out This much, however, is clear that it contains several strata belonging probably to different ages and probably also to different schools of thought The major part of this work is in verse There are, however, a few prose passages also It is likely that the prose portion containing the famous rasa-sūtra may be an early discussion on the subject However that may be, I take the whole portion, prose and verse, as one unit for the discussion here. The ānuvaṃsya āryās and s'lokas quoted in support of the main text in prose and verse, clarify what is said in the body of the text.

Having described in the first five adhyāyas of the Nā Śā, the mythical origin of the science of dramaturgy, its first production, the construction of the different types of theatre buildings, the ceremonial worship of the theatre, the different aspects of pūrvaraṅga, the difference between abhinaya, nṛtta and the different varities of nṛtta etc, Bharata comes to some of the main themes relevant to the art of dramaturgy.

In the sixth adhyāya, the sages ask Bharata five questions. Of these the first and the foremost are–

–ye rasā iti paṭhyante nāṭye nāṭyavicakṣaṇaiḥ ।

rasatvam kena vai teṣām etadākhyātumarhasi ।। (VI. 2)

and,

bhāvāscaiva katham proktāh kim vā te bhāvayantyapi ।

(VI. 3a-b)

Thus, the understanding of the rasas and the bhāvas occupy pominant place in the Nā Sā. The eight rasas and the sthāyin, sañcārin and sāttvikabhāvas are enumerated in verses 16 23 of the VI the Chapter. Lateron, after having enumerated abhinayas, *vrttis, pravṛttis, siddhis, four types of musical tones, four types of musical instruments, five types of singing and three types of theatre building, the author proceeds to explain the subject of rasa in prose*

Here comes the famous rasa-sutra viz "vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicārisamyogādrasanispattih"- In this sutra, the meaning of the word 'nispattih' derived from the root nispad has caused a great controversy It may be expressed in English, following Monier Williams, as something which comes about, or arises out of, or results from something else This sutra is translated by Raneiro Gnoli as follows -"Out of the union of determinants (vibhāva), the consequents (anubhāva), and the *transitory mental states (vyabhicārin), the birth of rasa takes place.*" *He translates, 'nispattih', by 'birth', which may be regarded as a colourless word not tending to any particular* view regarding the psychological progress of this birth. This sutra is followed by an explanation in prose supported by traditional verses

Here, an attempt is made to explain three points (i) How rasa comes about ? (ii) What is rasa ? and (iii) What feeling accompanies it ? The first point is explained on the analogy of a beverage In a beverage there is one principal ingrediant which combined with other tasteful ingradients becomes in an *integrated form a rasa like ṣāḍava and others Similarly, when the permanent mental states like rati or love, bhaya or fear,* etc, are combined with various bhāvas, specified in the sūtra as vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins, they become rasas The second point, as to why these are called rasas is also explained on the same analogy viz that these also, like the material beverages, are capable of being tasted The third point, viz

the feeling which accompanies the taste, is that of pleasure. Thus, all the three points involved in the sūtra are explained on the analogy of material rasas.]

This analogy is made clearer in the traditional verses quoted after this. Just as experts in taste, while eating the cooked things combined with many dravyas and 'vyañjanas enjoy it, similarly the wise or the connesseurs enjoy with mind–manasā–the permanent mental states which are combined with the abhinayas of bhāvas. It is for this reason that these are called nātyarasas. In these verses, two more points are added by way of clarification. One is that it requires an expert or a connoesseur to be able to discern and enjoy the taste properly, both in matters of food and drink as well as in the enjoyment of the taste in poetry and art. The second point is that it is with the mind that taste in poetry and art is perceived and enjoyed, as distinct from the physical sense of taste in the mouth.

As to why the sthāyibhāvas alone attain the state of rasa is explained in the VII Chapter. Here also, the explanation proceeds by way of analogy. Eventhough, men have similar characteristics, have similar bodies, yat, there are some who by their noble family, character, learning, artistic proficiency, attain to the state of kinghood, while other persons of inferior talent become their followers. Similarly, vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārins become subordinate to sthāyibhāvas. This means that in the psychological theories of the ancients, the eight or nine permanent moods, sthāyibhāvas, viz. rati or love, hāsa or laughter, śoka or grief, etc, were taken to be perpetual moods of living creatures in contrast to the fleeting moods such as nirveda, glāni, etc.

Thus, from these two passages, we gather that[rasa is a matter of tasting of permanent moods with mind by men who have proficiency in such tasting. The sthāyibhāvas attain to this mental tastefulness, rasatva, not by themselves but when connected with the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and the vyabhicārins.

This connexion is of a generative nature The knowlegde of the relation of feelings emotions and sentiments with events and circumstances of life becomes so to say transformed in poetry and drama into what are called vibhāvas and anubhāvas It is this connexion which is the stuff of what becomes rasa.⊃

Now let us see what the Na Śa means by the term 'vibhāva anubhāvas and vyabhicaribhāva

The meaning of the term 'vibhava is given as below –atha vibhāva iti kasmāt ucyate vibhāvo vijñanarthah, vibhāvah kāranam nimittam heturiti paryāyan vibhāvyante nena vāganga sattvābhinayā ityato vibhāvāh yatha vibhāvitam vijnatamity-anarthāntaram–(Na Sā VII pp 346) (G O S Ed)

⊂Vibhava is primarily taken in the sense of knowledge (vijñāna) It is however a piece of knowledge which reveals something else also Therefore, in relation to that something else which it reveals, it is also called kārana nimitta and hetu, i e there are other words for vibhāva It is by means of vibhāva that vācika, āngika and sāttvika abhinayas are so to say, understood or grasped specifically Thus vibhāvitam is said to mean vijñātam⊃ Thus rather not quite clear exposition in prose is clarified in the verse quoted as authority viz.,

bahavo rthā vibhāvyante vāgangābhinayāsrayāh ।
anena yasmāttenāyam vibhāva iti samjñitah ॥
(Nā Śā VII 4)

Because ⊂many meanings coming from vācika and āngika abhinayas are made clear or capable of being grasped or understood, it is called vibhāva Thus vibhāva is really a type of knowing which is responsible for other meanings culminating in the perception of mental states⊃

Anubhāva is explained as follows

–anubhāva iti kasmāt ucyate–anubhāvyantenena vāgangasattva krto bhinaya iti (Nā Sā VII, pp 347)

⟨Anubhāva is the expression of these mental states by means of vācika and āṅgika abhinayas The anubhavas may be identified with bodily expressions, including vocal expressions which show the mental states produced by the vibhāvas ⟩ The sloka is

–vāgangābhinayeneha *yatastvartho'nubhāvyate* ।
sākhāngopāṅgasamyuktastvanubhāvastatah smṛtāh

(Nā Sā VII 5)

Vyabhicārin or transitory state is explained as,

vi abhi ityetāvupasargau cara iti gatyartho dhātuh vividhamabhimukhyena raseṣu carantīti vyabhicārinah vāgaṅgasattvopetāh prayoge rasānnayanti iti vyabhicārinah

(Na Śa VII pp 355)

–i e ⟨'vi' and 'abhi' are prefixes, and the root is 'cara' meeting' 'to go', 'to move' Here the word vyabhicārinah means, 'those mental states, which in a variety of ways move towards the principal sentiments That is, they are the mental states which play the part of accessaries which reinforce the permanent moods ⟩

The rasa theory of Bharata may be interpreted in the following way ⟨*The vibhāvas are statements and presentations which give rise to emotions and sentiments.* The expressions of the sentiments and emotions thus born was anubhāvas The fleeting emotions caused and expressed in a similar way are the vyabhicārins These unite into a unitary whole like the honey *gathered from different plants. When this unitary* whole becomes tasted by one who can taste it with discernment, it is the state of rasa.

It may be noted that theory of rasa is based upon the psychological analysis of the human mind in ancient times The results have been put into a formula which has become traditional. It has eight (or nine) permanent states of mind, i.e sthāyibhāvas, thirty-three transitory states i e vyabhicārins, and the eight sattvikabhāvas This group of forty-nine

mental states is the material out of which eight or nine rasas are formed These are, srngara (love), hasya (laughter) karuna (tragic), vira (heroic), raudra (furious), bhaynaka (terrific), bibhatsa (odious), and adbhuta (marvellous), the natyarasas, and to which lateron is added the santa rasa (quietistic) The Na Sa being essentially a work on dramaturgy, enumerates, the different vibhavas anubhavas and sancarins that constitute these rasas, in the sixth and seventh adhyayas All this material in the Na Sa has more or less become *traditional in the later works on Sanskrit dramaturgy and poetics* 7

It may also be noted that in the 16th adhyaya of the Na Sa, dealing with the concepts of laksana, guna, dosa, and alamkaram, it is stated (vs. 113-114) that the gunas and the alamkaras have to be used in poetry, in consonance with the delineation of different rasas Here, it may be noted, rasa is visualised in connection with poetry i e kavya in addition to drama or natya

CHAPTER IX

'RASA' in the earlier authors in Sanskrit Poetics

(i) Bhāmaha
(ii) Daṇḍin
(iii) Vāmana
(iv) Udbhaṭa
(v) Rudraṭa

The comparatively simple rasa theory of the Nā Sā. becomes the sbuject-matter of fine analysis and recondite discussion in the later writers The different dārs'anika views have entered into this discussion and made it complicated These different views have been given by Abhinavaguptapādācārya in his commentary on the rassasūtra before he gives his own subtle theory The same subject has been touched by him in his commentary on Dhvanyāloka Before we come to this later development, it will be appropriate to study the treatment of rasa as given by writers on poetics earlier than Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta

In the earlier ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin etc we do not come across any adequate discussion on rasa-realisation It seems, these earlier writers on poetics had their own notion of kāvya or poetry as word and sense taken together in general All that rendered charm to poetry was termed 'alamkāra' in the wider sense of the term. Bhāmaha called it 'vakrokti' in general (II 85) (1) Daṇḍin also takes the term alaṃkāra in a wider sense and applies it to anything that may render charm to poetry. (II 1) (2) Vāmāna, at I 1 2, takes the term alaṃkāra in a wider sense and defines it as 'saundarya' or 'charm' in general (3) Thus, whatever is a source of charm in poetry, is broadly termed alaṃkāra by the earlier writers on poetics These writers must not have been unaware of the theory of

characterises a muktaka, while rasa is a characteristic of a mahākavya. Rasa as an alaṃkāra, as observed above, would find place even in a muktaka.

Daṇḍin

Daṇḍin also, from the theoretical point of view, seems to hold an identical position with reference to the topic of rasa. He also tries to incorporate rasa, bhāva, etc, under such figures as rasavat, preyas, etc. (10).

But, as compared to Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin seems to have given more importance to rasa. This is seen in his treatment of the figures such as rasavat, preyas, etc. (11) Daṇḍin treats of these figures at II. 280 291. He talks of śṛṅgāra at II. 281, of raudra at II 282, and of vīra at II 284. karuṇa is illustrated at II. 286. Bībhatsa, adbhuta and bhayānaka are illustrated in II. 288, 289, and 291, respectively. Abhinava in his Abh. (272, Vol. I Nā Śa. G.O S. Ed. II) while explaining the causal view of rasa held by Lollaṭa, says that earlier writers such as Daṇḍin also held a similar view. (12) The commentators try to read a fully worked out rasa theory in Daṇḍin. (13) But as to the theoretic position of rasa in kāvya, Daṇḍin says at II 287. that thus, kāruṇya which is enhanced, is taken as alaṃkāra (14) Thus, even for Daṇḍin, rasa is only an alaṃkara in poetry. (15).

Preyas is defined as, 'priyatarākhyāna' at II. 275 Preyas is felicitous expression and rasavat happens where rasa abounds. Ūrjasvi is where pride dominates or that which has appropriate excellence (16) From the illustrations cited by Dandin, it becomes clear that for him, preyas occurs in case of the suggestion of some bhāvas. (17). In the same way, ūrjasvi exhibits the bhāva of 'garva' or pride. Both preyas and ūrjasvi exhibit a bhāva as a kāvyaśobhākaradharma', i e. alaṃkāra which serves to render charm to poetry. Rasavat, on the other hand, as seen above, exhibits fully developed rasas in form of an alaṃkāra. (18)

Dandin, like Bhāmaha, while describing the characteristics of a mahākāvya says that a mahākāvya should be full of rasa and bhāvas (rasabhāvanirantaram), and should also have well-defined sandhis. He also, like Bhāmaha, refers to other works for a description of drama.

Vāmana

Vāmana does not treat these alamkāras. He, however, has tried to incorporate rasa in his own way in the arthaguna called kānti, which is defined at III. 2.15. (19). It should be noted that Vāmana seems to make an advance over his predecessors in subsuming rasa under gunas, 'which, for him, forms the essential of poetry-nitya dharmāh-as compared to alaṃkāras which are accedental or impermanent-i.e. anitya, a distinction which does not seem to have been made by Bhāmaha and Dandin.

Udbhaṭa

Udbhaṭa treats of the topic as below. In the fourth varga of his Kāvyālamkāra, he mentions these figures in the first kārikā. He defines preyasvat as, "Poetry which is composed so as to contain the indications of bhāvas like rati, by means of anubhāvas and the like, is said to contain preyās" The suggestion of these bhāvas such as rati and others, would lead us to rasavat. So, Vivṛtikāra says that here, rati or love is to be taken only with reference to God, king, etc. In case of rati or love with reference to the beloved, it is rasavat. (20). Rasavat is defined at IV. 3 as 'that in which the development of sentiments such as śṛṅgāra and the like, is clearly shown, and which are included (the indicators such as), a verbal statement of the sentiments, the sthāyin, the sañcarins, vibhāvas and abhinaya (21). Ūrjasvi (IV. 5) is, "the delineation of sentiments (rasas) and feeling (bhāvas), which hurt the sense of propriety in their depiction, or which are expressed in passion, anger, etc., (22). This is entirely a novel explanation of ūrjasvi, not to be seen either in Bhāmaha, or

in Dandin Again, the use of the terms such as, 'kamakrodhādikaranāt' probably suggests that 'rasa' according to Udbhata is caused by factors such as kāma or sex desire, krodha or anger etc Abhinava, as seen above tried to read the causal view of Lollata in Dandin

Here also, probably we may read the same with greater confidence Samāhita is defined at IV 7 as, "the description of the quelling of sentiments (rasa), feelings (bhava), or their semblances (abhāsas), quite unmixed with accessories (such as anubhāva) (23)

Thus it appears that Udbhata treats of rasa as a part of alaṃkāra But he has made a greater advance in discussing rasa eventhough as an alamkāra as can be seen in the definitions of preyasvat and the like. He mentions terms such as anubhāva and refers to the 'svas'abdavācyatva' of rasa. Thus, probably he is the first amongst the earlier writers to have incorporated Bharata's theory He also adds one more aspect of rasa theory viz. that whether rasa can be svas abdavācya i e expressed by its own name or not For him, rasa can be expressed by its own proper name, a position, generally controverted by authors like Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and others Udbhata also mentions śāntarasa

Rudrata

When we come to Rudrata we find a still greate radvance in the incorporation of ideas pertaining to rasa The first point to be noted is that he does not include rasavat, preyas, ūrjasvi etc. in the enumeration of alaṃkāras He however, in I 4 characterises kāvya by the word 'sarasam Whether this is for Rudrata a general characteristic of kāvya or merely as in Bhāmah and Daṇḍin a characteristic of a mahākvya is not quite clear because the kāvya to which he refers is one which a mahākavi is supposed to compose In the later adhyāyas viz XII to XVI, we find the subject of rasa discussed

along with the discussions on the nāyakas, nāyikās etc In fact, this section incorporates the relevant material of the Nā Śā His justification for bringing in this topic of rasa is as follows He says that poetry should incorporate rasas because those who have an aesthetic bent of mind are frigh tened by the dry teachings of the śāstras They can learn wisdom about the four ideals of life from poetry which is full of rasas (XII 1 2) (24) Namisādhu says that rasas are not considered while dealing with the figures of sense, because poetry has word and sense for its body and vakrokti, vāstava etc as literary embellishments, while rasas are like beauty, the natural quality (sahajāh gunāh), and therefore are excluded (25)

Thus as noted earlier, rasas are treated by Rudrata with reference to (kāvyāphala or) the object of poetry as derived by the connoesseurs He than directly proceeds with the enumeration of rasas, viz śṛṅgara vira, karuna, bibhatsa, bhayānaka, adbhuta, hasya, raudra, sānta and preyān (XIII 3) At XII 4, he says that rasas are so termed because they are relished as such-rasanadrasatvamesam Namisudhu says that the ācaryas such as Bharata have called sṛṅgaradi to be rasas, because the sthāyibhāvas are so relished Thus, it seems that Rudrata here treats of rasa-nispatti as seen in Bharata and tries to correlate it with the sahṛdaya who relishes rasa as a kavyaphala Then he gives two varieties of sṛṅgara viz sambhoga and vipralambha and proceeds with the different types of nāyakas and his companions From verses XII 6 onwards, he describes the different types of nāyikās The XIIIth adhyāya is devoted to a description of sṛṅgāra and the XIVth to the vipralambha In the XVth adhyāya he describes vira, bibhatsa, bhayantaka, adbhuta, hāsya, raudra, s'anta and preyān Then he gives a verse about the ritis that are appropriate to different rasas The last adhyāya is devoted to the different types of prabandhas

It should be noted that, as seen above in the light of the remarks of Namisādhu, Rudraṭa is inclined to take rasa as 'sahaja guṇa' or natural quality of kāvya or poetry, as against alaṃkāra which is an external ornament. Vāmana was the first to say that *guṇas are the permanent qualities* of kāvya, as against alaṃkāra, which is *'anitya dharma'* or impermanent quality. Vāmana incorporated rasa under kānti guṇa which formed one of the essentials as compared to mere alaṃkāra, which forms the external element in kāvya. Thus we see that the tendency to make rasa as something essential as compared to mere alaṃkāra (in its narrower connotation), first originated in Vāmana, and then was carried on further in Rudraṭa.

Moreover, Rudraṭa talks of preyas as a separate rasa at XV. 17. Rati or love with reference to a *friend gives rise* to this rasa. Thus, what in Bhāmaha, *Daṇḍin* and Udbhaṭa appears as alaṃkāra called *preyas*, appears in Rudraṭa as an independent rasa.

Rudraṭa, in the last chapter of his work treats of the various types of prabandhas or literary compositions. He says that the four objects of life should be treated in prabandhas mixed with rasas-(samyak tān abhidadhyāt rasasammis'rān prabandheṣu) Then he refers to the varieties of prabandhas in poetry, viz. (mahā) kāvya, kathā, ākhyāyikā, etc. These are of *two kinds-(i) imagined by the poet or (ii)* based upon tradition. *They may be (mahat) long, or short.* (XVI-2). He describes the longer variety in verse 5. Those are the great peoms in which all the four objects of life are depicted at length, and in which all the rasas are also depicted. While the smaller poems are those in which only one of the objects of life is depicted. As to rasas, all of them are not expected in them, while one rasa is completely depicited (XVI. 5 6). It may be karuṇarasa or vipralambha (i.e. pravāsa śṛṅgāra) or prathamānurāgam. (XVI. 34).

We have seen above that in the ālaṃkārikas earlier than Ānandavardhana, rasa is depicted as one of the alaṃkāras or guṇas, which, so to say, in their view, is a prominent characteristic of poetry These authors, however, are not unfamilier with the nāṭyarasas, discussed in the Nā Śā As we have seen, they bring them in while defining the mahākāvyas and by implication also in kathās and ākhyāyikās Thus, it would appear that for these authors, rasas and bhāvas have their proper place in the prabandha kāvyas, great or small We may note here the well-known lines about the muktakas of Amaru, wherein it is said that each verse of his is equal to a hundred prabandhas, implying thereby that one verse of Amaru has as much rasa as can be found in hundred prabandhas

Ānandavardhana

With Ānandavardhana, we enter into a new era of sanskrit poetics

He seems to have fully realised the importance of rasa both in drama and poetry, and tries to give rasa a prominent place while incorporating it in his general scheme of vyañjanā For him, the soul of poetry is dhvani or the suggested sense which is derived through the function of word called vyañjanā This dhvani or the principally suggested sense, is three-fold according to Ānanda, viz vastudhvani, or the suggestion of a matter of fact or idea, alaṃkāradhvani, or the suggestion of a poetic figure and rasadhvani or the suggestion of sentiment This rasadhvani is virtually regarded as the highest type of dhvani by Ānanda For him, rasa is never svaśabdavācya i e expressed through its own proper name, but is always suggested through vibhāva, anubhava and vyabhicārins Thus Ānanda seems to have achieved a great point while harmonising the concepts of rasa as seen in dramaturgy and that of vyañjanā in poetry Abinava has elaborated the point in his Abh as well as Locana

Thus we[1] have seen that the earlier alamkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin etc do not totally ignore the fact of rasa But they try to incorporate it under alamkāra, a source of charm to poetry Daṇḍin is more elaborate in his treatment Udbhaṭa also seems to be better informed about the concept of rasa and its position in kāvya He is probably the first to take rasa as svasabda vācya i e expressed by its own name But one point is clear that for all of them the ultimate 'alamkārya' is kāvya itself and rasa, bhava, etc, are only alamkāras, in thewider sense of the term as 'kāvyas'obhakara dharma'

In Vāmana and Rudrata we noticed a new trend to incorporate rasa, bhāva, etc under guna, the essential or eternal quality of kāvya (nityadharma) Rudrata also speaks of several rasas, in fact any bhāva for him can be rasa Ānandavardhana with his theory of dhvani and vyañjanā gives a new orientation to the whole theme Abhinavagupta, as we will see later on, elaborates the position taken by Ānanda and himself, in his Locana and Abh We will consider his views on rasa realisation later on

Foot notes

1 भामह II 85 सैषा सर्वैव वक्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।
यत्नोऽस्यां कविना कार्यं कोऽलङ्कारोऽनया विना ॥

2 दण्डिन् II 1 काव्यशोभाकरान् धमान् अलङ्कारान् प्रचक्षते ।

3 वामन I 1-2 : सौन्दर्यमलङ्कार ।

4 भामह III 6 रसवद्दर्शितस्पष्टशृंगारादिरस यथा ।
देवी समागमद्धर्ममस्करिण्यतिरोहित ॥

Bhāmaha does not choose to go into any detailed treat ment of Rasa At I 21 he says that the Mahākāvya should be युक्त लोकस्वभावेन रसैश्च सकलै. पृथक् । At V 3, he says स्वादु काव्य सोन्मिश्र शास्त्रमप्युपयुज्यते ।

5. भामह III.5 : प्रेयो गृहागतं कृष्णमवादीद्विदुरो यथा ।,,
अद्य या मम गोविन्द जाता त्वयि गृहागते ।
कालेनैषा भवेत्प्रीतिस्तवैवागमनात्पुनः ॥

This has been quoted by Dandin also. Appayya Diksita takes it as an example of ananvaya dhvani.

6. Bhamaha. III 7 : ऊर्जस्वि कर्णेन यथा पार्थाय पुनरागतः ।
द्विः संदधाति किं कर्णः शल्येत्यहिरपाकृतः ॥

7. भामह. III 10. . समाहितं राजमित्रे यथा क्षत्रिययोषितां ।
रामप्रसत्त्यै यान्तीनां पुरोऽदृश्यत नारदः ॥

8. S. D. X 86 . समाधिः सुकरे कार्ये दैवाद्वस्त्वन्तरागमात् ।

9. At II. 85 : Bhāmaha uses the term 'vibhavyate'. Abhinava tries to explain it in a technical sense of 'vibhavana'.

10 Dandin speaks of Rasa elsewhere also. He defines madhurya (I. 51) as, माधुर्यं रसवद्वाचि वस्तुन्यपि रसस्थितिः । i e. the establishment of rasa in word and in object. 'At II.292 he explains 'madhurya' as 'agramyata' or 'absence of vulgarity'.

(II 292 is · वाक्यस्याग्राम्यतायोनिर्माधुर्ये दर्शितो रस· ।
इह त्वष्टरसायत्ता रसवत्ता स्मृता गिराम् ॥

तरुण वाचस्पति explains as · एव शृङ्गारादिभिः अष्टभिः रसैः पूर्वदर्शितेन च अग्राम्यतोरूपेण रसेन नवधा रसत्वम् इति रसवदलङ्कारम् उपसहरति वाक्यस्येति । This is not very clear. हृदयगमा probably explains it in a clearer way when it says माधुर्यगुणे प्रदर्शित.
शब्दार्थयोः अग्राम्यतया जातः रसः वाक्यस्य भवति ।
अलङ्कारतया निर्दिष्ट रसवत्वं अष्टरसायत्तमेव ।

Dandin does not seem to take rasa in any technical sense, but only in the general sense of 'kavyarasa' alone, in all those occurrences. Hemacandra says the same when he says : श्रुतिवर्णानुप्रासाभ्यां वाग्रसं अग्राम्याभिधेयतया तु वस्तुरस । माणिक्यचंद्र also agrees to this He says (MS 180. आनन्दाश्रम ed.) श्रुतिवर्णानुप्रासाभ्यां वाग्रसः अग्राम्यतया तु वस्तुरसः । इत्थं रसो द्वेधा । At III. 149. again गिरा रस. is explained by Tarunavacaspati as

ग्राम्यत्वम् only At I 62 also 'rasa' does not carry any technical connotation I 62 reads —

काम सर्वोऽप्यलङ्कार रसमर्थे निषिञ्चति ।
तथाप्यग्राम्यतैवैन भारं वहति भूयसा ॥

11 Dandin also expects like Bhamaha, the Mahakavya to depict, without exception, rasa and bhava (see I 81 अलङ्कृत असंक्षिप्त रसभावनिरन्तरम् ।) तरुणवाचस्पति and हृदयगमा take 'rasa' and 'bhava' here in their technical sense But we may take this, with Dr De in the general sense of 'kavyarasa'

12 अभिनव भा (m 272, *Vol* I *Ns*)—चिरन्तनानां चायमेव पक्ष । तथा हि दण्डिना स्वालङ्कारलक्षणेऽभ्यधायि । रति शृङ्गारतां गता रूपबाहुल्य योगेन । इति (काव्यादर्शे ॥ 281) अधिरुह्यपरा कोपो रौद्रात्मतां गत (॥ 283) इत्यादि च ।

13 तरुण० says at II 281 तदिद रसवत् । रूपबाहुल्ययोगेन विभावानुभावव्यभिचारियोगेन इत्यर्थ ।

The हृदयगमा adds –रत्याभिधान एष स्थायी भाव मृतेत्यादिना वागारम्भानुभावेन अनुमीयमानै हर्षधृतिस्मृतिवितर्कप्रभृतिभि व्यभिचारिभि संसृज्यमान करुणानन्तरं शृङ्गाराख्यां लभते । तेन अन्वितमेतत् रसवत् ।

रंगाचार्य रेड्डी also follows तरुण He says that herein, वासवदत्ता is the 'विभाव' her sweet words, smile etc are the anubhavas and हर्ष, विस्मय च etc are the vyabhicaribhavas The स्थायिभाव called रति is enhanced to the state of शृङ्गाररस

14 दण्डिन् II 287 इति कारुण्यमुद्रितमलङ्कारतया स्थितम् ।

15 Dr De observes (pp 212 Sanskrit Poetics)-"But the Rasa in these figures is subordinate to the expressed *figure* itself to which it serves as a means of embellishment अलङ्कारतयास्मृतम्, in other words, the rasa is developed not for its own sake, but as increasing the beauty of expression" I fail to agree with this By '*अलङ्कारतया स्मृतम्*' what Dandin means is that here karuna rasa becomes the alamkara of kavya The term alamkara is to be taken, as noted above, in its wider sense of a काव्यशोभाकरधर्म. For, otherwise, we fail to

trace any other अलङ्कार in these illustrations, to which the particular rasa can be subordinated Again, Dandin calls rasavat to be that which is 'rasapes ala' i e that which causes delight due to rasa (II 275)

16 दण्डिन् II 275 प्रेय प्रियतराख्यान रसवद्रसपेशलम् ।
ऊर्जस्वि रूढाहङ्कारं युक्तोत्कर्षं च तत्त्रयम् ॥

17 तरुण says देवगुरुविप्रादिविषय प्रीतिप्रकाश प्रेय ।

18 Some modern commentators such as Reddi seem to overread things when they observe that rasavat, preyas and urjasvi are grouped together because all of them form the varieties of what is called असंलक्ष्यक्रमध्वनि (त्रयाणा असंलक्ष्यक्रम रूपैकधर्मत्वात् एकत्र निर्देश)

It is doubtful whether Dandin could be held to be conscious of the classification of Dhvani as above

19 वामन III ii 15 दीप्तरसत्व कान्ति ।

20 विवृतिकार-रतिरिह देवगुरुनृपादिविषया गृह्यते । कान्ताविषयायां तु रते सूचने रसवदलङ्कारो वक्ष्यते ।

21 उद्भट IV iii रसवद्दर्शितस्पष्टशृङ्गारादिरसादयम् ।
स्वशब्दस्थायिसञ्चारिविभावाभिनयास्पदम् ॥

22 IV 6 अनौचित्यप्रवृत्ताना कामक्रोधादिकारणात् ।
भावाना च रसाना च बन्ध ऊर्जस्वि कथ्यते ॥

23 उद्भट IV 7 रसभावतदाभासवृत्ते प्रशमबन्धनम् ।
अन्यानुभावनि शून्यरूप यत्तत्समाहितम् ॥

24 ननु काव्येन क्रियते सरसानामवगमश्चतुर्वर्गे ।
लघु मृदु च नीरसेभ्यस्ते हि त्रस्यन्ति शास्त्रेभ्य ॥ रुद्रट XII

25 नमिसाधु on रुद्रट XII 2- अर्थालङ्कारमध्य एव रसा अपि किं नोक्ता उच्यते-काव्यस्य हि शब्दार्थौ शरीरम् । तस्य च वक्रोक्तिवास्तवादय कटककुण्डलादय इव कृत्रिमा अलङ्कारा । रसास्तु सौन्दर्यादय इव सहजा गुणा इति भिन्नस्तत्प्रकरणारम्भ ।

PART III

CHAPTER X

Some Observations.

Thus far we have traced the two streams of thought, one, pertaining *to śabdavṛttis, with particular reference to vyañjanā* and dhvani, and the other pertaining to the origin and development of the concepts of rasa and other cognate ideas. In Dhvanyāloka we find these two currents meeting and merging with each other and bringing forth an integrated theory of rasa and dhvani

So, let us study this integrated theory of Ānandavardhana in detail

We come to discuss the theory of vyañjanā or dhvani as propounded in the Dhvanyāloka As I said in the beginning, the inspiration for the investigation came from the following verse

kāvyasyātmā dhvaniriti budhaiḥ yaḥ samāmnātapūrvaḥ
tasyābhāvaṃ jagadurapare bhāktamāhustamanye |
kecidvācāṃ sthitamaviṣaye tattvamucustadīyam
tasmādbrūmaḥ sahṛdayamanaḥprītaye tatsvarūpam ||

This verse makes us understand that dhvani was accepted as the soul of poetry by earlier teachers It was this very *dhvani that was called to be bhākta or secondary sense by* other teachers. There were some who said that eventhough dhvani was experienced, it was beyond expression in words There were some, however, who definitely negatived it. It was to remove this state of doubt and negation of dhvani that Ānanda undertook to write this work

In our search of these earlier theorists, we have not *succeeded in discovering any teachers of* poetics who had a clear theory of vyañjanā before them There might have been critics in old times as there are in the present days who might

have said that *though they experience the soul of poetry, it* was incapable of being expressed in words

As we have not been able in finding the earlier theorists of dhvani, similarly we have not found any theorists who have negatived *it. We have, however, found theories about the* two functions of the word, viz the primary and secondary i e bhākta and we have found the seeds of lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā in these

It seems that Abhinavagupta *also had undertaken such an* investigation and has practically come to a conclusion similar to ours In fact he says that there have been no books in which this theory is embodied Says he-avicchinnena pravāhena taire-taduktam vināpi viśiṣṭapustakeṣu viniveśanādityabhiprāyah (*Locana on Dhv* I 1)

Considering, however, Ānanda's arguments and illustrations to prove the independent verbal function of vyañjanā, we cannot deny the possibility that there might have been a *tradition amongst the teachers of poetics which embodies* affirmation and denial of vyañjanā These teachers might have been his contemporaries or near predecessors Ānanda quotes the following verse with the introduction viz –tathā ca anyena kṛta evātra ś lokaḥ

–yasminnasti na vastu kiñcana manaḥprahlādi sālaṃkṛti
vyutpannairacitam na caiva vacanair, vakroktiśunyam
ca yat ।
kāvyuṃ tad dhvaninā samanvitamiti prītya praśamsañjado ।
no vidmóbhidadhāti kim sumatinā pṛṣṭaḥ svarūpam
dhvaneḥ ॥

Abhinavagupta explains 'anyena' by the words–grantha-kṛtsamānakālabhāvinā manorathanāmnā kavinā If Abhinava-gupta *is right in this identification, we may conclude that* amongst the contemporaries of Ānanda, the theory of dhvani must have been propounded, denied, *and stoutly defended.* But, as to teachers earlier than this, of dhvani, we have no independent corroborative evidence.

Let us now consider Ānanda's views

We find that Ānanda by three progressive stages comes to regard rasa as the ātman or soul of poetry The first stage is found in the second kārikā of the first udyota of the Dhv Herein he says arthah sahrdayas'lāghyah kāvyātmā yo vyavasthitah' i e the meaning that is commended by the aesthetes-sahrdaya-is the soul of poetry Vācya in poetry is disposed of by saying that it is explained by many poeticists in the form of various figures of speech like simile and others (kārikā I 3) The idea of pratīyamāna in the poetry of great poets is explained on the analogy of beauty in the fair-sex (Dhv I 4), which is something over and above the beauty of several parts of the body *He seems to suggest that beauty is something* which comes out of the whole So does pratīyamānārtha or implict sense in a poem This is the second stage in which the importance of the pratīyamāna is established

This is followed by a discussion in the vṛtti establishing the difference between vācya and pratīyamāna This discussion, *as we note from the vṛtti, pertains to what is technically known* as vastuvyangya The second variety of vyangya that he refers to is alamkāra-dhvani The third variety of pratīyamāna is what he calls 'rasādilakṣaṇah' i e rasa, bhāva, etc About this *variety it is said that it is absolutely defferent from the vācya* This third variety of pratīyamāna, viz rasa is presented as the soul of poetry in the following kārikā

kavyasyātmā sa evārthah tathā cādikaveh purā |
krauñcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ sokah slokatvamāgatah ||

(Dhv I 5)

This is third stage Thus in the kārikās 2-4 and the vṛtti thereon, we find the philosophy of Ānanda, *regarding* the soul of poetry, in a nut shell Meaning is the soul of poetry In the meaning it is pratīyamāna, which is important And in the three varieties of pratīyamāna, pratīyamāna rasa is the soul of poetry This rasa is explained *in the vṛtti thereon*

as kavyasya sa eva arthah sarabhutah–, thus carrying forward the traditional meaning of rasa as essence in poetry.

This implict sense is something quite different from the direct meaning of words. This point he proves by giving illustrations. If, for instance, the explicit sense is of a positive nature, the implict sense is of a negative nature; or if the explicit sense is of a negative nature, the implict sense is of a positive nature, or if the explicit sense is either of a positive or negative nature, the implied is neither positive nor negative in nature. In some cases the subject-matter of the implicit sense is different from the explicit with reference to different people. These are illustrated by the verses such as, 'bhama dhammia' etc., 'atta ettha nimajjai', etc., 'vacca maha vvia ekke', etc. and 'de a paria' etc.

CHAPTER XI

RASA AND DHVANI AS LAID DOWN BY ĀNANDAVARDHANA

The Three dhvanis :

Ānanda takes up the three main types of implict sense, viz vastudhvani alamkāradhvani and rasadhvani i e the cases in which some bear fact or idea is implied, or alamkāra is suggested or rasa is evoked He has illustrated vastudhvani in the verses such as bhama dhammia etc as discussed above (see ch X) Here it may be noted that Ānanda clarifies the point that vastu and alaṃkāra can be expressed both by direct meaning i e vācyārtha or vyaṅgyārtha i e suggestion In the case of rasadhvani however, there is a complete break with abhidhā

Alaṃkaradhvani

In order to explain alaṃkāradhvani Ānanda introduces the idea of noticibility between the expressed sense and the implict sense That there is a sequence between the expressed meaning and the implicit meaning the latter following the former is not questioned In poetry, however the fact of the degrees of noticibility is a matter of importance Where the sequence is so quick that it does not attract the attention of the reader or hearer as in rasadhvani it is regarded by Ānanda as the mode of dhvani par excellence There are other cases however in which the sequence between the expressed sense and the implicit sense is clearly observed as in some of the illustrations of vastudhvani

These are the well known divisions of saṃlakṣyakrama and asaṃlakṣyakrama of dhvani

It appears that the sequence or krama is a necessary item in alaṃkāradhvani, e g in the verse–

unnatah prollasddharah kālāgurumalimasaḥ |
payodharabharastanvyāh kam na cakare bhilāṣiṇam ||

In this particular verse, the expressed meaning with reference to the monsoon season comes first Then, on the strength of double meaning words, the implicit with reference to a young lady also shines forth. The sequence between the two senses is apparently noticable The result is upamādhvani.

Ānanda explains and illustrates alamkāradhvani when he discusses the nature and scope of saṃlaksyakramavyaṅgya or that in which the sequence between the expressed sense and *the implicit sense is noticeable (II 20)* This particular variety of dhvani is subdivided into that which is based on either s'abda i e word (śabdaśaktyuttha) or an artha i e meaning (arthasaktyuttha) The śabdaśaktyuttha saṃlaksyakrama is again subdivided into two viz vastudhvani, as explained already, and alaṃkāradhvani.

Ānanda makes it clear at the outset that alaṃkāradhvani *occurs only when an alaṃkāra is implied on the strength of the power of a word* Thus, *when in a poem, alamkāra alone,* and not vastumātra or idea, is implied on the strength of śabdaśakti, it is said to be dhvani based on sabdasakti

(Says Ānanda II, 21 —

ākṣipta evālaṃkārah śabdasaktyā prakāsate |
yasminnanuktah sabdena śabdasaktyudbhavo hi sah ||

yasmādalamkāro, na vastmātram yasmin kāvye sabdasaktyā prakāśate sa sabda-saktyudbhavo dhvanirityasmākam vivaksitam) He holds that if, *an alamkāra, even when it is implied,* becomes expressed by some other word, then also it falls out of the province of dhvani (sa cākṣiptā laṃkāro yatra punah śabdāntarenābhihitasvarūpah tatra na sabdasaktyubdhavānuranānarūpavyaṅgyadhvanivyavahārah) *This is illustrated in the verse viz* dṛṣṭyā kesava etc In this particular verse,

the word 'salesam'turns the table and the verse instead of becoming an illustration of dhvani, paters out into an alaṃkāra called s'leṣa But, says Ānanda, if on the strength of implication another alaṃkāra is suggested, it becomes an illustration of dhvani as in-

atrāntare kusumasamayayugamupasaṃharannajṛmbhata grīṣmābhidhānah phullamallikādhavalāttahāso mahākālah -, or in the verse unnatah prollasaddhārah etc. or in case of dattānandāh prajānām etc Ānanda says that in these illustrations, we have to imagine on the strength of implicat on, the relation of upamāna and upameya between the two *vākyārthas* and *thus in these illustrations, upamādhvani is based on slesa.* Ānanda, then proceeds to illustrate different alamkāradhvanis such as virodhadhvani, vyatirekadhvani etc These are instances of *alamkāradhvani based on word* (sabdasaktyudbhava) At II. 25 Ānanda points out the variety of alaṃkāradhvani based on arthasakti Says he,

arthasakteralamkāro yatrāpyanyah pratiyate |
anusvānopamavyaṅgyah sa prakāroparo dhvaneh ||

Thus when an implied alamkāra, which is other than the expressed alaṃkāra is suggested on the strength of meaning, it is termed as arthasaktyudbhava-anusvānarūpavyaṅgya (Vācyālaṃkārav yatiriktoyatrānyólaṃkārórthasāmarthyāt pratiyamānovabhāsate *sórthasaktyubbhavo nāmānusvānarūpavyaṅgyónyo* dhvanih-on II 25) Ānanda holds that all the alamkāras such as rūpaka and the like that can be directly expressed, can take the form of the implied also (II. 26) He says that such implied alaṃkāras are exhibited variously by ālaṃkārikas such as Udbhata and the like Thus in samdeha, there is an implied element of upamā, rūpaka and atiśayokti Thus, it is not difficult to indicate the fact that some alaṃkāra is implied by some other alaṃkāra

(rūpakādiralaṃkāravargo yo vācyatāṃ śritah |
sa sarvo gamyomāntvaṃ bibhrat bhumnā pradarsitaḥ ||
II 26)

anyatra vācyatvenap rasddiho yo rupakādiralaṃkārah so'nyatra pratiyamānatayā bāhulyena pradarśitastatrabhavabdhirbhattodbhatādibhih. tathā ca saṃdehādisupaṃārūpakātiśayoktināṃ prakāśamānatvaṃ pradarśitamityalamkārāntarasyālaṃkārāntare vyaṅgyatvaṃ na yatnapratipādyam.

But Ānanda adds (II. 27) that even when we come across some other implied alaṃkāras as seen above, we do not call them to be dhvani till the expressed sense is not subordinated to the implied.

But when the expressed becomes subservient to the implied, then only it becomes the province of dhvani. Ānanda then goes on illustrating such cases. In prāptaśriresa kasmāt etc. we have rūpakadhvani. So also *in lāvaṇyakāntiparipūritadivimukhe'smin* smere'dhunā etc. upamādhvani is seen in virāna ramaiete, or in tam tāna etc. Ākṣepadhvani is seen as in-sa vakūumakhilān sakto etc. He also illustrates two cases of arthāntaranyāsadhvani as based on both sabdasakti and arthaśakti, Vyatirekadhvani utpreksādhvani etc. are also illustrated and explained. Ānanda, winds up the discussion with the remark that (II 28)–

evamalaṃkāradhvanimārgaṃ vyutpādya tasya prayojanavattām sthāpayitumidamucyate

–śarīrikaraṇaṃ yesām vācyatve na vyavasthitam ।
téalaṃkārāh parāṃ cohāyām yānti dhvanyaṅgatāṃ gatāh ॥

Thus, the alaṃkāras that have no sound position in the body of a poem when they are only expressed, attain to beauty when implied. He also adds that these implied alaṃkāras become dhvani only when purport is principally to that effect-vyaṅgyatvépyalaṃkārāṇāṃ prādhānyavivaksāyāmeva satyāṃ dhvanāvantaḥ pātah.

Ānanda, then says that these alaṃkāras become principally implied in two ways. They become so either on the strength

Thus rasa is the subject of vyañjanā par excellence.

Ānandavardhana treats this third variety of rasādidhvani under the subdivision called asamlaksyakramadhvani He holds that the vivaksitānyaparavācya dhvani i e abhidhāmula-dhvani *is subdivided into two varieties such as asamlaksyakrama* and samlaksyakrama i e one in which the sequence is either perceptible or not perceptible The asamlaksyakrama or that in which no sequence is *perceptible includes in itself the* varieties of rasadhvani, bhavadhvani, tadābhāsadhvani, bhāva-sandhi, bhavodaya bhavasabalata etc (II 3) These are subdivided into innumerable sub-varieties But all these are just termed as one i e asamlaksyakramadhvani (3) If it is principally suggested, it becomes dhvani But when rasa, bhāva etc become subservient to the expressed sense, it becomes the province of the alamkāras such as rasavat and the like (II 5) i e gunibhutavyangya

Ānanda is of the opinion that the asamlaksyakramadhvani is to be found with reference to varna i e syllable, pada i e word, *vākya i e sentence*, samghatanā i e *diction and prabandha* i e the whole composition Abhinava explains that it is to be seen with reference to a fraction of word (padaikadesa) or *two words (pada dvitaya) etc also*

The varna[1] or syllables also suggest rasa and the like Ānanda explains this by saying that letters such as s,g,r, yukta varnas, t, etc do not promote srngārasasa, while they are conducive to bibhatsa and the like (III 3-4). The suggestion of rasa through pada or a word is illustrated in—utkampini bhayapariskhalitāmsukānta etc Herein, the word 'te' makes *for the suggestion of karuna rasa (iti smaryamānam tedîyam* saundaryamidānim sātiśayasokāvesavibhāvatām prāptamiti Abhinava) Suggestion through a fraction of a word is seen as *in, vrīdāyogānnatavadanayā sannidhāne etc 'tribhāgah'* in the word 'cakitaharinihārinetratribhāgah' is suggestive Suggestion based on the whole sentence is seen as in krtakakupitaih *bāspāmbhobhih etc.*

This is an illustration of vipralambha śṛṅgāra At times this suggested sense of the type of rasa is mixed with some alaṃkāra also, as in smaranavanadīpūrenodbāḥ punarguruse-tubhiḥ' etc Ānanda mentions three types of saṃghatanā or diction viz asamāsā madhyamasamāsā and dīrghasamāsā He adds that this threefold saṃghatanā rests on gunas such as mādhurya and the like and suggested rasas, and the propriety of the speaker and the subject-matter is the regulating factor in its case

(III 6-gunānāsrityа tisthanti mādhuryādīn vyanakti sā ।
rasān tanniyame hetuh aucityam vaktṛvācyayoh ॥)

He points out further that in case of karuna and viprayoga, asamāsā saṃghatanā i e diction involving no compounds is favourable In raudra however, it can be either madhyamasamāsā or dīrghasamāsā He observes that in all the types of diction the prasādaguna is, a must Saṃghatanā may very with reference to the form of literature such as muktaka, and the like

The whole composition also becomes suggestive of rasa as illustrated by the Rāmāyana or the Mahābhārata The theme should be historical or imagined as the case may be But it should be properly beautified with the propriety of vibhava, anubhava and sañcāri (III 10) If the theme is historical the poet should let go situations as are not inducive to rasa and should also make innovations to evoke rasa (III 11) He should go in for saṃdhis and saṃdhyaṅgas not according to the instructions of the science of poetry or drama alone, but according to their ability to evoke rasa (III 12) The poet should delineate the different rasas at proper places in parts of the composition, in such a way as to promote the main rasa (II 13) He should use alaṃkāras aptly (II 14) These five factors govern the suggestiveness of rasa with reference to a whole composition He duely illustrates all this

A whole composition thus not only by itself suggests rasa, but successively by degrees also, through instances of

samlaksyakramadhvani contained in it, (na kevalam prabandhena saksadvyangyo raso yavatparamparyenapiti darsayitumupakramate–Locana on III 15) This is illustrated as in the speech of Pancajanya in Madhumathanavijaya, or as in Visamabanalila when kamadeva meets his friends Abhinava explains fully how these speeches of Pancajanya, Yauvana etc ultimately help the evocation of the principal rasa It is also found illustrated in the famous grdhragomayusamvada in the Mahabharata (Abhinava says sa cabhiprayo vyaktah santarasa eva paranisthitatam praptah Locana III 15) Ananda says that the rasadi dhvani is also suggested by sup tin vacana, sambandha, kararakasakti krt, taddhita, and samasa (III 1 6) Nipata, upasarga kala etc also suggest it All this is duely illustrated by him

Obstacles in rasavyanjana

Anandvardhana then proceeds to mention certain factors that tend to obstruct the realisation of rasa He says that a good poet should take pains to avoid such factors as may obstruct the rasa being realised in a big composition or even in a single stanza (III 17) The factors that may cause obstruction in rasa realisation are as below

(i) sketching the setting and the like of a sentiment that is of a nature quite contrary to the one in hand,

(ii) giving a very lengthy description of something eventhough it be connected with the main statement,

(iii) abruptly cutting off the delineation of the sentiment or its untimely evocation,

(iv) frequent delineation of a sentiment even if it is fully roused, and

(v) impropriety with reference to behaviour

(virodhirasasambandhivibhavadiparigrahah ı
vistarenanvitasyapi vastunonyasya varnanam (II8

Ānanda says that in the instances cited above there is a clear breach of propriety and it can not be saved by pointing out that the hero is eclipsed by ill fate !

(nacaivaṃvidhe viṣaye daivavyāmohitatvaṃ kathāpuruṣasya parihāro, yato rasabandha eva kaveḥ pradhānyena svapravṛtti-nibandhanaṃ yuktam III 19 Dhv)

Ānanda says that the poets should be solely devoted to the suggestion of sentiment and the like We have taken pains for all this and not merely for the establishment of dhvani alone ! (*rasādirupavyaṅgyatātparyamevaiṣām yuktamiti yatnosmābhira-rabdho na dhvanipratipādanamatrābhiniveśena*)

(iv) The fourth difficulty arises when rasa that is already fully aroused is repeatedly described as such Ra a after being fully aroused by its constituents and after being relished, tends to fade away *in the fashion of a fading flower if evoked repeatedly*

(v) Vyavaharanaucitya occurs e g when a heroine directly mentions her desires to the hero and not indirectly through proper gestures and the like

Or, it happens when vṛttis such e g kaiśikī and the like, as laid down in Bharata are described not with reference to their proper conditions

Ānanda cites some parikara verses to support his statements and observes that whatever is laid down by him is in harmony with the opinion of great poets such as Vālmīki and the like

He further elaborates th topic and gives instruction as to delineate factors as are connected with sentiments of the opposite type He says

vivakṣite rase labdhapratiṣṭhe tu virodhinām ।
bādhyanam aṅgabhāvaṃ va prāptānāmuktiracchala ॥ III 20

i e After the intended sentiment has been established on a sound footing there will be no defect in including even hindrances provided that these come either as *foils (bādhya)* or ancillaries

Ānanda is of the opinion that after the intended rasa is fully realised, the hindrances can be delineated in a two fold way as said above The bādhyatva i e serving as foils of the hindrances is said to be there when they are positively overcome by the intended sentiment and not otherwise Thus delineated they only tend to enhance the intended sentiment or, these factors cease to be hindrances when they are subordinated. Thay can be subordinated either in a natural way or in an imagined way In case of natural subordination, there is no case for hinderance e g in the description of disease with reference to vipralambha sṛṅgara But if one describes things that are not natural ancillaries e g death with reference to love in separation it will create hindrance Ananda is of the opinion that even if a poet thinks that death can be possibly described in case of love in separation, he should not do so For, if the substratum of the sentiment is lost, sentiment itself will be totally blasted And you are not up to promote karuṇa here If the poetry is centred round karuna rasa, such description is unobjectionable Or, at times description of death, in case of sṛṅgāra is unobjectionable, if there is a chance for an immediate reunion In case of a prolonged reunion, the evocation of proper sentiment is retarded The poet should avoid this

Ānanda illustrates the case of badhyatvena ukti i e narration as foils of the hindrances in the verse viz kvākaryam sasalakṣmaṇah etc, or as in case of the advice given by the other sage, when Puṇḍarīka is lost in love for Mahāsvetā The natural subordination is illustrated as in, bhramim aratim alasahṛdayatām etc, superimposed subordination is seen as in, pāṇḍuksāmam vadanam, etc. or as in kopāt komalalola etc.

Opposite Sentiments

Ānanda then proceeds to explain how opposite sentiments are to be delineated in a whole composition

He is of the opinion that eventhough it is accepted hat the whole work of poetic compositions should abound n

different sentiments, the poet, desirous of achieving the greatness *of his works, should delineate only one sentiment as the* principal one

(prasiddhepi prabandhānām nānārasanibandhane |
eko raso ṅgikartavyah tesāmutkarsamiccatā || III 21.

Ānanda is of the opinion that eventhough different rasas are fully aroused, one of them can be principal, if it is delineated right from tha begining of the work and is being referred to again and again (III 22)

(prabandhesu prathamataram prastutah san punahpunaranu samdhiyamānatvena sthāyi yo rasastasya sakalabandhavyāpino rasāntarairantarālavartibhih samāveso yat sa nāṅgitāmupahanti) Dhv On III 22

Just as there can be principal action or plot of a composition even if it gets mixed with other sub-plots, in the same way there can be one principal sentiment (III 23) Ānanda is of the opinion that not only sentiments such as vira and sṛṅgāra or sṛṅgāra and hāsya, or randra and sṛṅgāra, or vira and adbhuta or sṛṅgāra and adbhuta can be correlated as principal and subordinate, but also opposite type of sentiments such as śṛṅgāra and bibhatsa, vira and bhayānaka, sānta and raudra or śānta and sṛṅgāra also can be correlated as such, if when one sentiment is principal, the other one is not fully aroused

(avirodhi virodhi vā raso'ṅgini rasāntare |
pariposam na netavyastathā syādavirodhitā) || III 24,

Thus, a rasa not of the opposite type as in case of sṛṅgāra and hāsya, need not be fully aroused as compared to the main sentiment Even if they are equally developed, there is no contradiction, e g in, ekato ruia etc , or as in kanthātcchitvā etc

Or, the vyabhicāribhāvas with *reference to a rasa opposite* to the main sentiment, should not be described at length. And in case they are described at length, should there be an

immediate reversion to the vyabhicāribhāvas of the principal sentiment Or, even when a subordinate *sentiment is treated* fully, it should be, at all events, kept only as a subordinate by constant attention, such other escapes should also be imagined

In case, the subordinate sentiment is of the opposite type, it should be slightly less developed as compared to the main sentiment e g in case of *śānta* and *śṛṅgāra*

Ānanda then proceeds to lay down the specific means of overcoming opposition between two opposite sentiments He says

viruddhaikāśrayo yastu virodhi sthayino bhavet ।
sa vibhinnāśrayaḥ kāryastasya poṣepyadoṣatā ॥ (III 25)

i e if an opposite sentiment is delineated with reference to the same substratum as that of the principal one, the opposite sentiment should be given a different substratum and thus even *if the opposite sentiment is fully treated, there will not* be any contradiction, e g in case of vira and bhayānaka If vira is defined with reference to the hero, bhayanaka *should be delineated with reference to the enemy The opposi-*tion between sentiments arises in a two-fold way e g. as already seen above, sentiments such as vira and bhayānaka *cannot reside in the same substratum The opposition* between sentiments may arise when certain sentiments come side by side Now in such *cases, some other sentiments* should intervene in between (III 26), e g in Nāgānanda śānta and śṛṅgāra are delineated with adbhuta intervening between the two *Thus, the contradiction between two sentiments in* one and the same sentence also can be remedied (III 27), e g in bhurenudigdhān navapārijāta etc

Ānanda says that these instructions should be *carefully* observed more in case of śṛṅgāra which is the most delicate type-sukumāratamo hyasau (III 28) If the poet is slightly

negligent in the delineation of rasa, it is immediately noticed and therefore he should be all attentive in this task (III 29).

Other Topics

Having thus disposed of the main topic of rasadhvani, Ānanda has to find place for other traditional topics of poetics This he has to do under his scheme of vyañjanā For example, he treats the topic of vṛttis such as paruṣā upanāgarikā etc as given by Udbhata, Rudrata, etc. and ritis such as gaudi and vaidarbhi as given by Dandin, etc in the following way Ānanda holds that the main task of a great poet lies in a proper marshalling of all the contents and the expressions in the direction of the sentiments and the like–

vācyānām vācakānām ca yadaucityena yojanam |
rasādivisayenaitat karma mukhyam mahākaveḥ ||
(Dhv III 32)

This observation, says Ānanda is corroborated by the fact that even Bharata has laid down vṛttis with reference to artha such as kaisiki and the like and with reference to sabda such as upanāgarikā and the like, with the same purpose, that is, rasa in view Says he

etacca rasāditatparyena kāvyanibandhanam bharatādāvapi suprasiddhamevet pratipādayitumāha–

rasādyanuguṇatvena vyavahāro'rthaśabdayoh |
aucityavān yastā etā vṛttayo dvividhāḥ sthitāh ||
(Dhv III 33).

Ānandavardhana further adds that vyavahāro hi vṛttirity-ucyate-i e modes of employment are themselves given the designation of 'mode' The mode of employing sense in conformity to sentiment as well as to the considerations of propriety underlies the various (dramatic) modes such as kaiśiki and the like Similarly that which relates to sounds underlies the modes such as upanāgarikā and the like.

like Thus mode, properly employed with the sole intention of conveying sentiments and the like, will lend charm to dramatic as well as poetic works Sentiments and the like constitute life-essence of both these modes Plots and the like serve only as the body Says he,

-vyavahāro hi vṛttirityucyate tatra rasānuguna aucityavān vācyāsrayo, yo vyavahārastā etāh kaisikyādayah hi rasāditātparyena sannivesitāh kāmapi nātyasya kāvyasya ca obhayāmāvahānti rasādayohi dvayorapi tayorjivabhutāh itivṛttādi tu sarirabhūtameva

Ānanda clearly states (III 48) that once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so called 'modes' relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings will become intelligible He adds that when this theory of poetry involving a descrimination of the suggested-suggester relationship is grasped, other categories like literary modes like kaisiki and upanāgarika will become quite intelligible. Otherwise modes will remain only incredible like unseen objects, and will not come within the range of personal experience-says he,

sabdatattvāsrayah kāscidarthatattvayujo'parah |
vrttayopi prakāsante jnāte'smin kāvyalaksane || (Dhv III 48)

asmin vyangyavyañjakabhāvavivecanamaye kāvyalaksane jñāte sati yāh kascitprasiddhā upanāgarikādyāh sabdatattvāsrayā vṛttayo yascārthatattvasambaddhāh kaisikyādayastāh samyag ritipadavim avataranti anyathā tu tāsāmadrstārthānāmiva vṛttinamasraddheyatvameva syānnānubhavasiddhatvam

Ānanda also incorporates the topic of alamkāra, guna and dosa in his scheme of vyañjanā

In his opinion, figures like metaphor and the like, become truly significant (i e will be real ornaments) when they are employed in instances of sṛngāra which is the soul of suggestion, with great descrimination

two important varieties of prabandha kāvya But Ānanda makes the importance of rasa more comprehensive or universal in all the varieties of poetry of which prabandha is only one, as seen above Thus we may say that as far as our knowledge goes, it is in Ānanda that we find the element of rasa becoming the soul of all poetry, a thing which was made explicit by Visvanatha in his famous utterance viz vākyaṃ rasātmakam kāvyam

Classification of Poetry

Ānandavardhana, after having shown the nature and scope of vyañjanā in a comprehensive way, naturally comes to regard it as the principal element in poetry However there are literary compositions in prose and verse, in which vyañjanā may be subordinate to the expressed sense or may not be apparent at all in conveying the charm of the literary piece Such compositions however, cannot be altogether thrown out of realm of poetry So, Ananda has recourse to a sort of classification of poetry, on the principal of vyanjana He does this in the following way

Dhvanikavya –

The class of poetry in which the suggested element is principal and in which the expressed word subordinates its sense and the expressed sense subordinates itself and suggest the implicit sense is termed dhvani Ānanda says,

> yatrārthah sabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanikṛtasvārthau ।
> vyaṅktah kāvyaviseṣah sa dhvaniriti sūribhih kathitah ॥
> (Dhv 1 13)

He adds that the kind of poetry wherein both meaning i e specific meaning, and word i e specific word, go to suggest only the said (i e implicit) meaning, is signified by the name dhvani or suggestive poetry–

> yatrārtho vācyaviśesah vācakaviseṣah sabdo vā tamartham vyaṅktah, sa kāvyaviseso dhvaniriti)

Abhinavagupta adds that the dual in 'vyañktah' is not for nothing It goes to imply that when it is said that a *word is suggestive of a particular implicit sense, it is always* a particular word accompanied by its particular sense or else any word will suggest any sense In the same way, when a meaning suggests the *implicit sense, it is not divorced from* the word-element Thus in fact both word and meaning operate simultaneously *in all types of suggestion* But at times the word element is more *important in bringing about the* result viz the suggestion of the implied sense, or at times the *meaning aspect is more important* Thus on consideration of the greater importance of either this element or that in bringing about the required effect, it is so called that either word *or meaning becomes suggestive* Thus Bhatta Nāyaka is off the mark when he criticises the dual in 'vañktah'-Abhinava says-

-vyanktah iti dvivacanenedamaha-vadapyavivaksitavacye sabda eva vyañjakaḥ tathāpyarthasyapi sahakāritā na trutyati, anyatha ajñātārthópi sabdastadvyañjakah syāt vivakṣitānya-paravacye ca sabdasyapi bhavatyeva visistasabdabhidheyatayā vina tasyārthasyāvyañjakatvādıti sarvatra sabdārthayorubhayor api dhvananam vyāpārah tena bhattanāyakena dvivacanam dūsitam tadgajanimīlikayaiva (Locana On I 13)

Ānanda illustrates avivaksitavācya or that with unmeatn expressed sense, in which word element is more important in the suggestion of the implicit sense, in the verse

suvarnapuspāṃ pṛthivim cinvanti puruṣastrayah |
sūrasca kṛtavidyasca yasca jānāti sevitum ||

Abhinava says that herein word is primarily suggestive and meaning is but an accessary to it-sabdótra pradhānatayā vyañjakah arthastu tatsahakāritayeti catvāro vyāpārāh

Ordinarily, the implicit sense would be derived from the explicit sense of a work There are, however, cases in which the explicit sense is not at all intended by the poet so that

the implicit sense cannot be derived from it e g in the verse suvarnapuspām pṛthivīm etc, the poet not intend to convey the explicit sense in such a way to make possible the derivation of the implicit sense through it He only uses the word suvarnapusām pṛthivīm etc because by the use of these words the wants to imply the sense that it is persons who are brave, learned and who are good servants that can acquire wealth. It is to bring to relief the idea of great wealth that the poet uses the word suvarnaouspām. So, this is a case in which the explicit sense is not at all intended Yet, the implicit sense is intended by the use of these usual words It is with reference to such cases that Ānanda says that sabda conveys implicit sense

Vivaksitānyaparavācya or that with meant but further extending expressed sense is illustrated by the verse,

sikharini kva nu nama kiyacciram
kimabhidhānamasāvakarottapah |
taruni yena tavādharapātalam
das'ati bimbaphalam Sukasavakah ||

In this particular instance, the expressed sense is primarily suggestive of the implicit sense viz the praise of the nāyikā and the personal feeling of the nāyaka Abhinava says that here there are only three functions viz abhidhā, tātparya and dhvanana, and lakṣaṇā is absent here Even if somehow or other on account of the unusual question on the part of the questioner lakṣaṇā is admitted in this instance, the prayojana or intention remains only implied and rests only in the fourth stage He holds that in the variety of dhvani called asam lakṣyakramavyaṅgya or that in which sequence is not noticeable, there is no scope for laksanā at all–asaṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgye to lakṣanā samunmeṣamātramapi nāsti–(Locana on I 13) Thus, in it only the meaning becomes primarily suggestive

Ānanda has subdivided the vivakṣitābhidheya dhvani into two viz asamlakṣyakrama and saṃlakṣyakrama (Dhv II 2)

These are based on abhidhā, i e on the expressed sense primarily

Asamlaksyakrama is of the type of rasādidhvani Samlaksyakramadhvani is again two fold, viz (i) that which is based on word and (ii) that which is based on sense

Samlaksya based on word is illustrated as in, *atrantare kusumasamayayugamupasamharan* etc (ii) the same based on sense is illustrated in *evam vadini devarsau* etc He says, "atra hi lilakamalapatragananamupasarjanikrtasvarupam sabdavyāpāram vinaivārthāntaram vyabhicāribhavalaksanam prakāsayati

The Gunibhūtavyangya

Another variety of poetry is seen when the artistic excellence of the expressed sense is greater than that of the suggested, though the latter is also present along with the former *This is termed as gunibhutavyangya or poetry in* which the suggested sense is subordinated to the expressed

(prakāro'nyo gunibhutavyangyah kāvyasya drs yate |
yatra vyangyānvaye vacyacārutvam syāt prakarsavat (I)

Dhv III 35

It is illustrated as in 'lavanyasindhuh aparā eve', etc or as in, 'anurāgavati samdhyā', etc In the alamkāras such as rasavat and the like, the rasa, bhāva etc. are subordinated *to the* expressed sense as in case of a king who is subordinated to his servant when the servant is marrying -vivahanapravrttabhrtyānuyāyirājavat (III 35 Dhv) Implied alamkāras are subordinated *as in case of* dipaka and the like Ānada *is of* the opinion that in all poetic compositions that look delighted by reason of their lucid and elegant words, only this variety of poetry should be recognised by the intelligent critics (III *36 Dhv), as in laksmi duhidā etc. The whole host of figures* is seen mostly to put on a new charm when brought into

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touch with the implicit sense (vyaṅgyāṃs'ānugame satı–Dhv. III 37) Ānanda supports himself by the famous quotation from Bhāmaha viz saiṣā sarvaiva vakroktih etc. (II 85. Bhāmaha) All the figures such as rūpaka and the like fall under this variety

The gunıbhūtavyaṅgya may have thus implicit sense subordinated to the expressed sense, and the implicit sense itself may be of the form of alaṃkāra, or vastu or rasādı as the case may be (gunıbhutavyaṅgyasya ca prakarāntarenāpı vyaṅgyārthānugamalakṣanena viṣayatvamastyeva) Thus, this second variety, which is the essence of dhvani dhvaninisyanda rūpah is to be recognised by the cultured Ānanda observes that there can be no poetry without a touch of the charm of the implicit This is the great secret of poetry and the learned should make a note of it (tadayam dhvanınıṣyandarūpo dvitıyópı mahākavıviṣayo tıramanıyo lakṣanıyah sahrdayaih sarvatha nāstyeva sahrdayahrdayahārinah kāvyasya sa prakāro yatra na pratıyamānārthasamspars'ena saubhāgyam tadidam kāvyarahasyam paramıti sūribhih vibhāvanıyam Dhv on III 37)

Ānanda is of the opinion that even in the presence of figures and the like, it is this element viz. the shade of the implicit sense, which is a great source of charm as is bashfulness in case of women (III 38 Dhv)

The realisation of second meaning with the help of kāku or change in the accent is also to be put under this variety. (Dhv III 39)

Ānanda has already called this variety as dhvanınıṣyanda He categorically declares that this variety also can be termed as dhval, when viewed from the standpoint of the main purport of rasa-says he

prakāro'yam gunıbhūtavyaṅgyo'pi dhvanirūpatām ı
dhatte rasādıtātparyaparyālocanayā punah ıı (Dhv III 40)

This is illustrated as in, patyuh śirah candrakalām, etc, or as in, prayacchata ucaih, etc, or as in, durārādhā rādhā, etc

Citrakavya

Finally, Ānanda describes the third variety of poetry called citra He holds that the two varieties mentioned above have implicit sense either as the principal sense or the subordinate one But anything else than those two is citra Thus citra (Dhv III 42 43) has no touch of the implied sense and is two-fold with reference to word and sense In fact there can be no poetry without the touch of the implied But when a poet, having no intention with reference to rasa, bhāva, etc, goes on producing figures of word and sense, then that poetry is said to be bereft of rasādi Thus, in such instances, the apprehension of rasādi when the poet does not mean it, is very pale and therefore the poetry is said to be 'nirasa'–

(vivaksopārudha eva hi kāvye sabdānāmarthah vācya-sāmarthyavasena ca kavivivakṣavirahe'pi tathāvidhe viṣaye rasādipratitirbhavanti paridurbalā bhavatityanenā'pi prakārena nirasatvam parikalpya citraviṣayo vyavasthāpyate)

It may be noted here that Ānanda does not call these varieties by the terms 'uttama', 'madhyama' and 'adhama'

Ānanda in the earlier part established the full significance of vyañjanā in its three-fold form viz. vastudhvani, alaṃkāra-dhvani and rasadhvani However, it is rasadhvani which he particularly emphasises. He asks the poets not to falter in rasadhvani. The touch of rasa so vitalises the old familiar things that they seem to have freshness of new life, just as the trees do by the touch of Spring (Dhv IV. 4). He observes that though several varieties of the vyaṅgya-vyañjakabhāva are possible, the poet should be intent upon one of them in particular viz that related to the delineation of sentiment and the like (Dhv IV 5) Abhinava in his locana also seems

to drive in the same direction when he observes that rasadhvani alone is principally the soul of poetry and that vastudhvani and alaṃkāradhvani ultimately merge into it

Ānanda is of the opinion that through dhvani and guṇībhūtavyaṅgya an infinite variety opens to the poetic genius (Dhv IV 1) The sentiments and the like, whose course is very wide, *should be followed along the said instructions* The limited range of poetry thus becomes boundless (Dhv IV 3)

The expressed is also of infinite variety with reference to the consideration of place, time, etc (Dhv IV 7) But it shines forth only when associated with rasa (Dhv IV, 8) Ānanda says that the theme of poetry will remain inexhaustible *as nature herself, if it is charged with rasa*

Foot-notes

1. Brahmanaśramaṇanyāya, i e the analogy of one who was formerly a brahmin and has now turned a śramaṇa After turning a śramaṇa he ceases to be a brahmin and the like. But, on account of his former status, he is known as a brāhmaṇa śramaṇa In the same way, alaṃkāradhvani is so termed because it is supposed to have a former status of an expressed alaṃkāra

2 Abhinava *says that this experience of sentiments* and the like is of the nature of supreme joy In the minds of all the individuals, there are certain permanent impressions such as rati, hāsa, etc engrained and born of the experience of everyday life When one looks at some dramatic performance, or reads a poem, one *experiences* the vibhāva, anubhāva, etc. and the permanent fixed emotions are roused to the status of rasa or a sentiment and the cultured man experiences supreme joy This rasa then, is of the form of relish and is recognised as the soul of poetry. (See Locana on Dhv. I 4) –

(*yastu svapne'pi na svaśabdavācyo na laukika vyavahārapatitaḥ kintu śabdasamarpyamāṇahṛdayasaṃvādasundaravibhāvānubhāvasamucitaprāgviniviṣṭaratyādivāsanānurāgasukumārasvasaṃvidā–*

nandacarvanāvyāpārarasanīyarūpo rasaḥ sa kāvyavyāpāraikagocaro rasadhvaniriti, sa ca dhvanireveti, sa eva mukhyatayātmeti–Locana on Dhv I 5)

3 Ānanda uses the word *dhvani* to indicate vyañjanā in general as well as to indicate a poem in which vyañjanā predominates i e becomes the main source of charm Abhinavagupta, and later on Mammata and others, confine the use of dhvani to those poems in which implicit sense predominates and do not use it for vyañjanā in general

The fact of the unnoticibility of the sequence of the expressed and implicit sense is interpreted in another way by saying that both are as if grapsed simultaneously

CHAPTER XII

THE PURVAPAKSA AGAINST VYAÑJANĀ IN THE DHVANYALOKA

As already noted by us, the Dhvanyāloka in the very first verse of the first udyota takes note of some of the views which negativate the theory of vyañjanā Furtheron in the third udyota also, Ānanda tries to establish rasa or dhvani as the soul of poetry and rejects the suggestion of the relation of quality and qualified (i e guṇaguṇībhāva) between rasa or sentiment and itivṛtta or subject matter in a poem The relation can only be of the type of the suggested and the suggestor i e vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāva Ānanda goes on to prove this and distinguishes carefully between vyañjanā and abhidhā, vyañjanā and lakṣaṇā, vyañjanā and tātparya and vyañjanā and anumana or inference To do this, he refutes the views of Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākranas and Naiyāyikas Let us consider these arguments

The Abhāvavādins

First of all, Ānanda takes up the ālaṃkārikas who either deny vyañjanā or try to subsume it under other poetic categories

Ānanda puts the views of the pūrvapakṣa as below

Some people are of the opinion that poetry is constituted of word and sense Sources of charm with reference to both word and sense such as śabdālaṃkāras and arthālaṃkāras or figures of word and sense are well-known So also are the guṇas or qualities such as mādhurya, prasāda etc Rīti or styles like vaidarbhī gauḍī, etc., vṛttis or modes like upanāgarikā, paruṣā, etc., are also recognised sources of charm in poetry So, what could this dhvani or suggestion be, which is different from the said sources of charm in poetry ?

Others hold that suggestion does not exist indeed, for a species of poetry opposed to all well-known canons will necessarily cease to be poetry Poetry can not be defined only as that which is made up of such word and sense as will delight the mind of the critic This definition will not hold good to a procedure which deflects from all well-known canons mentioned Thus, even if the designation of poety were brought into currency to convey dhvani, it could not be universally accepted.

There are again those who hold that it is impossible to think that suggestion or dhvani can be something unknown before Since it is not distinct from a source of charm, it naturally comes under the cause of charm already noted Just by coining a novel designation for one of them only, something of note will have been declared at the most Moreover, since the ways of speech are endless, even if there should be an insignificant element left unexplained by the earlier writers, persons should not close there eyes under self-assumed illusion of being 'cultured critics' and dance about with joy saying that they have discovered 'suggestion' therein So many great critics have been expounding figurative elements of speech. But they see nothing in it to boast about Suggestion can be one more alaṃkāra or guna, if you like

Ānanda here quotes a verse in support of the above view which runs as, yasminnasti na vastu etc Abhinava says that it is composed by some Manoratha Kavi This, we have already noted

Some others hold that suggested sense is something only indicated i e bhakta Still others take it as something indescribable (1)

While explaining the theory of vyañjanā as given in Dhv. I, 13 (viz yatrārthah s'abdo vā etc.), Ānanda refutes the opposing views

Refutation of the Abhavavāda

Ānanda's main argument in the refutation of the abhāva vādi is that while the gunas and alaṃkāras etc rest on the

relation of the expressed and the expressor, dhvani or suggestion is based on the relation of the suggested and the suggestor i e vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāva Thus, dhvani or suggestion can not be subsumed under it He quotes a verse

> vyaṅgyavyañjakasambandhanibandhanatayā dhvaneh ı
> vācyavācakacārutvahetvantahpātitā kutah ॥ (Dhv I.)

Ānanda also clarifies that the alamkāras such as samāsokti and the like do possess a touch of the implict sense. But dhvani or suggestion cannot be subsumed under these alamkāras because in them the expressed sense is the principal source of charm and the implicit sense is only subordinate to it Thus, in the verse-upodharāgena violatārakam etc , which is an illustration of samāsokti the expressed sense with reference to moon and night is more charming and the implicit sense with reference to the hero and the heroine is subservient to it So, Ānanda observes that when the suggested sense is not the principal source *of charm, and when it only follows i.e subserves the expressed* sense, as in samāsokti and the like, it is said to be the province of alamkāras and the like Or, when the suggested is just *observed and where it is not held to be principal, it is* not said to be dhvani But only when word and sense have the suggested as their purport, it is said to be the province of dhvani (2)

Bhaktivādins refuted

Ānanda's main arguments against the bhaktivādins proceed as below :

Dhvani cannot be indentical with bhakti or secondary sense on account of difference in form-rūpabheda-, and bhakti cannot be the lakṣana or definition of dhvani as both the *fallacies* of too wide i e, ativyāpti and too narrow i e avyāpti would result in that case At the most it might serve as a pointer-upalakṣana to some of the species of dhvani or suggestion

(bhaktyā bibharti naikatvam rūpabhedādayam dhvaniḥ |
ativyāpterathāvyāpterna cāsau lakṣyate tayā || (Dhv. I, 14)
(.. kasyacid dhvanibhedasya sā tu syādupalakṣaṇam |
(Dhv. I. 19. a)

The difference in nature or form between dhvani and bhakti i.e. between suggestion and indication is that while suggestion lies in the implication of a meaning other than the expressed and in a way in which the suggested sense forms the purport and is principal, bhakti is mere metaphorical expression. (3)

Bhakti or secondary sense can not be the lakṣana or definition of dhvani or suggestion on account of the faults of ativyāpti and avyāpti. The fault of ativyāpti or too wide occurs because bhakti exists even in the absence of dhvani e.g in case of verses such as, parimlānam pina...etc. or cumbijjai sa ahuttam etc. Words such as 'lāvaṇya' and the like do not fall in the province of dhvani Ānanda is of the opinion that if one gives up the primary expressive power of a word and understands a sense (secondarily conveyed by it) through its indicative power, it is because of a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word *does not move falteringly* at all (as it moves falteringly when indicating a meaning secondarily).

(mukhyām vṛttim parityajya guṇavṛtyārthadarśanam |
yaduddis'ya phalam, tatra śabdo naiva skhaldgatiḥ) ||
(Dhv. I. 17)

Guṇavṛtti or indication is based on vācakatva or the primary power of expression of words. Thus, it can not be a definition of suggestion or dhvani which is solely based on suggestivity. Thus, suggestion i.e. dhvani is one thing and indication quite another-tasmādanyo dhvaniḥ anyā ca guṇavṛttiḥ.

Avyāptidoṣa or the fallacy of too narrow definition also walks in if one tries to define dhvani or suggestion as

indication For, indication. does not cover instances of suggestion like, 'that with meant but further extending expressed sense' i e vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani Thus, indication or bhakti cannot be the definition of suggestion or dhvani

Ānanda is of the opinion that at the most indication or bhakti might serve as a pointer to some of the species of suggestion or dhvani i e it may be an upalakṣaṇa of dhvani

Finally Ānanda makes a reply to those who took dhvani or suggestion as indescribable Ānanda says that even those, who declare that the nature of suggestion is only within the experience of cultured critics and that it is inexpressible, betray only their lack of discernment The definition of dhvani or suggestion has been already propounded (Dhv I 13) and so also the definitions of its several varieties will be set forth in the sequel Inspite of all these, if it should be thought of as inexpressible or anirvacanīya then this would be true of every thing in the world If, on the other hand, they are only giving expression to the all surpassing nature of suggestion or dhvani by means of this exaggeration, then they also might be regarded as stating the truth itself (4)

Thus, Ānanda first refutes the views of the opponents and clears the way for his theory

Vyañjana as distinguished from other sardavṛttis

Ānandavardhana brilliantly distinguishes between the nature and scope of vyañjana on one hand and that of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, tātparya and also anumāna on the other

The objector seems to hold that there is the relation of quality and substance between rasa i e the implied sense in general and the vācya or the expressed sense (guṇaguṇivyavahāro rasādīnāmitivṛttādibhiḥ saha yukto, na tu jīvas arīravyavahāraḥ rasādimayaṃ hi vācyam pratibhāsate, na tu rasādibhiḥ pṛthagbhūtam iti) (Dhv III 33) One can perceive the

expressed only as full of sentiment but never the expressed as an entity separate from sentiment

Ānanda does not seem to accept this position In his opinion, the expressed is not full of sentiment in the same way as is the body full of whiteness and the like Moreover, all do not seem to perceive rasa along with the expressed as is whiteness and the like perceived along with the body It can not be argued that the presence of sentiment in the expressed can be discernible only to the cultured, as is the preciousness of a jewel being discernible only to some For in that case, the sentiments would have to be discerned as something not differnt from the determinants i e vibhāva, consequents i e anubhāvas etc , as is preciousness in case of diamonds –(naivam, yato yathā jātyatvena pratibhāsamāne ratne ratnasvarūpānatiriktatvameva tasya lakṣyate, tathā rasā-dināmapi vibhāvānubhāvadiupavācyavyatiriktatvameva lakṣ-yate) (Dhv III 33) On the otherhand, it is well-known that vibhāva, anubhāva etc are not identical with rasa The apprehension of determinants and th• like is only an invariable condition of the apprehension of sentiments and the like Thus, as there is the possibility of cause-effect relation between the two, sequence becomes inevitable It is however, not notice-able on account of quickness Thus, the position stands that sentiments and the like, with unnoticeable sequence, are sug-gested The objector holds that the word itself aided by context and the like, produces a simultaneous apprehension of the expressed and the suggested, and therefore the problem of sequence does not arise at all, and that the apprehension of the expressed sense is not inevitable for gathering the suggested sense, as in case of song and the like. To this, Ānanda has the following reply That the word is suggestive of a particular sense only when aided by context and the like is acceptable to us also But this suggestiveness is sometimes due to their specific nature itself and sometimes due to the denotative power of words –(kiṃtu tadvyañjakatvaṃ teṣām

kadācit svarupavis'esanibandhanam kadācidvācakasaktinibandhanam) (Dhv III 33) In *instances where suggestiveness* is due only to the specific nature of sounds and where apprehension of expressed meanings does not play any part at all, it would be tantamount to saying that suggestiveness is not governed by the denotative power of words at all But if *suggestiveness is to be governed at all by the expressive power* of words, the conclusion becomes irresistable that the apprehension of suggested sense can only be later in time than the apprehension of the expressed sense If that temporal sequence is so brisk as to escape notice, what is to be done ? (tatra *yesām* *vācakasaktinibandhanam* *tesām* *yadi* *vācyatpratiti*mantarenaiva svarupapratityā nispannam tadbhavenna tarhi vācakaśaktinibandhanam atha tannibandhanam tanniyamenaiva vācyavācakabhāvapratityuttarakālatvam vyangyapratiteh prāptameva. sa tu kramo yadi lāghavānna laksyate taikim kriyate (Dhv III, 33)

Ānanda further argues that if in truth, the apprehension of sentiments were possible just by words aided by context and the like, then every reader acquainted with the context, including those who are quite ignorant of the connotation of words, should have had the apprehension of sentiment by merely hearing a poem If the apprehension of the expressed and the suggested were simultaneous, there would be no use at all of the apprehension of the expressed On the contrary, if there should be any use for the apprehension of the expressed it is possible *that the two* cannot coexist-(sahabhave ca vācyapratiteranupayogah upayoge vā na sahabhavah (Dhv. III 33)

It is true that in music, we have suggestiveness due to the perception of the specific nature of sound alone But even there, we do have, invariably, temporal sequence between the apprehension of the nature of sounds and that of suggested *sentiments But this temporal sequence in the two functions* of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments are suggested,

because sentiments are neither opposed to the expressed sense nor appear as similar to the other sense, they are incapable or being conveyed by anything else, and all their accessaries work together with lightening-quickness—(yeṣāmapi svarūpavis'eṣapratipattinimittaṃ vyañjakatvaṃ yatha gitādis'abdanām, teṣāmapi svarūpapratītervangyapratītes ca niyamabhāvi kramah tattu s'abdasya kriyapaurvāparyam ananyasādhyatatphalaghatanāsvās'ubhāvinis'u vācyenavirodhinyabhidhayantaravilaksane rasādau na pratiyate (Dhv III 33)

But in some contexts, the sequence is noticeable also, e g in case of resonance-like suggestion (anuranananarupavyaṅgyapratitisu-Dhv III 33) In this type of suggestion, there will be apprehension of two senses viz (i) the expressed sense, and (ii) the sense suggested by the power of sense, but quite distinct from the other expressed sense As nobody can concel the cause effect relation between the apprehensions of the two senses, the temporal sequence between them is obvious e g the prākrta gāthās such as bhama dhammia etc (atyantavilaksane ye pratiti tayorasakyanihnavo nimittanimittibhāva iti sphutameva tatra paurvāparyam Dhv III 33)

In the instances such as bhama dhammia etc it is impossible to affirm that the apprehension of the one is identical with that of the other Even in instances of resonance-like suggestion based on the power of word (i e sabdasaktimulānuranananarūpavyaṅgyadhvani), such as gavo vah pāvanānaṃ etc also, wherein we have the apprehension of the two senses from the same words, similitude, between the two senses will be found suggested Since we do not have any word openly expressing similitude, we will have to agree that it is suggested only by the power of sound. Thus it is clear that there is sequence between the apprehensions of the expressed sense and that of the suggested figure even here Similar is the case with padaprakāsasabdasaktimūlānuranarūpavyaṅgya i e in the variety of resonance-like suggestion based on the power of sound, viz that which shines out in individual words.

Ānanda holds that in suggestion based on unmeant expressed sense i e avivakṣitavācyadhvani-, the suggested sense comes only after the apprehension that the conventional meaning is inapplicable (in the context), and therefore, the temporal sequence is present as a rule It is therefore clear, that even the apprehensions of the expressive word and the expressed sense involves a cause effect relation and a temporal sequence It may be noticeable or otherwise

-(tasmādabhidhānābhidheyapratītyoriva vācyavyaṅgyapratītyornimittanimittibhāvānniyamabhāvī kramaḥ sa tūktyā kvacillakṣyate kvacinna lakṣyate)

Ānanda after having established that the two apprehensions viz. those of the expressed and of the suggested senses as not simultaneous but as the latter following the former, now proceeds to establish the distinction between the expressed (vācyartha) and the suggested (vyaṅgyārtha) on different grounds

The purvapaksa is given as below

First objection of the pūrvapaksa is that artha or meaning can neither suggest (vyañjaka) nor be suggested (vyaṅgya), because the existence of the suggested sense is dependent upon the existence of the suggestive word, and the existence of the suggestive word is dependent upon the existence of the suggested sense, and therefore, it is a case or arguing in circle. The answer to this would be that the suggested sense is already established earlier by independent meaning and hence this fallacy does not arise (5) This position is not accepted by the pūrvapakṣa According to it there is nothing like suggested sense of a word Whatever is expressed immediately or in sequence is really the expressed sense of the word i e. abhidhā. Thus, vyañjanā is in no way established Hence, it is futile to speak of a relation called 'vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāva'. In cases where one meaning leads to another the first is only a means-upāyamātra-to the second This, however, in no

way proves the existence of vyañjanā as something other than abhidhā This happens as in case of word sense and sentence-sense (6)

The name or the school of this objector is not mentioned by Ānanda Abhinavagupta, however, says that this objection is based upon the Mimāmsaka and Vaiyākarana theories, which he explains as follows (7)

upāyamātramityanena sādhāranoktyā bhāttam prābhākaram vaiyākaranam ca pūrvapaksam sūcayati bhāttamate hi,

vākyārthamitaye tesām pravrttau nāntariyakam ।
pāke jvāleva kāsthanām padārthapratipādanam etc ॥
(Locana, on Dhv III 33)

The slokavārtika says the burning fuel has preparation of food as its goal, itself being only a means to this end The fuel cannot do it in the absence of fire Thus, fire is nāntariyaka hetu or the immediate cause in the act of food preparation So, fuel is the hetu or cause of fire and fire brings about paka i e food preparation Ultimately fuel has 'pāka' for its end (hetu) Similarly, the words intend to give meaning But for that meaning sabdārtha (word-sense) becomes the nāntariyakahetu i e the immediate cause

The prābhakaras have a different analogy They cite the analogy of an arrow that, when discharged by a powerful man, cuts through the armour, pierces the vitals and takes away the breath Thus, the arrow has 'prānāpaharana' i e 'taking the life' as its object, but gātrāpaghāta i e cutting the vitals is the means In the same way, in going from a pada or word to a vākyārtha i e sentence sense, padārtha i e word-sense serves as a means only.

The Vaiyākaranas also share this view The only difference is that while the prābhākaras hold sakti in the 'kāryānvita', and therefore they do not stand in need of separate tātparya-vrtti, and the intermediate padārthas are taken to be tāttvika

or real, the Vaiyākaranas consider the padartha as unreal—atattvika-in the sense in which the vedāntins hold ghata, pata etc to be atattvika i e unreal, due to avidyā or nescience Thus, for the Vaiyākaranas, intermediate padārthas are unreal, the Sphota or S'abdabrahma is the only reality

The arguments of the Siddhāntin are based on the assumption of the characteristics of distinctness (bheda) as such Those things can be said to be distinct which are different in nature (i e svarupabheda), and different in scope (i e visayabheda) This dictum is applied to the expres sed sense i e vācyartha and the implied sense i e the vyangyārtha If the vyangyārtha (implicit sense) can be proved to be different from vācyārtha (expressed sense) both in svarūpa and visaya (i e nature and scope), they should be accepted as distinct from each other This is the siddhāntin s argument in a nut shell He elaborates it as follows

In case of a word giving another meaning after conveying the primary meaning, will the objector accept any difference between these two functions or not? Does the objector recog nise these two functions viz expression of the primary meaning and implication of the suggested sense as identical? The view that these two are identical can not be accepted There is difference in the scope as well as nature of these two (i e viṣayabheda and svarūpabheda), e g the scope of the function of expression in a word is confined to the primary sense, and the scope of the function of implication involves a sense other than the primary sense The objector can not say 'no' to the fact that the expressed sense (vācyārtha) is 'its own' sense of the word, while the implict sense (vyangyārtha) is, 'one belonging to the other' The expressed (vācyārtha) is directly related to the word The apprehension of the implied sense (vyangyārtha) can be remotely related to the word through the medium of the expressed sense (vācyārtha) If the implict sense (vyangyārtha) is also considered as directly related to the word, and not as indirectly related

through the medium of the expressed sense (vācyārtha), then, in that case, it should not be recognised as another sense at all. Thus the difference in the scope of these two functions becomes clear by itself.

The difference in nature, too, is equally obvious. The two functions can never be identical, for we find suggestiveness even in sounds of music etc. and even in gestures, which are not even sounds.

Again, the analogy of word-import and sentence-purport also does not quite apply to the expressed and the suggested senses. In the opinion of certain philosophers, the very concept of word-import is unreal Even those who take it to be real, will have to agree that the analogy of pot and its material cause (i e ghaṭa, tadupādānakāraṇanyāya) will explain better the relation between sentence-purport and word-import. Just as the material causes of pot cannot be separately recognised after the pot is made, so also, word and its sense are not recognised as distinct, once the sentence-sence is gathered. But this principle does not hold good with reference to the expressed and the suggested senses. When the suggested sense is gathered, the expressed is not driven away. The apprehension of the suggested is inseparably occasioned by the gathering of the expressed sense Thus, the analogy of the pot and lamp is more applicable. So, the remarks in the first udyota viz. that 'just as the purport of a sentence...... etc.' at Dhv. I. 10-aims only at pointing out that there is some similarity between the two in the fact that both are means to some other end. The analogy ends at this, and need not be pursued in greater details (10)

The objector now advances a fresh argument as below: 'Now, in this case there arises the contingency of there being two senses simultaneously following from one and the same sentence. In that case, it ceases to be sentenc eitself' To this,

Ānanda's reply is that this fault cannot be there as the two senses are related as principal and subordinate Either of the two senses can be principal or subordinate as the case may be (11)

Ānanda observes that when the vyaṅgyārtha or the suggested sense is subordinate, and the vācyārtha is principal, according to the maxim–yatparah sabdah sa sabdārthah i e a word means only that for which it is ultimately used, and it is said to be case of the s'abda or word being 'vācyaparaka'. When the vyaṅgyārtha or the suggested sense is principal the word is said to be 'vyaṅgyaparaka' Now, in the first instance, when the vyaṅgya or, suggested sense is subordinate, the word is not 'vyaṅgyaparaka', but the vyaṅgyārtha or the suggested sense is madhyavarti i e intermediatory So, it will have to be recognised as something different from vācyārtha or the expressed sense (12)

Vyañjanā, necessity for the Mimamṣakas

After having established the distinctness of vācyārtha or the expressed sense and vyaṅgyārtha or the implict sense, i e of abhidhā and vyañjanā Ānanda gives other arguments showing how it is necessary for the Mimāmsakas to accept vyañjanā, in order to make their distinction between laukika and vaidika vākyas (i e between sentences in ordinary speech and those in the vedas) logical

Ānanda observes that the adherent of the Mimāmsā school of philosophy will have to accept perforce the conclu sion that words have also incidental power of the nature of suggestiveness For the Mimāmsakas, the relation between word and meaning is eternal This is true both of the popular word and the vedic word For this reason, both the popular and vedic word would be equally eternally correct But this is not agreed to by the Mimāmsakas For the popular speech is fallible, while the vedic is not The reason lies in the fact

that the human speech is motivated by several considerations i.e. it is 'sopādhika'. Thus the Mīmāṃsakas have to accept the 'sopādhikasaṃbandha' i e. the element of intention in the popular speech in addition to direct relation between word and meaning. The suggestion of *this intention is* vyañjanā. So the Mīmāṃsakas cannot escape this contingency. (13)

This however does not mean that every sentence falls under *the category of vyañjanā. In cases where intention is identical with the directly expressed sense, there is no need* to bring in vyañjanā. We have to bring in vyañjanā only when the inteded sense in the form of vastu, alamkāra and rasa cannot be expressed by the direct sense. (14)

Lakṣaṇā-Vyañjanā

After having thus disposed of the question of the identity of ābhidhā and vyañjanā, we now take up lakṣaṇā.

The pūrvapakṣa *holds that vyañjanā is not different from* lakṣanā because both are dependent upon word and sense.

To this, Ānanda's answer is that both differ from each other on account *of the difference in nature and scope i.e.* because of svarūpabhedā and viṣayabheda The rūpabheda or difference in nature or from consists in the fact that guṇavṛtti or indication *is reputed to be not principal (i e. amukya)*, while vyañjakatva i.e. suggestivity is principal or mukhya. (15)

There is another difference in respect of their natures. Indication *(guṇavṛtti) is practically abhidhā or expression* itself, with the difference that it is a subordinate verbal function; suggestion (vyañjanā) on the other hand is something far removed *from expression. (16)*

Again, when another meaning is gathered through indication (guṇavṛtti), the first sense merges itself with the second and becomes *one with it*, e g. *in 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ' a hamlet on*

the Ganges'. But when the other sense in derived through suggestion, the first sense retains its individuality while conveying the other, in the fashion of a lamp 'Līlākamala-patrāni gaṇayāmāsa pārvatī-i e Pārvatī counted the petals of her play-lotus, etc -are illustrations to the point If the name 'indication' (lakṣaṇā) were to be given to those instance also where one sense conveys another sense without losing its own importance, then it would be tentamount to saying that indication (lakṣaṇā) itself is the primary verbal function. *For, usually, every sentence possesses the power to convey a* purport over and above the expressed senses of individual words (17)

It may be asked by the objector, that, "when a word conveys another sense, what is the precise verbal function involved ?" The Locana elaborates this argument as follows the function of a word is two-fold, either principal or subordinate Now, in the instances cited by the siddhantin, if he calls it to be principal function, it is nothing else but abhidhā and if he calls it a subordinate one, it is guṇavṛtti or secondary sense There is no third alternative So, when *vyañjanā operates, how will it be called by the Siddhāntin,* mukhya or amukhya ? (principal or subordinate ?)

The reply is that even in case of vyañjanā (suggestion) the function involved is the principal one, but owing to difference in conditions, *it cannot be called* abhidha Ābhidhā depends on convention Vyañjanā depends on context and the like Suggestion takes into consideration the importance of a particular word also, and therefore the word-element is also important (18)

Again, the difference in scope (viṣayabheda) is also quite clear The scope of suggestion is three-fold viz, (i) sentiments and the like, (ii) specific figures of speech, and (iii) suggested *ideas Of these three,* the apprehension of sentiments and the like can never take place through lakṣaṇā or indication

Same is the case with the suggested figures also. And, so far as the suggested idea is concerned, only that is suggested therein, which is intended to be conveyed by the poet by a process other than abhidhā or expression. All this cannot be included in the scope of lakṣaṇā, since we can see several examples of laksanā based merely on convention or usage i.e. rūdhi If at all there is any touch of beauty instanced in laksanā or indication, it is entirely due to the element of suggestion or vyañjanā, involved in it. Hence, laksanā (indication) and vyañjanā (suggestion) are widely different from each other. Suggestion, in fact, is not only different from abhidhā or expression and lakṣaṇā or indication, but it is also based upon each of them Thus it is impossible to regard suggestiveness (vyañjakatva) which is assisted by both these, to be wholly identical with either. As it derives assistance from laksanā, it cannot be identical with abhidhā and as it gets assistance sometimes from abhidhā (expression) it cannot be identical with laksanā (indication) alone. As it partakes the characteristics of both, it cannot be comprehended by either.

The objector may raise the following point, viz. that there may be no element of lakṣaṇā (indication) in suggestion with meant but further extending expressed sense. But what difference is there between suggestion with unmeant expressed sense and lakṣaṇā? (19). The reply is that there is no scope for any fault even here Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense (lakṣaṇāmūlaka dhvani) might walk in the foot-steps of lakṣaṇā (indication) but it does not assume the form of lakṣaṇā (indication) itself. It is possible to have an instance of indication (lakṣaṇā) which is devoid of suggestiveness. But we never come across suggestiveness devoid of the beauty of suggestion. Whenever we come across instances of indication (lakṣaṇā) that become a source of apprehension of the suggested content full of beauty, we find that it is all entirely due to its touch of suggestiveness In case of expression

(abhidhā) So, in both the divisions of suggestion with unmeant expressed sense, we see that indication (lakṣaṇā) is tinged with a shade of suggestiveness This certainly will not appear identical with lakṣaṇā (indication), but quite separate from it and brings delight to the minds of the cultured (20)

Ānanda further tells of resources of vyañjanā other than words Sounds without meaning also suggest emotions just as notes of music Gestures without sounds, also can convey meaning and emotions

Thus, Ānanda establishes the three-fold division of the verbal function, viz abhidhā, laksana and vyañjanā (21)

Ānanda in conclusion also makes a note of the fact that he has based his theory of vyañjanā on the authority of those who are masters of the principles of śabdabrahma He refers to the Vaiyākaranas upon whose Sphota theory he draws (22)

Having shown the distinctness of the three functions of word viz abhidhā lakṣana and vyañjanā Ānanda takes up the arguments of those who regard vyañjanā as inference

Vyañjanā and Inference

The logicians argue as below

In fact this suggestiveness is none other than implication, and implication is the same as the state of an inferential process The apprehension of the suggested idea is thus identical with the inferential knowledge of the probandum (paksa) So, to put it otherwise the relation of the suggester and the suggested is none other than the relation of liṅgaliṅgi i e probans-probandum There is also another reason which substantiates this conclusion The Siddhāntin has explained that words possess suggestiveness directed to the speaker's intention, and this element of the speaker's intention is only inferable (23)

Ānanda replies that any way, the Naiyāyika accepts the fact that over and above the meanings given by abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, there is a third process which gives its own peculiar meaning However, this process cannot be regarded as inference, because there is no proper inference at all An inference depends upon the relation of liṅgaliṅgibhāva which is absent in this process In a logical inference, there is no doubt about the sādhya which is proved by means of hetu, e g when fire is inferred on the basis of hetu i e smoke, no doubt remains about the inference of the predicate i e sādhya Such a logical sādhyasādhana relation does not exist in the case of the implied sense or vyaṅgyārtha No logical relation between sādhya and sadhana is meant in vyaṅgyārtha i e suggested sense Hence though vyaṅgyārtha or suggested sense is grasped indirectly, the mental process is not that of logical inference Hence vyaṅgyārtha is to be regarded as the function of word as such

How vyañjakatva is different from liṅgatva or how vyaṅgyapratīti and liṅgapratīti are dissimilar and non identical, is explained by Ānanda as follows The objector has really made a clever use of the words of Siddhāntin in substantiating his position He has remarked that the speaker's intention is certainly implied and added that such implication is the same as the state of inferential probans (i e liṅgatva) But in fact the true meaning of the statement is as below -The scope of words is two-fold, (i) inferable and (ii) expressive of which, the inferable is always of the nature of the speaker's intention This intention of the speaker, once again, is two-fold-(i) desire to utter words for their own sake and (ii) desire to convey meanings through words Between these, the first type of the speaker's intention does not play any part in verbal discourse It only serves to distinguish an animal from a non animal But the second type of speaker's intention plays the part of approximate cause in verabal discourses, though it is rendered rather remote due to several other

intervening factors between the utterance of the word and the apprehension of its meaning Both these types of speaker's intention are inferable from words (24)

But the expressive scope of words is related to meaning itself which happens to be the aim of the speaker's intention to convey meanings It is also two fold (i) The expressed and (ii) the suggested (25) The speaker may use words in a view to convey his meaning directly by means of them (and then we get the vacyārtha), or he may use words which do do not directly convey his meanings, with a view to achieving some purpose (and thus we get the vyaṅgyārtha) Both these aspects are far from appearing as probandum of any inference based on words On the other hand, the relationship between word and such expressive content is something other than inference, whether it be a conventional or unconventional relationship It is only the aspect of intention on the part of a speaker to employ words or meaningful words that is inferable and not the meaning itself conveyed by his words If it were true that the meaning itself could form the probandum of an inference having words for its probans, there should be no scope for doubts at all, whether any meaning is right or otherwise, e.g, when the probandum viz. fire, is inferred from the probans, viz smoke, there is indeed no room for any doubt about the existence of fire (26)

Ānanda then goes on to explain that the vyaṅgyārtha as it is conveyed by the power of the expressed itself (vācya-sāmarthyākṣiptatayā), it too, is related to the word, just as the expressed meaning is related to the word Directness or indirectness is not the differentiating condition of a relationship (sākṣādasākṣādbhāvo hi saṃbandhasya aprayojakah) That suggestiveness is related to expression has been already shown The conclusion is thus indisputable that words will have the state of an inferential probans only while implying the intention of the speaker and that the meanings themselves

which are signified by the words are due to the verbal power of expression and not inference (27)

Now, we may take instances of meanings which are suggested by a word These may be of the nature of intention and may not be as well Can we say *that all such meanings are conveyed by the power of expression alone in words ? or Should we postulate some other function ?* It has been already shows that the power of expression alone cannot explain the suggested meaning Hence we will have to admit another function and that function itself is called suggestiveness by us The nature of suggestiveness is not co extensive with the nature of an inferential probans, since the former exists in objects like light where the latter is absent (28) *Just as the expressed content of words is not identical with the probadum of an inference, so also suggested content is not identical with it* (29) On the contrary, that which becomes the object of an inferred probandum as shown above, does not constitute what is expressed but constitutes only an adventitious attribute of what is expressed (30) *If the expressed meaning too were to be gathered by inference, there could be no scope for any difference of opinion regarding it in the world, which we do come across in our daily life*

It is true doubtless, that at times, one does not resort to inference and other instruments of knowledge while deciding the truth of even an expressed meaning Though it falls within the scope of other instruments of knowledge, its being simultaneously an object of the verbal power of expres sion does not suffer in the least The same is the case with the suggested meaning also (31) Again, *as a matter of fact, the question of logical truth and falsity in regard to suggested sense in poetry, is entirety futile Therefore, it is ridiculous to indulge in discussions regarding different instruments of knowledge applicable therein* (32) *So it is impossible to identify the apprehension of the suggested meaning with the apprehension of the inferred probandum in every case*

Thus Ānanda establishes the theory of vyañjanā and shows how vyañjanā is different from abhidhā, tātparya, lakṣaṇā and anumāna

Foot note

(1) बुधै काव्यतत्त्वविद्भि, काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति संज्ञित परम्परया य समाम्नातपूर्व सम्यक् आ समन्तात् म्नात प्रकटित तस्य सहृदयजनमन प्रकाशमानस्याप्यभावमन्ये जगदु । तदभाववादोना चामी विकल्पा सम्भवन्ति ।

तत्र केचिदाचक्षरिन् । शब्दार्थशरीरं तावत्काव्यम् । तत्र च शब्दगताश्चारुत्वहेतवोऽनुप्रासादय प्रसिद्धा एव । अर्थगताश्चोपमादय । वर्णसघटनाधर्माश्च ये माधुर्यादयस्तेऽपि प्रतीयन्ते । तदनतिरिक्तवृत्तयो वृत्तयोऽपि या कैश्चिदुपनागरिकाद्या प्रकाशिता ता अपि गता श्रवणगोचरम् । रीतयश्च वैदर्भीप्रभृतय । तद्व्यतिरिक्त कोऽय ध्वनिर्नामेति ।

अन्ये ब्रूयु –नास्त्येव ध्वनि । प्रसिद्धप्रस्थानव्यतिरेकिण काव्यप्रकारस्य काव्यत्वहाने सहृदयहृदयाह्लादि शब्दार्थमयत्वमेव काव्यलक्षणम् । न चोक्तप्रस्थानव्यतिरेकिणो मार्गस्य तत्सम्भवति । न च तत्समयान्त पातिन सहृदयान् कांश्चित् परिकल्प्य तत् प्रसिद्ध्या ध्वनौ काव्यव्यपदेश प्रवर्तितोऽपि सकल विद्वन्मनोग्राहितामवलम्बते ।

पुनरपरे तस्याभावमन्यथा । कथयेयु –न सम्भवत्येव ध्वनिर्नामापूर्व कश्चित् । कामनीयकमनतिवर्तमानस्य तस्योक्तेष्वेव चारुत्वहेतुष्वन्तर्भावात् । तेषामन्यतमस्यैव वा अपूर्वसमाख्यामात्रकरणे यत्किञ्चन कथन स्यात् ।

किं च वाग्विकल्पानामानन्त्यात् सम्भवत्यपि वा कस्मिंश्चित् काव्यलक्षण विधायिभि प्रसिद्धैरप्रदर्शिते प्रकारलेशे ध्वनिर्ध्वनिरिति यदेतदलीकसहृदयत्वभावनामुकुलितलोचनैर्नृत्यते तत्र हेतु न विद्म । सहस्रशो हि महात्मभिरलङ्कार प्रकारा प्रकाशिता प्रकाश्यन्ते च । न च तेषामेषा दशा श्रूयते ।

तस्मात्प्रवादमात्र ध्वनि । न त्वस्य क्षोदक्षम तत्त्व किञ्चिदपि प्रकाशयितु शक्यम् । तथा चान्येन कृत एवात्र श्लोक ।

यस्मिन्नस्ति न वस्तु किंचन मन प्रह्लादि सालङ्कृति व्युत्पन्नैरचित न चैव वचनैर्वक्रोक्तिशून्य च यत् । काव्यं तद्ध्वनिना समन्वितमिति प्रीत्या प्रशसन्जडो नो विद्मोऽभिदधाति किं सुमतिना पृष्ट स्वरूप ध्वने ।

भाक्तमाहुस्तमन्ये । अन्ये तु ध्वनिसज्ञित काव्यात्मान गुणवृत्तिरित्याहु ।

यद्यपि ध्वनिशब्दसंकीर्तनेन काव्यलक्षणविधायिभिः गुणवृत्तिरन्यो वा न कश्चित् प्रकारः प्रकाशितः तथापि अमुख्यवृत्त्या काव्येषु व्यवहारं दर्शयता ध्वनिमार्गो मनाक्स्पृष्टोऽपि न लक्षित इति परिकल्प्य एवमुक्तम्–भाक्तमाहुस्तमन्ये इति ।

केचित्पुनर्लक्षणकरणशालीनबुद्धयो ध्वनेस्तत्त्वं गिरामगोचरं सहृदयमनःसंवेद्यमेव समाख्यातवन्तः । तेनैवंविधासु विमतिषु स्थितासु सहृदयमनःप्रीतये तत्स्वरूपं ब्रूमः । /

तस्य हि ध्वनेः स्वरूपं सकलसत्कविकाव्योपनिषद्भूतमतिरमणीयमणीयसीभिरपि चिरन्तनकाव्यलक्षणविधायिनां बुद्धिभिरनुन्मीलितपूर्वम् । अथ च रामायणमहाभारतप्रभृतिनि लक्ष्ये सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धव्यवहारं लक्षयतां सहृदयानामानन्दो मनसि लभतां प्रतिष्ठामिति प्रकाश्यते । Dhv I 1

(2) Adhinava puts them as,

(i) तत्र समयापेक्षणेन शब्दोऽर्थप्रतिपादक इति कृत्वा वाच्यव्यतिरिक्तो नास्त्येव व्यङ्ग्यम्, (ii) सदपि वा तदभिधावृत्त्याक्षिप्तं शब्दगतार्थबलाकृष्टत्वात् भाक्तम्, (iii) तदनाक्षिप्तमपि वा न वक्तुं शक्यं कुमारीष्विव भर्तृसुखमतद्विद्स्विति त्रय एवैते प्रधानविप्रतिपत्तिप्रकाराः ।

(3) लोचन on Dhv I 1 reads तत्राभावविकल्पस्य त्रयः प्रकाराः–शब्दार्थगुणालङ्काराणामेव शब्दार्थशोभाकारित्वाल्लोकशास्त्रातिरिक्तसुन्दरशब्दार्थरूपस्य काव्यस्य न शोभाहेतुः कश्चिदन्योऽस्ति योऽस्माभिर्न गणित इत्येकः प्रकारः । यो वा न गणितः स शोभाकार्येव न भवतीति द्वितीयः । अथ शोभाकारी भवति तर्ह्युक्तेष्वेव गुणे वाऽलङ्कारे वान्तर्भवति, नामान्तरकरणे तु कियदिदं पाण्डित्यं, तथापि किञ्चिद्विशेषलेशमाश्रित्य नामान्तरकरणमुपमाविच्छित्तिप्रकाराणामसंख्यत्वात् । तथापि गुणालङ्कारव्यतिरिक्तत्वाभाव एव । तावन्मात्रेण च किं कृतम् ? अन्यस्यापि वैचित्र्यस्य शक्योत्प्रेक्षत्वात् । चिरन्तनैर्हि भरतमुनिप्रभृतिभिर्यमकोपमे शब्दार्थालङ्कारत्वेन इष्टे । तत्प्रपञ्चदिक्प्रदर्शनं त्वन्यैरलङ्कारिकैः कृतम् । तद्यथा कर्मण्यण् इत्यत्र कुम्भकारादुदाहरणं श्रुत्वा स्वयं नगरकारादिशब्दा उत्प्रेक्ष्यन्ते । तावता क आत्मनि बहुमानः । एवं प्रकृतेऽपि इति तृतीयः प्रकारः । एवमेकः त्रिधा विकल्पः, अन्ये च द्वौ इति पञ्च विकल्पा इति तात्पर्यार्थः ।

(4) व्यङ्ग्यस्य यत्राप्राधान्यं वाच्यमात्रानुयायिनः ।
समासोक्त्यादयस्तत्र वाच्यालङ्कृतयः स्फुटाः ॥

व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्रतिभामात्रे वाच्यार्थानुगमेऽपि वा ।
न ध्वनिर्यत्र वा तस्य प्राधान्यं न प्रतीयते ॥
तत्परावेव शब्दार्थौ यत्र व्यङ्ग्यं प्रति स्थितौ ।
ध्वनेः स एव विषयो मन्तव्यः सङ्करोज्झितः ॥ (Dhv I)

(5) अयमुक्तप्रकारो ध्वनिर्भक्त्या नैकत्वं बिभर्ति, भिन्नरूपत्वात् । वाच्यव्यतिरिक्तस्यार्थस्य वाचकाभ्यां तात्पर्येण प्रकाशनं यत्र व्यङ्ग्यप्राधान्ये स ध्वनिः । उपचारमात्रं तु भक्तिः । (Dhv I 14)

(5) येऽपि सहृदयहृदयसंवेद्यमनाख्येयमेव ध्वनेरात्मानमाम्नासिषुस्तेऽपि न परीक्ष्यवादिनः । यत उक्तया नीत्या वक्ष्यमाणया च ध्वनेः सामान्यविशेषलक्षणे प्रतिपादितेऽपि यद्यनाख्येयत्वं तत् सर्वेषामेव वस्तूनां तत्प्रसक्तम् ।

यदि पुनर्ध्वनेरतिशयोक्त्यानया काव्यान्तरातिशायि तैः स्वरूपमाख्यायते तत्तेऽपि युक्ताभिधायिन एव । (Dhv I 19)

(6) तदेवं व्यञ्जकमुखेन ध्वनिप्रकारेषु निरूपितेषु कश्चिद्ब्रूयात्, किमिदं व्यञ्जकत्वं नाम ? व्यङ्ग्यार्थप्रकाशनम् ? न हि व्यञ्जकत्वं व्यङ्ग्यत्वं चार्थस्य । व्यञ्जकसिद्ध्यधीनं व्यङ्ग्यत्वं व्यङ्ग्यापेक्षया च व्यञ्जकत्वसिद्धिरित्यन्योन्यसंश्रयादव्यवस्थानम् । Dhv III 33

(7) तस्मात् तात्पर्यविषयो योऽर्थः स तावन्मुख्यतया वाच्यः । या त्वन्तरा तथाविधे विषये वाच्यान्तरप्रतीतिः सा तत्प्रतीतेरुपायमात्रं पदार्थप्रतीतिरिव वाक्यार्थप्रतीतेः । Dhv III 33

(8) ध्वन्या III 33 ननु वाच्यव्यतिरिक्तस्य व्यङ्ग्यस्य सिद्धिः प्रागेव प्रतिपादिता तत्सिद्ध्यधीना च व्यञ्जकसिद्धिरिति कः पर्यनुयोगावसरः । सत्यमेवैतत्, प्रागुक्तयुक्तिभिर्वाच्यव्यतिरिक्तस्य वस्तुनः सिद्धिः कृता, स त्वर्थो व्यङ्ग्यतयैव कस्माद्व्यपदिश्यते ? यत्र च प्राधान्येनावस्थानं तत्र वाच्यतयैवासौ व्यपदेष्टुं युक्तः, तत्परत्वाद् वाक्यस्य । अतश्च तत्प्रकाशिनो वाक्यस्य वाचकत्वमेव व्यापारः । किं तस्य व्यापारान्तरकल्पनया ? तस्मात् तात्पर्यविषयो योऽर्थः स तावन्मुख्यतया वाच्यः । या त्वन्तरा तथाविधे विषये वाच्यान्तरप्रतीतिः सा तत्प्रतीतेरुपायमात्रम् पदार्थप्रतीतिरिव वाक्यार्थप्रतीतेः ।

On this, the Locana reads —कश्चिदिति । मीमांसकादिः शास्त्रवित् । अस्त्वसौ द्वितीयोऽर्थः तस्य यदि व्यङ्ग्य इति नाम कृतम्, वाच्य इत्यपि कस्मान्न क्रियते ? व्यङ्ग्य इति वाच्याभिमतस्यापि कस्मान्न क्रियते ? अवगम्यमानत्वेन हि शब्दार्थत्वं तदेव वाचकत्वम् । अभिधा हि यत्पर्यन्ता तत्रैवाभिधा

यत्क्वचमुचितम्, तत्पर्यन्तता च प्रधानभूते तस्मिन्नर्थे इति मूर्धाभिषिक्तं ध्वनेर्यद्रूपं निरूपितं तत्रैवाभिधाव्यापारेण भवितु युक्तम् । तदाह–यत्र चेति । तत्प्रकाशिन इति । तद्व्यङ्ग्याभिमतं प्रकाशयत्यवश्यं तद् वाक्यं तस्येति ।

उपायमात्रमित्यनेन साधारणोक्तया भाट्टं प्राभाकरं वैय्याकरणं च पूर्वपक्षं सूचयति । भाट्टमते हि

वाक्यार्थमितये तेषां प्रवृत्तौ नान्तरीयकम् ।
पाके ज्वालेव काष्ठानां पदार्थप्रतिपादनम् ॥

इति शब्दावगतैः पदार्थैः तात्पर्येण योऽर्थ उत्थाप्यते स एव वाक्यार्थः । स एव वाच्य इति । प्रभाकरदर्शनेऽपि दीर्घदीर्घो व्यापारो निमित्तिनि वाक्यार्थे पदार्थानां तु निमित्तभावः पारमार्थिक एव । वैयाकरणानां तु सोऽपारमार्थिकः इति विशेषः । एतच्च अस्माभिः प्रथमोद्योत एव वितत्य निर्णीतमिति न पुनरायस्यते प्रयोजनैव तु क्रियते । तदेतन्मतत्रय पूर्वपक्षे योज्यम् ।

(10) ध्वन्यालोक On III 33.

अत्रोच्यते––यत्र शब्दः स्वार्थमभिदधानोऽर्थान्तरमवगमयति तत्र यत्तस्य स्वार्थाभिधायित्वं यच्च तदर्थान्तरावगमहेतुत्वं तयोरविशेषो विशेषो वा ? न तावदविशेषः यस्मात्तौ द्वौ व्यापारौ भिन्नविषयौ भिन्नरूपौ च प्रतीयेते एव । तथा हि । वाचकत्वलक्षणो व्यापारः शब्दस्य स्वार्थविषयः गमकत्वलक्षणस्त्वर्थान्तरविषयः । न च स्वपरव्यवहारो वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोरपह्नोतु शक्यः । एकस्य सम्बन्धित्वेन प्रतीतेः । अपरस्य सम्बन्धिसम्बन्धित्वेन । वाच्योर्थः साक्षात् शब्दस्य सम्बन्धी, तदितरस्त्वभिधेयसामर्थ्याक्षिप्तः सम्बन्धिसम्बन्धी । यदि च स्वसंबन्धित्वं साक्षात्तस्य स्यात्तदार्थान्तरव्यवहार एव न स्यात् । तस्माद्विषयभेदस्तावत्तयोर्व्यापारयोः सुप्रसिद्धः ।

रूपभेदोऽपि प्रसिद्ध एव । न हि यैवाभिधानशक्तिः सैवावगमनशक्तिः । अवाचकस्यापि गीतशब्दादे रसादिलक्षणार्थावगमदर्शनात् । अशब्दस्यापि चेष्टादेरर्थविशेषप्रकाशनप्रसिद्धेः । तथा हि, व्रीडायोगान्नतवदनया इत्यादि श्लोके चेष्टाविशेषः सुकविनार्थप्रकाशहेतुः प्रदर्शित एव ॥

तस्माद्भिन्नविषयत्वाद्भिन्नरूपत्वाच्च स्वार्थाभिधायित्वमर्थान्तरावगमहेतुत्वं च शब्दस्य यत्तयोः स्पष्ट एव भेदः । विशेषश्चेन्न तर्हीदानीमवगमनीयस्याभिधेयसामर्थ्याक्षिप्तस्यार्थान्तरस्य वाच्यत्वेन व्यपदेश्यता । शब्दव्यापारगोचरत्वं तु तस्यास्माभिरिष्यत एव; तत्तु व्यङ्ग्यत्वेनैव न वाच्यत्वेन । प्रसिद्धाभिधानान्तरसम्बन्धयोग्यत्वेन च तस्यार्थान्तरस्य प्रतीतेः शब्दान्तरेण स्वार्थाभिधायिना यद्वि-

पर्योकरणं तत्र प्रकाशनोक्तिरेव युक्ता। न च पदार्थवाक्यार्थन्यायो वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोः । यतः पदार्थप्रतीतिरसत्यैवेति कैश्चिद्विद्वद्भिरास्थितम् । यैरप्यसत्यत्वमस्या नाभ्युपेयते तैः वाक्यार्थपदार्थयोर्घटतदुपादानकारणन्यायोऽभ्युपगन्तव्य , यथा हि घटे निष्पन्ने तदुपादानकारणानां न पृथगुपलम्भस्तथैव वाक्ये तदर्थे वा प्रतीते पदतदार्थानाम् । तेषा विभक्ततयोपलम्भे वाक्यार्थबुद्धिरेव दूरीभवेत् । न त्वेष वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोर्न्याय , न हि व्यङ्ग्ये प्रतीयमाने वाच्यबुद्धिर्दूरीभवति, वाच्यावभासाविनाभावेन तस्य प्रकाशनात् । तस्मात् घटप्रदीपन्यायस्तयो , यथैव हि प्रदीपद्वारेण घटप्रतीतावुत्पन्नायां न प्रदीपप्रकाशो निवर्तते तद्वद्व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतौ वाच्यावभास । यत्तु प्रथमोद्योते यथापदार्थद्वारेण इत्याद्युक्त तदुपायमात्रात् साम्यविवक्षया ।

(11) ध्वन्या III 33.—नन्वेव युगपदर्थद्वययोगित्व वाक्यस्य प्राप्त तदभावे तु तस्य वाक्यतैव विघटते, तस्या एकार्थत्वलक्षणत्वात् नैष दोष , गुणप्रधानभावेन तयो व्यवस्थानात् । . तस्मात् स्थितमेतत्–व्यङ्ग्यपरत्वेऽपि काव्यस्य न व्यङ्ग्यस्याभिधेयत्व अपि तु व्यङ्ग्य त्वमेव ।

(12) ध्वन्या III 33 किं च व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्राधान्येन अविवक्षायां वाच्यत्व तावद् भवद्भि न अभ्युपगन्तव्य अतत्परत्वात् शब्दस्य । तदस्ति तावद् व्यङ्ग्य शब्दाना कश्चिद् विषय इति । यत्रापि तस्य प्राधान्य तत्रापि किमिति तस्य स्वरूपमपह्नूयते ।

(13) ध्वन्या III 33 स च तथाविध औपाधिको धर्म· शब्दानामौत्पत्तिकशब्दार्थसंबन्धवादिना वाक्यतत्त्वविदा पौरुषेयापौरुषेययोर्वाक्ययोर्विशेषमभिदधता नियमेनाभ्युपगन्तव्य·, तदभ्युपगमे हि तस्य शब्दार्थसम्बन्धनित्यत्वे सत्यपौरुषेयपौरुषेययोर्वाक्ययोरर्थप्रतिपादने निर्विशेषत्वं स्यात् । तदभ्युपगमे तु पौरुषेयाणां वाक्याना पुरुषेच्छानुविधानसमारोपितौपाधिकव्यापारान्तराणा सत्यपि स्वाभिधेयसम्बन्धापरित्यागे मिथ्यार्थतापि भवेत् । दृश्यते हि भावानामपरित्यक्तस्वभावानामपि सामान्यान्तरसम्पादितौपाधिकव्यापारान्तराणां विरुद्धक्रियत्वम् । तथा हि–हिममयूखप्रभृतीनां निर्वापितसकलजीवलोक शीतलत्वमुद्वहतामेव प्रियाविरहदहनदह्यमानमानसैर्जनैरालोक्यमानाना सता सन्तापकारित्व प्रसिद्धमेव । तस्मात् पौरुषेयाणां वाक्यानां सत्यपि नैसर्गिके अर्थसम्बन्धे मिथ्यार्थत्व समर्थयितुमिच्छता वाचकत्वव्यतिरिक्त किंचिद्रूपमौपाधिक व्यक्तमेवाभिधानीयम् । तच्च व्यञ्जकत्वादृते नान्यत्। व्यङ्ग्यप्रकाशनं हि व्यञ्जकत्वम् । पौरुषेयाणि च वाक्यानि

प्राधान्येन पुरुषाभिप्रायमेव प्रकाशयन्ति । स च व्यङ्ग्य एव सत्वमिधेयः, तेन
सहाभिधानस्य वाच्यवाचकत्वलक्षणसम्बन्धाभावात् ।

(14) ध्वन्या III. 33. नन्वनेन न्यायेन सर्वेषामेव लौकिकाना वाक्या-
नां ध्वनिव्यवहारः प्रसक्तः । सर्वेषामप्यनेन न्यायेन व्यञ्जकत्वात् । सत्यमेतत्;
किन्तु वक्त्रभिप्रायप्रकाशनेन यद् व्यञ्जकत्वं तत् सर्वेषामेव लौकिकानां वाक्या-
नामविशिष्टम् । तत्तु वाचकत्वान्न भिद्यते व्यङ्ग्य हि तत्र नान्तरीयकतया
व्यवस्थितम् । न तु विवक्षितत्वेन । यत्र तु विवक्षितत्वेन व्यङ्ग्यस्य स्थितिः
तत्र व्यञ्जकत्व ध्वनिव्यवहारस्य प्रयोजकम् । यत्त्वभिप्रायविशेषरूपं व्यङ्ग्य शब्दा-
र्थाभ्यां प्रकाशते तद्भवति विवक्षित तात्पर्येण प्रकाश्यमान सत् । किन्तु तदेव
केवलपरिमितविषयस्य ध्वनिव्यवहारस्य न प्रयोजकमव्यापकत्वात् । तथा दर्शित-
भेदत्रयरूपं तात्पर्येण द्योत्यमानमभिप्रायरूपमनभिप्रायरूपं च सर्वमेव न ध्वनिव्यवहा-
रस्य प्रयोजक इति यथोक्तव्यञ्जकत्वविशेषे ध्वनिलक्षणे नातिव्याप्तिन चाव्याप्ति ।
तस्माद्वाक्यतत्त्वविदा मतेन तावद् व्यञ्जकत्वलक्षणः शाब्दो व्यापारो न विरोधी
प्रत्युतानुगुण एव लक्ष्यते ।

(15) ध्वन्या III. 33 रूपभेदस्तावदयम्–यदमुख्यतया व्यापारो गुणवृत्तिः
प्रसिद्धा । व्यञ्जकत्व तु मुख्यतयैव शब्दस्य व्यपार· । न हि अर्थात्
व्यङ्ग्यत्रयप्रतीतिर्या तस्या अमुख्यत्व मनागपि लक्ष्यते ।

(16) ध्वन्या III 33 अथ चान्यः स्वरूपभेदः यद् गुणवृत्तिरमुख्यत्वेन
व्यवस्थितं वाचकत्वमेवोच्यते । व्यञ्जकत्व तु वाचकत्वादत्यन्त विभिन्नमेव ।
एतच्च प्रतिपादितम् ।

(17) ध्वन्या III 33 अयं चापरो रूपभेदो यद्गुणवृत्तौ यदार्थोऽर्थान्तर-
मुपलक्षयति तदोपलक्षणीयार्थात्मना परिणत एवासौ सम्पद्यते। यथा गङ्गाया घोषः
इत्यादौ। व्यञ्जकत्वमार्गे तु पदार्थः पदार्थान्तरं द्योतयति तदा स्वरूप प्रकाशयन्ने-
वासावन्यस्य प्रकाशकः प्रतीयते प्रदीपवत् । यथा लीलाकमलपत्राणि गणयामास
पार्वती इत्यादौ । यदि च यत्र अतिरस्कृतस्वप्रतीतिरर्थोऽर्थान्तर लक्षयति तत्र
लक्षणाव्यवहारः क्रियते तदेव सति लक्षणैव मुख्यः शब्दव्यापार· इति प्राप्तम् ।
यस्मात् प्रायेण वाक्यानां वाच्यव्यतिरिक्ततात्पर्यविषयार्थावभासित्वम् ।

(18) लोचन on ध्वन्या III. 33. कीदृश इति मुख्यो या न वा प्रका-
रान्तराभावात् । मुख्यत्वे वाचकत्वमन्यथा गुणवृत्तिः, गुणो निमित्तं सादृश्यादि,
तद्द्वारिका वृत्तिः शब्दस्य व्यापारो गुणवृत्तिरिति भावः । मुख्य एवासौ व्यापारः
सामग्रीभेदाच्च वाचकत्वात् व्यतिरिच्यत इत्यभिप्रायेणाह–उच्यत इति ।

रूपम् । यदि हि लिङ्गितया तत्र शब्दानां व्यापारः स्यात् तच्छब्दार्थे सम्यङ्मिथ्यादिविवादा एव न प्रवर्तेरन्, धूमादिलिङ्गानुमितानुमेयान्तरवत् ध्वन्या III.

(27) तस्माद्वक्त्रभिप्रायरूप एव व्यङ्ग्ये लिङ्गतया शब्दानां व्यापारः । तद्विषयीकृते तु प्रतिपाद्यतया ।–ध्वन्या III. 33

(28) न च व्यञ्जकत्व लिङ्गत्वरूपमेव, आलोकादिष्वन्यथा दृष्टत्वात् । ध्वन्या III. 33

(29) तस्मात् प्रतिपाद्यो विषयः शब्दानां न लिङ्गित्वेन सम्बन्धी वाच्यवत् । ध्वन्या III 33

(30 हि लिङ्गित्वेन तेषां सम्बन्धी दर्शितो विषय, स न वाच्यत्वेन प्रतीयते, अपितूपाधित्वेन । ध्वन्या III 33

(31)यथा च वाच्यविषये प्रमाणान्तरानुगमेन सम्यक्प्रतीतौ क्वचित् क्रियमाणाया तस्य प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वे सत्यपि न शब्दव्यापारविषयताहानिस्तद्वत् व्यङ्ग्यस्यापि । ध्वन्या III 33

(32) काव्यविषये च व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतिनां सत्यासत्यनिरूपणस्य अप्रयोजकत्वमेव इति तत्र प्रमाणान्तरव्यापारपरीक्षोपहासायैव सम्पद्यते । तस्माल्लिङ्गिप्रतीतिरेव सर्वत्र व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतिरिति न शक्यते वक्तुम् । ध्वन्या. III 33

CHAPTER XIII

SOME ANTI-DHVANI THEORISTS

While starting the exposition of dhvani as expounded in Dhv we raised the question of the earlier writers, who did not accept dhvani and against whose views Ānanda was trying to establish his theory We noted that we have not been able to discover specific works of authors who hold views opposed to the dhvani theory Consequently, we relied upon Dhv and Locana for the opposing views (Ch 24) We do, however, find works posterior to Dhv which carry on their polemics against the dhvani theory In order to complete the discussion on dhvani we now take up these views

Among these works, we come across Abhidhāvrttimātṛkā (AVM) of Mukul Bhatta (circa 9th 10th Cen A D), Vakroktijivita (VJ) of Kuntaka (circa middle of 10th-11 the cen A D Das'arūpaka (DR) of Dhanañjaya (last quarter of 10th Cen) with Avaloka of Dhanika, Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhatta (circa 11th A D-12th A D) and S'ṛṅgāraprakāsa (Sṛ Pra) of Bhoja-(Circa 11th A D)

Before we start with Mukula Bhatta, it should be noted that Bhatta Nāyaka's name also should be mentioned first as he is said to have composed his Hṛdayadarpana with an object of dhvanidhvaṃsa, Pratihārendurāja also mentions Ubdhata as one who did not acc-pt dhvani and knowingly incorporated the same under various figures of speech One Manoratha Kavi, a contemporary of Ānanda, is also mentioned by Abhinava He (i e Manoratha) wrote the famous verse viz yasminnasti na vastu etc to redicule dhvani

Mukula Bhatta

We begin with those ālaṃkārikas who seem to include the suggested sense under lakṣanā In this context, we may mention the names of Mukula Bhatta and Kuntaka

Mukula Bhatta, like the older grammarians and the Mimāmsakas, satisfied himself with only two modes of expression, viz. abhidhā and laksanā All implicit sense is put under laksanā by him In his Abhidhāvrttimātṛkā (AVM), Mukula incorporates all the examples of the implicit sense under laksana He discusses the nature of abhidhā in his AVM He also treates of laksanā therein Laksanā is treated only as a subdivision of abhidha and virtually he believes only in one sabdavrtti viz. abhidhā (1) He seems to incorporate the implicit sense under laksanā which is only a part of abhidhā

He considers laksanā to be three-fold on the basis of vakta i e speaker, vakya i e sentence, and vācya i e the meaning or context On the basis of these three factors, suddha laksanā and upacāra laksanā both become three-fold Thus we arrive at six sub-divisions of laksanā (2) The illustrations cited are as below

Vaktrnibandhana laksanā is that in which the laksyārtha is gathered with reference to the type of the speaker The illustration is drstim he prativesini etc. The speaker is a wanton woman and the laksāyartha is gathered with reference to her Mukula holds that the future 'ratagopana' is the laksyārtha here (For dhvanivādin, however, it is an example of vyañjanā, based on vaktṛvaisistya or peculiarity of the speaker, and herein we derive through vyañjanā some 'vastu' or idea from another vastu' or idea)

Vakyanibandhana laksanā is based on a particular type of a sentence The illustration is, prāptasrih eṣa kasmāt etc. Here, the natural movement of the ocean is taken ro be due to something else Here the superimposition is due to a particular vākyārtha or the meaning of a sentence Thus, the 'upacāra' is 'gauna' or subordinate The superimposition of Visnu on the king is the laksyartha (3) (For the dhvanivādin, this is 'rūpakālaṃkāradhvani' i e suggestion of the figure called rūpaka)

The vācyanibandhana lakṣaṇā occurs when the lakṣyārtha is gathered on the perusal of the vācyārtha or the expressed sense This is illustrated as in durvārā madaneśavo disi disi etc Herein the vakyartha or the expressed sense of the sentence is that as agni i e fire is superimposed on vasanta i e spring, Kāmadeva or the god of love etc, they become unbreakable On perusal of this expressed sense, vipralambha śṛngāra is gathered through akṣepa or implication Thus, it is a case of upadanalakṣaṇā with Mukula (4) Thus, Mukula seems to incorporate rasadhvani under lakṣaṇā He says lakṣaṇāmārgavagahitvam tu dhvaneh nūtanatayopavarnitasya vidyata iti diśam unmilayitūm idamatroktam (AVM pp 22)

Kuntaka

Kuntaka accepts only one mode of verbal expression viz abhidhā The implied meaning which poems convey are for him so many different twists of abhidhā So, he, instead of postulating the new mode of vyañjanā, would explain everything by abhidhā and the several twists to which it can be subjected For Kuntaka, dyotaka and vyañjaka words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning (arthapratitikāritva) may be termed as vācaka, metaphorically Thus the dyotya and vyañgya arthas i e suggested meaning in general, also are vacya or expressed on account of their quality of being gathered by us He accepts only abhidhā but he does not reject either lakṣaṇā or vyañjanā as they are but the extension of abhidhā only (5)

Kuntaka tries to incorporate some of the implicit sense under upacāravakratā He subsumes some other implicit sense under some other variety of vakratā He does not seem to include the whole of vyañjanā in lakṣaṇā However, Vidyādhara, the author of Ekāvali holds that Kuntaka incorporates all dhvani under bhakti or lakṣaṇā(6) Dr Harichandra Sāstri (Kālidāsa et l Art Poetique de l'Inde pp 96-97) suggests that bhakti stands for vakrokti and that Kuntaka therefore, is a bhaktivādin Dr Kane does not agree with this

vrttis of the ancients (i e Udbhata) are the same as varnavinyāsavakratā He says (V.J II 5)

"varnacchāyanusarena gunamargānuvartini ı
vrttivaicitryayukteti saiva proktā cirantanaih ||
yamaka is also a variety of the same

He says "yamakam nama kopyasyāh prakarah paridrsyate ı
sa tu sobhantarabhāvat iha nati pratanyate || V J II 7)

Padapurvārdhavakratā has several varieties, such as rudhivaicitryavakratā, paryāyavakratā, upacāravakratā, visesanavakratā, samvrtivakratā, vrttivakratā, lingavaicitryavakratā, and kriyāvaicitryavakratā

Rūdhivaicitryavakratā is defined as
(V J II.8 9)

yatra rudherasambhāvyadharmādhyaropagarbhatā ı
sadharmātisayāropagarbhatvam vā pratiyate ||
lokottaratiraskāraslaghyotkarsābhidhitsayā ı
vacyasya socyate kāpi rūdhivaicitryavakratā ||

There are two varieties or rudhivaicitrya Examples of the first variety are the word 'kamalāin' in 'tālā jāanti' etc., and '*rāmah' in 'snigdhasyāmala' etc Examples of the second* variety of rudhivaicitrya (i e vidyamanadharmātis'ayavācyādhyāropagarbhatva) are, tatah prabasyāha etc. (Raghu III 51) and rāmo'sau bhuvaneṣu etc. (quoted in K P IV)

From the illustrations quoted as above we can see that the lakṣanāmula arthāntarasamkramitavācya variety of dhvani seems to have been covered in rūdhi vaicitrya

Paryāyavakratā (V J II 11,12) is defined as

"abhidheyāntaratamastasyātisayaposakaḥ ı
ramyacchāyāntarasparsāttalamkartumisvarah ||
svayam visesanenāpi svacchāyotkarṣapes'alah" ||
paryāyastena vaicitryam ||

An example is nābhiyoktum anrtatvam isyase etc., wherein the word 'vajrinah' cannot be replaced by 'indrasya' without *killing the charm. By this variety*, paryāyadhvani or

what is technically termed as śabdaśaktimūlaka anuraṇana rūpavyaṅgya padadhvani seems to have been covered (130). Kuntaka himself says this very clearly.

Then follows upacāravakratā defined as · (V J.II.13–14) :
yatra dūrāntarenyasmāt sāmānyamupacaryate |
leśenāpi bhavatkāmcid vaktumudriktavṛttitām ||
yanmūlā sarasollekhā rūpakādiralamkṛtih |
upacārapradhānāsau vakratā kācıducyate ||

Examples of this are, snigdhaśyāmala etc., gacchantınām ramaṇavasatım etc., and gaganaṃ ca mattymeghaṃ etc. The first and the last are cited in the Dhv. as examples of arthāntarasamkramitavācya and atyantatıraskṛtavācya varieties of dhvani.

As already noted earlier, probably this inspires the author of Alamkārasarvasva to say that . upacāravakratādıbhih samasto dhvaniprapañcah svīkṛtah.

Viśeṣaṇavakratā and samvṛtivakratā are defined as :
(V.J.II.15.16)

viśeṣaṇasya māhātmyāt kriyāyāh kārakasya vā |
yatraollasati lāvaṇyam sa viśeṣaṇavakratā ||
yattu samvrıyate vastu vaicıtryasya vivakṣayā |
sarvanāmādibhih kaiścitsoktā samvṛtıvakratā ||

The examples are śucıśıtala etc., and nivāryatāmāli kimapyayam batuh (Kumāra. Sam. V. 83). This also partially covers what is technically termed as arthāntarasamkramitavācyadhvani.

Vṛttıvaıcitryavakratā includes vakratā with reference to kṛt, taddhita, samāsa, ekaśeṣa and sannanta This covers all dhvani derived by kṛt, taddhita etc, (Dhv.III. 16) (14). Dhv.III. 16 also refers to dhvani based on nipāta, kāla, upasarga, liṅga etc (15). This is covered by Kuntaka's other varieties of padaparārdhavakratā such as kārakavakratā, vacana, upasarga, pratyaya, nipātavakratā, puruṣavakratā, etc.

In the third unmesa the author comes to the discussion of vākyavaicitryavakratā In connection with this he speaks of vastuvakratā at III I (16)

The vastu may be 'sahaja' or 'āhārya' (i e kavisaktivyut pattiparipākapraudha) The example for both these is asyāḥ sargavidhau etc This variety includes some vastudhvani as the delineation is with reference to 'vastu that may be not vācya or expressed only, but also vyaṅgya i e suggested (17)

Kūntaka s vākyavakratā covers alamkāradhvani as well as the normal figures of speech He recognises the pratiyamāna variety of rūpaka, vyatireka etc, where these figures are implicit The illustration is lāvanyakāntiparipuritadiṅmukhe' smin etc Rupakadhvani of Ānanda is also hereby covered (18)

He also gives instructions here as to how sentiment and other objects can be used in a poem to yield charming results and how to lend charm to poetry by nourishing appropriate rasas bhāvas etc The verse tiṣthet kopavaśāt etc is cited as an example of vipralambha and the lamentations of Vatsarāja (in Tāpasavatsarāja Act II) as examples of karuna

In the 4th unmeṣa he gives the treatment of prakaranava kratā and prabandhavakratā Prakaranavakratā is illustrated by several verses from the Raghu (V), with the remark-kuberaṃ prati samantasaṃbhāvanayā jayadhyavasāyaḥ kāmapi sahṛdayā hlādakāritāṃ pratipadyate The introduction of the curse of Durvāsā is also an instance to the point Yet another illustration in prakaranavkratā is the mṛgayāprakarana or the episode of hunting in Raghu (IX) The episode introduced with the words tatah pravisati rajjuhastah puruṣaḥ (Mudrā rākṣasa (VI) is also an instance to the point

Prabandhavakratā is defined as–
itivṛttānyathāvṛttarasasampadapekṣayā |
rasāntarena ramyena yatra nirvahanaṃ bhavet ||

kathāmūrterāmūlonmīlitas'rıyah |
vinayānandanispatyai sā prabandhasya vakratā ||

The Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata are the examples. Thus prabandhavakratā covers prabandhadhvani (19) Another variety of prabandhavakratā is,

"trailokyābhinavollekhanāyakotkarsaposinā |
itihāsaikadesena prabandhasya samāpanam ||
taduttarakathāvartivirasatvajihāsayā |
kurvīta yatra sukavih sā vicitrasya vakratā ||

An example is Kirātārjunīya He says that great poets show their imagination even in giving names to their works e g. Abhijnānas'ākuntala, Mudrārākṣasa, etc etc. It is genius that makes all the difference, though the plot may be the same (20) Again, at IV 26, Kuntaka reads—In all the compositions of poets, which are composed in different ways and which speak of the path of truth, there is a sort of vakratā (uncommon to others). (21) Compositions based on the same source acquire individuality due to vakratā Thus, Kuntaka covers prabandhadhvani by prabandhavakratā

Kuntaka's approach to the fact of rasa is also noteworthy. For him, rasa is the highest factor in the poetic art which is of the form of vakrokti Vakrokti is related to rasa in the same way in which it is related to dhvani Thus, just as for the dhvanivādin dhvani is the soul of kāvya and rasadhvani is the highest form of dhvani; in the same way, vakrokti is the soul of kāvya and rasa is the most important aspect of vakrokti.

Kuntaka seems to pay great importance to the fact of rasa He wants poetry to be tadvidāhlādakāriṇī i e such as would delight the critic. (22) At I.5, in his V.J., while dealing with kāvyaprayojana he refers to rasa (23) Again, while talking about sukumāra mārga, he says that a sahṛdaya or tadvid is 'rasādiparamārthajña' (rasādiparamārthajñamanaḥsaṃvādasundaraḥ I.26 V.J) and while dealing with saubhāgyaguṇa, the critics are described as 'sarasātma' i e. 'ārdracetas'. (24)

He also seems to take rasa as the soul of kāvya He declares it categorically that prabandhavakratā is that highest form of vakrokti (25) These prabandhas or compositions on which the fame of great poets rests, are full of rasa-'nirantararasodgāragarbhasandarbhanirbharāh' (V.J IV 11) They do not depend upon kathāmātra or story element or content alon- (26) Thus, for Kuntaka rasa is the soul of a prabandha or a composition and is one of the aspects of vakrokti. Kuntaka thus seems to cover rasadhvani of the asaṃlaksya variety

Rasa for Kuntaka is not vācya or expressed While dealing with the problem of the alaṃkāras such as rasavat, preyas, etc. he laughs at Udbhata's theory of rasa becoming 'svasabdavācya' or being expressed by its own proper name (27)

While considering the nature of kāvyavastu or poetic context, Kuntaka takes rasa to be very important Thus, at V J III.11 (vṛtti) he says that 'rasanirbharatā' or the condition of being drenched in rasa is the principal aspects of poetic context He devides kāvyavastu-poetic context as two-fold, cetana or sentient and jaḍa or insentient, and takes the first one as principal and for that rasaparipoṣa or the enhancement of sentiment *is inevitable (28) Then he gives many examples* of vipralaṃbha and karuṇa rasas and leaves other rasas to the readers (29) For him, the description of jaḍa or insentient object becomes interesting on account of its ability to evoke rasa (30) In the same way and for the same purpose i e to evoke rasa, the description of the unimportant sentiment object such as birds and the like is also welcome (31) He adds that (V J III 10 Vṛtti) kāvyavastu or poetic context is two fold on account of its being 'svabhāvapradhāna' or 'rasapradhāna' and that both should be embellished on account of both of them being 'sahajasaukumāryasarasa' or full of rasa on account of natural beauty (32)

While discussing different mārgas also Kuntaka refers to rasa The Sukumāra *mārga is charming* (V J I 26) on account

of its being favourable to the mental aptitude of those who know the highest object called rasa (33) The vicitramārga is also 'sarasākuta' i e accomplished by rasanirbharābhiprāya (34) The madhyama marga being a combination of these two, must be necessarily charged with rasa-'rasapusta'

Thus we see that with his theory of vakrokti or a striking mode of speech differing from and transcending the ordinary everyday mode of speaking about a thing, and such that charms by the skill of the poet, Kuntaka seems to cover up all the sources of charm in poetry, beginning with alamkāra and ending with dhvani and rasa As already noted earlier, even dyotaka and vyañjaka words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning, -arthapratitikāritva-are termed 'vācaka' i e expressive of meaning, metaphorically Thus, broadly speaking, Kuntaka may be termed as an antar-bhāvavādin and a bhaktivādin to a certain extent

Dhanañjaya and Dhanika

We will now consider the views of Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, (Circa 10th Century A D) the authors of Dasrupaka and Avaloka on it, respectively These are also well-known anti-dhvani theorists who try to explain the fact of suggested sense through tātpraya or purport

In the fourth prakāsa of the DR the authors touch the problem of rasānubhūti or the experience of sentiment in poetry Dhanika's elaborate commentary brings out their views clearly. They accept the fact of rasādi but they fail to accept the proposition that rasādis are convyed by vyanjanā They hold that the vyangya or suggestion of the dhvanivādins can be explained with the help of tātparya s'akti or purport alone In order to get the suggested sense through tātparya s'akti or purport, we will see how Dhanika expands the limits of tātparyārtha or purpòrt-sense The line of argument proceeds as below -

The laukika vakyas or sentences in day to day usage

such as 'gāmabhyāja', where the kriyā or action is clearly heard of, and sentences such as 'dvāram dvāram' in which the kriyā or action is not heard of, but is gathered through prakarana or context, only kriyā or action can be considered as the vākyārtha or the sense of a sentence. In the same way, even in kāvya or poetry, rasa which is the ultimate purpose of kāvya or poetry, forms the vākyārtha' Thus rasa becomes the ultimate vākyārtha i e kāvyavākyārtha and therefore, is at times expressed in clear terms such as 'prityai navodhā priyā,' or is at times brought about by the particular vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārins etc It should not be argued that as ratyādi and the like, is an apadārtha (i e not the direct meaning of a pada or word), it cannot therefore be gathered by vākyārtha or sentence-sense For, ultimately, our tātparya sakti or purport rests in the final kriyā or action-' kāryaparya-vasāyitvāt tāparyas'akteh' -i e the action of enjoyment Now, all sentences, pauruseya i e used in human speech and apauruseya i e divine, alike, have some action in their motive If it is not so, any sentence would be as useless as the uttering of a mad man ! With reference to the words in poetry, it can be said with the help of positive and negative concomittance, that they aim only at the generation of its own unique joy. Kāvya or poetry sets about to achieve this end only There cannot be any other end in view, except this So then, in a kāvya, the vibhāva, anubhāva etc. stand for the padārthas (i e word sense) and the ratyādi brought about by them is the vākyārtha (or purport) Thus, a kāvyavākya is formed It should not be argued that as in case of song and the like, there is no vācyavācakabhāva or the relation of expressor and the expressed here (In a song, the meaningless notes make for the experience of joy) Because here, in the field of kāvya, the experience of a particular rasa is felt by those alone who are conversant with vibhāva, anubhāva etc Now in the realisation of such a rasa, which is the vācyārtha of a kāvyavākya, only abhidhā and tātparya sakti are quite sufficient and therefore, it is gratuitous to postulate the theory of vyañjanā

Thus, the tatparyavādin comes to the conclusion that whatever is supposed to be conveyed by vyañjanā is really conveyed by abhidhā and tātparya Surely, in case of 'anyoktis' wherein the purport is not expressed in clear terms, dhvani cannot be resorted to.

The dhvanivādin cannot say that in case of sentences such as 'viṣam bhuṅkṣva' etc, the purport lies in the principal suggested sense, viz. 'do not take food at his place', gathered by vyañjanā, and not by tatparya For, in this case, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense is not at all over till the last limit of the full purport is reached If at all there is any further sense left to be gathered later on, in that case, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense is not to be taken as complete in itself *It becomes complete i e viśrānta-only when the* ultimate sense meant to be brought out by the speaker is gathered by the hearer Thus, on the acceptance of the fact of tātparya, it is redundent to assume dhvani or vyañjanā

A limit to the sense gathered from a sentence can not be put A particular sentence can not be restricted to a particular sense only Tātparya or purport rests in the ultimate action So far as the so called desired sense is not gathered, the expressed sense or vācyārtha can not be said to be over Tatparya is not to be measured on scales-tātparyam na tulādhṛtam-so as to limit its extent, and is not to be determined as just this much and not that much !

The pūrvapakṣa (i e. dhvanivādin) may argue as follows The sentences viz bhrama dhārmika etc, gives only the sense 'bhramaṇakriyā'. There is no word giving the sense of prohibition and therefore, after giving the meaning in form of an injunction, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense finds its completion. Then, on account of the peculiarity of the speaker viz the wanton girl, the sense of negation flashes forth on the mind of the cultured critic Thus, vyaṅgyārtha i e the suggested sense, flashing forth only after the expressed sense is completely gathered-vācyaviśrānti-will have to be accepted

But, the tātparyvādin explains away the negative suggested sense from the positive expressed sense in bhrama dhārmika etc, with the help of tatparya alone, because the vācyārtha or *the expressed sense can be said* *to have been completed only* after the intention of the speaker is fully conveyed If the intention of the speaker is not fully conveyed, the expressed should be taken as incomplete only Thus, if the sense of negation is not conveyed then for the speaker, viz the particular wanton girl the expressed sense remains incomplete

The sentences of human speech-(pauruseya)-are spoken with some idea in mind, i e with a desire to convey something-(vivaksā),-and therefore, the full meaning of the speaker, i e his intention should be termed as 'tātparya' in poetry Till this is not gathered, the sense cannot be said to be complete If the sentence is said to convey the full sense, then in that case, how and why should it give another sense ? And, in case if it goes for it, it is clear that the sentence sense is not complete

Finally, Dhanika explains that the rasādi and the kāvya are related by way of 'bhāvyabhāvaka' relation and not by 'vyaṅgyavyañjakabhava' (35)

Mahimabhatta

Mahimabhatta points out the following ten blemishes in the definition of dhvani as given in Dhv I 13, which has been noticed previously For the sake of understanding the polemic of Mahimā, I repeat it as under

yatrārthah sabdo vā
tamarthamupasarjanikṛtasvārthau |
vyaṅktah kāvyaviśesah
sa dhvaniriti sūribhih kathitah || (Dhv I 13)

The blemishes as pointed out by Mahimā are enumerated as below

(i) arthasya visistatvam
(ii) sabdah

(iii) (Śabdah) saviśesanah
(iv) vyaktih
(v) dhvanih
(vi) 'vā' sabda
(vii) 'dvivacanam' in vyaṅktah'
(viii) tadah pumstvam
(ix) the term 'kavyaviśesah' and
(x) vacanam ca kathanakartuh i e 'suribhih

The first fault according to Mahima is that the particular adjective viz upasarjanikṛtasva is redundant with reference to 'artha' An adjective is one that is shown to be variable Now, '*upasarjanikrtasva* or '*rendering one s own self subordinate is* an adjective which does not possess variability For the expressed sense, being an indicator of the suggested sense is necessarily and always subordinate Says he :

uktam gunikṛtatmatvam
yadarthasya visesanam ।
gamakatvānna tattasya
yuktamavyabhicaratah ॥ (Vy V I 7)

The purport of Mahimā's argument seems to be as below. Adjectives are generally used to indicate a variable quality, e g lotuses may be white, blue or red But that adjective which merely repeats the nature of the thing invariably *connected, is logically speaking redundant This is exactly the* case in qualifying 'artha' by the adjective 'upasarjanikrtasva, because it is always so

It may be noted that the first fault as indicated by Mahima seems to be of the type of 'avācyavacana' or mentioning *of something when it is not absolutely required*

The second blemish in the definition of dhvani as given by Ānanda consists in the mentioning of the word 'sabdah' A word has no other *function* save expressing its own meaning

Thus, it cannot suggest any other sense -śabdah punaranupādeyah eva tasya svābhidhānamantarena vyāpārāntarānupapatterupapādayiṣyamānatvāt (Vy V I)

Thus, it seems that the second fault pertains to making *sabda the conveyor of the implicit sense, because the sole* function of the word is to express its own meaning The second fault reiterates the position of Mahima viz that the word has one continuous meaning and there is no room for anything else like vyakti

The third fault lies in qualifying śabda by the adjective 'upasarjanikrtartha In the opinion of Mahimā, sabda is always subservient to its meaning just as a jar is subservient to *water that it is meant to contain Śabda can be said to be* principal, if at all, when there is verbatim repetition in a quotation So it will bring in 'asambhava dosa' if word is qualified by the adjective, 'upasarjanikṛtasvārtha

Here therefore, there is the fault of 'asambhava because the word being always subservient to meaning, there can be no contingency in which its meaning would be subservient to it, which would happen if its meaning is to be subordinated to itself in order to convey vyangyārtha or the suggested sense

Even if the two faults previously shown are repudiated, Mahimā says that it would be still open to the fault of 'punarukta' or repetition -(vyabhicārāsaṃbhavayorapi vā yat svārthayorupasarjanikṛtatvavacanaṃ tat punaruktam tayorarthā ntarābhivyaktyarthamupāttayossāmarthyādeva tadavagateri tyuktam, (Vy V I)

It may be noted here that the blemish as pointed out here is merely of a formal nature

Further, in continuation of the third fault discussed as above, Mahimā tries to find the fault of avyāpti in this definition, because the dhvani which is suggested in such *figures as dipaka would be out of the perview,* in as much

as these figures are varieties of abhidhā and because 'abhidhā' is not mentioned in the definition, therefore they remain left out If it is contended that the mention of abhidhā is included in the mention of śabda and artha, then the mention of śabda also would be redundant, because it is implied by mentioning artha

The fourth fault mentioned by Mahimā refers to vyakti or vyañjanā itself He holds that it is wrong to say that word and sense 'suggest' further sense The fourth fault thus refers to the very doctrine of vyañjanā According to him, the word has only one sense and whatever else comes out of it is a matter of inferential process In this philosophy of word, word is a means to an end, –sādhyasādhanabhāva–and the end is what the hearer is supposed to do or not to do The understanding of this sādhya becomes possible through the process of inference So, for him, whatever follows the direct meaning of the word is a matter of inference –'sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahāraḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvagarbhatayā prāyenānumānarūpo'bhyupagantavyah, tasya parapravṛttinivṛttinibandhanatvāt tayośca sampratyayāsampratyayātmanoranyathākartumaśakyatvatah na hi yuktimanavagacchan kaścidvipaścidvacanamātrāt sampratyayabhagbhavati) (Vy V I)

Having thus substituted inference for vyañjanā, he comes upon a two-fold division of meaning viz. 'vācyārtha' and 'anumeyārtha' Says he–arthópi dvidho vācyónumeyaśca tatra *śabdavyāpāravisayo vācyah sa eva mukhya ucyate* (Vy V I) With reference to the second, one may incidentially point out that Mahimā really gives up his case by calling it 'artha' Says he arthópi dvividhah vācyonumeyasca tatra sabdavyāpāravisayo vācyah sa eva mukhya ucyate. (Vy V I.) Having thus established to his satisfaction anumeyārtha, he explains how vyaṅgya or suggested vastu, alaṃkāra and rasa are cases of anumeya vastu, alamkāra and rasa respectively He adds that while the first two can be directly expressed also, the third is

only inferred -(sa ca trividhah vastumātramalaṃkārarasādayaśceti tatrādyau vācpāvapi saṃbhavatah anyastvanumeya eveti) (Vy V I)

Here, Mahimā has to face a great difficulty According to the accepted definition of valid anumāna, his inferential processes in poetry do not confirm to the cannon of (logical) inference His opponents naturally show that what follows the direct meaning of words in a poem is not inference in any logical sense Mahima's answer to this is as follows

The meaning that comes to the mind as a sequence of direct meaning of a word is 'anumeya' This later manifestation of meaning is supposed to be due to three causes They may be described in the accepted darsanika terminology as kārakahetu, and jñāpakahetu, under which also comes the third viz anumāna hetu or liṅga The illustration of the first is curds resulting from milk, the second, the appearance of a jar by a lamp in a dark room, while the third is the inference of fire on a mountain by the appearance of smoke Now, the meaning following from the direct sense is not discovered by the first two, but by the third, and therefore, it is a process of anumāna or inference

As to the validity in some cases of knowledge, he quotes a passage which says that even an illusory knowledge may become valid in a particular context He quotes in his support from pramāna vārtika II 5 574 Says he,

taduktam-bhrāntirapi sambandhatah pramā iti
manipradipaprabhayoh manibuddyābhidhāvatoh |
mithyājñānaviśeṣe'pi viseso'rthakriyām prati || iti ca

(Vy V I)

"Between two people approaching two lights, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp, (without being conscious of what they really are, but) with the idea that it is a jewel, there exists a difference in respect of casual efficiency, but not a difference of mistaken cognition' (Translation pp 36

The esthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta—Raneiro Gnoli—SERIE ORIENTALE ROMA, XI 1956)

The purport of the verse is that the two persons see two lights of which the one is that of a lamp and the other is that of a jewel Both of them do not know whose light it is—but they run with a belief that it is a jewel Here the ingorance of both is equal, yet the one who gets at a jewel has his purpose *fulfilled*

Thus, eventhough the linga may be illusory, the inference may be valid if the purpose is served

Mahimā, *however, before* he *goes into these arguments* turns round his opponents and says that it is absurd to seek logical validity in what he calls kāyvānumiti and he waxes eloquent on the poetic charm of it—

tenātra gamyagamakayoh sacetasām satyāsatyatvavicāro nirupayogo eva kāvyavisaye ca vācyavyaṅgyapratitīnām satyāsastya tvavicāro nirupayoga eva iti *tatra* pramānāntaraparīkṣopahāsāyaiva sampadyate iti (Vy V I)

In modern terminology, one might say that the inferential process in poetry is more of a psychological nature than of a logical type

Having proved to his satisfaction that the relation between a word's immediate meaning and the meaning that follows, is not of the nature of vyaṅgyavyañjaka but of the nature of inference, he explains *all the fine points worked out by* Ānanda in the terminology of inference In fact he gives the same illustrations and practically follows the same mode of argument

The fifth fault arises as below 'Dhvani' is said to be there when the vācya or expressed sense is said to be suggestive. But in that case an inferred sense, even if it is suggested, does not become dhvani, for *there is* absence of expressed sense in it Thus in 'dhvani' there is gathering of the implicit sense through vācha or expressed alone But if this is the

connotation of dhvani, then it brings in the fault of the definition being 'too narrow' In the illustrations such as, 'evam vādini' etc, there is first the suggestion of a bhāva called 'lajjā' or 'avahitthā' Through that suggested bhāva, love of Parvati is suggested This is a case of suggestion based on suggestion Now 'dhvani' as explained earlier has its scope limited to suggestion based on expressed sense only (Mahimā shows how 'artha' can mean the expressed sense alone)

(kim ca yatra vācyasyārthasya vyañjakatvam sa ced dhvanistarhi tadanumitasya vyañjakatve dhvanitvam na syāt, tasya vācyatvābhāvāt tataśca, 'evam vādini devarsau' ityadau dhvanitvamiṣṭam na syād ityavyāptirlakṣanadoṣah) (Vy V I)

Mahima holds that if the word 'arthah' in Dhv I 13 means both vācya and vyangya i e expressed and suggested sense, then also ativyāptidosa or the fault of 'too wide' follows He holds charm only with reference to implicit sense that follows immediately without any vyavadhāna or intermediary, or a vyavadhāna i e intermediary only in form of a vyabhicāri-bhāva or an alamkāra. If it is else than this, it is without charm But the definition of dhvani embraces such instances also Mahimā says

"yadyartha iti vācyó rtho bhimato'vyāptireva sā I
yenaivamvādinityādāvarthasyārthāntaradgatih II
athobhau tarhyativyāptirdvitravastuvyavasāyini I
prahelikadirūpépi kāvye dhvanyātmatā yatah II
(Vy V I 21 22)

In this, his fifth argument, Mahimā shows two faults viz avyapti and ativyāpti, the first, by confining the meaning or 'artha' to vācyārtha alone, and the second by including vyangyārtha also

Sixth fault lies in the mention of 'vā' Vā suggests either option (vikalpa) or collection (i e samuccaya) It cannot mean option, for earlier 'śabda' is explained as not to be suggestive And even if it is accepted to mean option, then it cannot be construed with the dual in form of 'vyankiah' If it means

collection then suggestivity will rest only on both sabda and artha taken together only Thus, such cases of dhvani resting on only 'śabda' or only 'artha' will be excluded and avyāptidoṣa will follow :

–(kiṃcātra vāsabdo vikalpārtho vā syāt samuccayārtho vā na tāvadvikalpārthah pakṣāntarasambhavasya vyutpāditatvāt sambhave vāsya dvivacanānupapattih, tayoh samuccayābhāvāt ... samuccayārthatve'pi yatra sabdārthayorekaikasya vyañjakatvaṃ tatra dhvanitvam iṣṭam na syāt (Vy V I)

The seventh fault follows from the sixth and touches the use of dual in 'vyanktah' Here, Mahimabhaṭṭa takes the substance of his argument from the discussion between Bhaṭṭanayaka and Abhinavagupta as given in the latter s work–'Locana', Abhinava says that objections of Bhaṭṭanayaka are due to carelessness because in the act of suggestion the word does it as related to meaning and meaning does it as related to word, and therefore, the dual is justified Mahimā simply rejects this defence of Abhinava (37)

Eighth fault results from the use of the pronominal stem Here it refers to 'pratiyamānam vastu' (Dhv I 5) It is used in masculine instead of neuter, which would be grammatically correct (kimca tamiti tadah pumstvena nirdeśónupapannah – Vy V I) It may be noted that this argument is merely verbal and does not refer to the substance

In the ninth blemish, the objection is against 'kāvyaviśeṣah' Mahimā says that according to Dhvanikāra, a poem becomes a poem only if there is dhvani, and if there is no dhvani there is no poem Therefore it is pointless to use the word kāvyaviśesah' Taking this verse (i e, Dhv I 13) in conjunction with 'kāvyasyātmā sa evārthah' etc (Dhv I 5), Mahimā argues further that where there is no rasa there is no poetry and therefore, to specify a composition as peculiar poetry is useless Thus, it is useless to circumscribe the sphere of dhvani by qualifying the term kāvya by 'viseṣa', in as much

as it gives rise to the false notion that there are other specimens of kāvya besides what can be properly subsumed under dhvani –

(api ca kāvyaviseṣa iti kāvyasya visiṣṭatvamanupapannam kāvyamātrasya dhvani vyapadesaviseṣaṇatvena iṣṭatvāt, tasya rasātmakatvopagamāt tadabhāve casya kāvyatava na syāt kimuta viseṣah iti anārambhaṇīyameva etat prekṣāvatām syāt vaiphalyāt (Vy V I)

There can be no varying degrees of charm in aesthetic realisation which can be made the basis of this differentiation *implied by the expression-'kāvyaviseṣah', for, in each case the final blissful experience is interminate in its* character and does not admit of any determinate analysis leading to comparison inter se (38)

It might be argued that there are nine different sentiments (rasa) and, the distinction *implied might have reference to any particular rasa amongst them But such a course of argument* would lead to the exclusion of poetic compositions *from the* category of dhvanikāvya that do not suggest that particular sentiment (39) One might however contend that there are other varieties of suggested sense besides rasadhvani which is raised to the status of the soul of literary art, viz vastu-dhvani, and alamkāradhvani Thus, when rasadhvani would be characterised by the suggested vastu and alamkāra, severally or jointly, , then and then only would it be regarded as a specimen of *dhvanikāvya But this defence too would be of no avail, for* when a piece of poem *manifests exclusively a* particular emotion without suggesting either vastu or alamkāra the designation of dhvani would not be applicable-a ridiculous positions indeed ! So, the qualifying word 'viseṣah' is idefensible (40)

Tenth fault is avācyavacanadoṣa as seen in 'sūribhih' kathitah' The specific mention of the nominative viz sūribhiḥ,

of the particular form 'kathitah' is needless and therefore unjustifible.

(kimca 'sūribhih kathita'iti kathanakriyākartrnirdesah paksadvaye'pyavācya eva kartrmātravivaksāyām kriyāyāh kartravyabhicārāt kartrvisesavivaksāyāmanantaroktakramena vyāpāravisesasambandhādeva tadvisesāvagatisiddheriityavācya-vacanam dosah)

The tenth fault–avācyavacanadosa–is mentioning something which need not be mentioned If merely the agents of 'kathitah' are implied in general, they are already implied in the very use of the word 'kathitah' If some particular authors are implied, these are already referred to formerly Thus the mention of sūribhih is redundant

Mahimā, having thus refuted dhvani to his satisfaction, and being indisposed to bother himself with minor items, improves upon the definition of dhvani as follows

vācyastadanumito vā
yatrārtho'rthāntaram prakāsayati ।
sambanbhatah kutascit
sa kavyānumitirityuktā ॥ (Vy.V I 25)

And adds,

etacca anumānasyaiva laksanam nānyasya yaduktam trirūpālingāt parārthānumānamiti kevalam samjnābhedah. (Vy.V I)

The ten faults shown by Mahima are not all of equal importance As we have noted, some of these are mere verbal and some are mere quibbles His main argument seems to be that the word 'artha' should be limited to the first direct meaning–vācyārtha–of the word Therefore, whatever else follows this vācyārtha in the mind of the sahrdaya should be regarded as anumeya He has this much justification in his view that the indirect thoughts and feelings arising out of the direct meaning can be psychologically regarded as of an inferential

nature This however, is in no sense a logical anumāna or inference In fact, Mahimā, as we have noted, laughs at those who while having 'kāvyānumiti' think of the 'tārkika' anumiti

He, like Ānanda tries to elaborate this point, and show how the several categories of poetics can be subsumed under this In fact in this part of the treatment of the subject, he practically takes the analogy of Ānanda's vyanjanā e g Mahimā has his asamalksyakrama and samlaksykrama so also vastu anumiti, alamkrāranumiti and rasādi anumiti etc The illustrations that he uses are mostly taken from Dhv Thus kavyānumiti takes the form of vyanjanā for Mahimā

Bhoja

Now, in order to understand Bhoja's position, let us consider briefly his S K Ā, and the published fragments of Sr Pra, as well as Dr Raghavan s learned and critical thesis on Sr Pra Dr De seems to say that Bhoja does not accept the dhvani theory of Ānanda in toto, though he does quote many of the kārikas of Dhv and appropriates some of its other matter (41)

Dr Rāghavan in his Bhoja s S'r Pra tries to refute at length Dr De s views on this point We have, while tracing the earlier indications of vyañjanā pointed out that the idea of *vyañjanā* is to be found in some of the alamkāras discussed by Bhāmaha and Dandin (Vide Ch pp) We can concur with *the opinion that in S K Ā and Sr Pra there are alamkāras* and gunas which embody vyañjanā This however, does not necessarily make *him* a vyañjanāvādin, *though* we may concede that as Dr Raghvan says, Bhoja may be called an antarbhāvavādin.

We have seen that both Dhañjaya and Dhanika, in DR and its Avaloka, refute the theory of vyañjanā and substitute *the* tātparya vṛtti in its place to do for vyañjanā *Bhoja*,

Muñja's successor, seems to follow the tradition of his learned assembly in not giving importance to vyañjanā. In this respect we can agree with Dr. De when he says, that Bhoja's school, "......stands in many respects apart from the kasmirian school of Ānandvardhana", but we cannot agree with him when he says..., "and appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the Dhvani theory". As to the use of Ānanda's kārikās and some of its matter of Bhoja, we may point out that even the greatest opponent of Ānanda viz. Mahimabhatta also does the same But thereby he does not become a vyañjanāvādin. In contrast to this we may say that Hemacandra, the author of Kāvyānuśāsana (Crica. 11th Cen. A D.), who lived in the time of Siddharāja and Kumārapāla accepts the views of the kashmirian authors Abhinava and Mammata, and is an ardent vyañjanāvādin (see Kā. Śā I sū. 20-25)

However, it may be added that a discordant note is struck by Rāmacandra and Gunacandra, the disciples of Hemacandra, who in their Nāṭyadarpana (III. 109 sū 163) take rasa to be 'spaṣṭānubhāvaniścevah' and add that the term 'spaṣṭa' qualifying 'anubhāva' means well determined. For, only the well determined object serves as a mark or liṅgam.- Spaṣṭāh iti spaṣṭāḥ samyak nirnitāh. asamdigdhan hi liṅgam bhavati. Thus the authors seem to lean more towards Sri. S'aṅkuka.

Mammata who follows Ānanda in his theory or vyañjanā, after refuting the views of anumānavādin and the like, takes up the view of advaitavādins Advaitavādins as they are, they assume an akhandabuddhi, i.e. the sense of the whole as responsible for the elucidation of meaning. Even they, however, have to accept the division of pada, padārtha etc. And so, in the illustrations discussed in this context, they cannot escape vyañjanā, if they have to arrive at the implied sense in those verses.(42)

Visvanātha, the author of S D (circa 1300-'50 A D) discusses the views of those who try to incorporate vyañjanā in the means of knowledge called 'arthāpatti Visvanātha is of the opinion that as in case of anumāna, so also in case of arthāpatti the basis is vyāptijñāna or the knowledge of vyāpti *Now vyaṅgya or the suggested sense can not be said to rest* on vyāpti Now vyaṅgya or the suggested sense can not be said to rest on vyapti on account of vyabhicāra and saṃdeha So, it can not be gathered by arthapatti (43)

Visvanatha further adds that the suggested sense is not even 'sūcanabuddhigrādhya' i e. gathered by signs and symbols (sucana) Even this depends on an earlier popular saṃketa When it is already understood between the two parties concerned that the raising of the forefingure means a particular *number, then only that particular gesture suggests that number* Thus, even this sūcanabuddhi is in a way a sort of loose anumana and the suggested sense cannot be gathered by it (44)

He also adds *that the vyaṅgyartha cannot be gathered by* 'smṛti' Others hold that the suggested sense can be gathered by smṛti or memory because the knowledge of rasādi is caused by saṃskara or impressions But in this case there will be 'ativyāpti in 'pratyabhijnā' i e recognition also, for pratyabhijnā is also born of sam kāras but is not of the form of smṛti (45)

The above review of the opponents of dhvani school shows that they are not opposed to pratiyamānatā or implied sense *as a source of charm in poetry The difference arises as to* how this implication is grasped Ānanda regards this as one of the functions of word but this function is not, according to him, fulfilled by either abhidhā or laksanā, He therefore, posits a third function of word viz vyañjanā His opponents *see no necessity of adding a third function of word because* the implied sense can be grasped by inferential processes of thoughts, by meanings yielded through abdidhā and lakṣanā.

So for them, to accept vyañjanā would lead to what is called gaurava doṣa. Thus, the question resolves itself into the acceptance or non-acceptance of this additional function of word. Modern logicians who discuss the function of language do accept, what they call the emotive use of language in addition to its scientific function. The various emotive association a word has, become, so to say, prominant in poetic language. But if one considers the psychological processes of the emotive function, one has to agree that they are of an inferential type. In fact, as Mammaṭa says, those who experience and enjoy *rasa* have to be keen in the inference of sthāyin-(loke pramadādibhih sthāyyanumāne'bhyāsapa ṭavavatām..." etc K.P.IV 28) Thus it is not impossible to reconcile both the opposing views

Foot-notes

(1) इत्येतदभिधावृत्तं दशधात्र विवेचितम् । अ. वृ. मा. का. १२ (अभिधावृत्तिमातृका)

(2) वक्तुर्वाक्यस्य वाच्यस्य रूपभेदावधारणात् ।
लक्षणा त्रिप्रकारेयं विवेक्तव्या मनीषिभिः ॥ अ. वृ. मा. (का. ६)

(3) आकम्प्यमानस्यापि समुद्रस्य कम्पनार्थत्वेनाध्यवसित तत्राध्यवसान-गर्भो गौणोपचार । अ. वृ. मा. (PP 13).

(4) इत्यत्र हि स्मरशरप्रभृतीनां पञ्चानामध्यारोपितवह्निभावानामसहत्व वाक्यार्थीभूतम् । अत. तस्य वाच्यता । तात्पर्यालोचनसामर्थ्याच्च विप्रलम्भशृङ्गारस्य आक्षेप इत्युपादानात्मिका लक्षणा ।–अ. वृ. मा. PP 14.

(5) व. जी. 1 8 (वृत्ति)–

यो वाचक स शब्द, यो वाच्य च अभिधेयः सोऽर्थ इति । ननु च द्योतकव्यञ्जकावपि शब्दौ सम्भवतः । तदसंग्रहान्नाव्याप्तिः । यस्मादर्थप्रतीतिकारित्वसामान्यादुपचारात्तावपि वाचकावेव । एवं द्योत्यव्यङ्ग्ययोरर्थयो प्रत्येयत्वसामान्यादुपचाराद् वाच्यत्वमेव । तस्मात् वाच्यत्व वाचकत्वं च शब्दार्थयोर्लोके सुप्रसिद्ध यद्यपि लक्षण, तथाप्यस्मिन् अलौकिके काव्यमार्गे काव्यवर्त्मनि, अयमे-तयोर्वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणः परमार्थ, किमप्यपूर्वं तत्वं इत्यर्थ ।

(6) एतेन यत्र कुन्तकेन भक्त्यन्तर्भावितो ध्वनिस्तदपि प्रत्याख्यातम् । -एकावली, इदानीं यदप्यन्यैरस्य भक्त्यन्तर्भूतत्वमुक्तं तदपि दर्शयितुमाह वक्रोक्तीत्यादि । PP 51 (B S S Ed) See also Jayaratha (PP 8)

(7) यत्रदूरान्तरेऽन्यस्मात् सामान्यमुपचर्यते ।
लेशेनापि भवेत् काचिद्वक्तुमुद्रिक्तवस्तुताम् ॥
यन्मूला सरसोल्लेखा रूपकादिरलङ्कृतिः ।
उपचारप्रधानासौ वक्रता काचिदुच्यते ॥ V J II ka. 13 14.

(8) यथा मूर्तं वस्तु दर्शनस्पर्शनसंवेद्यस्नेहनगुणयोगात् (स्निग्धमि)त्युच्यते तथैव कान्तिरमूर्ताप्युपचारात् स्निग्धेत्युक्ता । V J II 13

(9) अत एव च प्रत्ययान्तरे अस्मिन्नुपचारे न वक्रताव्यवहारः, यथा गौर्वाहीक इति । V J II 13

(10) शास्त्रादिप्रसिद्धशब्दार्थोपनिबन्धव्यतिरेकि–V J I

(11) शब्दार्थौ सहितौ वक्रकविव्यापारशालिनि ।
बन्धे व्यवस्थितौ काव्यं तद्विदाह्लादकारिणि ॥ V J I 7

(12) उभावेतावलङ्कार्यौ तयोः पुनरलङ्कृतिः ।
वक्रोक्तिरेव वैदग्ध्यभङ्गीभणितिरुच्यते ॥ V. J I 10

and also उभौ द्वावप्येतौ शब्दार्थौ अलङ्कार्यौ अलङ्करणीयौ केनापि शोभातिशयकारिणालङ्करणेन योजनीयौ । किं तद् तयोरप्यलङ्करणमित्यभिधीयते, तयोः पुनरलङ्कृतिः । तयोर्द्वित्वसङ्ख्या विशिष्टयोरप्यलङ्कृतिः पुनरेकैव, यया द्वावप्यलङ्क्रियेते ।

काऽसौ वक्रोक्तिरेव । वक्रोक्तिः प्रसिद्धाभिधानव्यतिरेकिणी विचित्रैवाभिधा । कीदृशी, वैदग्ध्यभङ्गीभणितिः । वैदग्ध्यं विदग्धभावः, कविकर्मकौशलं तस्य भङ्गी विच्छित्तिः, तया भणितिः । विचित्रैवाभिधा वक्रोक्तिरित्युच्यते ।

तदिदमत्र तात्पर्यम् । यत् शब्दार्थौ केनापि व्यतिरिक्तेनालङ्करणेन योज्यते । किन्तु वक्रतावैचित्र्ययोगितयाभिधानमेवानयोरलङ्कारः । तस्यैव शोभातिशयकारित्वात् । एतच्च वक्रताव्याख्यानावसर एव उदाहरिष्यते ॥ V J I 10

(13) एष एव शब्दशक्तिमूलानुरणनरूपव्यङ्ग्यस्य पदध्वनेर्विषयः V J II 12 (वृत्ति)

(14) ध्वन्या III 16 –सुप्तिङ्वचनसम्बन्धैस्तथा कारकशक्तिभिः ।
कृत् तद्धितसमासैश्च द्योत्योऽलक्ष्यक्रमः क्वचित् ॥

(15) ध्वन्या III. 16 –च शब्दात् निपातोपसर्गकालादिभिः प्रयुक्तैः अभिव्यज्यमानो दृश्यते ।

(16) व. जी (V. J.) III 1 –उदारस्वपरिस्पन्दसुन्दरत्वेन वर्णनम् ।
वस्तुनो वक्रशब्दैकगोचरत्वेन वक्रता ॥

(17) V. J. III i (वृत्ति)–

वस्तुनो वर्णनीयतया प्रस्तावितस्य पदार्थस्य यदेवंविधत्वेन वर्णनं सा तस्य वक्रता वक्रत्वविच्छित्तिः । किंविधत्वेन इत्याह–उदारस्वपरिस्पन्दसुन्दरत्वेन । उदारः सोत्कर्षः सर्वातिशायी यः स्वपरिस्पन्दः स्वभावमहिमा तस्य सुन्दरत्वं सौकुमार्यातिशयस्तेन, अत्यन्तरमणीयस्वाभाविकधर्मयुक्तत्वेन, वर्णनं प्रतिपादनम् । कथम् वक्रशब्दैकगोचरत्वेन । वक्रो योऽसौ नानाविधवक्ताविशिष्टः शब्दः कश्चिदेव वाचकविशेषो विवक्षितार्थसमर्पणसमर्थः, तस्यैकस्य केवलस्य गोचरत्वेन प्रतिपाद्यतया विषयत्वेन । वाच्यत्वेनेति नोक्त, व्यङ्ग्यत्वेनापि प्रतिपादनसम्भवात् ॥

(18) ध्वन्या. II. 17–इत्येवंविधे विषयेऽनुरणनरूपरूपकाश्रयेण काव्यचारुत्वव्यवस्थानात् रूपकध्वनिरिति व्यपदेशो न्याय्यः ।

(19) व जी on I. 21 –प्रबन्धे वक्रभावो यथा–कुत्रचिन्महाकविविरचिते रामकथोपनिबन्धे नाटकादौ पञ्चविधवक्रताप्सामग्रीसमुदायसुन्दर सहृदयहृदयहारि महापुरुषवर्णनमुपक्रमे प्रतिभासते । परमार्थतस्तु विधिनिषेधात्मकधर्मोपदेशः पर्यवस्यति, रामवद्वर्तितव्यं न रावणवदिति ।

(20) कथोन्मेषसमानेऽपि वपुषीव निजैर्गुणैः ।
प्रबन्धाः प्राणिन इव प्रभासन्ते पृथक् पृथक् ॥ इत्यन्तरश्लोक । (४२)
on IV 25 व. जी.

(21) नूतनोपायनिष्पन्ननयवर्त्मोपदेशिनाम् । महाकविप्रबन्धानां सर्वेषामस्ति वक्रता ॥ V. J. IV. 26.

(22) व जी. I. 10.–see foot-note No. 10.

(23) व. जी I. 5 –चतुर्वर्गफलास्वादमप्यतिक्रम्य तद्विदाम् ।
काव्यामृतरसेनान्तश्चमत्कारो वितन्यते ॥

(24) व. जी I. 6 –सर्वसंपत्परिस्पन्दसम्पाद्य सरसात्मनाम् ।......
सरसात्मनाम् आर्द्रचेतसाम्...... ।

(25) व. जी. I. 6 अन्तर्श्लोकः–
प्रबन्धेषु कवीन्द्राणां कीर्तिकन्देषु किं पुनः ।

(26) व. जी. IV. 11–निरन्तररसोद्गारगर्भसन्दर्भनिर्भराः ।
गिरं कवीनां जीवन्ति न कथामात्रमाश्रिताः ॥

(27) व जी III. 1 –तदिदमुक्त भवति यत् स्वशब्दै. अभिधीयमाना श्रुतिपथमवतरन्तेश्चेतनाना चर्वणचमत्कारं कुर्वन्तीत्यनेन न्यायेन घृतापूपप्रभृतय पदार्था स्वशब्दैरभिधीयमाना तदास्वादसपद सम्पादयन्तीत्येव सर्वस्य कस्य चिदुपभोगसुखार्थिनस्तैरुदारचरितैरयत्नेनैव तदभिधानमात्रादेव त्रैलोक्यराज्य सम्पत्सौख्यसमृद्धि प्रतिपाद्यते इति नमस्तभ्य ।

(28) V J III 7 (वृत्ति)-मुख्य मत्प्रधान चेतनसुरासुरादिसम्बन्धी-स्वरूप तदेवविध सत्कवीना वर्णनास्पद भवति स्वव्यापारगोचरतां प्रतिपद्यते । कीदृशम्-अक्लिष्टरत्यादिपरिपोषमनोहरम्–अक्लिष्ट कदर्थनाविरहित प्रत्यग्रता मनोहरो यो रत्यादि स्थायिभाव तस्य परिपोष शृङ्गारप्रभृतिरसत्वापादन स्था य्येव तु रसो भवेत् इति न्यायात् ।

(29) एव विप्रलम्भशृङ्गारकरुणयो सौकुमार्यात् उदाहरणप्रदर्शन विहितम् । रसान्तराणामपि स्वयमुत्प्रेक्षणीयम् । V J III 7

(30) जडानामचेतनाना सलिलतरुकुसुमसमयप्रभृतीनामेवविध रसोद्दीपन सामर्थ्यविनिबन्धनबन्धुरं वर्णनीयतामवगाहते । V J III 7

(31) रसोद्दीपनसामर्थ्यविनिबन्धनबन्धुरम् ।
चेतनानां अमुख्याना जडाना चापि भूयसा ॥ V J III. 8.

(32) व जी III 10 (वृत्ति)-तदेवविध स्वभावप्राधान्येन रस-प्राधान्येन द्विप्रकारं सहजसौकुमार्यसरसं स्वरूपं वर्णनाविषयवस्तुनः शरीरमलङ्कार्यतामेवार्हति ।

(33) रसादिपरमार्थज्ञमन संवादसुन्दर । V J I 26

(34) व जी I 41 स्वभावसरसाकूतो भावानां यत्र बध्यते ।
केनापि कमनीयेन वैचित्र्येणोपबृंहित ॥

and also

विचित्रमेव स्वरूपान्तरेण प्रतिपादयति । स्वभाव इत्यादिदी । यत यस्मिन् भावानां स्वभावः स्वपरिस्पन्द सरसाकूत रसनिर्भराभिप्राय पदार्थाना निबध्यते निवेश्यते etc etc

(35) अवलोक of धनिक on दश IV.

यथा लौकिकवाक्येषु श्रूयमाणक्रियेषु गामभ्याजेत्यादिषु अश्रूयमाणक्रियेषु च द्वारं द्वारमित्यादिषु स्वशब्दोपादानात् प्रकरणादिवशात् बुद्धिसन्निवेशिनो क्रियेव

कारकोपस्थिता वाक्यार्थस्तथा काव्येष्वपि स्वशब्दोपादानात् क्वचित्, प्रीत्यै नवोढा प्रियेत्येवमादौ, क्वचित् च प्रकरणादिवशात् (नियताविहित–N S) नियत-विहितविभावाद्यविनाभावाद् वा साक्षाद्भावकचेतसि विपरिवर्तमानो रत्यादि स्थायी स्वस्वविभावानुभावव्यभिचारिभिस्तत्तच्छब्दोपनीतै संस्कारपरंपरया (परं)-परा प्रौढीमानीयमानोरत्यादिवाक्यार्थ । नचाऽपदार्थस्य वाक्यार्थत्वं नास्तीति वाच्यम् । कार्यपर्यवसायित्वात् तात्पर्यशक्ते । तथा हि पौरुषेय अपौरुषेय वाक्य सर्वं कार्यपरम् । अतत्परत्वेऽनुपादेयत्वादुन्मत्तादिवाक्यवत् । काव्यशब्दानां चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां निरतिशयसुख स्वादव्यतिरेकेण प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकयो प्रवृत्तिविषययो प्रयोजनान्तरानुपलब्धे (स्वानन्दो) स्वादोद्भूतिरेव कार्यत्वेनाव धार्यते । तदुद्भूतिनिमित्तत्व च विभावादिसंसृष्टस्य स्थायिन एवावगम्यते । अतो वाक्यस्याऽभिधानशक्तिस्तेन रसेनाऽऽकृष्यमाणा तत्तत् (स्वार्था) स्वादा-पेक्षितावान्तरविभावादिप्रतिपादनद्वारा स्वपर्यवसायितामानीयते । तत्र विभावा-दय पदार्थस्थानीयास्तत् संसृष्टो रत्यादि वाक्यार्थ । तदेतत् काव्यवाक्यम् । (यदीय) यदीयौ ताविमौ पदार्थवाक्यार्थौ । न चैव सति गीतादिवत् सुखजन कत्वेऽपि वाच्यवाचकभावानुपयोग । विशिष्टविभावादिसामग्रीविदुषमेव तथाविध रत्यादिभावनावतामेव स्वादोद्भूते । तदनेन अतिप्रसङ्गोऽपि निरस्त । ईदृशि च वाक्यार्थनिरूपणे परिकल्पिताभिधादिशक्तिवशेनैव समस्तवाक्यार्था वगते शक्त्यन्तरपरिकल्पन प्रयास यथाऽवोचाम काव्यनिर्णये ।

तात्पर्यानतिरेकाच्च व्यञ्जकत्वस्य न ध्वनि ।
किमुक्त स्यादश्रुतार्थतात्पर्येऽन्योक्तिरूपिणि ॥१॥
विष भक्षय (पूर्वो यस्चैव) वाक्ये यश्चैव परसुतादिषु ।
(प्रसज्यते) प्रयुज्यते प्रधानत्वात् ध्वनित्व केन वार्यते ॥२॥
ध्वनिश्चेत् स्वार्थविश्रान्त वाक्यमर्थान्तराश्रयम् ।
तत्परत्व त्वविश्रान्तौ तान् न विश्रान्त्यसंभवात् ॥३॥
एतावत्येव विश्रान्तिस्तात्पर्यस्येति कि कृतम् ।
यावत्कार्यप्रसारित्वात् तात्पर्यं न तुलाधृतम् ॥४॥
भ्रमधार्मिक विश्रब्धमिति भ्रमिकृता (स्पदे) स्पद ।
निर्व्यावृत्ति कथ वाक्य निषेधमुपसर्पति ॥५॥
प्रतिपाद्यस्य विश्रान्तिरपेक्षापूरणाद् यदि ।
वक्तुर्विवक्षित (प्राप्त) प्राप्ते अविश्रान्तिर्न वा कथम् ॥६॥
पौरुषेयस्य वाक्यस्य (विवक्षा परतन्त्र) विवक्षा परतन्त्रता ।
वक्त्रभिप्रेततात्पर्यमत काव्यस्य युज्यते ॥७॥

इति । अतो न रसादीनां काव्येन सह व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभाव । किं तर्हि भाव्यभावकसम्बन्धः, काव्यं हि भावकम् । भाव्या रसादय ।

The NS Ed reading are bracketted ( ) It contains numerous mistakes. A revised text, with the corrections made by MM Kuppuswami Shastri is given here as quoted by Dr Raghvan, Sr Pra (pp 181-182)

(36) अर्थस्य विशिष्टत्व शब्द सविशेषण तद् पुरत्वम् ।
द्विवचनवाशब्दौ व्यक्तिध्वनिर्नाम काव्यवैशिष्ट्यम् ॥
वचन च कथनकर्तुं कथिता ध्वनिलक्ष्मणीति दश दोषा ।
ये त्वन्ये तद्भेदप्रभेदलक्षणगता न त गणिता ॥ व्य वि I

(37) अभिनव observes-

व्यक्त इति द्विवचनेनेदमाह-यदप्यविवक्षितवाच्ये शब्द एव व्यञ्जक तथापि अर्थस्यापि सहकारिता न त्रुट्यति, अन्यथा अज्ञातार्थोऽपि शब्द तद् व्यञ्जक स्यात् । विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्ये तु शब्दस्यापि सहकारित्व भवत्येव, विशिष्टशब्दाभिधेयतया विना तस्यार्थस्याव्यञ्जकत्वादिति सर्वत्र शब्दार्थयोरुभयोरपि ध्वनन व्यापारः । तेन यद् भट्टनायकेन द्विवचन दूषित तद्गजनिमीलिकया एव । -लोचन on Dhv I 18

See also, Mahima-

अत्र केचिन्विद्वन्मानिनो द्विवनसमर्थनामनोरथाक्षिप्तचित्ततया वाच्यवाचकयो विस्मृतसुप्रसिद्धप्रतीतिक्रमभावा त्योरेककालिकनां शब्दस्योत्तनयनिरस्तामपि व्यञ्जकतां पश्यत तन्निबन्धनां ध्वनिभेदयोरविवक्षितवाच्यविवक्षितान्यपरवाच्ययो ध्वननव्यापारं प्रति पर्यायेण अन्योन्यसहकारितां तदपेक्षा चानयो प्रधानेतरतामुपकल्प्य सहकारितया व्यक्तिक्रिया प्रत्युभयोरपि कृतकर्तृत्वात् तदपेक्षो व्यक्त इति द्विवचननिर्देश, प्राध्यान्यापेक्षश्च-यत्रार्थ शब्दो वेतिविकल्प्य इति मन्यमाना व्यङ्क्त इति द्विवचनेनेदमाह-अर्थ शब्दो वेति विकल्पाभिधान तु प्राधान्यभिप्रायेण इति यदाहु, तद् भ्रान्तिमूल न तत्त्वमित्यलमवस्तु निर्बन्धनेन । व्य वि I

(38) अपि च काव्यविशेष इति काव्यस्य विशिष्टत्वमनुपपन्नम् । काव्यमात्रस्य ध्वनिव्यपदेशविशेषत्वेन इष्टत्वात्, तस्य रसात्मकत्वावगमात् । यत स एवाह काव्यस्यात्मा स एवार्थ तथा चादिकवे पुरा । क्रौञ्चद्वन्द्ववियोगोत्थ

शोक श्लोकत्वमागत ॥ न च तस्य विशेष सम्भवति निरतिशयसुखास्वाद-लक्षणत्वात् । यदाहु —

पाठ्यादथ ध्रुवागानात् तत संपूरिते रसे ।
तदास्वादपरैकाग्रो हृष्यत्यन्तर्मुख. क्षणम् ॥
ततो निर्विषयस्यास्य स्वरूपावस्थितो निज ।
व्यज्यतेऽह्लादनिष्यन्द येन तृप्यन्ति योगिन ॥

तदभावे चास्य काव्यतैव न स्यात् । किमुत विशेष एति अनारम्भणो-यमेवैतत् प्रेक्षावता स्यात् वैफल्यात् । व्य वि I

(39) न च रसाना वैशिष्ट्ये तदात्मन काव्यस्य विशिष्टत्वमिति युक्त वक्तु अव्याप्ते । एव हि प्रतिनियतरसात्मन एव तस्य ध्वनित्व स्यात्, नान्यस्य अन्यरसात्मन , वैशिष्ट्याभावात् । इष्यते च तत्रापीत्यव्याप्तिर्लक्षणदोष । व्य वि I

(40) न च रसात्मन काव्यस्य वस्तुमात्रादिभि' विशेष शक्य आधातुम्, तेषा विभावादिरूपतया रसाभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वोपगमात् । न च व्यञ्जकाना वैचित्र्ये व्यङ्ग्यस्य विशेषोऽभ्युपगन्तु युक्त शाबलेयादिनामिव गोत्वस्य । ततोऽस्य विशिष्टतोपगमे वा यत्र तयो उभयोरेकैकस्य वा व्यङ्ग्यता तत्रैव ध्वनिव्यपदेश स्यात् न तु केवलरसात्मनि काव्ये वैशिष्ट्याभावात् । (व्य वि I)

(41) Dr De (Sanskrit Poetics II, pp, 229) says

'It will be convenient in this connection to take up the *school of opinion represented by the writer on poetics in* the Agnipurāna and by Bhoja, which stands in many *respects* apart from kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana and which appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the Dhvani theory '

on pp 261 he says 'He i e (Bhoja) even appropriates karikas from the Dhvanyāloka, although he does not accept the theory "

(42) अविशिष्टमपर्यायानेकशब्दप्रतिष्ठितम् ।

एक वेदान्तनिष्णातास्तमखण्ड प्रपेदिरे ॥ K P II बालबोधिनी also बादरायण,

अनवयवमेव वाच्यमनाद्यविद्योपदर्शितालीकपदवर्णविभागमस्या निमित्तम् । and also —अखण्डबुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्यो वाक्यार्थ एव वाच्य वाक्यमेव

च वाचकम् इति येऽप्याहु तैरप्यविद्यापथपतितै पदपदार्थकल्पना कर्तव्यैवेति तत्पक्षे अप्यवश्यमुक्तोदाहरणादौ विध्यादि व्यङ्ग्य एव । K P V,

see also --परिनिश्चितनिरूपभ्रंशशब्दब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता मतमाश्रित्यैव प्रवृत्तोऽयं ध्वनिव्यवहार इति तै सह किं विरोधाविरोधौ चिन्त्येते । ध्वन्या III see also Adhinava on this quoted earlier,

(43) एतेनार्थापत्तिवेद्यत्वमपि व्यङ्ग्यानामपास्तम् अर्थापत्तेरपि पूर्वसिद्ध व्याप्तिच्छाया उपजीव्यैव प्रवृत्ते यथा यो जीवति स कुत्राप्यवतिष्ठते जीवति चात्र गोष्ठ्यामविद्यमानश्चैव इत्यादौ । S D. V.

(44) किं च, वस्त्रविक्रयादौ तर्जनीतोलनेन दशसंख्यादिवत् सूचन-बुद्धिवेद्योऽप्ययं न भवति । सूचनबुद्धेरपि संकेतादिलौकिकप्रमाणसापेक्षत्वात्तुमान प्रकारताङ्गीकारात् । S D V

(45) यच्च संस्कारजन्यत्वात् रसादिबुद्धिः स्मृति इति केचित् । तत्रापि प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अनैकान्तिकतया हेतोराभासता । *S D V.*

CHAPTER XIV

DHVANI IN ABHINAVAGUPTA

Abhinavagupta follows the Dhvanyāloka in his theories on dhvani and rasa His two important works on this subject are a commentary on Dhv known as Locana and a commentary on the Nā Sā of Bharata, known as Nātyavedavivrti or Abhinavabhārati (A bh) The merit of his work lies in clear elaboration and at times subtle explanation and original insights to a certain extent He was a great philosopher of pratyabhijñā school, and has implicitv taken certain ideas peculiar to that school for granted In his discussions So his works on the pratiyabhijnā school of thought, viz Tantrāloka, and Isvarapratyabhijnāvivrtivimarsini incidentally throw some light on some aspects of his theory of poetry

As the Locana and the A bh are commentaries, much of their content is naturally the same as that of Dhv and Nā Sā. For these reasons, much of their treatment is bound to be piece-meal In the discussion of the contents of Dhv and Nā.Sa , I have, as far as possible, confined myself to the works themselves. Here while considering Abhinava's comms , I will note the points which have been clarified, elaborated and sometimes improved upon by him In the treatment of these points some repetition would be unavoidable though I have tried to avoid it as far as possible As noted just now, the treatment of various topics in these comm s, particularly in Locana, is piecemeal, and so, in order to give a coherant account, I have brought together the pieces bearing on the same topic and tried to give a connected account Let us now first consider the Locana.

The Tradition (Āmnayā) of Dhvani

Abhinava holds that the theory of dhvani was laid down by so many intelligent people He, however, fails to mention any concrete name of an ālamkārika who must have called dhvani to be the soul of poetry. He records an unwritten tradition of the dhvanivādins in the words –avicchinnena pravaheṇa *tairetaduktaṃ* vinā'pi viśiṣṭapustakeṣu viniveśanādityśābhiprāyaḥ (Locana on Dhv I 1) Thus, it seems that Abhinava seems to have failed in discovering the names and the works of the original propounders of dhvanivāda

Definitions of Dhvani

Abhinava accepts the definition of dhvani as given in the Dhv *I 13 He tries to explain the duel in 'vyaṅktaḥ' By this*, according to him, what is meant is that in both the varieties of sabdasaktimūla and arthasaktimūla of dhvani, both word and meaning (śabda and artha), have a role to perform Thus, Bhattanāyaka was wrong in criticising the duel ending in 'vyaṅktaḥ'

Says he vyaṅktaḥ iti dvivacanenedamāha–yadapyavivakṣitavācye sabda eva vyañjakaḥ tathāpyarthasyāpi sahakāritā na *truṭyati, anyathā ajñātārtho pi sabdastadvyañjakaḥ syāt* vivakṣitānyaparavācye ca sabdasyā'pi bhavatyeva viśiṣṭa abdābhidheyatayā vinā tasyarthasyāvyanjakatvāditi sarvatra śabdārthayorubhayorapi dhvananam vyāpāraḥ tena bhatta nāyakena dvivacanaṃ duṣitaṃ tadgajanimīlikayaiva arthaḥ sabdo vā iti vikalpābhidhānaṃ pradhānyābhiprāyena (Locana on Dhv I 13)

Two meanings of the term dhvani and its five-fold *application*

Abhinava derives the word dhvani in two different ways giving two different meanings One is dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ i e. *that which sounds, reverberates or implies is dhvani*, the

second is-dhvanyate iti dhvanih-i e *that which is sounded, reverberated, or implied is dhvani* The first refers to sabda which implies some meaning, and also to meaning (vācyārtha) which implies further meaning and also to the process i e. sabdana or dhvanana of a word which implies something The second derivation explains dhvani as something which is implied This, we might say, is dhvani proper

In addition, a poem, which consists of all these four, is also known as dhvani Thus he explains dhvani in such a way as to cover all the five accepts Says he

sa iti artho vā sabdo va vyāpāro vā artho'pi vācyo vā dhvanatiti, sabdo-pyevam vyangyo va dhvanyate iti vyāpāro vā sabdarthayordhvananamiti karikayā tu pradhānyena samudāya eva kāvyarūpo mukhyatayā dhvanirıti pratipāditām

Further on, he explains this point in greater detail He elaborately discusses the Sphotavāda of the vaiyākaranas and tries to correlate it with the theory of dhvani He says *asmābhirapi prasiddhebhyah sabdavyāpārebhyo'bhidhātātparyalaksanārūpebhyótirikto vyāparah dhvaniritiyuktah evam* catuskamapi dhvanih tadyogācca samastamapi kāvyam dhvanih (Locana on I 13 Dhv) He adds -tena vācyopi dhvanih, vācakopi sabdo dhvanih, dvayorapi vyanjakatvam dhvanatiti krtva sammisryate vibhāvānubhāvasamvalanayeti sabdanam sabdah sabdavyāpārah, na cāsāvabidhādirupah, apitvātmabhūtah, so'pi dhvananam dhvanih kāvyamiti vyapadesyasca yo'rthah *so'pidhvanih, uktaprakāradhvanicatustayamayatvāt ata eva sādhāranahetumāha-vyanjakatvasāmyāditi* vyangyavyanjakabhāvah sarvesu paksesu *sādhārana ityarthah*

This double derivation of dhvani makes it necessary to keep *the two meanings apart to avoid confusion The one suggests an agent or the process of suggestion, the other, what* is suggested There are *three main types of dhvanis accepted* by both Ānanda and Abhinava, viz vastudhvani, alamkāradhvani and rasadhvani. All the three must come under

'dhvanyate' derivation The other derivation viz 'dhvani' (and dhvanana) appear to have been given in confirmity of the vaiyākaranas for whom sabda or word is 'dhvani' which *reverberates Sphota*

The three types of Dhvani

Abhivana accepts the general three fold classification of *dhvani as given* by Ānanda However, *he adds some further* explanation For him, the pratiyamāna or implied sense is described as two-fold, (i) laukika or the one that is met with also in ordinary discourse and (ii) kāvyavyāpāraikagocara or *one which is met with only in poetry This means that the* first is possible in poetry as well as ordinary discourse, while the second is possible only in poetry

The first viz laukika dhvani in poetry is of two types, (i) that which suggests vastu or some matter-i e vastudhvani and, (ii) which suggests a figure of speech i e alaṃkāradhvani *This laukika dhvani in its two varieties can equally be expressed* directly by its own words as one might ask the mendicant not to go to the place of rendesvous because the dog is killed by a lion Alamkāradhvani is so termed on the analogy of *brāhamana śramana*

The variety of dhvani which is possible in poetry is *rasadhvani* Only this *rasadhvani is dhvani in the opinion of* Abhinava This alone it being pr dominant, is the soul of poetry Rasadhvani, says Abhinava can never be expressed by its own name He holds that this alone is primarily the soul *of poetry*, and that both vastudhvani and alaṃkāradhvani finally terminate into rasadhvani Says he sa ca dhvanirevetì, sa eva mukhyatayā ātmeti vastvalamkāradhvanyo rasadhvani paryantatvameveti vayameva vakṣyāmastatra tatre tyāstām tavat (Locana on Dhv I, 4)


Says he *pratiyamānamātre'pi* prakrānte tṛtiya eva rasadhvaniriti mantavyam itihāsabalāt prakrāntavṛttigrantha

balācca tena rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalaṃkāradhvanı tu sarvathā rasam pratı paryavasyete iti vācyādutkṛṣṭau tāvitaybhiprāyena dhvanih kāvyasyātmetisāmānyenoktah

Experience of Rasa Abhınava has elaborately discussed the nature of the experience of rasa in his A bh Here, however, he gives a brief account of it Rasa is recognised to be of the form of svasaṃvid Abhınava holds that the experience of sentiments and emotions etc. is of the nature of Supreme Joy In the minds of all the individuals, there are certain permanent impressions such as rati, hāsa, etc engramed and born of the experience of everyday life When one looks at some dramatic performance, or reads a poem, one experiences the vibhāva, anubhāva etc and the permanent fixed emotions are roused to the status of rasa and the cultured man experiences supreme joy This rasa, then, is of the form of relish and is recognised as the soul of poetry We will deal with Abhinava's views on rasa-realisation in greater details later on We, may, however, note his words *yastu svapne'pi na svasabdavācyo na laukika-vyavahārapatitah kintu sabdasamarpyamānahṛdayasaṃvādasundaravibhāvasamucitaprāgvinivista-vyāpārarasaniyarūpo rasah sa kāvyavyāpārikagocaro rasadhvaniriti,* (Locana on Dhv I 4)

The possible varieties of dhvani

Abhınava has also tried to give the possibe varieties of dhvani under Dhv II 31, and Dhv III 43 in a mathematical way on the basic of varieties given in Dhv At Dhv II. 31 he gives thirtyfive basic varieties of *dhvani It can be explained as below*



All these when multiplied by the subvarieties of guṇibhutavyangya, alaṃkāra and dhvani through the relation of saṃsṭṣṭi and saṃkara, tend to be 7420. Abhinava tries to illustrate some of them. It has been pointed out by modern writers that Abhinava's calculation of the number of dhvanis is not correct. It should be 9940 and not 7420.

The abhāvavādins or the opponents of dhvani

Abhinava also treats the views of some dhvanyabhāvavādins i e those who do not accept *vyañjanā* and *dhvani* He tries to classify them, and then in his own way tries to refute the views of the advocates of *abhihitānvayavāda*, anvitābhidhānavāda, etc

In this matter also, Abhinava has given us more detailed and elaborate discussion He says that the abhāvavādins are virtually of five classes though apparently Ānanda has counted only three The first variety of abhāvavādins are subdivided into three as below -tatrābhāvavikalpasya trayah prakārah-śabdārthagunālamkārānāmeva śabdārthasobhākāritv llokaśāstrātiriktasundaraśabdārtharūpasya kāvyasya na sobhāhetuh kaś cidanyo sti yo'smābhirna ganita ityekah prakārah yo vā na ganitah sa śobhākāryeva na bhavatiti dvitiyah atha sobhākari bhavati tarhyasmadukta eva gune vā'lamkāre vāntarbhavati nāmāntarakarane tu kiyadidam pānditym athāpyuktesu guṇālamkāresu vā nāntarbhāvah, *tathāpi* kimcidviseṣaleśamāsritya nāmāntarakaranamupam āvicchittiprakārānāmasamkhyatvāt tathāpi gunālamkāravyatiriktatvābhāvah eva *tāvanmātrena* ca kim krtam? anyasyāpi vaicitrasya sakyotpreksyatvāt cirantanairhi bharatamuniprabhṛtibhiryamakopame eva *śabdārthālamkāratveneste* tatprapañcadikpradarsanam tvanyairalamkāra kārih kṛtam tadyathā 'karmanvan' ityatra kumbhakārādvudāharanam srutvā svayam nagarakārādi sabdā utpreksyante tāvatā ka ātmani bahumānah evam prakrtepiti tṛtiyah prakārah evamekastridhā vikalpah, anyau ca dvāviti pañca vikalpāh iti tātparyārthah (Locana on Dhv I i)

Thus Abhinava classifies these opponents of dhvani as below (a) those who hold that dhvani does not exist at all or nāstyeva dhvanih, (b) those who say that dhvani is only bhakti or secondary sense-i e bhaktireva dhvanih and (c) those who maintain that dhvani is undescribable i e anirvācyo dhvanih The first variety is subdivided into three types Thus in all we have five varieties of abhāvavādins

Abhinava then points out that the theory of the absence of dhvani is a matter of past, *while the bhāktavāda is a* continuous tradition – bhāktavādastvavicchinnah pustakesvityabhiprāyena bhāktamāhuriti nityapravartamānāpeksayābhidhānam He does not mention any specific name of those abhāvavādins However, as noted earlier he mentions one Manorathakavi who ridicules dhvani

Abhinava tries to correlate bhāktavāda with the earlier poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Udbhata, Vāmana, etc He says · darsayateti–bhattodbhatavāmanādinā (Locana on Dhv. I. 1)

He goes on to establish vyanjanā and dhvani and tries to silence the abhihitānvayavāda, anvitābhidhānavāda, etc. in the following way :

Abhihitanvayavada refuted

The argument of the abhihitānvayavāda proceeds as below : *The tātparyavṛtti, in case of bhama dhammia etc* has not ended in form of the intended sense The words such as dṛpta, dhārmika, tad, etc cannot be rcorelated and therefore there is mukhyārthabādhā or contradiction in the primary sense. Thus, there is scope for viparīta lakṣanā having virodha or contradiction for its 'nimitta' This viparita lakṣanā makes for the sense of negation in this particular illustration viz bhama dhammia etc. This sense of negation is derived thus only on the strength of word (sabdaśaktimula eva) and therefore, there can not be any sense other than the expressed

(nanu tātparyasaktiraparyavasitā vivaksayā dṛptadhārmikatadādipadārthananvayarūpamukhyārthabādhabalena virodhanimittayā viparitalakṣaṇayā ca vākyārthibhūtaniṣedhapratitimabhihitānvayadṛśā karotiti śabdasaktimula eva sorthah, evamanenoktamiti hi vyavahārah tanna vācyātiriktonyo'rtha iti (Locana, Dhv I 4)

Abhinava, in the refutation of the above view explains *the nature and scope of abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣanā* He holds that in the particular illustration viz bhama dhammia

etc as there is no mukhyārthabādha or contradiction in the primary sense, correlation is not impossible So there is no scope for lakṣaṇā at all (ata eva mukhyārthabādho nātra saṅkya iti na viparitalakṣaṇāyā avasaraḥ)

Abhinava considers the point whether the suggested sense can be gathered in the third stage, viz lakṣaṇā For him suggestion comes at the fourth stage He holds that in instances such as gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ or siṃho baṭuḥ, the sense of coolness, purity etc. with reference to the hamlet, or the sense of the heroic quality of the baṭu, is gathered by vyañjanā, the fourth power and can not be gathered by anumāna or inference on account of the faults of anaikāntikatva and the like, or by remembrance, as *it is only with reference to experienced objects*, or by abhidhā *in the absence of convention or by* tātparya as it is over with correlation only, or by lakṣaṇā in the absence of 'skhaladgatitva' or faultering movement of words, or lakṣitalakṣaṇā which involves the contingencies of ānantya i e endlessness and vyabhicāra i e discrepancy Thus, the suggested sense is gathered only by suggestion, the fourth power of word.

(yattvidam ghoṣasyātipavitratvaśitalatvasevyatvādikam prayojanamaśabdāntaravācyam pramāṇāntarapratipannam baṭorvā parākramātiśayaśālitvam tatra śabdasya na tāvanna vyāpāraḥ, tathā hi-tatasāmīpyāttaddharmatvānumānamanaikāntikam, Siṃhaśabdavācyatvam ca baṭorasiddham atha yatra yatrai vaṃśabdaprayogastatra *tatra taddharmayoga ityanumānam*, tasyāpi vyāptigrahakāle mauhkam pramāṇāntaram vācyam, *na cāsti* na ca *smṛtiriyam*, ananubhūte tadayogāt, niyamapra tipattervakturetadvivakṣitamityadhyavasāyabhāva prasāneacca ityasti tāvadatra śabdasyaiva vyāpāraḥ vyāpārasca nābhidhātmā samayābhāvat na tātparyātmā tasyānvayapratitāveva parikṣayāt, na lakṣaṇātmā uktādeva hetoḥ skhaladgatitvābhāvāt tatrāpi hi skhaldgatitve punarmukhyārthabādha nimittam prayojanamityanavasthā syāt ata eva yat kenacillakṣitalakṣaṇeti nāma

krtam tadvyasanamatram tasmādabhidhātatparyalaksanāvyatiriktaścaturtho'sau vyāpāro dhvananadyotanavyañjanapratyāyanāvagamanādisodaravyapadeśanirūpito'bhyupagantavyah - Locana on Dhv I 4)

Abhinava is of the opinion that difference in the functions of word is gathered on the strength of the difference in the accessories Abhidhā rests on convention, tātparya on corre lation, laksanā on the contradition of the primary sense-mukhyārthabādha, and the like Vyañjanā or suggestion is different from these, as it rests on the meaning gathered through these and also on the intelligence of the hearer It subordinates the first three and is termed as the soul of poetry (tena samayāpeksā vācyāvagamanaśaktirabhidhāśaktih tadanyathānupapattisahayāvabodhanaśaktistatparyaśaktih mukhyārthabādhādisahakāryapeksārthapratibhāsanaśaktirlaksanā śaktih tacchaktitrayopajanitārthāvagamamūlajātatatpratibhāsapavitritapratipatr pratibhāsahāyārthadyotanaśaktirdhvananavyāpārah, sa ca prāgvrttam vyāpāratrayam nyakkurvan pradhānabhūtah kāvyātmetyasayena nisedhapramukhatayā ca prayojanavisayopi nisedhavisaya ityuktam (Locana-Dhv I 4)

Anvitabhidhanavada refuted

Abhinava also silences the anvitābhidhānavāda He argues in the following way The upholder of anvitabhidhānavāda, on the strength of the maxim viz yatparah sabdah sa sabdārthah, believes in abhidhā alone which operates like an arrow shot by a great hero, and gets at the suggested idea also Abhinava holds that when the objector expects abhidhā to go furher and further, he cannot take the whole process as one and identical, on account of the difference in subject matter If the subject-matter is not one but many, then on account of the difference in accessories it is bound to be non identical For when the subject matter is identical, with reference to word, buddhi i e understanding and karma or action, the fact of intermitant operation is discarded If the subject matter is different, our position viz that the functions are different, stands

(yópyanvitābhidhānavādi 'yatparah śabdah sa śabdārthah' iti hrdaye grhitvā śaravadabhidhāvyāpārameva dirghadirghamicchati, tasya yadi dirgho vyāpārastadekosāviti kutah ? bhinnaviśayatvāt athānekosau tadviṣayasahakāribhedādasajātiya eva yuktah. sajātiye ca kārye viramya vyāpārah śabdakarmabudhyādinām padārthavidbhih nisiddhah. asajātiye cāsmannaya eva) (Locana on Dhv. I. 4)

Sphotavāda silenced

Abhinava also tries to meet with the upholders of Sphota He holds that those who accept the non-divisible Sphota, or non divisible sentence, also have got to accept, on emp rical ground, the existence of individual words i.e padas and the like Thus, even for them vyañjanā should be acceptable on empirical ground When one crosses the bounds of empirical ground, one may accept the maxim-sarve sarvārthavācakāh, and may do away with the difference of abhidhā, lakṣanā etc And *this position at transendental level is not unknown to our* author i e Ānandavardhana who also composed Tattvāloka, a work *on philosophy*

(yepyavibhaktam Sphotam vākyam tadartham cāhuh, tairapyavidyāpadapatitaih sarveyamanusaraniyā prakriyā, taduttirnatve tu sarvam paramesvarādvayam brahmetyasmacchāstrakārena na na viditam tattvālokam grantham viracayatetyāstām) (Locan Dhv. I. 4)

Rasādi Dhvani

Now we will consider the topic of rasādi dhvani as treated in the Locana (on Dhv. II 1–4). In the udyota II, kārikās 1–4, the subjects of rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa, bhāvaśānti etc., is treated Abhinava, in Locana on these kārikās elaborately explains and illustrates these topics He says a poem lives by its rasa. Even then, some particular element of it happens to charm more and therefore gets projected in some poems'. These give rise to bhāvadhvani, bhāvodaya, bhāvaśānti, etc.–(yadapi ca rasenaiva

Abhinava then says that thus these bhāvadhvanis are just the drippings (nisyanda) of rasadhvani and on account of the special source of charm they are separately cognised. (evaṃ rasadhvanerevāmī bhāvadhvaniprabhṛtayo nisyandā āsvāde pradhānam prayojakamevāmsam vibhajya pṛthagvyavasthāpyate (Locana on Dhv. II 3)

Rasadhvani

Rasadhvani occurs there only when for the connoesseur, tasting is brought about by the relish of sthāyin combined with vibhāva, anubhava and vyabhicārin -rasadhvanistu sa eva yo'tra mukhyatayā vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicārisaṃyojanoditasthāyipratipattikasya pratipattuh sthāyyamśacarvanāprayuktah evāsvādaprakarṣah-Locana on Dhv II 3) This is illustrated as in kṛcchrenoruyugaṃ vyatitya etc Abhinava holds that when this rasa is principally suggested, it becomes the province of asaṃlakṣyakramadhvani When rasādi is suggested in a subservient way, it is rasādi alaṃkāra Says he tatrābhi vyaktih pradhānatayā bhavatvanyathā vā pradhānatve dhvanih, anyathā rasādyalamkārah (Locana on Dhv II 4)

Like Ānanda, he also maintains that the alaṃkāras such as upamā, utprekṣā etc indirectly, through the body in form of word and sense, embellish rasa, the soul Rasa is the ultimate alamkārya Just as a dead body cannot be decorated, in the same way, poetry without rasa cannot be embellished

etaduktaṃ bhavati-upamayā yadyapi vācyārtho'lamkriyate tathāpi tasya tadevālaṃkaranaṃ yadvyaṅgyārthābhivyañjanasāmarthyādhānamiti vastuto dhvanyātmaivālaṃkāryah katakakeyūrādibhirapi śarīrasamavāyibhiscetana ātmaiva tattaccittavṛttiviśesaucityasūcanātmatayālaṃkriyate-(Locana on Dhv II 5)

Here, it may be pointed out that the later writers like Mammata, Hemacandra etc absorb all these ideas regarding bhāvadhvani, rasābhāsa etc in their works We may say that the ideas of Dhv regarding vyañjanā and rasa are, to say,

given completeness by Locana and the A bh on the rasasūtra of the Nā Sā The later writers draw upon all the three as one source

The Sahṛdaya

This rasa-realisation is experienced only by 'sahṛdaya' and not by all ordinary people He explains the term 'sahṛdaya' as follows *yeṣām kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsavaśādviśadībhūte* manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasaṃvādabhājah sahṛdayāh-(Locana, on Dhv I 1), yathoktam-(Nā Śā) (VII 10)-

yo'rtho hṛdayasaṃvādī
tasya bhāvo rasodbhavah ।
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena
śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭhamivāgninā ॥

i e-The faculty of self-identification with the events represented (the determinants, consequents, etc) demands that the mirror of the mind should be made completely clear, by means of repeated acquaintance with the practice of poetry The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their own hearts, are those who have this faculty For it has been said 'the tasting of that which finds the consent of the heart arouses the rasa The body is pervaded by it, as dry wood by fire" The mind and the heart must be mirror-like ('viśada-vimala), ready to receive all the images which are reflected in them vimalamukurakalpībhūtanijahṛdayāh (A bh p 37) In the Tantrāloka III 200, Abhinava says

tathā hi madhure gīte sparśe vā candanādike ।
mādhyasthyavigame yāsau hṛdaye spandamānatā ॥
ānandaśaktih saivoktā yatah sahṛdayo janāh ।

"When the ears are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils with the scent of sandal wood, etc the state of indifference (non participation, impersonality, etc), disappears

and the heart is invaded by a state of vibration (spanda manata) Such a state is precisely the so-called beatitude, thanks to which man is, 'gifted with heart' According to the Saiva philosophy of Kashmir, heart is consciousness itself, thought, beatitude, etc (Gnolly)

In his A bh (p 280) he defines the 'adhikara 'as-adhikari catra vimalapratibhanasalihrdayah'-i e The qualified person is in this case any person whose heart possesses a mirror-like power of intuition (pratibhāna) Elsewhere (A bh Vol II p 339) Abhinava says that poetic sensibility is the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (kavihrdaya tadātmypattiyogrtā)

Abhinava has tried to record his views on rasa realisation in the locana on Dhv II. 4 He has also recorded and refuted the views of Lollata, Sankuka etc However, we will discuss this in the following chapters wherein we will consider the relevant portion of his Abh on the rasa-sūtra of Bharata in Na.Śā VI Ch

It may be noted in the end that like Ānanda, Abhinava also holds that rasa, bhāva, etc are always suggested and can never be directly expressed Says he rasabhāvatadābhāsatatprasamāh punarna kadacidabhidhiyante, atha casvādyamānatāpranatayā bhānti tatra dhvananavyāpāradrte nāsti kalpanantaram Locana on (Dhv I 4)

CHAPTER XV

THE NATURE OF RASA-EXPERIENCE AS EXPLAINED BY

(i) **Bhatt Lollata**–Cir 815 A D De Sk Poetics P 36, Edn. '60–Second and third quarter of the ninth cen A D –Pandey–Abhinavagupta p 128, 3rd Edn (1935) 750–800 A D Kane, History of Sk Poetics

(ii) **Shri Śaṅkuka**–9th A D, De Sk. Poetics p. 36, ed ;–850 A D -Pandey, Abhinavagupta, p 128, Ed. '35 840 A D identified with poet Śaṅkuka–Kane

(iii) **Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka**–End of 9th and beginning of 10th Cen A D De –p 41, 883–902 A D –Pandey p 130 900–925 A D Kane, p 43

(iv) **Abhinavagupta**–1015 A D De, 950–'60 to 1015 A D K C Pandey (Abh p 8), 980–1030 A D Kane, p 43

We noted in the earlier chapter the rasasūtra and its prose explanations given in the Nā.Śā This forms the first stage in the development of rasa theory. The second stage is found in the relation established between vyañjanā and rasa as in the Dhv The third stage can be seen in the relevant portion of Locana and the A bh of Abhinavagupta We now study this third stage

We may start the discussion by stating again the rasasūtra of the Nā Śā viz 'vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ' It appears from the works of Abhinava that this sūtra was much discussed and debated upon and was variously explained e g by Lollata, sri Saṅkuka, etc. [The

names of the other commentators are Udbhata and Kirtidhara, see Sangitaratnakara of Sarngadeva (I P. 19) Unfortunately, the works of those authors are not yet discovered We have, *therefore, to rely upon references* in Abhinavagupta's works for their views Eventhough, Abhinava has tried to be as objective as possible in presenting their views, we cannot say *that these are given in their completeness Much therefore in* their views remains obscure With this proviso in mind, we will now take up the views of these writers in the order as given by Abhinava

For the sake of classification, we may note that the main *points of controversy refer to,* (i) the *absence of the mention* of 'sthayibhava' in the sutra, (ii) the meaning of the term 'samyoga', and (iii) the meaning of the term 'nispattih', and *the psychological and epistemological problems arising out of* these.

Abhinava has adopted the method in vogue amongst the later darsanikas It is to present the views which are farthest from the opinion of the author and get them refuted by the later critic This in turn is refuted by another one, and so on till we reach the last but one view which is refuted by Abhinavagupta himself before stating his own position (1)

We will now first take up Bhatta Lollata (2)

Bhatta Lollata adds the term 'sthayin' in the sutra to make the meaning clear He explains the sutra to mean that the relation of sthayin or the permanent mental state with vibhavadis i e determinants consequents, etc, causes rasa Lollata accepts the normal happening in ordinary life As in ordinary life the permanent mental states such as delight or rati and the like are caused due to some factors, and this delight which is caused is expressed through its own actions or effects and is nourished by some *accompanying factors, in* the same way it so happens in poetry also Abhinava says

that this view of Lollata seems also to be the view of Dandin who says, 'kopo raudrātmatām gatah', or 'ratih' śṛṅgāratām gatā', etc i e 'anger when heightened becomes the furious', or 'delight becomes love' etc Thus, for Lollata, as in normal life a particular feeling caused by certain factors, expressed through certain effects and enriched through ancillary factors reaches its own height, in the same way, in poetry or drama rasa is the product of this union More precisely, "the determinants are the cause of the birth of the mental state (cittavṛtti) that is the permanent mental state (sthāyibhāva). In using the term consequents Bharata does not mean the consequents arising *from the rasa (since these obviously* cannot be considered as causes of the rasa) but only the *consequants arising from the mental states* Eventhough *the transitory mental states, in so far as they are mental movements, cannot accompany simultaneously the permanent* mental state, Bharata in this sutra means that the permanent mental state remains nevertheless *in a state of latent disposi*tion (vāsanā) Rasa, therefore, according to Lollata is simply permanent mental state intensified (upacita) by the determinants, the consequents, etc The permanent mental state by itself is in a dormant state anupacitah"

Thus according *to Lollata, the sṛṅgārarasa, for example* is the one between the original Rāma and Sītā The actor, and we may add, *the poet, by* what *Lollata calls 'anusan*dhāna' are able to present this rasa Dr Pandey interprets *this word 'anusandhāna' in the technical sense of* 'yojana' current in the Śaiva Āgama(3) (Indian Aesthetics p 39–40 Ed. '59) *With this interpretation* of anusandhāna Dr Pandey puts a new view about Bhatta Lollata's theory. For him, *rasa is concerned with the* artist and *is an object itself.* According to Dr. Pandey, Bhatta Lollata does not have the *spectator or the reader* in his mind (Indian Aesthetics p 40–Ed '59 see foot-note no 3) But Mammata, Hemacandra and later writers and commentators take pratiti

also to be a part of the view of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and thus take cognisance of the spectator also in rasa experience Dr Pandey, however, says that Mammaṭa has amended the text of Abhinavagupta *slightly* by adding the word 'pratiyamāno' (see p 40–ibid) But, if we however presume that Lollata s view is not fully quoted by Abhinava, and also assume that Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, etc probably had the original text of Lollaṭa's commentary on the Nā Śā before them, it may not be necessary to regard the pratiyamānatā as an amendation on the part of Mammata Whatever it may be, *the utpatti and the pratiti view of Lollata has been* traditionally accepted So ,Lollaṭa with his theory of utpatti-paripuṣṭi-pratiti, just transforms the fact of ordinary life to the realm of poetry He may, therefore, be called in modern terminology, a realist (4)

Śri Śaṅkuka

Sri Saṅkuka opposes this view of Bhatta Lollata on several grounds *His first argument pertains to the text of the* sūtra itself Śaṅkuka holds that if the sthāyins generated by the vibhāvas, suggested by the anubhāvas and nourished by vyabhicārins become rasa, then Bharata should have first mentioned and defined the sthāyins But this he has not done On the contrary he first mentions and defines rasa in the sixth chapter of the Nā Sā, and then deals with the *bhāvas in the seventh adhyāya Moreover, if rasa is just the* nourished or intensified (upacita) stage of the permanent mental state, it would be useless, after having given the cause of the generation of the sthāyibhāva, to give again, in a separate sūtra, the cause of rasa, which is merely an intensified sthāyin This would make the sūtra redundant (5)

Śaṅkuka next takes up another aspect of Lollata's theory for refutation Lollaṭa said that rasa is an intensified form *of the* sthāyibhāva Śaṅkuka argues *If the different stages*

of the permanent mental state were to be taken into considera tion, such stages would be innumerable and therefore we would have to recognise infinite stages of rasa This would contradict the text of Bharata which recognises the six varieties of hasya and the ten stages of srngāra But his most important argument against Lollata s upacitivada is that sentiments such as sorrow anger, etc are intense to start with and gradually they tend to be less and less Thus the upacitivāda contradicts this fact of experience

So, Sankuka interprets the sūtra thus–

tasmāt hetubhir vibhavākhyaih, kāryaiscānubhāvātmabhih sahacārirūpaisca vyabhicaraiḥ prayatnārjitatayā kṛtrimairapi tathānabhimanyamānairanukartṛsthātvena lingabalataḥ pratiya mānah sthāyi bhavo mukhyaramādigatasthāyyanukaraṇarupah anukaranarupatvādeva ca nāmāntarena vyapadiṣto rasah –(A bh p 272 Na Sa Vol I Ed 1956) (6)

We may analyse Sri Sankuka s above interpretation as follows "The kārana (cause), kārya (effect) and the sahacāris (accompanying mental states) of the real world become in poetry, drama, etc vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhava respectively In his seventh adhyāya Bharata explains vibhava as 'vijñānarthaḥ' (p *346 ibid), i e that which brings about knowledge* Anubhāva *is that which enables one to experience,* i e the four fold abhinaya (p 367–ibid) The vyabhicarins are the fleeting emotions(7) which accompany the main perma nent mental state These three are achieved by the artist through effort and therefore *they are artificial* In actual *life* these are natural *But eventhough they are achieved by effect* and *are artificial,* yet by the art of the imitator or the poet, they are not taken as such by the spectator or reader It is *of course* the imitator(8) who exhibits these three *For the* spectator they become the *linga i e* the characteristic mark which enables him *to* apprehand *inferantially the* permanent mental state as being inherent in the imitator The sthāyi bhāva here is understood in the form of imitation *of the*

permanent mental state of the original Rāma and the like Such a perception of sthāyibhāva is called rasa for the only reason that it is in form of imitation (9) This theory of Śaṅkuka is known to tradition as anukṛti–anumitivāda

The vibhāvas are ascertained by the power of poetic speech The significance of anubhava is grasped through training The vyabhicārins are grasped through the artificial evocation of one's own experience. But the sthāyin cannot be ascertained even by poetic speech The words such as rati, hāsa, etc, merely name these sthāyins These words i e rati, hāsa etc do not evoke in the mind the sentiments as would be done by the verbal representation i e vācika abhinaya (9) Verbal representation–vācika abhinaya–is not merely speech, but something artistically accomplished by it What is obtained in the mind by vācika abhinaya i e known or grasped, is called 'avagamana'-communication by Śrī Sankuka This power of avagamana or communication and evocation, is other than mere verbal function It is something achieved by the actor's art Precisely for this reason, Bharata does not mention the term sthāyin, not even in a different grammatical case (A bh p 275, ibid) It would serve no purpose

Thus, the natural sthāyin is not rasa So, concludes Śaṅkuka, that the rati or delight imitated by the actor is śṛṅgāra, the sentiment of love It is quite proper to say that śṛṅgara is of the nature of imitated rati and is born of it Here, a question would arise—how an unreal knowledge can achieve the purpose of the real knowledge? i e how the knowledge of the imitated feeling that is unreal, can give rise to the experience of a real feeling? In answer to this question, reference is made to maṇipradīpaprabhānyāya. (A bh p 275, ibid) (10)

Śrī Saṅkuka also raises the question as to the nature of this rasa experience *He has before him the following categories*, valid knowledge, the invalid knowledge, doubt and

similarity None of these holds good when one witnesses a play. What actually one sees on the stage is that the actor is happy. This is valid knowledge But one does not see it in this way The actor who is personifying Rāma is not Rāma Thus what appears is false But one does not see in it this way. Similarily, one does not doubt whether the actor is or is not Rāma Nor one has the knowledge of the actor's similarity with Rāma So, none of the logical modes of knowledge holds good of this experience and yet there is a real experience (sphurannanubhavah) So, in what way this throbbing experience be understood? Here, Sri Sankuka adds a new mode of cognition which he calls 'citraturaganyāya' or the mode of perceiving the painted horse Just as one reacts to a painted horse not in any one of the recognised logical category, so does one in a drama, or a piece of poetry In modern terminology, we would say this the creation of imagination But the point to be noted here is that in the opinion of Sañkuka, the experience of the creation of imagination is real in its own right eventhough, it may not fall under any recognised logical category In other words, the reality of aesthetic experience is established by Sri Sañkuka

Sri Sañkuka's interpretation of the rasa-sutra may be put in the following way (Bharata has intentionally omitted the mention of sthāyin in the rasa-sūtra The mere mention of it would have served no purpose Rasa is the imitation of sthāyins as postrayed in the art of the actor The psychological process in the mind of the spectator who experiences rasa resembles the inferential mode Then Śri Sañkuka raises the important question as to the nature of this rasa experience It does not fall under any of the recognised logical categories and yet is it as real as anyone of these modes of cognition To explain this, he introduces the 'citraturaganyāya' One reacts to the presentation on the stage as one reacts to the painted horse Just as we call the painted horse to be a horse, in the same way the character of Rāma in poetry of

drama is called Rāma Thus Śrī Śaṅkuka tries to explain poetic experience with the help of imitation and inference The vibhāvādis for him are not the kārakahetus but the jñāpakahetus (11)

Lollata took both the experiences of day-to-day life and the world of poetry as belonging to the same plane Saṅkuka puts both of them on a different plane ℑ

Abhinavagupta gives the refutation of the views of Śrī Saṅkuka through his teacher Bhatta Tota (12)

The first point that is taken up for refutation is the anukṛti or imitation part of Śaṅkuka's theory When art is regarded as imitation, logically the question of its origin arises.

Bhatta Tota takes up the peoposition-ratyanukārah sṛṅgārah for refutation He puts forth four alternatives . for whom rasa is imitation ?-(i) It is for the spectator ? Does the spectator apprehend rasa as imitation of something ? Or, (ii) It is for the actor ? Does the actor imitate somebody ? or (iii) Is it merely the opinion of the critics and commentators ? or (iv) has Bharatamuni said that rasa is an imitation ?

Bhatta Tota bases his argument on the assumption that there must be something similar b-tween the original and the imitation He shows that there is absolutely no similarity between the mental state of rati and what one sees in the actor These two are totally different To show their extreme difference Bhatta Tota uses the philosophical arguments of what constitutes difference These are, (i) svarūpabheda or the difference in nature, (ii) perception by different senses and (iii) difference of substrata These are applied as below (i) The body of the actor, the constumes, his horripilation, his faltering words, the raising of his arms, the waving of them, etc his frowns, his expressive glances, etc are physical, rati, krodha, etc are mental Thus they differ in nature (ii) The body of the actor, his costumes, etc. are seen by the physical sense of the eye, while rati, krodha, etc are perceived

by the internal sence–antahkarana Thus, these are perceived by different senses (iii) The substratum of the body, costume, etc and the substratum of rati, krodha, etc are different Thus they differ in substrata also Thus there is total difference between the original and its supposed imitation

The purport of Bhatta Tota's argument seems to be this What the imitator shows–his body, his costumes and his gestures, are physical These cannot imitate rati or delight which is purely a mental state So, it would be absurd to say that sṛṅgāra is the imitation of rati

In the above argument of Bhatta Tota, the body, costumes, etc are taken as sṛṅgāra and then the absurdity of these as imitation of the mental state of rati is shown The protogenist of Śrī Śaṅkuka corrects this misunderstanding or misstatment His contention is that it is the mental state of the actor made known by the above items as the imitation of rati, which is called sṛṅgāra To this, the answer of Bhatta Tota is that what is thus apprehended is the mental state of the actor, i e. the rati of the actor, and it is not apprehended as an imitation.

Now, it is not his natural mental state that the actor represents by gestures etc, but that of the original persons. That is why the vibhāvādis are called artifical (kṛtrima) –This is the next position which Bhatta Tota attacks If these vibhāvādis are understood as artifical by the spectator, how would they make the spectator comprehend it as rati ?. To this the answer would be that what the spectator comprehends is 'ratyanukāra'. This is done through an inferential process So Bhatta Tota now argues to show the absurdity of inferring the imitation of rati One can infer rati from these causes But one cannot infer something which is not the effect of these causes viz 'ratyanukāra'. Similarity here it would not do. One cannot infer from mist which resembles smoke, a japā–flower which resembles fire

Further, the theory of imitation (anukāra) cannot be supported on the observation of similitude The actor who is not really angry appears to be so This is in a way true But in fact the actor appears similar to one who is angry by raising his eye-brows and the like But this much similarity does not constitute imitation of the original Even if for the sake of argument we take this to be anukāra or imitation, it goes against what the spectator perceives Bhatta Tota says as such He says that the impression of the spectator is not that of similarity Such a preception would b- without any emotion (bhāvasunya-p 275 ibid) While the spectator feels emotion when he sees the performance of the actor

Next to this, Bhatta Tota tries to refute the opinion of Śrī Saṅkuka that in the cognition of rasa, there is neither valid knowledge, nor invalid knowledge, etc When the spec tator perceives Rāma in the actor how can it be said that it is not valid knowledge ? Similarly, after the show is over and one knows the actor in his proper person, one s previous knowledge that the actor was Rāma proves false So it would be viparyaya i e invalid also

Then, to say that through the power of poetry vibhavadis are ascertained, is absurd No actor who speaks-seyam mamangesu etc -ever feels that Sita is his somebody If it is meant for the spectators, it would be easier for them to connect it with the original sthāyin Thus Tota refutes the view that rasa, for the spectator, is an imitation of sthāyin

After this, he takes up the second alternative viz imitation in the case of the actor or nata No actor when he acts, does it with consciousness that, 'I am imitating Rāma or his mental state' Even then, if anukāra or imitation is insisted upon, the following difficulties would arise Here the most obvious argument is that whom does the actor imitate? The original Rāma can not serve as his model because

'anukarana' There is another meaning also of 'anukarna', and that is doing something after it has been done by somebody else (pascatkaranam) This would hold good in the case of everybody in life It is not something special for the actor or nata Thus anukarana or imitation in any of the two senses, is not possible for the actor

The followers of imitation theory would not accept this interpretation of their view They would rather say that while depicting Rāma they are imitating the sorrow of some excellent person But here, the old difficulty would arise With what would they imitate the sorrow of that excellent character? The actor has not before him the mental state of sorrow of the excellent character If he imitates his sorrow by imitating the anubhāvas such as tears and the like, of the excellent person, then the old difficulty of 'vailakṣanya' or total difference between the physical anubhava and the mental state of sorrow would arise

If in answer to this, it is said that the actor imitates only the anubhāvas of the excellent character, then that excellent character will have to be particularised Without such particularisation, one cannot understand whose anubhāvas are imitated If to defend their position it is said that the actor imitates a person who weeps as he weeps, then the personality of the actor enters into it and then it will not be imitation but his own sthāyin

Having thus refuted the theory of anukārya-anukartr bhāva (p. 275, ibid), Bhatt Tota has to explain anukāra in as much as nātya has been defined as bhāvānukīrtana (Na sa I 107), and lokavṛttānukarana-(I 112), by Bharata in the first adhyāya Abhinavagupta has discussed this point(p 35-37 ibid), quoting the authority of the Kāvyakautuka of his Upādhyāya Bhatta Tota who interpreted anukīrtana as meaning 'anuvyavasāya' i e re-orientation Reference to this is made here also (p 276, ibid). What the actor does is explained in the following way. The

Bhatta Nāyaka says that the same objections would apply if we *accept the theory that rasa is simply generated.* Thus he makes short-shift of utpattivāda

He also briefly refers to the abhivyativāda Abhivyakti means menifesting something which exists potentially Here, the manifestation would naturally depend upon the means of manifestation Now if we assume that rasa exists potentially *and is later manifested* by means *of* vibhāvādis, *this* would result in many degrees of rasa-manifestation And this is surely not what happens in rasa-experience This general argument can be applied both with reference to oneself and to someone else, as before Thus Bhatta Nayaka rejects abhivyaktivada also (p 276, ibid)

Now before we consider the views of Bhatta Nāyaka we may refer to the brief presentation of rasa theory from the Sāmkhya point of view, Sāmkhyadrsā, p 276 (ibid) According to this view, the nature of rasa consists of happiness (sukha) and misery (duhkha). *We may say, this has reference to the* sattvaguna and the rajoguna The aggregate of objects which have potentiality of creating happiness and misery is external And, in this aggregate, the vibhāvas perform the role of dala i e upādāna-or material substratum, while the anubhāvas and vyabhicārins are refining agents The sthāyins or the permanent mental states caused by the appropriate aggregates are *internal* and have the nature of happiness and *misery* Abhinava does not take the trouble to refute these views but simply says that those who say that such propositions of Bharata viz. as 'sthāyibhāvān rasatvam upaneşyāmah' are to be taken metaphorically (upacāra), and not literally, knowingly contradict the text Arguments of such people need not be taken seriously This is rather laconic and we cannot clearly understand why the sāmkhya views are not *properly considered*

In the views of Bhatta Nāyaka, we have some terms which remind us of the sāmkhya terminology and some sāmkhya

theory also Whether he has something to do with the above sāṃkhya views, we cannot say Let us now consider Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory.

His explanation of rasa is given in the A bh. as below (p. 278, ibid) "bhaṭṭanāyakastvāha raso na pratīyate, notpadyate, nābhivyajyate svagatatvena hi pratītau karune duḥkhitvam syāt, na ca sā pratītir yuktā sītāderavibhāvatvāt, svakāntāsmṛtya-saṃvedanāt, devatādau sādhāraṇīkaraṇayogyatvāt, samudrollanghanāder asādhāraṇyāt na ca tadvato rāmasya smṛti ranupalabdhatvāt tasmāt kāvye dosābhāvaguṇālamkāramayatvalalakṣaṇena, nāṭye caturvidhābhinayarupeṇa nividanijamohasaṃkaṭatānivāraṇakāriṇā vibhāvādisādhāraṇīkaraṇātmanābhidhāto dvitīyenāṃśena bhāvakatvavyāpāreṇa bhāvyamāno rasónubhavasmṛtyādivilakṣaṇena rajastamónuvedhavaicitryabalād drutivistaravikāsātmanā sattvodre kaprakāśānanda mayanijasaṃvidvisrāntilakṣaṇena parabrahmāsvādasavidhena bhogena paraṃ bhujyata iti etc. (16)

In the sāṃkhya view the buddhi or the citta consists of three qualities *sattva, rajas and tamas* This *tamas in relation* to buddhi is also called moha or stupour As long as this stupour predominates, one is unable to perceive fineness, nor one can have a clear understanding of anything The function of art is to narrow down or remove the narrowness caused by this quality of *tamas* A poem does this by its characteristic viz. the absence of defects (dosa) and the presence of guna and alamkāra (i e excellence and figures of speech) Drama does *this by its four fold* abhinaya *i e representation* When this thick veil on the mind is thus removed, the power of revelation bhāvakatva which is the next step after the first denotative power abhidhā of the word, operates *This operation consists of generalising the vibhāvādis of the poem or the drama It is this* power which makes one aware of rasa The rasa is *enjoyed by what is technically known as* bhoga-enjoyment This 'bhoga' is technically understood in the Sāṃkhya philosophy as arising out of the Union of purusa and prakṛti, *in buddhi*, the finest

evolute of prakrti, the former as being reflected in the latter Here, it would mean that the puruṣa reflected in buddhi enjoys the rasa-buddhi This bhoga is regarded as different from direct experience (anubhava), memory (smrti), etc On account of the persistance of rajas and tamas in buddhi, it assumes variety This variety gives it the characteristic of drti, vistara and vikāsa (i e fludity dilatation, and expansion respectively) This bhoga reposes (viśrānti) in one s own saṃvit-consciousness, which becomes pervaded by enlightenment-prakāsa and joy-i e ānanda on account of the predominance of sattva On this account it becomes like the enjoyment or taste of parabrahma

The purpose of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka seems to be this—Words in poetry do not rest with merely giving the denotation They have the capacity to give a generalised sense i e they genera lise the vibhāvādis This means that rasa which is the resultant of vibhāvādis is also grasped the by generalised way To put it in another way, the sthāyibhavas aroused with reference to an imaginary particular person, time, place, etc, become generalised by the generalisation of the vibhavas so that their limitation disappears and so the percipient can become aware of them as a part of his own consiousness Because the consciousness is fully awakened by the power of poetic speech rasa is enjoyed Thus one may say that the function of the poetic speech reaches the last stage of bhoga also

We will see later on that many of these ideas are appropriated in Abhinava's philosophy of rasa also But for the present, we are concerned with what Abhinava refutes in Bhatta Nayaka s theory His main objection is against introducing the new term of bhoga in rasa philosophy as against pratiti or apprehension and such other forms of knowledge If Bhatta Nayaka means rasana i e tasting by bhoga, it is also a form of knowledge-prat patti Because of its meaning being different, a separate name may be given to it, as in case of drasana or perception, anumati or inference, sruti or

verbal knowledge, upamiti or knowledge through similitude, and pratibhāna or intuition etc. etc

Abhinavagupta's second *objection is* against the *rejection* of both utpatti and abhivyakti with reference to rasa It is said that rasa, which is a fact of experience, is not caused or brought into being, then it must be existing for ever. And, if *its manifestation is also rejected, then it will have to be accepted* that rasa does not exist for there is no third alternative. A thing which is not apprehended in any way, cannot be the subject of discourse, i e, it cannot be asserted that rasa exists.

The third point of attack is the recognition of the three mental states of druti fluidity, vistara or dilatation and vikāsa or expansion Abhinava holds that if it is asserted by Bhatta Nāyaka that by 'pratiti' or apprehension is meant the power of generating enjoyment and that it consists of the nature of druti i e, fluidity, vistara i e dilatation, etc we accept it. But then, why only three states as mentioned above ? There will be as many pratitis or apprehensions of the nature of tasting as there are rasas And they will be all generating bhoga In fact there will be infinite permutations and combinations of the three gunas viz sattva, rajas and tamas, on the principal of predominance and subordination, then why accept only three ?

Abhinavagupta would accept 'bhāvanā', if it is understood in the following sense, viz to make anything the subject-matter of cognition in the form of tasting, consisting of chewing caused by vibhāvādis.

Abhinava accepts the opinion of Bhatta Nāyaka expressed in the verse.

bhāvasaṃyojanāvyaṅgyaparasaṃvittigocaraḥ ।
āsvādanātmānubhavo rasaḥ kāvyārtha ucyate ॥

because it makes the meaning of a poem rasa, which is manifested by vibhāvādis

Here ends the refutation of the views of Bhatta Lollata, Śri Sańkuka and Bhatta Nāyaka in Abhidavabhārati. In it, the theory of Lollata, that rasa is caused by the vibhāvādis and that it is only an intensified state of sthāyin has been refuted through the mouth of Śri Śańkuka Sri Sańkuka's view that rasa is an imitation of sthāyin is rejected through Bhatta Tota. His inference theory is ridiculed by comparing it with the type of pseudo-inference in which one might infer from mist resembling smoke, a red japā flower resembling fire His analogy of citraturaga is also discarded The main point of objection in Bhatta Nāyaka's theory is his bringing in bhoga, a category different from all kinds of pratitis or apprehensions

All these thinkers, however, have something important to contribute to the development of the theory of rasa The relation of the poet's world with reality enables one to grasp the inherent emotion in the person's event and things of the world This may be said to be Lollata's contribution. The semblance of the poet's world with reality and the inferential process psychologically involved in the deducing of emotions from the imitated world are elements in aesthetic perception, emphasised by Śri Sankuka Bhatta Nāyaka contributes the important element of 'sādhāranikarana' which is an inevitable precondition in all aesthetic experience. His three forms of rasa-pratitis viz druti, vistara, etc are important to understand the states of mind behind specific rasa-experience We shall see that Abhinavagupta has drawn upon some of these ideas in the formation of his rasa theory

RASA EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA (1015-A D De, 950-60 A D -1015 A D. K C. Pandey; Abh p. 8, 980-1030 A D -Kane P 43)

In this chapter, we will now try to understand and discuss Abhinavagupta's ideas which go to form his theory of rasa The first thing that he asserts is kāvyārtho rasah

(p 278.A bh -Nā S'ā second Ed G O S), and quotes as his authority kāvyarthān bhāvayanti (Nā S'ā VII p 342 ibid) In the A bh on this in adhyāya seven, it is explained that artha here does not mean the direct sense (na tvarthasabdo'bhidheyavāci), but what is principally sought after And what is principally sought after is rasa

Rasa as Kāvyārtha

He says that in a poem the meening of a word and that of a sentence ultimately ends in rasas Therefore, on account of their uncommonness and predominance the meaning of poem is rasas-kāvyasyārthah rasah (p 343, ibid) (17) This emphasis on rasa as the meaning of a poem is to keep out such terms as bhoga and the like

Sadhāranikarana

[Bhatta Nāyaka had shown that the sādhāranikaranavyāpāra i e the process of generalising or universalising is an important function of poetic speech Abhinava finds an analogy for this process in the pūrva mīmāmsā He gives two illustrations from sruti to show this rātrimāsata', they lay by night, and 'tāmagnau pradāt —he gave it to fire]

In these two sentences, the meaning is limited by person, number and tense Now when someone with a purpose and qualifications to understand and interested in doing something related to this hears these sentences, he derives another meaning which removes the limitations of person, number and tense and has the general idea of sitting by night or offering something to the fire And because he is interested in doing some such thing, he will understand the meaning such as 'I will sit for the night', 'I will sacrifice this for the fire' etc Now this process consisting in transference of meaning is called by different darsanas by different names such as pratibhā or intuition, bhāvanā or propulsion, vidhi or command, niyoga

or order etc The same sort of transference of meaning takes place in a qualified person from the poetic speech This is the basis of sādhāraṇikaraṇa] The idea seems to be that in a person with a pragmatic outlook, hearing, and we may add, seeing something in which he is interested, becomes generalised i e the original limitations of time, person, etc are eliminated This may be applied to a person who is interested in poetry, and has the capacity to understand and appreciate poetry. When such a person reads a poem, the person, the number and the tense etc in the poetic speech become, so to say, eliminated for him, after the first stage of understanding it in a direct way is over The object presents itself to a sahṛdaya in unlimited form

The Sahṛdaya

[This means that the sadhāraṇikaraṇa vyāpāra is possible for a sahṛdaya alone So, the first prerequisite to appreciate poetry or to enjoy the joy of aesthetic feeling is sahṛdayatā Cosequently, it is but natural that Abhinava should lay so much emphasis on sahṛdaya He defines the adhikārin or the qualified person as follows adhikārī cātra vimalapratibhānaśā-lihṛdayah (A bh p 280 ibid) i e the qualified person here, is one whose heart possesses a mirror-like power of intuition. All do not have this intrinsic capacity to taste a poem Individuals possessed of aesthetic sensibility are called possessed of heart They are those who have the concord of heart (sahṛdaya, hṛdayasaṃvādabhāk)] He defines the sahṛdaya in the Locana as follows yeṣāṃ kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsavaśād viśadībhūte mano-mukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasaṃvā-dabhājah sahṛdayāh, yathoktam (Nā Śā VII 10)-

yórtho hṛdayasaṃvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ |
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭhamivāgninā ||

The nature of Rasa

[Abhinava starts his discussion on rasa by describing how the process of sādhāraṇikaraṇa takes place and how rasa-

experience arises in a sahrdaya by taking three illustrations from Kalidāsa,—one from Śānkuntala-viz. grivābhangābhirāmaṃ muhuh etc. (I.7) and the other two from Kumāra Sam. viz. umāpi, etc. (III. 62), and harastu kiñcit ... etc. III 67.

The first is an illustration of bhayānaka rasa, and the other two of śṛṅgāra. This is how the process takes place. First, one becomes aware of the usual sense of the sentence viz. grivābhangābhirāmam etc. After this, another apprehension takes place. This is of the nature of mental visualisation. In this second stage of mantal visualisation, the tense, person, etc. become eliminated. The young-one of the deer which is visualised in this apprehension loses its particularity and therefore, the idea that some particular deer is frightened becomes unreal. Consequently, fear as such, unlimited, freed from time and space, appears, so to say, before mind. Thus far, we may add, that the poetic speech is in the analogy of the illustrations quoted before. But from here it goes a step further. The fear, untouched by time and space, is a fear which does not frighten the first person of observer (bhitoham), nor does it refer to a third person, nor has it a reference to an enemy, friend or a neutral person. This means that the fear has reference to no person as such And because no one is involved, there is neither the sense of unhappiness nor happiness, and consequently, there is no reaction to avoid or take it (hānopādāna). These latter, as we shall see, are the vighnas or obstacles which come in the way of aesthetic experience. So, this experience is different from experiences in which these reactions take place in ordinary life. Therefore, here, the sentiment of fear is grasped by an apprehension, free from such obstacles. Consequently, as it were, this sentiment of fear itself enters the heart (sākṣādiva) and revolves before our eyes. This is bhayānaka rasa. We may add that the same procedure will apply to the experience of śṛṅgāra from the other two illustrations.

In such an experience of rasa, one's own self is not very much suppressed, nor it is allowed particularly to emerge. This

holds good about any other person, who witnesses the soka, and we may add, reads a poem Therefore, the cognition of sādharanya or the generality is not limited to any person, It is extended (vitata) like the cognition of vyapti i e universal pervasion, acquired by competent person, from the relation of smoke and fire, or like the knowledge of the relation between trembling and fear

After thus describing the process of generalisation and pointing to the universally cognisable nature of this generality, Abhinava tells us that it is the assemblage of actor and such *other things that help the process of visualisation* In this assemblage, the generality becomes very much nourished, because the limiting factor of time, space, knower, etc and those given by the poem totally disappear on account of mutual elimination Therefore, all the competent persons in an audience are capable of apprehending it in one compactness (ekaghanatā), and this helps in the nourishment of rasa This happens because there is concord of vāsanā i e latent dispositions amongst persons whose minds are full of varied vasanās i e innate dispositions (p 279 ibid) The avighnasamvit or unimpeded consciousess, brought about in this way is camatkāra These are the technical terms of the pratyabhijñā philosophy, which we shall try to understand later

It may be regarded as cognitive determination (adhyavasāya) or the mental power of putting ideas together and forming whole,—this latter may be translated as imagination samkalpa) This visualisation may be regarded as remembrance (smṛti) also but it is not to be taken in the sense in which the dilecticians take it The sense is similar to 'taccetasā smarati nūnamabodhapūrvam' etc (Abhi Sā V 2) This *memory is not dependent on any previous experience* So, whatever term one might apply, this is apprehension (pratīti) of the nature of testing in which rati or delight, particularly the erotic delight as such, appears This apprehension

of delight is not conditioned by any other particularity. For this reason, it is not the experience of common place delight (laukika ratih). But for that, it is not false (mithyā); nor it is indescribable (anirvācya) It is also not similar to the common place apprehension of delight (laukika tulya), nor is it of the nature of superimposition of the popular experience (tadāropāditulya) However, from another point of view, this apprehension of rati or delight as such, may be regarded as a state of intensification of sthayibhāva or the permanent mental state (upacayāvasthā'stu) (18), because there is no restriction of time, space and person It may be regarded as imitation (anukāra), because it is done following the original state of mind And, if we follow the vijñānavāda in which all percepts are mental, we may regard this experience as a collection of mental elements, which are of course the vibhāvādis Here we see how Abhinava interprets and appropriates the theories of former ācaryas Taken as one may, from all points of view, it is the mental state (bhāva) which, grasped by the apprehension from which all obstacles have been eliminated, and of the nature of tasting is rasa. (P. 280 ibid) Such a consciousness, samvitti, freed from obstacles, is called among people as camatkāra, nirves'a (immersion), rasanā (tasting), āsvādana (sampling), bhoga (enjoyment), samāpatti (accomplishment), laya (lysis), visrānti (rest), etc (19) Abhinava says loke sakalavighavinirmuktā saṃvittireva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabhogasamāpattilayavisrāntyādiabdairabhidhiyate. (ibid P 280)

We might say, the above in a way gives a complete view of Abhinava's theory of rasa. In this the principle of sādhāranikarna or generalisation is taken from Bhatta Nāyaka as far as we know though, of course, Abhinava tries to see its root in the Pūrvamimāmsa Abhinava's own contribution may be said to lie in his concept of rasa as an entity grasped by nirvighnā saṃvit or unimpeded consciousness. Naturally therefore, he devotes good space to the discussion of these

This discussion, over and above giving us the knowledge of the mental stuff which is to be tasted as rasa, has another significance The sthāyins or the permanent mental states being vāsanās or latent dispositions are to be found in all beings For this reason, when an aesthete or sahrdaya witnesses a play *or reads a poem, he finds his own mental disposition* coming into his consciousness. As Abhinava says lateron, this is the reason why an aesthete even though he is not concerned in a worldly sense with what he reads and witnesses, finds himself a part of the total experience (p. 285 Ibid yasyām svātmā'pi tadvāsanāvattvādanupravistah)

The Vighnas

Abhinava says, – (tathāhi-laukikenānumānena samskṛtah pramadādinā (dina) tātasthyena pratipadyate. api tu hṛdaya-samvādātmakasahṛdayatvabalātpūrnibhavisyadrasāsvādānkuribhāvena smṛtyādisopānamanārubyaiva tanmayibhāvocitacarvanāprānatayā na ca sā carvanā prāṅ mānāntarād yenādhunāsmṛtih syāt na cātra laukikapratyaksādipramānavyāpārah. kintvalaukikavibhāvādisamyogabalopanataiveyam carvanā sā ca pratyaksānumānāgamopamānādilaukikapramānajanitaratyādyavabodhataha tathā yogipratyaksajanitatatasthaparasamvittijñānātsakalavaiṣayikoparāgasunya suddhaparayogigatasvātmānandaikaghanānubhavācca visisyate etesām yathāyogamarjanādivighnāntarodayāttatsthyena sphutatvaviṣayāvesavaivasyakrta saundaryavirahāt atra tu svātmaikagatatvaniyamāsambhavāt (na visayāvesavaivasyam) svānupravesātparagatatvaniyamābhavāt (na tatasthyāsphutatvam) tadvibhāvādisādhāranyavasasamprabuddhocitanijaratyādivāsanāvesavasācca na vighnāntarādinām sambhava ityavocāma bahusah (Abh. Vol. I p. 284–285)

We might say in a general way, that those things which come in the way of the cognitive chewing of the permanent and transitory mental states are the vigihnas or obstacles Abhinava mentions seven such obstacles (21)

The first is called sambhāvanāvirahārūpā pratipattāvayogyatā the second, svagataparagatatvaniyamena desakālādivisesāvesah, the third, nijasukhādivivasībhāvah, the fourth, pratityupāyavaikalyam, the fifth, sphutatvābhāvah, the sixth, apradhanata, and the seventh, *samsayayogah*

The first may be called improbability When the matter of a poem or a drama or a piece of art appears improbable, one's mind cannot rest on it and consequently, we may add, one is unable to reach the state of rasa-experience For this reason, the subject matter or a poem or a drama must appear as probable The second may be called the intrusion of the space-time particularly This would arise when a reader or a spectator takes the subject-matter as either referring to himself or to someone else Such personal factors would bring in the obstruction of the particularity of space and time This, we may add, results in obstructing sādhāranikarana or generalisation The third may be called helplessness, due to arising of personal considerations of happiness and the like This also would be due to the bringing in of the element of personality This would cloud the samvit-or consciousness and make the grasping of sādhāranikarana or generalisation impossible The fourth may be called the lack of means of apprehension A works of art which is defective in its presentation cannot create apprehension of its meaning in the mind of the reader and the spectator We may explain this as below A poem, which does not use correct language, would not be properly understood or a singer who does not indicate the vādi and *samvādi etc* would not be properly understood The fifth may be called lack of clarity (sphutatva) A poem may use correct language and yet it would lack clarity In a poem or drama, or a work of art, one expect one's apprehension to be like visualisation (partyakṣocitapratyayasākānksatva) Abhinava quoted the authority of Nyāyabhāsya and says that all cognition has for its end direct perc*ption or visualisation This applies to the aesthetic cognition also Abhinava says that, this is why abhinaya or

representation and the like, are required for a play In short, each art has its own technique of making its contents as if visualised The sixth obstacle may be called the lack of emphasis on the principal element In the rasanispatti, for the experience of rasa, these agents viz vibhāvādis are mentioned. But none of these by themselves, can be the principal object of delineation The uddpana vibhāvas and anubhāvas are insentient and therefore, they cannot be principal The vyabhicārins or the transitory mental states, eventhough of the nature of consciousness, are always dependent So, they also cannot be principal. For these reasons, sthāyins alone can be the principal In a poem or a drama, in which the delineation lacks this quality of making the sthāyins or permanent mental states a principal matter of delineation, would create an obstacle in the experience of rasa We have seen before, why the sthāyins or the permanent mental states are the *universal dispositions of living creatures* and why the vyabhicārins are only the transitory mental states Even amongst the sthāyins, Abhinava would choose four, viz. rati or delight, krodha or anger, utsāha or heroism and nirveda, born out of philosophical knowledge Even these would be subservient to one another According to the variety of the drama one of these would be principal and the rest subservient

We may here point out a very important element in Abhinava's theory of art Rasa being the final aim of a poem or any other piece of art, one cannot have a proper aesthetic experience if the principal rasa is not brought into relief by making others subservient Therefore, this is a vighna The seventh may be called the obstacle of doubt

A poet who does not provide a proper combination of vibhāvadis *would create doubt into the mind* of the reader as to which rasa is conveyed The vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārins or the determinants, consequents and the transitory states respectively, by themselves cannot lead to a

*to remove these obstacles–tatra vighnāpasārakāh vibhāvaprabhṛ*tayah (p 280. ibid) This may be interpreted in a simple way. A poem, or a drama, or any other work of art, consists of the vibhāvadis So, if the creation of a poem or a play or any other art is done in a proper way, these obstacles would not arise and it would lead to the aesthetic experience

Abhinava's interpretation of rasa-sūtra

Abhinava says (tatra lokvyavahāre kāryakāranasahacarātmakaliṅgadarsanesthāyyātmaparacittavṛttyanumānābhyāsapātavādadhunā tairevodyānakatākṣavīkṣanādibhirlaukikim kāranatvādibhuvamatikrāntairvibhāvānubhāvasamuprañjakatvamātrapranaih, ata evālaukaikavibhāvādivyapades'abhagbhih pracyakāranādirupasaṃskaropajivanakhyāpanāya vibhāvādināmadheyavyapadesyairbhāvādhyāyepi vakṣyamānasvarūpabhedairgunapradhānatatparyena sāmajikadhiyi samiyagyogam sambandhamaikāgryamāsāditavadbhiralaukikanirvighnasamvedanātmakaca rvanāgocaratām nito'rthascarvyamānataikasāro na tu siddhasva bhāvah tatkālika eva na tu carvanātiriktakālāvalambi sthāyivila (yila)ksana eva rasah (A bh Vol I, p 284)

This may be elaborated as below

(After all this preliminary discussion, Abhinava comes to the interpretation of the rasa-sutra First he explains the particular significance of vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva One may say, these are congnitive elements In the *common place experience, one is able to infer a permanent* mental state of any other person by the observation of the concomitant relation between the permanent mental states and the collocation of its cause, effect and accessories The quickness of inference which comes out of practice goes beyond the necessity of the causal stage (atikrānta), in enabling to perceive the sthāyins or the permanent mental states, by the presentation of a garden or the casting of glances and the like, in poetry or drama These cognitive processes are no longer causative elements of the sthāyins or the permanent mental states For

this reason, the kārana (cause), the kārya (effect) and sahakārī (the accessory), are termed as vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārīns respectively These three, in order of principal and subordinate, have to reach a proper union (samyag yoga), or relation (sambandha), or one-pointedness (aikāgrya), in the mind of the audience This is, what is called, "vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyoga" *From such a saṃyoga of these, comes a meaning which is the subject of the cognitive chewing (saṃvedana), from which the obstacles have been removed* and which makes this *cognitive-chewing an extra ordinary* experience. The meaning thus grasped *is rasa It is of the* essence of cognitive chewing, and not something whose existence has been accomplished before (sidhhasvabhāva) It is immediate (tatkālika eva), and not something which exists in time other than the cognitive chewing Thus rasa is something different from natural sthāyin or the permanent mental state]

Srī Saṅkuka *said that because rasa is the imitation of sthāyins or the permanent mental state, the word sthāyin was* not mentioned *in the sūtra But it* is the sthāyin or the permanent mental state, known by the vibhāvādis, which is rasa, because it is so tasted To this, Abhinava replies that in that case even such a popular experience would be rasa, because when one tastes a mental state which really does not exist in the actor, why one should not taste it when it is actually there Therefore, inferential cognition of sthāyin or permanent mental state is not rasa If sthāyin were mentioned in the sūtra as inferred from the vibhāvādis such a contingency would arise For this reason the word sthāyin is not mentioned in the sūtra However, we find such references in the Na S ā as 'sthāyī rasibhūtah,' etc Abhinava would say that there is a propriety in this, because the 'sthāyī' material which was known in the world by the causes etc, is now useful for cognitive chewing by recourse to vibhāvadis

Abhinava also objects to the inference theory by saying that there would be no taste (rasatā) in the inference of

common place mental states Therefore, the taste of rasa, whose nature is that of extra ordinary camatkāra is different from common place cognitions like memory and inference

Rasa Experience by the Aesthete

After thus explaining the rasasūtra in an abstract way, Abhinava describes how an aesthete experiences rasa His mind is cultivated in the process of common place (laukika) inference. This means that a mental state would immediately arise in his mind with its corresponding affection So, he does not, therefore, perceive a handsome young lady in a poem or on the stage with indifference (tātasthyena), but he does it with the sprouting of the taste of rasa which is going to be fuller later on He is able to do this by the force of his sahrdayatva which is of the nature of concord of the heart (hrdayasamvāda) He has this experience, without climbing (22) the steps of inference, memory, and the like, because the essence of such an experience is cognitive chewing and this cognitive chewing corresponds to the sense of identification with what is perceived (P 284, ibid) What is meant is that the spectator's mind becomes identified with what he perceives and this gives rise to the appropriate charvanā or cognitive chewing

In Abhinavagupta's theory, this carvanā or cognitive chewing is a condition precedent to rasa experience, and because it is of the nature of cognition, he has to distinguish this carvanā or cognitive chewing from other forms of cognition

The epistemological nature of rasa-experience

This carvanā or cognitive chewing cannot be of the nature of remembrance, because it was not known before through some other pramānas or means of knowledge It cannot be identified with the other laukika or common place means of knowledge such as sense-perception (pratyakṣa) and the like This carvanā is brought about by the force of collocation of

extra-ordinary vibhāvas or determinants and the like There fore, this carvanā is to be distinguished from the knowledge of rati or delight and the like, *born from ordinary worldly* pramānas or means of knowledge like direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), scriptural authority (āgama), analogy (upamāna) etc It is also to be distinguished from the indifferent consciousness generated by the extra-sensory perception of a yogin, and also *from the experience of the uniform compect joy of the ātman of the higher* yogin, because it is void of the colouring of the sense object

The reason of this distinction in each case is given thus In the case of the knowledge of rati or delight, and the like acquired through worldly means of knowledge, there is always the contingency of personally acquiring or abandoning the thing (hānopādana) And this is an obstacle in rasa experience In the case *of an ordinary yogin, on account of indifference (tātasthya),* there is haziness of experience, while in carvanā or cognitive chewing, there is clear visualisation (asphuṭatvena) In the experience of the higher yogin, there is lack of beauty (saundaryaviraha), because all the colouring of the sense objects is absent In the case *of cognitive chewing or carvanā, there is no vaivasya or helplessness before the objects of sense, because the cognition* is not necessarily taken in relation to one self There is no indiffence because in a way, one's self is there in the experience, and there is no necessary reference to somebody else And therefore, there is no consequent jealousy. In carvanā or *cognitive chewing* there is vāsanā or latent disposition of one's own rati or delight and the like, *awakened by the force of* the generalised determinants and the like So, there is no rise of obstacles in rasa-experience

For this reason, the vibhāvādis or *the determinants* and *the like, are not the efficient causes of rasa, because in* that case, even when they are not there, there will be the existence of rasa, just as a jar might exist eventhough the potter and the like do not exist They are not also the causes

of cognition, and therefore, do not come under the category of means of knowledge i e -pramānas The pramānas or the means of knowledge enlighten only what exists previously *But rasa does not exist previous to the vibhāvādis* and therefore, is not a prameya i e something to be known Naturally then, the question arises,-what are these vibhāvādis? This usage of the vibhāvādis is useful for the understanding of carvanā-the cognitive chewing-, and for this very reason, it is an unusual usage-alaukika vyavahāra If it is asked, "where do you find such a thing at any other place in the world?", we may say that it is a tribute to our proving that it is extraordinary as far as the worldly matters go But if an analogous example is required, we would say that *we do not find the taste of a drink in its ingradients taken separately*

Here, we may point out that when the rasa experience is called something other than laukika i e common place in the world, it is here opposed to the experience in poetry, drama, in short, in art Abhinava has been trying all along that aesthetic experience cannot be compared or evaluated with *the other experiences of worldly matter*

But when rasa is lifted out of the usual categories of know ledge, logic would say that it is an unknowable (aprameya) *entity Abhinava would accept this position*, because for him the very life of rasa lies in its rasyatā i e in its being tasted and this experience is not of the nature of prameya (i e a knowable entity) and the like This would contradict the thesis of the sutra which says that rasa is a 'nispatti', which is neither generation nor knowledge Here, Abhinava makes a fine distinction The reference of nispatti' in the sūtra is not to rasa as such but to 'rasanā' or the process of cognitive chewing or tasting whose object is rasa In this way, the life of rasa is solely dependent upon rasanā And therefore, *on account of the 'nispatti' of rasanā or cognitive chewing*, rasa may also be called as caused This rasanā or cognitive chewing is neither due to the means of knowledge (pramāna-

vyāpara), nor to causal process (kāraka vyāpāra) But then, this does not make it a *false experience (aprāmānikah)*, because it is proved by its very consciousness (svasamvedanasiddhatvāt) Therefore, rasa-experience is sui generis

Abhinava, after having distinguished rasanā or cognitive chewing from other forms of cognition, does not deny to it knowableness as such In fact he says that rasanā *is of the nature of knowledge (bodha) It is only different* from other forms of knowledge ususlly recognised The difference lies in its means, viz. the vibhavādis, being different from other means of knowledge in common practice (laukikavailaksanyāt)

So, the purport of the sutra, according to Abhinava is that rasa is an extra-ordinary entity which is the object of rasana or cognitive chewing, and that this rasanā is born of the collocation of vibhavādis

Abhinava summarises (P 285 ibid) this lengthy discussion thus — The make-up of the actor hides the identity of the *actor We also do not think that he is Rāma, eventhough* that thought is forcibly brought before us by the poem The reason for this is the intense previous impressions which do not *allow* us to *think of him to be Rāma The result of this* state of mind is that the spectator gives up the time and the *space* both of the actor and of Rāma We see on the stage horripilation and the like These make us cognise rati or delight as such But this cognition is freed from the restraint of time and space. *In this cognition, one's self also enters because one* possesses the latent dispositions (vāsana) of rati or delight, and the like. And so, one's cognition of rasa is not of an indifferent person *But one does not cognise rati or delight* as an effect of a determinate cause-niyatakāranatayā-for *oneself* Therefore, there is no possibility of one's becoming attached (abhisvanga) or making an effort to obtain One does not cognise rati or delight as of somebody else benifitting *from it* as a result of definite cause And so, one does

not feel any pain or enmity etc (duhkhadvesādyudaya) So, the generalised rati or delight, when it is cognised in one movement of consciousness or its chain (saṃtānavṛtti) is sṛṅgāra Abhinava again repeats that the idea of generality is due to vibhāvādis We may say this is Abhinava's attempt to explain the participation of one s self in an aesthetic experience

All rasas–of the nature of joy

An important point in Abhinava s theory remains to be discussed [He accepts the theory of 'ānandarūpata sarva rasānām (p 282 ibid) This point he has discussed while discussing the sixth vighna or obstacle All the sthayins or permanent mental states by themselves in worldly experience are not of the nature of happiness In rasa–experience, they give joy because they become the matter of cognitive chewing in one s own consciousness freed from obstacles Such a consciousness is of the nature of one uniform compact light and its essence is joy or ananda Therefore, even sorrow or anger and the like when they become the part of such a consciousness give joy The theory that nirvighna samvit as such is accompanied by joy or has joy as its constituent is a tenet of the pratyabhijña school.]

Different philosophical schools represented by different acaryas

The fact of rasa is particularly accepted by almost all the writers on sanskrit poetics Here its development has taken a psychological and epistemological direction The explanation given in the Nā sā of the rarasutra was enough for the actor and his director, the natyacārya

When however the interpretation of the rasasutra was taken up by the pundits well versed in the sāstras it became more and more sophisticated

We have seen above that in the interpretation of rasa doctrine there is an attempt to explain the psychological

mimāmsaka It is however doubtful, whether we can, on this evidence, take him to be a mimāṃsaka It is well-known that the mimāṃsā rules of interpretation are used by the followers of different schools

In the utpattivāda and the pratitivāda of Lollata, if both utpatti and pratiti refer to the spectator as Mammata and others have assumed, we can find in it the mimāmsā view of svatahprāmānyavāda, wherein the occurrence of knowledge is accompanied by its varacity That is, the occurrence of the knowledge of Rāma is accompanied by the knowledge that this is Rāma

Dr Pandey and Gnoli have shown that Lollata commented upon the Spanda Kārikā, and therefore was presumably a follower of the Kashmir Saivism According to Dr Pandey, Lollata uses the term anusandhāna in the Saiva sense of yojana In fact, one reference in the Abh which says that parispanda is not the only vyāpāra of ātman, according to Lollata, suggests that it is at least one vyāpara of ātman This would make him the follower of the pratyabhijñā school of Kashmir Saivism

In the presentation of Sankuka's views in the Abh, we find him emphasing the imitation theory of rasa and assuming a sort of inferential process in its cognition, Dr Pandey thinks that he adopts the technique of prācya nyāya (P 50 Indian Aesthetics) Is this however, sufficient to call him a Naiyāyika? There is nothing in the Nyāya philosophy to suggest the imitation vi-w And, no Naiyāyika worth his salt would call the psychological process of indirect knowledge a real inference So his views should be taken as his reflections on the nature and mode of rasa

In the theory of Bhatta Nāyaka, there are no doubt some sāṃkhya concepts such as those of the three gunas, and that of bhoga But he also refers to the 'ānandamaya nija saṃvit', and 'paramabrahmāsvāda' (P 277 ibid) However in Abh

(P. 5) Bhatta Nāyaka's views would make him a māyāvādi vedāntin. (*see also* Dr. *Pandey who supports this*. P. 72–73 Indian Aesthetics). It would seem however, that here too, we have not enough references to identify his schools of philosophy.

As to Abhinavagupta, we know that he was a follower of the pratyabhijñā derśana. Fortunately, some of the important works on Pratyabhijñā darsana are discovered and edited in Kashmir series of texts and studies In these philosophical works, *we find some basic concepts of the school* which *also* hold good for his theory of rasa. As we noted above, terms like 'saṃvit', 'nirvighnā saṃvit', 'camatkāra' and 'ānanda' have a peculiar significance, which we can clearly understand only in the light of their meanings in the discussion of Pratyabhijñā philosophy. Eventhough, *we cannot go here into the details* of this philosophy, a very brief account would be necessary for a proper understanding of these terms (24) *The pratyabhijñā* school is monist in its metaphysics The one single substance which manifests itself as the cosmos of living and non-living objects is 'citi' 'or' 'caitanya' It can therefore be called spiritual monism The ultimate 'citi' or 'caitanya' is called in *this school* as 'Śiva' *All the phenomena of the universe are* the self-manifestation or self-reflection of Śiva This school *differs from other schools of vedānta, particularly from that* of Saṅkara, in regarding this power of self-manifestation of Siva as real This Śiva caitanya is conceived not as something static, but frought with dynamic energy.

This view of ultimate reality is explained through several *concepts, and some of these are 'spanda', phurattā', 'vimarsa'*, 'camtkāra,' icchā' etc Abhinava himself has explained briefly but lucidly • these terms *in his work named Tantrasāra* We cannot do better than summrise what he has said in the upodghāta or introduction of this work

He says that nature of all existants is light-prakāsa This prakās'a is one and universal. It is not divided by time and

space (desa, kāla), because time and space themselves are of the nature of prakāsa. This prakāsa is then identified with samvit -sa eva ca samvit (p 2) Samvit is explained as-arthaprakāsarupā (arthaprakāsarupā hi samvit) This means that the nature of samvit is to enlighten objects (artha) But this prakāsa is also, enlightenment itself It is not dependent upon anything else (pāratantryam), for its enlightenment Thus, this prakāsa is one and svatantra, i e self-dependent, and because it is not limited by space, time and form it is all pervading (vyapaka), eternal (nitya), and formless, eventhough it has all the forms in it potentially

Thus this monism of prakāsa and samvit is monism of consciousness

After this are mentioned the various śaktis or powers of this samvit Its dependence (svatantryam) is its power of ananda (ānanda saktih) Its camatkāra is its power of will (icchasakti) Its nature of enlightenment is its power of cognition (jnanasaktih) Its capacity to assume all forms is its power of acting (kriyāsaktih) Eventhough, it can be described as joined with these powers, in reality, it is Siva containing within Himself, iccha, jñāna, and kriyā, i e will, knowledge and activity It is light and it reposes in its own joy (p 5-6, Tantrasāra -Kashmir Series of Texts and studies-No XVII Ed 1918)

Then, Abhinava describes how this Siva in its full independence shows itself as anu (25)

From this brief account, we find that samvit whose nature is to enlighten or present objects is the ultimate reality When it is completely independent, it is joy itself (ānanda) As desire it is camatkāra, Thus the three are identical To be reposing in this is to be Siva, or ānanda i e joy

In this school, everything that is or exists is Siva in reality And therefore, wherever the mind goes, there is the state of Śiva -

"yatra yatra mano yati bāhye vā bhyantare'pı vā |
tatra tatra sivāvasthā vyāpakatvāt kva yāsyatı ||

Vıjñanabhaırava V 116, p 99–Kashmır Sanskrıt Granthāvalıh Vol 6, Ed 1918

The essentıal thıng ıs that one's *samvıttı or consciousness* must repose unobstructedly ın ıts true nature ı e ın Sıva This *is joy itself* In this school the possibility of saṃvıt knowıng itself or reposıng ın ıtself ıs the source of all joy,–sensual, artistıc or spıritual The following verse from Vıjñanabhaırava *is taken* as authority by Abhınava and other writers of this school for this view

" *jagdhıpānakrtollasarasānandavıjṛmbhanat* |
bhāvayedbharıtāvasthaṃ mahanandastato bhavet ||
(Sloka72, P 60)

Abhınava has explaıned this view ın detaıl ın his Īsvarapratyabhıjñavıvrtıvımarsını (P 117–179, Vol II Ed, 1941, Kasmır *Series of Texts and Studies*) *Camatkrtı is explained as* camatkrtırhı bhuñjānasya yā krıya ı e The mental activity of one who enjoys *ı e* the mental *activity of enjoyıng ıs* camatkrtı It ıs also 'bhogasamāpattımaya ānandaḥ' This ıs joy, ānanda, which consists ın beıng ıdentıcal wıth enjoyment This ıs further clarified thus – *the enlightenment of one s own camplete nature* assumes the form of parāmarsa ı e. thought or consıousness It ıs called ānanda Svarupasya svātmanah parıpurnanıjasvarū paprakāsanam eva paramarsamayatāṃ dadhad ānanda itı ucyate p 177 (ıbıd) This vıew is applied to the mundane experıences of men *It is also shown how and when one has* joy and when one has not The ıllustratıon of a hungry man ıs cıted Because he is empty, he is in need of something else His *mind has become* vıvasa (helpless) by the desıre of food which ıs something dıfferent from hımself In this condıtion there ıs no one *solid consciousness of one's self (ekagha navṛttı)* and therefore, he ıs as ıf without joy We have seen that vıvasatā or helplessness ıs *a sort of vıghna or obstacle*

When, however, his belly is full, his incompleteness in the form of his emptiness is destroyed And so, in that condition of satisfaction, he has joy which lies in the cognition of oneself. But this joy is incomplete, because hunger exists in potential form–samskārarūpatayā–and therefore, he has still to desire the objects of the satisfaction of his epitite Abhinava says that all the worldly joy is of this nature When one gets something desired, one is afraid of its future loss and so one always remains disturbed and therefore incomplete But even in this mundane existance, whatever little joy is there, is the result of experiencing one's own-self i e having a momentory touch or contact with Siva Abhinava supports his view by a quotation from Sri Bhatta Narāyana who says that whatever joy is seen in this universe is a drop of the Ocean of joy which is Divinity itself

Abhinava, by fine analysis isolates the aesthetic element of joy even in matters of food and drink He says that while drinking sweet juice, there is a cognitive element viz 'idamittham'–'It is like this'–, which is distinct from gluttonous elements And in this way, one reposes in oneself as a knower and while doing so, one thinks principally of the knower element i e pramātrbhaga Thus, a person distinguishing in thought the knower-element of consicousness is called bhuñjāna i e one who enjoys in proper sense What Abhinava emphasises is the aesthetic element in the experience of such gross things as eating and drinking This aesthetic element, according to his philosophy, is the respose in oneself as cogniser We may put this in a simpler way and say that the thought viz 'I enjoy' is the source of aesthetic joy

Having thus made distinct the aesthetic element even in gross matters, he shows the aesthetic elements in poetry and drama (P 178-9 ibid) Rasas like srngāra which are subject-matters of drama and poetry are, he says, distinct from sensual joys Here, by the removal of obstacles like, earning and abandoning-hanopādāna-one tastes happiness by

completely overcoming the sense of otherness (anyathābhāvam) i.e. when one enjoys the sentiments depicted in poetry and drama, one *does not think of anything else. This is in a* way a precondition of aesthetic enjoyment. This experience because it is free from all obstacles-nirvighnatvāt-is rasanā (or tasting), carvana (sampling), nirvṛti (bliss), pratīti (apprehension), and *pramātṛtvavis'rānti or repose in the state of* being a knower. In this experience, there is another part of enlightenment or knowledge which reposes in the objects of knowledge. But one has to be oblivious of this part and *concentrate on the knower-element in order to enjoy rasa.* Such a capacity makes one a sahṛdaya. For further discussion he here refers to his Abh.

This makes it clear that the element of joy in experiences of gross things and of art has the same source When this *element becomes supreme, and when the mind is freed* from all other desires of objects, it is said to be enjoying the supreme divine bliss This divine experience is-"I am S'iva".

Abhinava, at the end of this discussion shows the difference between the enjoyment of gross elements and aesthatic *elements as follows madhurādi rasāsvāde tu viṣayaspars'*-avyavadhānam (p. 179) i.e. in the enjoyment of sweet drinks there is the obstruction in form of the contact with an outside object, i.e. here one can get joy only through an *external object.* This is its limitation. *In the enjoyment of* poetry and drama, one's experience is freed from such obstacles. But the potentiality of such obstacles remains latent and capable of getting into conciousness-tato'pi kāvyanāṭyādau tadvyavadhānas'ūnyatā tadvyavadhānasaṃskārānuvedhastu.- *But in poetry and drama, those who are careful of obviating* the part of obstacles in experience can have the highest bliss, i.e. those who are real sahṛdayas can get the highest bliss-tatrāpi tu tathoditavyavadhānāms'atiraskriyāsāvadhāna-hṛdayāḥ labhanta eva paramānandam. Thus Abhinava, like a true

aesthete, sees the possibility of the experience of highest joy in poetry and art

In this philosophy, highest joy (paramānanda), nirvṛti (bliss), and camatkāra are of the nature of parāmars'a i e thought or consciousness But this parāmars'a has to be completely free and independent of anything other than itself, and it must have one compact cognitive chewing This parāmars'a becomes paramānanda on account of its solid state of cognitive chewing anupacaritasya saṃvedanarūpatā nantariyatvena avasthitasya svatantrasya rasanaikaghanatayā parāmars'ah paramānanda nirvrtih camatkāra ucyate

The above discussion taken from the I P V.V gives a sort of philosophical background to the aesthetics of Abhinavagupta (26) It is something which is not divorced from our empirical experience of joy Both the aesthetic joy and the spiritual joy are cognate of this joy, or, we may put it as some writers of this school do, that whatever little joy we have in our mundane experience is cognate of this Divine joy The degrees in these experiences of joy are caused by the degrees of the soul s dependence on something other than itself When the soul is completely independent and does not rely upon or repose in anything else, it is the highest joy

In the view of this philosophy, everything is S'iva The limited individual human soul is S'iva itself As long as the individual human soul (anu) does not recognise itself (pratyabhijñā) as Siva it is limited and consequently unhappy So, one may say, that the moments of such recognition in the life of a soul are the moments of joy. Poetry and drama and art, everything that is beautiful and sublime in nature and anything which makes one sensitive of the inner vibration (spanda) or the inner throbing sphurattā afford a peep into this world of Bliss and Joy

Foot-notes

(1) See as an example the Tattabodhavidhāyinī of Abhayadevasūri on the Sanmatitarka of Sidhhasenadivākara. Ed Pundit Sukhlalji and Pundit Bechardas, Gujarat Vidyapeeth, Ahmedabad

(2) We are here particularly concerned with the A bh. on Nā Sā (VI, VII) The portion of the comm dealing with the rasasutra was very corrupt and therefore obscure in the first edition (G O S) Luckily this portion has been almost quoted verbatim in the viveka on Kā Śā of Hemacandra With the help of this viveka as critically edited by Prof R C Parikh, Gnoli has tried to give a satisfactory text of this portion of A bh The second edition of the G O S has much improved upon the text of the first edition There are, however, many obscure places in all these texts including Viveka We here also draw upon the second edition of the Kā Sā (Prof Parikh) for Viveka

In this chapter, I have tried to translate the technical terms and the relevant portions from the A bh, with the help of Gnoli's invaluable work

(3) He says we have stated above that Bhatta Lollaṭa was both a literary man and a philosopher He knew Saiva philosophy It is therefore, reasonable to support that the word 'anusandhāna', which he uses here, has the only meaning that was recognised in the contemporary philosophical circle That the word 'anusandhāna' was synonymous with "yojana" and not "abhimāna" as 'āropa' is evident from the following verses of Utpalācārya in the Īsvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā and Abhinava's commentary on it

kādācitkāvabhāse yāp ūrvābhāsadiyojanā ।
saṃskārat kalpanā proktā sa'pi bhinnāvabhāsinī ॥
I P V Vol I-256

-kādācitkah kadacidbhavah ajñātadesakālākārah avabhāse yasya dehādeh svalaksanarūpasya, tatra yā pūrvābhāsenā bālādisarirābhāsena yojanā yoham bālah sa evādya yuvā ityanusandhanam

(4) · Bhatta Lollata flourished in Kashmira in the IXth or Xth century He wrote a commentary, now lost, on the Nātyasastra of Bharata Ksemaraja (spandanirnaya, p 34) and A G (Abhinavagupta) (M V V, V 778) quote a Bhatta Lollata who wrote commentary (vrtti) to the Spandakārikā of Vasugupta In my opinion, it seems probable that these two Bhatta Lollatas are one and the same person, Bhatta Lollata, would, in this case, have lived in the reign of Avantivarman (856–83 A D, Vasugupta lived under Avantivarman) or in the reign of his successor, Sankaravarman This change also involves a change in the dates of Sankuka (C S Infra p 32, n 4), who could then be identified no longer with the poet Sankuka, who was a contemporary of Ajitapida (early IXth century) '–R Gnoli p 30

See also K C Pandey–Comparative Aesthetics Vol I Indian Aesthetics (Ed 1959), p 38–39–40 says

–"we have discussed the date of Bhatta Lollata in an earlier work (Abh. 126–9) He was a contemporary of Bhatta Kallata, the author or publisher of the Spanda Kārikā He commented not only on Bharata's Nātya Sāstra but also on the Spanda Kārikā He therefore, inherited both the drama turgic and the philosophical traditions from his predecessors In interpreting him we have to keep this fact in mind and also "Thus, we find that Bhatta Lollata was not concerned with the Spectator's point of view of rasa In his commentary, as we learn it from Abhinava's presentation of his view, there was no reference to the spactator The word "pratiyamānah', implying the spactator, has been introduced by Mammata, with very slight amendation of the text of Abhinava, which we have already given above Mammata's amendation runs as follows :

"mukhyayā vṛtyā rāmādāvanukārye,
tadrūpatānusandhānāt
nartakepı pratıyamāno rasaḥ" K P IV

For Lollața's view, see also Locana

"tathāhı pūrvāvasthāyāṃ ya sthāyı sa eva vyabhicārisampātādinā praptaparıposo'nukāryagata eva rasah nātye tu prayujyamānatvāt nātya rasa ıtı kecıt' (*Locana* on II 4 Dhv)

See also *Mammata s presentation of Lollata's view*

"vıbhavairlalanodyanādıbhıralambanoddıpanakāranaıh rat yādıko *bhāvo* janıtah anubhāvaıh katākṣabhujakṣepaprabhrtıbhıh kāryaıh pratıtıyogyah kṛtah, vyabhıcarıbhırnırvedadıbhıh sahakarıbhırupacıto mukhyayā vṛttya rāmādavanukarye, tadrupatanusandhānānartake pı pratıyamāno rasa ıtı bhattalollataprabhrtayah (K P IV)

(5) This portion of the A bh is rather laconic But *fortunately this has been given a more amplified form* in the Viveka of Hemacandra I have followed it here

(6) This portion consisting of the above quotation and what follows in the A bh on the next page (p 273 G O S Ed '56) *is given in a more logical form in the viveka of* Hemacandra The same trend of argument is found in the K P, of Mammata in a concise form

(7) See Ch VIII of the thesis

(8) Compare with Aristotle s mimesis

(9) *How does the spectator who witnesses the sentiments* of the actor feel those sentiments himself? The Viveka gives the following explanation *vastusaundaryabalat kasayaphala* carvanā parapurusādarsanaprabhavamuknaprasekakalana kalpayā
. etc (p 91-92, Ed 64 Prof R C Parikh)

The first explanation is *that it is beauty of what is* presented-vastusaundaryabala that evokes rasa in the spectator The second is an analogy When one perceives some

other person chewing a fruit with astringent flavour, saliva is produced in one's mouth This physiological action has its counterpart in the nature of emotion also Eventhough one may have no cause of laughter or sorrow if one sees someone laughing or weeping, one automatically feels like laughing or weeping These two viz 'vastusaundaryabala' and kasāya-phalacarvanā' are not found in the text of A bh Whether they are later additions or they formed part of the original text of Sankuka, we cannot say

(10) Abhinaya is the art which uses natural modes of speech, movements of body, etc for the effective communication of ideas, feelings, emotions, sentiments, etc In fact its success lies in endowing these with the semblance of reality which the mere speech or movement of the body fail to do So here, what cannot be communicated by mere words is communicated or evoked by uttering words in an artistic appropriate way

(11) See above

(12) "Sankuka flourished in Kashmir after Bhatta Lollata It is doubtful whether he should be identified with the poet Sankuka, author of a poem called Bhavanābhyudaya, who, accordingly to Kalhana (R T. IV, 705) lived under the reign of Ajitapāda (about 830 A D) In this case, his predecessor, Bhatta Lollata can no longer be identified with the commentator, of the same name, on the Spandakārikā, and so his period should be put back to the end of the 8th century and the beginning of the 9th Sankuka wrote a commentary to Bharata, now lost, which is frequently quoted by A G On Śankuka see De, S P, I p 38, Pandey, A G p 128 -Gnoli, p 32

K. C. Pandey-Abhinavagupta p 128 Ed 1935-says "From frequent references to and criticism of S'ri Sankuka's interpretation of the Bharata Sutra by Abhinava in his commentary (pp. 67,75,104) as also from the fact that he points out

differences between his original of the Bharata Sūtra and that of Srī Sankuka, (A bh 216 217) it is apparent that the latter also commented upon Bhārata Sūtra That he belonged to Kashmir and was a contemporary of King Ajitapida (850), we have already stated in the foregoing pages

It may be noted that this theory of imitation reminds one of the "mimesis" *i e* 'imitation' of Aristotle.

As for Sañkuka's *views as noted in the Locana*, read following "anye tu-anukartari yah sthāyyavabhāsóbhinayādi-sāmagryādikrto *bhittāviva haritāladinā aśvāvabhāsah, sa eva* lokātitatayāsvādaparasamjñayā pratityā rasyamāno rasa iti nātyādrasā nāṭyarasāh" (Locana on Dhv II 4)

See also Mammata (K P IV)

kāvyānusamdhānabalācchiksābhyāsanirvartitasvakāryapra katanena ca natenaiva prakāsitaih kāranakāryasahakāribhih krtrimairapi tathā nabhimanyamānairvibhāvādisabdavyapadesyaih 'samyogāt' gamyagamakabhāvarūpāt, anumiyamānópi *vastusaundaryabalādrasaniyatvenānyānumiyamānavilaksanah* sthāyitvena sambhāvyamāno ratyādirbhāve rasa iti śhri śankukah

Gnoli remarks (pp 39)—Śañkuka's mistake consists in asserting that aesthetic experience is an experience of a discursive kind (*savikalpa, it is an imitation*), and at the same *time saying that it differs from every other* kind of discursive cognition The doctorine which he professes is thus vitiated by an intrinsic contradiction The whole of Bhatta Tota's confutation, reproduced by Abhinava, *reduces in the last analysis to a close* and often scholastic examination of this contradiction

(13) Hemacandra explains - ayam bhāvah prasiddhāt ratilaksanāt kāranād ratyanukaranam nāma kāranāntaram tatprabhavasced anubhāvāh syuh tathaiva ca visesavidā yadi jñāyeran tadā ratyanukaranalaksanasya vastvantarasyānumānam samanjasam syāt na caivam, *tat katham iva ratyanukarana-*

pratītiḥ aviśesavidā ca tathāvidhānubhāvadarśane ratirevānumīyate tac ca mithyājñānam eveti

As for Bhatta Tauta or Tota see

"The expression 'my masters' observes H C (Hemacandra) alludes to Bhatta Tota (or Tauta), who was the direct master of A G and, therefore, lived in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th Century Bhatta Tota wrote a work of poetry, the Kāvyakautuka, on which A G wrote a commentary (vivarana) which has not yet been found The confutation of sankuka, given in the following pages, goes back therefore, to Bhatta Tota"-(Gnoli p 38)

(14) See also Locana on Dhv II 4

kavyepi ca tasmāt sthitametat abhivyajyante rasāh pratītyaiva ca rasyanta iti.

See also Mammata (K P IV)

na tatasthyena nātmagatatvena rasah pratīyate, notpadyate nābhivyajyate api tu kāvye natye cābhidhāto dvitīyena vibhāvādisādhāranīkaranātmanā bhāvakatvavyāpārena bhāvyamānah sthāyī, sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayasamvidviśrāntisatattvena bhogena bhujyate

The expression sattvodreka is reproduced almost verbatim by Mammata It has been commented upon in several ways Vidyācakravartin (K P Trivendrum Sanskrit Series) explains as below sattvodrekād yau prakāśānandau tanmayyāṃ saṃvidi samādhivṛttirūpāyāṃ yā yogināṃ viśrāntir vigalitasakalas ramā nistarangenāvasthitih tatsadṛśena

Mānikyacandra (p 74) comments on sattvodrekena prakāśah prakato ya ānandas tanmayī yā saṃvit tasyāṃ viśrāntih, sā satattvaṃ paramārtho yasya sa tathā

Abhinava says in the Locana (p 183)

rajastamovaicitryānuviddhasattvamayanijacitsvabhāvanirvṛtiviśrāntilaksanah Viśvanātha says:

sattvodrekād akhandasvaprakāśānandacinmayah |
vedyāntarasparśaśūnyo brahmāsvādasahodarah ||
lokottaracamatkāraprānah kaścit pramātṛbhih |
svākāravad abhinnatvenayam āsvādyate rasah ||

"Rasa is tasted by the qualified persons (i e qui rationem artis intelligunt) It is tasted by virtue of the emergence of sattva It is made up of a full Intelligence, Beatitude and self-luminosity It is void of contact with any other knowable thing, twin brother to the tasting of brahman It is animated by a camatkāra of a non-ordinary nature It is tasted as *if it were our very being, in indivisibility" (Trans. Gnoli pp 55)-Gnoli further adds" cf. the translation of* A K Coomaraswamy The Transformation of Nature in Art, Harvard, 1934, pp 48 *Coomaraswamy translated camatkāra* with 'lighting-flash' According *to Visvanātha, sattva is* nothing but the mind or inner sense (manah) devoid of any contact with *rajah* and *tamah* (pp 55)

Gnoli writes (p 50)-Bhatta Nāyaka flourished in Kashmir after Ānandavardhana (who was a contemporary of King Avantivarma, 856-883 A D), the author of the Dhvanyā loka Bhatta Nāyaka is, therefore, to be placed round about 900 A D It is not, probably, mistaken to identify him with brahmana Nāyaka, who lived during the reign of S'aṅkaravarman (883-902 A D), and who is mentioned by Kalhana (R T V 159) In the I P V V, III, p 96, A G quotes a stanza of Saiva inspiration, which he attributes to Bhatta Nāyaka, to which he gives the title of mimāṃsakāgranih (the same title is given by A G, elsewhere, to Kumārila, mimāṃsakapravara) Another stanza of Bhatta Nāyaka (taken from a stotra) is quoted by Kṣemarāja (Spandanirnaya p 18) I am inclined to think that these two BhattaNāyakas were one and the same person The poetic work of Bhatta Nāyaka is the Hṛdayadarpana, which has not yet come to light The opening stanza of this work, which contains an invocation to Siva, has been preserved in the A bh, I p 5 The stanzas from Bhatta Nāyaka, which recur a few lines later, are taken, without any doubt, from this work The fragments of the poetic work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka have been collected by T. P Chintamani, J O R M, Vol I, pp 267-276

On the poetic doctrine of Bhatta Nāyaka and the confutation of dhvani, of T. R. Chintamani, J.B.U., Vol 17, part 2, pp. 267–276 Bhatta Nāyaka's theory is also stated with few variations in the Dhv. Ā. L. pp. 180 ff. On Bhatta Nāyaka in general, see Kane, S D.V. pp. 212–215, Pandey, A. G, pp 128–130.

On Bhatta Nāyaka, Pandey writes (Indian Aesthetics Ed. '59 p 72)—Intellectual Background of Bhatta Nāyaka—

Bhatta Nāyaka was an immediate predecessor, or an older contemporary, of Abhinava : for, he was king Śaṅkuka Varman's contemporary (883–902 A D). He therefore, lived in the same literary atmosphere as that in which Abhinava lived By his time the two important factors in the evolution of the form, which the aesthetic theory assumed in the hands of Abhinava, had come into being (1) Ānanda Vardhana had propounded the theory of Dhvani, the power of language to convey the spiritual meaning (Dhvani) and (2) Śaiva metaphysics also had been well systematised by Utpala in his detailed commentary, the vivṛti, on his own Isvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. But Bhatta Nāyaka did not come under the influence of either. He was an avowed opponent of the spiritual meaning theory and wrote a work, the Hṛdayadarpaṇa, with the expressed object of demolishing it. And he seems to have simply ignored the Saiva philosophy He followed the vedānta school and based his theory upon the same school of philosophy.

...He had vedantic tendencies. For, in the course of his commentary on the very first verse of Bharata's Nātyasastra, he refers to the vedantic conception of the phenomenal world. He points out its similarity with the dramatic presentation. According to him, the activities of Rāma, Rāvana, etc. (in stage presentation) shine wonderfully, though they are actually non existent. They are mere creations of imagination and therefore are without any fixed form and are capable of millions of imaginative additions They are different from

objects of dream, illusion, etc, and therefore, are capable of fully captivating the heart They are products of actors, who in the course of production do not abandon their essential nature, exactly as Brahman does not give up his essential nature when the creates the phenomenal world But in spite of all this they are capable of giving rise to aesthetic experience and thus serve a human purpose Just so this phenomenal world, which is nothing but mere name and form, which really do not exist, serves the highest human purpose, through reflection and contemplation

He also makes use of the vedantic conception of Ānanda, as predominance of pure Sattva, free from all admixture of Rajas and Tamas He represents the aesthetic experience to be kin to the mystic realisation of Brahman He however, does not thoroughly stick to vedantic technique in his exposition of the aesthetic theory We shall briefly give an account of vedantic and allied conceptions, utilised by Bhatta Nāyaka in proper context

The passage from Bhatta Nāyaka, suggesting his vedantic leaning may be quoted as below (A bh Vol I p 5)

bhattanāyakastu brahmanā paramātmanā yadudahrtama vidyaviracitanissārabhedagrahe yadudaharanikrtam yannātyam tad vaksyāmi, yathābi kalpana mātrasāram tata evānavasthi taikarupam ksanena kalpanāsaharasarasaham svapnādivilaks anamapi susthutarām hrdayargrahanidānamatyaktasvalambana brahmakalpanaitoparacitam rāmarāvanadicestiam kuto'pyabhū tādbhūtavrtyā bhāti, tatha bhāsamanamapi ca pumarthopaya tāmeti tathā tadrgeva visvamidamasatyanāmarupaprapancāt makamata ca sravanamananādivasena paramapumaratha prāpakamiti

(15) Viveka (p 96, Ed '64, Prof Parikh) has the *following additional proposition* 'paragatatvena tu pratitau tātasthya meva bhavet".–If the apprehension of rasa is taken with reference to someone other than himself, one would be indifferent to it This proposition might have formed part

CHAPTER XVI

SOME OTHER WRITERS ON RASA

(i) Dhanañjaya and Dhanika (C. 10th A D)
(ii) Bhoja (11th A D) and others

Dhanañjaya and Dhanika

Dhanañjaya and Dhanika the authors of DR with its Avaloka occupy an important place in the history of Sanskrit poetics and dramaturgy, Chronologically they come after Ānanda and are almost contemporaries of Abhinava As against the Kashmirian writers on poetics Dhanañjaya and Dhanika along with Bhoja, the successor of Muñja represent the Malva school of writers We must therefore consider in what aspects these authors differ from Ānanda and Abhinava As to the views of the latter they may or may not have been known to these writers

Dhanañjaya defines rasa as follows

vibhavairanubhāvaisca sattvikairvyabhicaribhih |
ānīyamānaḥ svādyatvam sthāyibhavo rasah smrtah ||

(DR IV 1)

This definition is in a way explanatory of the famous sutra of the Nā Sā which is taken as authority for all the discussions on the subject We saw while discussing the views of Bhatta Lollata, Sri Sankuka and others that the absence of mention of sthayibhava in the rasa sutra is one of the main topics of discussion We also saw that in the opinions of Sri Sankuka and Abhinava, the mention of sthayibhava is not only unnecessary but would have also ruined the definition because in their view sthāyibhāvas as such never becomes the objects of rasa

Dhanañjaya however is definite in his view that it is the sthāyibhāva which becomes the object of rasa This is an important difference

A minor difference is to be found in the addition of sāttvikabhāvas as one of the agents bringing about rasa. This is in fact an addition in the rasa-sutra itself Though the sāttvika can be taken as implied in anubhāvas, its separate mention is justified by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika in the following way Eventhough the sāttvika bhāvas are also anubhāvas, yet they are different from them as they originate from sattva i e mind alone Says Dhanañjaya (DR IV 4 b 5a)–

pṛthagbhāvā bhavantyanye 'nubhāvatve' pi sāttvikāh |–4b
sattvadeva samutpattestacca tadbhāvabhāvanam ||–5a

Dhanika says

paragataduḥkhaharṣādibhāvanāyāmatyantānukulāntahkar–
anatvam sattvam yadaha
sattvam nama manah prabhavam tacca
samāhitamanastvādutpadyate

Another important point of difference lies in the modus operendi of rasa experience We have already seen that Dhanañjaya and Dhanika do not accept the vyangya-vyanjakabhāva but are satisfied with bhavya-bhavaka relation This, we have already noted, is the view propounded by Bhatta Nāyaka also, who mentions bhavakatva and bhojakatva vyāparas (Na Sā Vol III G O S Edn P 276–7)

Yet another important topic to be found in Dhanañjaya is that of the four cittabhūmis or four states of mind from which arise the different rasas These are as follows

svādah kavyarthasambhedatmānandasamudbhavah |
vikāsavistaraksobhaviksepaih sa caturvidhah || DR IV 43

Dhanika explains it elaborately as below He says that the sthāyibhava correlated with vibhāvādis is kāvyārtha On the strength of this the heart of sāmājika is harmonised with that of Rāma, and the like The ego centered limited cognition of I is obliterated The joy caused due to this is the kāvyānanda This joy is basically the same with reference to all the rasas but different rasas come into force by different

vibhāvādis On account of this difference in vibhāvādis, the mental states-cittabhūmis-are also divided into vikāsa, vistara, kṣobha and vikṣepa Rasas are also classified on the basis of these cittabhūmis Says he

kāvyārthena vibhāvādisamsṛṣṭasthāyyātmakena bhāvakacetasah sambhede' nyonyasamvalane pratyastamitasvaparavibhāge sati prabalatarasvānandodbhutih svādah tasya ca sāmānyātmanaika tvépi pratiniyatavibhāvādikāranajanyena sambhedabhedena caturdha cittabhumayo bhavanti – (Avaloka on D R IV 44)

Vikāsa is with reference to sṛṅgāra and hāsya, vistara with vira and adbhuta, kṣobha with bibhatsa and bhayānaka and vikṣepa with raudra and karuna Says Dhananjaya,

sṛṅgaravirabībhatsaraudreṣu manasah kramāt |
hāsyadbhutabhayotkarṣakarunanām ta eva hi ||

(DR IV 44)

We have already seen that Bhatta Nayaka mentions three cittabhumis If Bhatta Nāyaka can be accepted as a predecessor of Dhanañjaya, we may say that he follows Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in this respect

There is another important point in which Dhanañjaya differs, viz the number of rasas In the Nā Sa itself we find,' astau nātye rasāh smrtah -(Nā Sā VI 15) Lateron we find santarasa also as the ninth rasa This portion dealing with the topic of śantarasa is, in view of modern critics, an interpolation though we find that Abhinava, Mammata, Hemacandra etc all accept nine rasas Dhanañjaya and Dhanika however, forcibly controvert this latter view Their arguments as to why sāntarasa cannot be a natyarasa are interesting, They are as below

Dhanañjaya enumerates sthāyibhāvas in DR IV 35, as, 'ratyūtsahajupsāḥ krodho hāsah smayo bhayam sokah | samamapi keticprāhuh puṣtirnātyeṣu naitasya ||

Dhanika adds that as sama is of the form of cessation of all activity it cannot be represented on the stage Thus sānta

has no place in a dramatic represenatation. In Nāgānanda love for Malayavatī is described throughout and the attainment of the state of vidyādhara is narrated in the end. If śama is the sthāyibhāva in Nāgānanda it will not be in harmony with the above. The same anukārya cannot be the substance of two opposite types of things viz. anurāga and virāga. Thus in Nāgānanda śama is not the sthāyin but utsāha is the sthāyin that goes with dayāvīra Dayāvīra is not opposed to śṛṅgāra which is subservient to it or phala in form of sovereignty (cakravartitva) Thus there only eight rasas in nāṭya. Says Dhanika .. sarvathā nāṭakādāvabhinayātmeni sthāyitvamasmābhiḥśamasya niṣidhyate...etc ..aṣṭāveva sthāyinaḥ . Avaloka on DR IV.35.)

Dhanañjaya further adds that nirveda has its nature not identical with that of the sthāyin So how can it be relished ? Its enhancement will only make for lack of relish So there are only eight sthāyins in drama Says he,

nirvedādiratādrūpyādasthāyī svadate katham ।
vairasyāyaiva tatpoṣaḥ tenāṣṭau sthāyino matāḥ।। (DR IV 36)

As to the nature of rasa experience and as to the seat of rasa in the connoisseur they do agree with Ānanda and Abhinava The concomittant of rasa experience is joy In fact Dhanika says

vakṣyamāṇasuabhāvairvibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisāttvikaiḥ kāvyopāttairabhinayopadar śitairvā śrotṛprekṣakāṇāmantarviparivartamāno ratyādirvakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇaḥ sthāyī svādagocaratām nirbharānandasamvidātmatāmānīyamāno rasaḥ
(DR. Avaloka IV. 1.)

As rasa is connected with cognition and joy, it rests only in the rasika or the connoisseur. Says Dhanika .

tena rasikaḥ sāmājikaḥ kāvyaṃ tu tathāvidānandasaṃvidunmīlanahetubhāvena rasavadāyurghṛtamityādivyapadeśavat.
(Avaloka on DR. I. i.)

Bhoja

Bhoja succeeded Muñja whose court pundits were Dhananjaya and Dhanika S K Ā and Sr Pra are the two works on poetics attributed to Bhoja S.K Ā is published Sr Pra. is published in parts only But we get a critical evaluation of the contents of this work in the learned thesis of Dr V. Raghavan

The Rasa-Theory of Bhoja

Bhoja has dealt with the topics of rasa in his two voluminous works the S K Ā and the Sr Pra The former has been published severel times and the publication of the latter is undertaken by H O S though it is not yet out Dr V Raghavan has, however, published an exhaustive treatise on Sṛ Pra He has also given at the end of chapters full quotations of the relevant portions of the text Here, I draw upon NS Ed of the S K Ā and for S'ṛ Pra I rely upon the passages quoted by Dr V Raghavan

Bhoja's theory of rasa appears in some aspect to be peculiar to himself, or we may say to the literary men of his court I will here mainly discuss his views as far as they bear upon the interpretation of the rasa-sutra of the Na S'ā

Dr Raghavan has exhaustively and very ably analysed the different shreds of the complicated fabric of d scussion on rasa

Bhoja seems to have recognised three stages or kotis of rasa viz the parā, madhyamā and the uttarā koti He seems to have derived a plea for this arrangment from Dandin For Bhoja, as for Dandin, rasa is also an alaṃkāra in the wide sense of kāvyosobhākara dharma Bhoja includes rasas under alaṃkāras and cites Dandin who says

preyah priyatarākhyānaṃ rasavadrasapesalam ।
ūrjasvi rūdhāhamkāraṃ yuktotkarsam ca tat trayam ॥

'Yuktotkarṣam' is taken by Bhoja in an unsual sense and he bases his three kotis of rasa on this Says he

tatra 'ūrjasvi rudhāhaṃkāraṃ' ityanena ātmavis'eṣanisthasya utkṛstādṛstajanmanaḥ anekajanmānubhavasaṃskārāsāditadraḍhimnaḥ samagrātmasampadudayātis'ayahetoh alam (sham)-kāravisesasya up°samgrahādahaṃkārī (da) bhimānasṛṅgārā dyaparanāmno rasasya mānamayavikārarūpena abhimaninām manasi jāgratah pūrvāṃ kotim upavarnayati 'rasavad rasapes'alam' ityanena vibhavānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogādrasa nispattiriti ratyādirūpeṇa anekadhāvirbhāvataḥ abhivardhamānasya paraprakarṣagāminaḥ s ṛṅgārasya madhyamāvasthāmavasthāpayati 'preyaḥ priyatarākhyānam ityanena samastabhāvamūrdhabhiṣiktāyā rateh paraprakarsādhigamāt bhāvanāpathātikrame *bhāvarūpatīmullaṅghya premarupena pariṇatāyā upādānāt* bhāvāntarānāmapi paraprakarsādhigame rasarūpeṇa *pariṇatiriti jñāpayan ahaṃkārasya uttarāṃ kotiṃ upalaksayati*
(Śr Pra Vol II. p 365–70 Ch XI)

For Bhoja, the rasas and the rasa theory dealt with by other ālaṃkārikas *fall under the madhyamāvasthā It should* be noted, however, that for him rasas in the madhyamāvasthā are really bhāvas only but are secondarily called rasas As noted earlier, he has derived his clue from Dandin s dictum as quoted above vis preyaḥ priyatarākhyānam etc For him, the process which *would result in rasa is the process of* development and *intensification of sentiments and emotions* So, *for Bhoja, rasa is the* utkarṣa or prakarṣa of emotion This is similar to the upacaya theory of Lollata For the explanation of rasa-sūtra given by Bhoja, we have to rely on the passage in the S'ṛ Pra (See Dr Raghavan s Sṛ Pra. p 516) (Sṛ Pra p 381–388) He explains the rasa sūtra with reference to what he calls the madhyamāvasthā, in the following way

Bhoja first explains the term 'vibhāva' in its two aspects viz. ālaṃbana and uddipana He says kathaṃ punaḥ vibhāvā

nubhāvavyabhicārisamyogāt rasanispattih ? ucyate-yathā indusannidheh gandakah syandate, yatharkasannidheh suryakānto jvalati, yathā karpurasannidheh sphatiko viliyate, tathā tebhyastebhyah alambanavibhavebhyah tadākārapariṇatendriyabuddhyupādhiyogino bhimānimanasah te te ratikrodhas'okādayo bhavāh samutpadyante – "There is abhimāna in the mind, when objects confront it, the abhimāna takes the shapes of objects and according as the objects are pleasant or otherwise, the bhavas, rati, krodha, soka, etc are born The process is respectively similar to the candrakanta stone flowing out in the presence of the moon (rati), the sūryakānta blazing forth on the sight of the Sun (krodha), and the sphatika melting in the proximity of karpura (s'oka)–This explains alambana-vibhāva' (Trans Raghavan p 487)

Then, he explains the uddipana vibhāva as follows atha indudaye yathā samudrah ksubhyati, yathā apathyasevayā vyadhirabhivardhate, yathānāryasannidheh sādhuradhikam duhkhakaroti, tathā tebhyastebhyah uddipanavibhāvebhyah tattadanubhavasamakārayoginah manash tattadbhāvā (a) bhivṛddhaye te te vikārā upajāyante

"Just as the sea becomes boisterous at moon-rise, just as disease increases by bad diet, just as a rogue creates more mischief when he gets to his aid one more of his own class, so also uddipana-vibhāvas create trouble first (ksobha), then increase the suffering more and more The uddipanas are thus kṣobhakas, abhivardhakas and pratikūlas, agitating, inflaming and adverse This explains ūddipana-vibhāva – (Raghavan p 487–8)

From these sthāyibhāvas thus created and kindled respectively from rasa by ālambana and uddipana vibhāvas, arise anubhāvas and vyabhicārins They are essentially of the form of bhāvas, though differing in name and form They are ābhyantara or internal and bāhya or external

How are these vibhāvādis correlated and act upon the sthāyins to produce rasa ? Bhoja explains this in the words.

atha yathā ıksubhyo rasah, sarsapebhyastaılam, dhātubhyo hıranyām, asmabhyo loham, dadhno navanıtam, kāsthato' gnıh, tebhyastebhyah yantrāgnımanthasamyogebhyah nıspatantı, tathā evebhyah vıbhavānubhāvavyabhıcārısamyogebhyah ratıkrodhasokādıbhyah, te te rasāh nıspadyante

ı e As *juıce ıs created from sugarcane, oıl is pressed* out of sarsapa, gold from metal, ıron from stone butter from curds, fire from faggots, by the ınstrumentalıty of machınes, fire or churnıng, sımılarly, from ratı, krodha, etc, wıth the help of partıcular vıbhavādıs, are produced partıcular rasas So, rasas are ıntensıfied sthayıns through the contact of the sthayıns wıth vıbhavadıs Thıs upacaya takes place ın the followıng way

yathā lavana (rasa) āmlādayah svasamyogınah mrdvıkā dınāpı ātmarupatām nayantah upacıyante, tatha ratyadını *vıbhavādınapyātmarupatām nayantı upacayante*

(S r Pra Vol II p 385

These three vız vıbhava, anubhāvā and vyabhıcarıns dıffer ın nature but they become ıdentıcal and get merged ın the one flood of rasa-rasatā, rasenaıva sāmānyam bhavatı *ıbıd p 385*

So, it seems, Bhoja also, lıke Dandın and Lollata, adopts the causal vıew But here an ımportant poınt ıs to be borne ın mınd The causal theory adopted by Bhoja is sāmkhya theory of satkāryavāda, accordıng to whıch, effects pre-exıst *ın an unmanıfest form ın the cause The actıvıty ıs concerned* only wıth makıng manıfest what was unmanıfest Sımılarly, accordıng to thıs theory, rasas pre-exıst ın vıbhāvādıs and theır combınatıon wıth sthāyıns brıng them out, makes th-m manı fest Bhoja's prakarsa is sımılar to Lollata's upacaya

Many such rasas combıne *to produce rasa-samkara,* even as many tastes go to make up drınks Says Bhoja atha yathā osadhırasebhyah madhunıspattıh, yathā madhurādıbhyah sadavotpattıh, gudādıbhyah āsavotpattıh, tathā tabhyah tebhyah rasasāmānyebhyah rasavısesābhınırvrtıh

Then he talks of the jātibhedas of rasas such as bhāva, rasa, tadābhāsa etc., and also of the stages or avasthās such as utpāda i e. birth, abhivṛddhi i.e. nourishment and sthairya i.e. firmness. Says he :

atha yathā ekasyāpyagneh bhaumadivyaudaryādayo jātibhedāh dāhālokapākādayo arthakriyāh sandṛśyante, tathaikasyāpi rasasya bhāvarasatadābhāsādayo jātibhedāh utkanthābhisaṅganirvṛtyādayah arthakriyāh utpādābhivṛddhisthairyādayo avasthāh, samupalabhyante ı

Another novel feature of this theory is that Bhoja tries to obliterate the distinction between sthāyibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins. For Bhoja, all the 49 bhavas can become rasa on attaining prakarsa by vibhāvādis :- ratyādināmekonapañcāśato'pi'vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogāt paraprakarsādhigame rasavyapadeṣārhatā ı (Sr. Pra. Vol. II. p 381)

These are called rasas only secondarily i e. through upacāra They are of three forms, prakrsta, bhāvarūpa and ābhāsa : sa śṛṅgārah, so 'bhimānah sa rasah, tathā etc. ratyādayo jāyante ....tadupādhiścāyamupajāyamāno rasah tridhā vikhyāyate prakrsto bhāvarūpah, ābhāsataśca ı (ibid p. 356)

Now we come to the other kotis viz. parā and the uttarā. These seem to be his own original thinking on the matter, though they are not so original as they appear at the first sight. Says Bhoja : etena rūdhahamkāratā rasasya pūrvā kotih. ratyādināmekonapañcāśatopi vibhāvānubhāvavybhicārisaṃyogāt paraprakarsādhigame rasavyapadeśārhatā rasasyaiva madhyamāvasthā. preyah priyatarākhyānamiti upalaksanena yathā rateh premarūpena parinatih tathā bhāvāntarānāmapi paramaparipāke premarūpena parinatau rasaikāyanamiti rasasya paramā kāsthā iti pratisthitam bhavati. P. 351. Śr. Pra. Vol. II.

In the very first kārikā of the fifth ch. of his S. K. Ā. Bhoja puts forth his new theory of rasa in the words :

raso 'bhimāno' hankārah śṛṅgāra iti giyate ı
yo'rthah tasyānvayāt kāvyam kamanīyatvamaśnute ıı
(S.K.A.V. 1)

In the Śr Pra (Vol I P 1-3 Mas Ed) he says,

atmasthitaṃ guṇaviśeṣamahaṃkṛtasya
śṛṅgāramāhuriha jīvitamātmayoneḥ |
tasyātmaśaktirasanīyatayā rasatvam
yuktasya yena rasiko' yamiti pravādaḥ ||

In a person, says Bhoja, in whose consciousness Ego has become manifest, there is a particular quality of such Ego-consciousness This is the very life of Eros who takes birth from such a self. This quality of Eros is known as śṛṅgāra This quality i e, śṛṅgāra is tasted in the self by the self This tasting is rasa sui generis A person in whom this self-tasting has become manifest or developed is called rasika Thus, by this verse, Bhoja explains the meaning of the word ahamkara used in the first kārikā of his S K Ā V.

Let us try to understand the implications of this statement We take as our basis the samkhya psychology, which Bhoja seems to follow or have in mind and which teaches that the man in the world is a particular correlation of puruṣa and prakṛti According to its another dogma puruṣa is merely the subject of knowledge. It is completely unchainging and inactive Puruṣa can not be said to do anything It is consciousness itself and so to say enlightens the transformation that takes place in prakṛti In such a relation, therefore, what we ordinarily call mental transformations are to be understood as the transformation of prakṛti which is material in nature but which is continuously being illuminated by the caitanya of the puruṣa

In the evolution of prakṛti from its state of equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas, the first evolute is known as mahat This seems to indicate the vastness of reality as such From this evolves what is known as buddhi which should be understood as cognition as such This is to say that the vastness of reality first evolves the specific quality of cognition. Buddhi gives birth to ahaṃkra which we may interpret as Ego or individuality This evolute of individuality further evolves

into what are known as pañca tanmātrās i e the subtle elements which become gross in *different kinds of matter* and the motor organ and the sensoria organs and in inner organ called antahkarana or *manas, which seems to be the active* agent between the buddhi and the remaining fifteen elements. *We need not go in the study of the further evolutes of prakrti.* What we are concerned with here is the fact of individualised buddhi and Ego which is called 'abhimānohamkārah' by Īs'varakṛṣna (Sā Kā 24)

It is the self-enjoyment of this Ego which in the opinion of Bhoja is rasa or taste par excellence In other words, when such a state of consciousness is reached it is called rasa Bhoja seems to take this as his basic principle in the discussion of rasa With this fact he joins up another fact and that is the nature of Eros or kāma as such This is supposed to be self-originating (ātmayoni, compare Amarakosa, ātmabhuh) This is the fundamental fact of love or rati, which is usually identified *with the sex-passion* Sex-passion *is something* which joins the two opposites The relation of purusa and prakrti, *in a way, is visualised in a similar union, though not identical,* Eros seems to become manifest in this way Because the manifestation of Eros is known by the term *sṛṅgāra, Bhoja is* tempted to equate the three abhimāna, ahamkāra and sṛṅgāra as indicating the consciousness of taste or enjoyment

How far Bhoja is justified in equating the three is another matter If we here can take the tāntrika or the Śākta view of ultimate union of prakrti and puruṣa' or siva and sakti, we can find justification for Bhoja's view of defining rasa as śṛṅgāra, abhimāna and ahaṃkāra

He, however to be consistant with his utkarṣa theory, interprets śṛṅgāra as sṛṅgaṃ riyate-etc This view of Bhoja is, in a way, a substitute for the nirvighna saṃvit of the kashmirian sākta ālaṃkārikas In the discussion of Abhinavagupta, however, we find nirvighna saṃvit coming as a final

state in rasa-consciousness Bhoja starts with abhimāna, ahaṃkāra and *śṛṅgāra* as the *prime condition of rasa* Thus for Bhoja, a person whose Ego has developed to the capacity of this tasting-rasa—is rasika proper. It is only such a person for whom rasa has meaning

S K Ā. and Śr. Pra. however, *do not in a systematic way* develop these ideas So many different items have been brought in, so that it is very difficult to discover a consistant theory, *as for example we do in case of Dhv Bhoja's attempt to* derive all the eight or nine rasas from this basic śṛṅgāra has led to much confusion. Sṛṅgāra is by tradition the principal *rasa amonst eight or nine other rasas Its preponderance in* literature is immense. It, therefore, in a popular way can be called rasa par excellence But this is not the sense in which *Bhoja uses the word śṛṅgāra in his* S K Ā V 1, *and its* further explanation in the Sṛ Pra Here śṛṅgāra is the primary fact of the Ego experiencing itself Even when we identify Ego and Eros, Śṛṅgāra *in the usual sense cannot be identified* with it It is as much a derivative as the other rasas like vira, adbhuta, karuna, etc Bhoja seems to have been *misled into confusing these positions, unless we take the old* platonic idea of Eros or the Modern Freudian idea of Libido as the source of all emotions Anyway, Bhoja has the unique *distinction of putting a new dynemic idea into the dialectics* of rasa

*As Dr. Raghvan has pointed out, Bhoja bases his specul*ations on rasa on his concept of rasika He tries to explain the current usage of the term 'rasika' as follows rasah asya astiti rasikah *Rasa is thus a quality of an individual which* makes a man rasika. Rasika, for Bhoja, is not merely the connoisseur or the enjoyer of poetry alone It means the cultured man in general *He has in him the excellent quality of rasa* and this distinguishes him from the other viz. the nirasa. This quality of rasa is identical with all rasikas Bhoja says that this *rasa of the rasika is nothing else but the Ego-Ahaṃkāra tattva*

itself This rasa ahaṃkāra is in the poet, charater, actor and spectator It is endowed in a person on account of meritorious deeds in past life Says he ātmasthitam gunavisesam etc (see obove)

Rasa is cittasamvāda But all men do not have cittasaṃ vāda in all rasas So, Bharata and following him Abhinava classify characters into uttama madhyama and adhama dhirodatta, dhiroddhata, dhiralalita and dhirasānta etc Bhoja also therefore, tries to find out one characterising rasa for each of the four types of heroes such as dhirodātta, dhiroddhata etc This classification becomes intelligible only when we accept a scheme of four different rasas as dominating the characters as their distinguishing marks and as their permanent moods So, Bhoja speaks of udātta uddhata preyas and santa as the rasas of the four types of heroes

Bhoja has also criticised Bharatas scheme of four prakrti rasas producing the other four rasas This scheme, Bhoja him self accepts with modifications But Bhoja unnecessarily criticises Bharata by confusing his idea of abhimana-sṛngara with Bharata s idea of the usual sṛṅgara

Bhoja s new sṛṅgāra is not the old sṛṅgāra or rati prakarsa This he makes amply clear by his classification of sṛṅgāra into dharma-sṛngara, artha sṛṅgāra, kāma sṛṅgāra and moksa-sṛṅgāra, and by this he means the activities or purusartha of men in these directions Here, by kāma sṛṅgāra is meant the usual sṛṅgāra of rati-prakarsa Says he

vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogāt (vi) prakarṣamāpadya mānaḥ pradhanah (bhā) vo ratirnama kamaśṛṅgārākhyāṃ labhate P 733 Vol IV Ch 32 Śr Pra

This kāma-sṛṅgāra also is subdivided by Bhoja into dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa (1) It should be noted, however, that for Bhoja activity towards moksa is mokṣā-ṣṛṅgāra in which Bhoja treats the pure type of jñānamārga of the sanyāsin or that

of a karmayogin or he also speaks of gṛhastha-mumukṣu and his activities The last is the dhira-praśānta and his wife married according to vedic rites is the heroine in this case

In his *uttarā koṭi* he talks *of all rasas merging into one* rasa-the preman rasa—

rasam tviha premānamevāmananti, sarveṣāmeva hi ratyādi prakarṣāṇām ratipriyo raṇapriyo'marṣapriyah parihāsapriyah premnyeva paryavasānāt, (Sr Pra Vol II P 352-7 ch XI)

The bhūmā of rati, hāsa, etc is not rasa, but sṛṅgāra alone is rasa Says he – tatkathamucyate, 'ratyādibhumāni punarvitathā rasoktih" *iti ? ucyate-na ratyādibhumā rasah*, kim tarhi ? sṛṅgarh, sṛṅgāro hi nāma viśiṣṭestadṛṣṭacestābhivyañjakānām ātmaguṇasampadām utkarṣabijam buddhisukheccbādveṣaprayatnasamskāradyatis'ayahetuh ātmanāhaṅkāraviśeṣah sacetasā rasyamāno rasa ityucyate, yadastitve rasiko'nyathabhāve nirasa *iti*, (Sr Pra, Vol II) 352-7 Ch XI)

In this last part we see that rasa, far from remaining merely a matter of poetic taste, becomes a sort of the realisation of the essence of the self in form of preman

Here I may incidentally point out that in the later works of vaiṣṇavite writers such as *Ujjvalanilamaṇi sṛṅgara rasa* does not remain merely a matter of human love but rises to the status of Divine love, the love of the Gopi's for SriKṛṣṇa We also find a similar but curious treatment of the subject in the work called Hamsavilasa of Mithu Kavi of Gujarat

The Rasa theory of Ramachandra and Gunachandra

The influence of DR, and that of S K Ā and Sr Pra the works of Malva, is evident in Hemacandra and his disciples *Rāmcandra and Guṇacandra in Gujarat Hemacandra is cognised* of the new ideas put forth by Bhoja and his works But he prefers to follow the tradition of Ānandavardhana and Abhinava gupta and subsumes some *of the items under old terms* Thus sneha-rasa with ārdratā as its sthāyin is subsumed under rati,

The love for a friend is rati, love for a brother as in case of Lakṣmaṇas love for Rāma is dharmavīra, that of children for their parents is bhaya In the same way, says Hemacandra that laulyarasa with gardhatā as its sthāyin can be subsumed under either hāsa or rati Similar is the case with bhakti

As the ND is more independent in holding certain views, we will take it up first Rāmacardra and Guṇacandra, the pupils of Hemacandra, however, are more independent of tradition of their guru in this recpect They seem to follow Bhoja in recognising some of the sañcārins as sthāyins developing into independent rasas They hold that over and above the nine rasas there can be many more such as laulya rasa with gardha as its sthāyin, sneha with ārdratā as its sthāyin, vyasanarasa with āsakti with its sthāyin etc They also recognise additional vyabhicārins such as kṣut, tṛṣṇā, maitrī, muditā, sraddhā, dayā, upekṣā, rati, santosa, kṣamā, mārdava, ārjava, dakṣinya, etc They also hold that even the sthāyins and anubhāvas become vyabhicārins This is seen in Bhoja also who says–nanu astau sthāyinah astau sāttvikāh, trayastrimsad vyabhioārinah iti bruvate na tat sādhu, yatómisāmanyatamasya etaireva parasparam nirvartyamānatvāt kascit kadācit sthāyi, kadacittu vyabhicāri ato'vasthāvasāt sarve'pyami vyabhicārinah, sarve'pi ca sthāyinah sāttvikā api sarva eva, manaḥprabhavatvāt , anupahataṃ hi manah sattvamityucyate (Sr Pra Vol II p 352–7. Ch XI)

Bhoja also speaks of many other rasas such as ānandarasa with praharsa as its sthāyin and also vira, auddhatya, svātantrya, sādhvasa, vilāsa, anurāga and saṅgama rasas He also speaks of twenty more rasas such as rati, utkarsa, dhrti, utkanthā, vismaya, mati, vitarka, cintā, capalatā, hāsa, utsāha, stambha, gadgada, unmāda, vrīdā, avahitthā, bhaya and saṅkā etc (Śr Pra P 400) It should be noted that the inclusion of vira in the list given as above is something curious, for vira rasa is recognised by all the ālamkārikas and there is nothing new in it.

The tendency to recognise nine traditional rasas is not altogether new Even Abhinava quotes the views of others who accepted rasas such as *sneha, laulya,* etc with ārdratā and gardha etc as their sthāyins respectively

Let us examine the definition of rasa as given in the ND. The ND says

sthāyibhāvah sritotkarsah vibhavavyabhicāribhih ।
spastānubhāvaniseeyah sukhaduhkhātmako rasah ॥

The first thing that we note is the mention, in this definition, of *the term sthāyibhāvah This is in accordance with the* practice of Dhananjaya and Bhoja

The second point to be noted is that in the rasa-sutra of Bharata, all the three i e vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin, combine to give rasa, while here, a little different analysis is given The effect of rasa is brought about by vibhavas and the vyabhicārins i e these are taken as the causes of rasa But the determination of rasa is explained as due to clear and distinct anubhāvas This determination or nis'caya comes about in an inferential process dependent upon concomitants This reminds us of the Naiyāyika view of Śri Sankuka (anumiti-anukṛti).

The third important point of difference lies in recognising the dual nature of rasa, i e causing sukha or duhka The meaning is that some rasas give pleasure while others give pain In all these matters *Hemacandra follows the traditional view* of Ānanda and Abhinava

The ideas underlying this definition are explained by the authors in their commentary. They take up the position of realists like Bhoja. For them, as noted in the kārikā itself, sthāyibhāva, when intensified, is itself rasa This really happens with the original persons *The love for Sitā* can only reside in Rāma, and vice-varsa They enjoy the sentiment of mutual *rati in reality Their love cannot be experi*enced by anyone else

Then how are we to explain the rasa in the readers and the spectators ? The authors say that it is a well-known fact that people do recognise other peoples' sentiments This cognition is not of course, direct, because sentiments of others are beyond direct perception They are, therefore, only inferred This inferential cognition is dependent upon concomittance But how in a poem or a stage-play can we *bring the original characters whose feelings we can infer ?* The actor gives a semblance of the vibhāvas etc of the original characters, while during this act, eventhough the actor has not the original feeling in him, yet by his anubhāvas he creates the possibility of the inference of feelings in the minds of the spectators It is for this reason that the authors say that rasa is determined by spastānubhāva i e clear gestures etc.

The idea seems to be something like this The actor with the help of the vibhāvas and vyabhicārins, is enabled to work out the proper anubhāvas which give rasa to his spectators

The authors make this point clear in the part of the vṛtti which discusses the rasa sūtra : yadapyucyate vibhāvānuubhāvarvyabhicārisaṃyogādrasanispattiriti tatrāpyanubhāva vyabhicārinas ca striyādivarnaniyānukāryāpeksayaiva dṛstayāḥ etc, (p. 143 G O S Ed) The terms anubhāvas and vyabhicārins in the sutra, according to their interpretation, refer to the described or represented women etc From these comes rasa by direct perception of one's own experience and by indirect inference of other's experience This is in conformity with the other exporents of the sutra who naturally take the anubhāvas and vyabhicārins as those of described or represented charactors *The difference lies in taking vibhāvas as belonging* to the original person Probably here they follow Bhoja. The authors say that rasa in its distinctness can only reside in the original characters, because vibhāvadis are real only to them and for this reason, the vyabhicārins and anubhāvas born out of rasa are distinct only in their case But for others i e, spectators etc, the vibhāvadis are not real (kevalaṃ mukhya-

dayanti sumanasah purusāḥ harsādīṃs'cādhigacchanti tathā nanābhāvabhinayavyañjitān vāgaṅgasattvopetān sthāyibhāvanāsvādayanti sumanasah preksakāh ca harṣādīmscadhigacchanti tasmānnatyarasā ityabhivyākhyātāh (G O S Ed Nā S'ā VI), *Thus, according to this view, it is held that the rasas, presumably all*, are pleasant But those, however, who think that all the rasas are not pleasant, interpret the passage differently Abhinavagupta says anye tvādis'abdena s'okādināmatra samgrahah (Abh on Nā S'ā G O S Ed p 290) Abhinava's own view is as said above, that all rasas are pleasent He rejects the other opinion by saying -sa ca na yuktah sāmājikānām harsaikaphalaṃ nātyam, na s'okādiphalam He says with emphasis -asmanmate tu samvedanamevanandaghanamāsvādyate tatra kā duhkhas'ankā kevalam tasyaiva citratākarane ratis'okadivāsanavyāpārastadudbodhane cābhinayādivyāpārah (p 293 ibid) Dr Raghvan notes the sukha-duhkhatmakatā view of one Rudrabhatta given in his Rasakalika He also refers to Haripāla's view regarding the painful nature of vipralambha. (J O R Madras Vol XI P 113–14,107)

Thus we see that Rāmacandra and Gunacandra do not follow tradition of their guru in many respects

We will now take up some other authors, such as—

(i) **Mammata (11th-12th A D)**

(ii) **Hemacandra (1088 A D–1172 A.D)**

(iii) **Visvanatha (1300-1350 A D)**

(iv) **Jagannatha (1620-1660 A D) and others**

Mammta, the great syncretist of Sanskrit Poetics has tried to synthesise most of the views of earlier ācāryas In his maṅgala, he characterises the poetic creation as pleasant on account of nine rasas But in the definition of poetry, he does not mention rasa as such This, however, is implied in s'abdārthau', because in the three varieties of artha, the vyaṅgyārtha for him si the meaning of *poetry par excellence* In the varieties of vyaṅgyārtha it is rasavyaṅgya which is the most important He summarises the discussions of Abh. in

one elaborate sentance In this matter, Mammata implicitly follows Ānanda and Abhinava

So does Hemacandra in his Kāvyānus'āsana In fact he has quoted the whole passage bearing on rasa from A bh At the end of this he says that he also follows Abhinava in this matter–etanmatameva casmābhirupajivitamiti (Viveka p 103) Visvanātha similarly follows Ānanada and Abhinava in this matter *But he gives prominence to rasa in his definition of* kavya viz vākyaṃ rasātmakaṃ kavyam (S D I) He has, however, clarified one point as to how rasa becomes abhivyakta He says vyakto dadhyādinyāyena rupantaraparinato vyaktikṛta eva rasah na tu dipena ghata iva purvasiddho vyajyata taduktam locanakāraih–'rasah pratiyanta iti tvodanam pacatitivad vyavaharah iti ' (S D III 1)

Pundit Jagannātha in his R G has discussed many of the problems of Sanskrit Poetics in an independent way The sum and substance of his ideas on rasa, however, are not *different from those of Ānanda, Abhinava and Mammata* He, however, like the earlier theorists of rasa such as Bhatta Lollata, Sri Sankuka, Bhatta Nayaka, etc, who give the explanation of rasa-experience according to their philosophical dogma, gives his vedantic twist to the explanation of rasa-experience According to vedantic view, the nature of the ātman is 'sat', 'cit' and 'ananda' This 'cit' in our ordinary *life is darkened by a cloud* (āvarana), may be of māyā The *poet s speech through its vibhāvādisāmagri breaks up this* covering-āvarana-and when this happens, the essential constituant of the soul, viz ānanda, becomes self-revealed This is the reason according to him why all rasa experiences have as their condition ānanda-bliss And it is for this reason that, according to Jagannātha, rasānanda is regarded as similar to brahmānanda, of course, it is not brahmānanda as such We may say following Jagannātha that poetry by temporarily *removing the coverage of the consciousness gives for the time being a glimpse of the bliss of the soul*

Resume'

It is my purpose here to put together the main ideas arising out of the discussions in the different chapters of this thesis I have tried to trace the semantic histroy of dhvani, vyanjanā and rasa.

As to dhvani we saw that the meaning that is attached to it in works of poetics is not found, as far as my inquiry goes, in either early vedic literature or later. It is found in its usual sense of sound or making sound In this sense it is used as a synonym for sabda in the works of the vaiyākaranas, particularly in connection with Sphota This usage of the grammarians seems to have been taken up by the poeticists in their works But as dhvani suggests Sphota, similarly in a peem word and its meaning suggest something else and are on that analogy called dhvani When and by whom such a usage was made curret is not known Anyway, by the time of Ānandavardhana it seems to have been an established usage because his work is called Dhvanyāloka which, as we have seen, is devoted to the discussion of dhvani and vyañjanā It may be noted here that in some of the modern regional languages such as Gujarati, the word dhvani is used in the sense of purport or suggestion

Coming to vyanjana or vyañjanā we find that we do not find these verbal nouns used in the vedas But √añj and vi+√anj are frequently used

The meaning that we gather from this is interesting √Anj has the sense of anointing The survey of the occurrences of vi+√añj in the vedas shows two connected meanings viz, to bring out something hidden by applying some other thing, to brighten, to adorn, to decorate, to embellish, to manifest In this sense vynjana becomes something like alamkarana It has the sense almost of adding beauty or exhibiting it

The Nighantu and the Nirukta, as in case of the vedas, do not have any word like vyañjanā The Nighantu has not

even √añj or vi+√añj in any form The Nirukta contains occurrences of √añj in the sense of 'to anoint' In Nirukta we come across 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'indicator' In Ch I, *Yāska cites the opinion of Gārgya who holds that upasargas,* though not meaningful by themselves, are yet suggestive of (dyotakāh) the relation of nāma and ākhyāta Yāska does not mention 'dyotana' by name, but he seems to come very close to 'dyotana' here, which, however, is equivalent to '*vyanjana*' *of the later* ālamkārikas

In the Rk-prātis'ākhya we come across 'vyanjana' only *in the technical sense of a consonant* As *to why consonants* are called vyañjana is not explained But we may presume that they are so called because the consonants are indicated or made manifest by their relevant sound units

In Pānini's Astādhyāyī, we find 'vyanjana' used in a special sense in addition to the technical sense of a consonant In Pa II i.34, we have, 'vyanjanairupasikte', wherein 'vyañjana is something which serves to enhance the relish of the main item of food This usage extends the meaning of the word vyañjana to ingredients which add to the flavour of the original substance or bring out its original taste to a greater advantage. When Bharata (Na S'ā VI) while describing the nature of rasa gave the analogy of ṣādavādirasa and show the impor*tance of vyañjana, he might have had in his mind this idea* viz. that of ingredients enhancing or exhibiting the taste of the original substance. This has an important bearing on the relation of vyanjanā and rasa For Bharata vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin are ingredients which enhance or make manifest the taste of the sthāyins

How far this analogical application of vyañjana to rasa is responsible for the later relation of vyañjanā and rasa is difficult to say In the Mahābhāsya of Patañjali, we come across many occurrences of √añj and vi+√añj and also words such as

vyañjana We find vi+√añj in the sense of suggestion as in Mbh Pā VIII 1 70 line 15/page 381 (Mbh Ed Keilhorn)– ihāpi mandrasādhanā kriyāṅga vyajyate At Mbh Pa VIII 2 48 line 23 23/page 408 (Mbh Ed Keilhorn) we have vyanjana in the sense of 'prakāsana

Thus we learn from the earlier literature that vyañjana has the sense of decoration, decorator, indication indicator, consonant sounds suggesting or giving the inner meaning and ingredients enhancing or exhibiting to advantage the original taste of substance

From the study of the works of classical writers prior to Bhāmaha and Dandin such as Bhasa, Asvaghosa and Kalidasa, we find that the meanings of the earlier literature continue But in these works we also find the later sense of suggested meaning or suggestion or something other then directly expressed or cleary grasped e g Bu Ca IV 84 has 'upapannam idam vakyam sauhārdavyañjakam tvayi, wherein a vākya is said to be suggestive of sauharda or the feeling of friendship, or Megha (purva) 29 has–saubhagyam te subhaga virahāvasthayā vyañjayanti, wherein Nirvindhya suggests, by her state, the good luck of the cloud

In Saundarananda XVIII 11–we have vyanjana in the sense of alamkara We know that in Vamana the word alamkāra has two senses viz that of saundarya and a figure of speech It is not unlikely that the word vyañjana also had a sense similar to alamkāra i e beauty or beautifying agent and also the sense of suggestion The first sense of alamkāra seems to have gone out of usage but the second sense seems to have prevailed in sanskrit poetics Thus vyanjana in the sense used in sanskrit poetics seems to be current in the work of early classical writers

Thus with the earlier poets vyañjana seems to have been accepted as suggestion in poetry This naturally makes for the recognition of vyañjanā as one of the functions of a word Th

topic of the functions of words has to be studied through the discussions in the works of grammarians and other philosophical schools From these discussions the following points emerge Firstly as regards the relation between Sphota and dhvani, we can make the following, observations

(1) In the view of grammarians dhvani is explained as 'dhvanatiti dhvanih'. Dhvani is so termed because it sounds, or rings or reverberates *Sphota* The *word ghata, for example*, is *used for* the object ghata which is seen, touched, etc while the utterance of ghata is sound by itself This means that what is touched and seen is expressed through sound which is the function of hearing Thus dhvani came to have the meaning of suggesting one thing by another This import of dhvani was taken up in poetics as suggestion–vyañjanā in all its varied forms All the different *items that had the capacity to suggest something were regarded* as vyañjakas e g sabda, artha, pada, padāmsa varna and also guna, alamkāra, riti, vrtti, vākyaracana, prabandha as a whole etc

(2) In the philosophy of the grammarians the sound 'ghata' for example, does not give the meaning directly It does so through Sphota which in its turn is suggested by the sound ghata. Thus what we ordinarily call meaning is arrived at by an indirect process For the ālamkārikas also, the process of *vyangyārthagrahana is not direct but indirect We arrive at* the suggested sense either through abhidhā or through lakṣanā

(3) *The grammarians believe in* vākyasphota *They do not* accept the separate existence of padas *i e individual words*, and much less of letters or varnas But common experience of ordinary people misleads many to believe that the meaning is derived from individual words or padas and thus through letters or varnas The Mimāmsakas accept this position. It seems, however, that here ordinary people, and so also the Mimāmsakas, do not seem to pierce the veil of delusion and they mistake the nature of condition for the nature of the

contents The nature of the condition is the multiplicity of *letters, the nature of contents is the unity of word–the* vākyasphoṭa

Similar is the case with some ālamkārikas Abhidhā and lakṣaṇā form the nature of condition and vyañjanā or dhvani is the nature of the contents Those who fail to distinguish between ends and means, seem to confuse abhidhā and lakṣaṇā with vyañjnā

(4) To put it otherwise, for the grammarians, the letters may be taken just as what we may call the object of knowledge i e jñānasya viṣayah while the word–whole is jñānasya phalam–the result or the fruit of knowledge For the ālamkārikas also, abhidhā and lakṣaṇā are jnānasya viṣayah, while vyanjanā may be taken as jñānasya phalam These two are not to be confused

(5) The grammarians believe in vākyasphoṭa So they avoid the contingency faced by the padavādin viz that of recognising parts even of letters or varṇas Similarly those ālaṃkārikas who want to arrive at the vyaṅgyārtha with the help of lakṣaṇā, will have to go for a second lakṣaṇā, and a third and a fourth lakṣaṇā ad infinitum, involving further prayojanas

(6) Sphoṭa is a distinct entity by itself, not to be indentified with dhvani i e sound of a word The 'vyangya' is also *a separate* entity, not to be confused with abhidheyārtha or lakṣyārtha

(7) For the grammarians, there is a krama or sequence *in the process of* gathering meaning *from a word* From word to Sphoṭa and from Sphoṭa to meaning–this is the sequence In the same way with the ālaṃkārikas also, there is a sequence perceptible or imperceptible, between vācyārtha and vyaṅgyārtha

Ānandavardhana, Abhinavaguptapāda and Mammaṭa etc, while discussing this topic refer to the budhas, the wise men

who have taught this doctrine These budhas are Vaiyākaranas And they are, as we have seen, justified in making this remark

The second line of inquiry leads us into the consideration of sabdārthavṛttis in other schools of thought such as those represented by the Vaiyākaranas, Mimāmsakas, etc The points that emerge are as follows The vaiyakarana view, particularly as represented by Patanjali and Bhartrhari is as follows In Patanjali, we find the discussion of mukhyārtha and gaunārtha. But we do not come across any definition as such of abhidhā, gauni, laksanā or vyañjanā While discussing the gaunārtha or secondary sense, he mentions *four* different circumstances in which secondary function takes place Tātasthya or the relation of location, tāddharmya, or the relation of substance and quality, or function, sāmipya or the relation of proximity and sāhacarya or being together are mentioned under Pa. IV. I 48 We come across the term abhidhāna paving way for abhidhā vrtti In sādharmya relation as mentioned above, we find the material for gauni vṛtti and for lakṣanā we find material in other relations as mentioned above. No strict line of demarcation is laid between gauni and laksanā When we come to Bhartrhari, we find material which is the source of vyañjanā in the later ālaṃkārikas In the Mbh. nothing more definite for vyañjanā is noticed than already noted by us earlier.

Bhartṛhari not only mentions gauna and mukhya artha but also discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention (sanketa) with reference to more than one senseṣ, i e a word having multiple senses In his view, the particular meaning out of several is determined by factors such as context, time, place, etc (V P II 317-318) It is important to note that later ālaṃkārikas like Abhinava, Mammata, etc quote these very verses while explaining the abhidhāmūlā śābdi vyañjanā Now, the particular sense being fixed, others come to our mind,

according to the ālamkārikas with the help of vyañjan Bhartṛhari does not concern himself with the gathering of th extra sense He only discusses how a particular word, out the many conventional senses, is limited to convey only o sense at a time But it is exactly here that the ālamkārik begin where the grammarian has ended Thus the origin inspiration for vyanjana is supplied by the grammarian

Among the later grammarians, Nagesa was the first recommend the case of vyañjanā clearly

As for the Mimāṃsakas, we find in Jaimini and Saba clear references to abhidhā and laksanā We also come acro some varieties of laksana and dharma laksanā is also terme guṇavāda (Mi Su 1 2 10) Gunavāda is also found to b used in a wider connotation of upacāra or secondary applica tion in general Later Mimamsakas such as Kumarila an others mention the tātparya vṛtti also But, there seems to b no reference to vyañjanā as such

As for the Naiyāyikas the acceptance of abhidhā b Gotama and others is clearly indicated in the discussion samketagrahana (Nyā Su II 2 65) We also come across reference to the nature of secondary usage or upacāra in Nyā Su II 2 64 The Vatsyayanabhasya illustrates different varietie and also refers elsewhere to bhakti and bhākta artha But w do not come across any reference to vyañjanā as such

Later Naiyāyikas such as Gadādhara and Jagadisa are no inclined favourably towards vyañjanā which is just a ment cognition or mānasa bodha for them They accept words t be rūdha laksaka yogarudha and yaugika (Sa Sa Pra 16

The relevance of noting different views on sabdārthavṛtti in different schools of thought is that our earliest writers o

Bhāmaha seems to be quite familiar with abhidhā But as to his familiarity with functions of word other than the direct one, particularly vyanjana, we may say that vyañjanā does not find the same place as abhidhā in his mind i e he does not seem to have recognised vyanjana as a separate vṛtti He, however, uses vi+√anj with the later meaning of vyanjana at different places Similar is the case with Dandin who also mentions gaunavrtti in clear terms Vamana refers to lakṣanā but we miss any clear reference to vyanjanā in his writing It is in Udbhata that we come across a clear mention of 'avagamana' vrtti as distinct from vācyavācakavṛtti (IV 47) when he defines paryāyokta This avagamana vṛtti can vyanjanā In Rudrata, we come across only an indirect recognition of vyanjanā when he defines and illustrates bhāvālaṃkāra (VIII, 38-39)

Thus, it seems that the import of vyañjana was not unknown to the early poeticists, though they had not clearly recognised it

Ānandavardhana, Abhinava, Ruyyaka and *Jagannātha observe that the fact of dhvani, though not clearly so named,* was not unknown to the early poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc who tried to subsume it under different categories But I have tried to show that we do find an element of implicit sense in the treatment of various topics such as guna, alamkāra, etc by these authors, but it does not go to prove that they knew dhvani theory clearly and subsumed it knowingly under various heads

This may be the basis for the belief of Ānanda, Abhinava etc who observe that Bhāmaha, Dandin etc knew dhvani and subsumed it under different poetic categories The extent works of Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc however do not give proof of the fact that they recognised consciously and subsumed dhvani under various heads

Thus it is only in the Dhvanyāloka that we find the first sāstric discussion of śabdārthavṛttis giving a definite

status to vyanjana as one of the three sabdarthavṛttis In the discussion of the varieties of dhvani, Ānandavardhana gives mainly three viz vastudhvani, alamkāra dhvani and rasadhvani In poetry, however, vastu and alamkāra can be also conveyed by abhidhā and laksanā It is only rasa which is exclusively conyeyed by vyañjana It therefore seems that the clear recognition of rasa as the very essence of poetry necessitated the discussion as to how rasa, which is not conveyed directly, is conveyed The process of vyañjanā appeared to be the most satisfying process for the suggestion of rasa Thus the fact of rasa and the function of vyañjanā become interrelated, and hence the theory of vyanjanā and rasa has to be viewed as one For the proper understanding of this inter relation, an inquiry into the origin and development of the concept of rasa becomes desirable (3)

In the vedas we find rasa not only in the physical sense of something liquid, but also in the sense of sap in the plants, animals, etc, and also the juice that can be pressed out or extracted, taste etc In one context, Rv IX 67 31 and 32 we may be able to find some reference to a meaning similar to kāvyarasa There are the pāvmāni sūktas to be studied by the ṛsis Feeling of ecstasy or fulfilment is attached to rasa at Av X 8 44 Qualities as those of exhilaration, joy-giving, taste, flvaour etc. are also associated with rasa which thus becomes an objects of relish, a joy-giving essence These meanings make it very easy for the connoisseurs to utilise the word for the aesthetic flavour of sentiments and emotions as found in literature

In the Nā Sa (I, 17) rasa is associated with Av Rasa occurs very often in the AV but there is no clear case of later meaning of kāvyarasa or nātyarasa in it Abhinava tries to explain this connection in his own way But I have suggested that probably a better link can be sought in the love-charms, which are as many as 33, and which can be safely taken as beautiful love lyrics, their ritualistic application notwithstanding

The Taittiriya Up. contains the famous utterance in which rasa is said to be the soul of the universe and which, on attainment, results in highest joy. This also can be taken as an original inspiration for later theorists

In the Nighantu, Nirukta, and Bṛhaddevatā, we have nothing new to take a note of with reference to rasa. Pāṇini's use (V. 2 95) of rasa is not very clear But the Mbh supplies some interesting data On Pā V 2 95, Patañjali has the following discussion He tries to justify this sūtra when preceding sutra to the same effect is already there A possible answer suggested is that this sūtra is mentioned in order to exclude the use of other matup suffixes Patañjali illustrates other matvarthiya suffixes as in 'rasiko naṭaḥ', 'urvasi vai rūpiṇi apsarasām' etc Kāsikā and Tattvabodhini on the Siddhāntakaumudi make it clear that here 'rasa' in 'rasiko naṭaḥ' and 'rūpa' in 'rūpiṇi' do not stand for sense qualities to be perceived by the corresponding sense of taste and sight, but for aesthetic taste and beauty respectively Thus it is in the Mbh of Patañjali that we first find a clear mention of rasa in 'rasiko naṭaḥ' in the later sense of the Nā Sā Naturally the usage must have been much older for Patanjali to give it as an illustration

'Rasa' in the early classical poets such as Bhāsa, Asvaghosa and Kālidasa, has the sense of taste. The authors lived before 500 A D and the Nā Sā, of Bharata which is placed between 300-500 A D may be regarded as familiar with these poets or with such other works Whatever it may be, in the Nā Śā we find the theory of rasa crystallised into a sūtra This naturally presupposes previous discussions on the subject Whether the discussion on the nature of rasa started in the schools of dramaturgy or in earlier naṭasutras mentioned by Pāṇini, we have no means of giving a definite opinion As in case of vyañjanā, the earlier poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc seem to be aware of rasa and bring it under alaṃkāra guṇa and It is

only in Dhv. that like vyañjanā rasa gets full recognition and is taken as the very essence or soul of poetry

Thus in Dhv we find a full exposition of the theory of rasa, particularly the nature of conveying rasa. We saw that according to Ānanda, rasa can be conveyed only through vyañjanā In the Nāṭyavedavivṛti and the Locana by Abhinavaguptapadācarya, we find other theories of the process of rasa realisation such as those represented by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrī, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, etc It seems that Ānanda had all these theories before him in their embrionic form and he tried to establish that it is only vyañjanā that can convey rasa Abhinava elaborated this point by giving in the pūrva-pakṣa the views of different thinkers and refuting them and finally establishing the vyañjana process as the exclusive process for rasa realisation

However, there were still others who tried to disagree from Ānanda Dhanañjaya, like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka seems to maintain bhavyabhavaka relation with reference to rasa and kāvya, while Kuntaka has vicitrā abhidhā, rasa being a form of vakrokti in the wider sense of the term and Mahimā tries to revive the anumitivada In Bhoja we find a different trend He has a novel approach and tries to correlate rasa-abhimāna-ahamkāra-śṛṅgara, with the sāmkhya trend of thought in its background (see also Bhojavṛtti on Patañjala sūtra I 6 P 6, and II 6 P 18- ed Ānandāsrama series) Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra also strike a different note though the traditional views of Ānanda and Abhinava ultimately gain ground and are firmly reestablished in the hands of Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha

The mental process which enables one to experience rasa can not be really separated from the experience itself as said above It may be analytically separated for the purpose of discussion But in fact it is one unitary whole It is for this reason that we have to consider the theory of the process of rasa and the experience of rasa as one It is for this very

reason that the view that one holds about the process of rasa affects the theory regarding the nature of the experience of rasa and vice-versa The consideration of this aspect is essential for the understanding of the nature of rasa We have there fore to consider the different views on rasa experience from this point of view also (As noted earlier in the earlier vedic literature rasa is something liquid It is flavour in the mouth, sense of taste etc On the other side, it is the juicy extract of something, the essence of a thing In the Taittiriya Upanisad we find that the ātman which is the supreme reality of the universe is also the essence of the universe—raso vai sah–) In sanskrit literature on one side we find the different meanings of rasa given in Amarakosa and other laxicons continue On the other side, however we find that right from the time of Patanjali and probably even earlier, the term rasa is in use for non material flavour or taste i e in its aesthetic sense In 'rasiko natah' as noted earlier, we find the word rasa used in this sense. When the word rasa is used in early poetry, it appears in this sense of literary or artistic flavour.

In the period of the Na Sā and even in earlier ages the nature of rasa seems to have been a subject of great and varied discussion The Nā Sā has crystalised it in form of sutra viz. "vibhāvanubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogādrasanispattih' (Na Sā Ch 6) The explanation given in the Nā Sā shows that rasa is a resultent of many things, technically of vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva It is explained on the analogy of sadavādirasa It is accompanied by a feeling of joy But any resultant of various ingredients is not rasa in the Nā Sa The sentiments and the emotions, the sthāyibhāvas and the vyabhicāris, sāttvikabhāvas and their expressions anubhāvas that are part and parcel of the human mind are experienced as rasa

To put it in another way, one may say that rasa is a taste of sentiments and emotions as they ooze out from the cognitive

he belonged to the school of Kashmir Śaivism We have tried to suggest that excepting the case of Abhinavagupta who was a philosopher of the Pratyabhijña School of Kashmir Saivism, nothing definite can be said of other ācāryas As nirvighnā samvit and camatkāra play the central role In Abhinava's philosophy of rasa, their technical meanings have to be understood from a consideration of them in the pratybhijñā school

Abhinavagupta has said in the verses preceding his discussion that his is an attempt not to find fault with the teaching of the previous ācaryas but to put them in clearer and purer form This is not merely an expression of modesty on his part If we analyse the different threads in the web of Abhinava s final statement, we will see in them the opinion of the previous ācaryas put in a more acceptable position *The sahṛdaya who only has the capacity to aperceive rasa is well informed* about the *relation of things* and events, and the sentiments, emotions and feeling that they arouse in life This ingredient in rasa preception comes from, we may say, Lolatta The element in rasa preception of the swiftness with which a sahrdaya, witnessing a drama or reading a poem, infers from the spactacle, the appropriate emotions, comes from Sri Sankuka Sri Śankuka also by invoking the citraturaganyāya frees the presentation in a poem of drama from the limitations of reality which would necessitate the judgement about the truth or falsehood or the doubtfulness or similarity of the poetic fact with life In other words, Śri Sankuka takes poetic creation out of the field of gross reality

The universality in the perception of rasa comes from the sādhāranikarana of Bhatta Nāyaka *In rasa perception one* is not troubled by the intrution of the *egoistic impulses of* myness, thyness or hisness This makes it possible for the sahṛdaya to see a sthāyibhāva in its unversality, free from these obstrusions This makes for the heightening of pure consciousness sattvodreka-which is joy itself

Abhinava weaves in his theory all these ideas freeing them from logical blemishes. Abhinava accepts from Bhatta Nāyaka his sādhāraṇīkaraṇa vyāpāra, but not his idea of bhoga. In his view vibhāvādis are adequate for the manifestation–vyakti–of rasa. The contemplation of the vibhāvādis is compared to chewing. Thus contemplative chewing yields rasa. But the activity of chewing and the experience of rasa are, so to say, pari passu.

Jagannātha accepts this view but substitutes vedāntic terminology. He calls it 'bhagnāvaraṇā cit' and equates rasa with the experience of the highest reality, quoting 'raso, vai saḥ'.

We have already seen that though Dhanañjaya and Dhanika do not accept the theory of vyañjanā, yet they regard the experience of all rasas as joyful Bhoja also regards the experience of all the rasas as joyful But Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, and later on Siddhicandra in his commentary on K. P. called Kāvyaprakāśakhaṇḍana, follow a different tradition They take the realistic view that the sentiments, emotions and feelings, not pleasant in life, cannot be pleasent, because they are conveyed through poetry. We do not know whether Lollaṭa who is a realist held this view But it is quite consistant for those who do not distinguish between the nature of the experience, in ordinary life, of sentiments, emotions and feelings from their cognition in poetry and art, to hold such a view.

Most of the theorists in Sanskrit poetics have adopted the view of lokottaratā in poetic experience. In fact it is by the suppression of the conetive side of the ego that the rasa experience becomes possible. Bhoja however regards ahaṃkāra and abhimāna as central to rasa. As already noted in his view a nāyaka, according to the type of his abhimāna or ahaṃkāra, is able to experience the relevant rasa. e g. dhīralalita enjoys kāma śṛṅgāra, dhīroddhata enjoys artha śṛṅgāra, dharma śṛṅgāra

is enjoyed by a gṛhastha with his wedded wife, etc (Śṛ Pra, Chs 18, 19, 20)

In Bhoja's philosophy there are three stages of rasa viz parā, or (पूर्वा), madhyamā and uttarā For him the traditional understanding of rasas comes in the madhyamā koti His highest stage of uttarā koti is the experience of preman rasa

We have seen that Bharata regards eight only as the nāṭya-rasas But we find the ninth rasa viz sānta, even in the Nā Śā, whether as a later addition or the view of a different school we are unable to say In any case, the experience of sānta rasa carries a man beyond the aesthetic stage as such In it he comes back to life, where however, the ego and its passion are calmed down This is the life of an unworldly man If the suppression of egoistic passions is the condition of rasa, sānta is also rasa But because it is a part of his life, it does not reach the aesthetic or imaginative stage The rasika of Bhoja who has the highest preman-rasa is in a way similar to this but different in as much as his view goes beyond the aesthetic sānta rasa to the state of preman-great love This imperceptibly carries us in to Bhakti rasa It is both imaginative and aesthetic in its nature as well as real for the Bhakta There is so much genuine poetry in the songs of the Bhakta which is a reality as far as Bhaktas are concerned

The work of Rūpaghosvāmi viz Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu and Ujjvalanilamaṇi illustrate this development Haṃsavilāsa, the Sanskrit work of the Gujarati poet Mittu (18 th Cen) also illustrates this development in a new way

We thus find in the rasa theorists an attempt to grapple with the type of experience which in poetry and art, using the material of life, yet takes them beyond life's egoistic limitations and in certain cases makes their very life free from such limitations Thus rasa is a spiritual experience and we find it illustrated in the history of Indian culture, wherein poetry, art and religion move together

Foot-notes

(1) Editions (1) A Barooah, Calcutta 1884 (2) by Vireśvara, Sastri, Benaras 1888 (chs iv and v) (3) by Jivanand Vidhyasagar with Com. of Ratnesvara (on chs i–iii), Calcutta 1894, (4) by Kedarnath Durgaprasad and Vasudev L Pansikar, Nirnaya Sagar Press, with Comm of Ratnesvara (on chs i–iii), and of Jagaddhara (on iv), Bombay 1925, 1934 Our references are to this

(2) This classification seems to be based upon the different types of marriage

(3) It may be noted here that Gnoli in his learned introduction mentions only rasa as dhvani proper

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Vijñānabhairava

Vaiyākaranabhūsanasāra-Kondabhaṭṭa.

ABBREVIATIONS

Abhı Sā -Abhıjñana Sānkuntala
A bh -Abhınavabbaratı
A V M -Abhıdhāvṛttımātrkā
Av -Atharvaveda
B O R I Bhandarkar Orıental Research Institute
Bu Ca -Buddha Carıta
Dhv Dhvanyāloka
D R Daśarupaka of Dhanañjaya
G O S Gaekwad s Orıental Serıes
K P -Kavyaprakasa of Mammata
Kumara-Sam -Kumārasambhava
Mālavıkā -Malavıkagnımıtram
Mbh-Mahābhāṣya of Patanjalı
Megha Meghaduta
Mı Sū Mımāmsā Sūtras
Nā Śa-Nāṭyasāstra
Pa Panını
Pā Su Panını Sutra
Pratıjña -Pratijñāyagandharāyana
Pratıma Pratımanātaka
Rv -Ṛgveda
Rk-Prā Ṛkprātıśākhya
Raghu -Raghuvamsa
Sau -Saundarananda
Sā -Sāyana
S B -Sābarabhāṣya on Mımāṃsā Sūtras
S K A -Sarasvatı Kanthābharana of Bhoja
Śṛ Pra -Sṛangāra Prakāsa of Bhoja
Svapna -Svapnavāsavadattam
Sv -Samaveda
Vıkramo -Vıkramorvasıya
V P -Vākyapadıya

V J –Vakroktijivita of Kuntaka.
Vy V Vyaktiviveka of Mahima.
Yv –Yajurveda

वे सू वेदान्तसूत्र
न्या सू.–न्यायसूत्र
मी सू मीमांसा सूत्र
सा द –साहित्यदर्पण of विश्वनाथ
दुर्ग–दुर्गाचार्य on निरुक्त
श श प्र –शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका
वै सू –वैशेषिक सूत्र
शाबर भा –शाबरभाष्य
व्य वि.–व्यक्तिविवेक
व जी –वक्रोक्तिजीवित

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